Burden v. The Incorporated Village of Port Jefferson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2:29 pm, Mar  24, 2023

X U.S. DISTRICT COURT

TIMOTHY BURDEN, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND

ORDER

v. 21-CV-4967 (GRB)(SIL)

THE INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF PORT

JEFFERSON, JAMES MURDOCCO,

MARGOT GARANT, AND DARA MARTIN-

ORLANDO,

Defendants.

X

GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Timothy Burden brings this Section 1983 action against the Incorporated Village

of Port Jefferson, Mayor Margot Garant, local prosecutor Dara Martin-Orlando, and officer James

Murdocco for slander and violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments

of the US Constitution. Defendants move to dismiss. For the following reasons, defendants’

motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Facts

According to the amended complaint, Timothy Burden is a resident of Port Jefferson

Village (“Village”). Docket Entry (‘DE 19”), Am. Compl., ¶ 8. In August 2018, Burden observed

two people parked in an unmarked vehicle in front of his residence. Id., ¶ 14. Defendant James

Murdocco, who Burden now knows to be a Village Code Enforcement Officer, was inside the

vehicle. Id., ¶¶ 12, 16. Dressed in plain clothes, Murdocco was wearing a badge and a firearm in

a holster attached to his belt. Id., ¶¶ 17, 19. Murdocco stepped out and told Burden that he was a

Village employee. Id., ¶¶ 17, 19. When Burden asked Murdocco to produce identification,

Murdocco refused and spoke with Burden about his property. Id., ¶¶ 20-21. Repeatedly, Burden

asked Murdocco to produce identification and Murdocco refused. Id., ¶ 22. Each time Murdocco

asked a question about Burden’s residence, he got angrier with Burden’s lack of responses. Id., ¶

23. As the conversation became more heated, Murdocco appeared to brandish his hip where his

pistol was located while putting his hand near the grip, calling attention to the weapon. Id., ¶ 24.

Burden’s brother, who was inside Burden’s home and witnessing the events unfold, called Burden

and told him that he would call the police. Id., ¶ 25. Burden then told Murdocco that the police

were on their way, and he would wait inside. Id., ¶ 26. Motioning his hand near his gun, Murdocco

loudly ordered Burden to stay on the street. Id., ¶ 27. When the Suffolk County police officer

arrived, Murdocco showed the police officer his Village identification and explained what had

occurred. Id., ¶¶ 34-37. The police officer did not arrest Burden. Id., ¶ 38. Murdocco said, in

sum and substance, that he did not care if Burden did not violate any law; he was writing Burden

a ticket so that he would have to go to court and pay a fine. Murdocco wrote a ticket charging

Burden with disorderly conduct. Id., ¶¶ 39-40.

In October 2018, Village Justice Court Judge Tara Higgins arraigned Burden for disorderly

conduct under Village Code § 181-6 (A & B). Id., ¶ 45. The prosecutor, defendant Dara Martin-

Orlando, did not provide Burden with a Huntley notice.1 Id., ¶ 46. Despite announcing readiness

for trial at arraignment, the Justice Court adjourned trial to November. Id., ¶ 47. The complaint

conclusorily alleges that defendant Mayor Margot Garant directed Judge Higgins to find Burden

guilty and delay the verdict as a further punitive step. Id., ¶ 48.

1 “In New York, a Huntley hearing is held if the prosecution intends to offer a defendant’s confession. If the

confession is challenged, a hearing is held in which the prosecution has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that a defendant's statement was voluntary. See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72 (1965).” Thomas v. Lord,

396 F.Supp.2d 327, 335–36 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

In November 2018, Judge Higgins held a bench trial. Id., ¶ 55. At trial, Judge Higgins

allowed Burden’s statements into evidence over his objections that the statements were a violation

of New York State Criminal Procedure Law Section 710.302 and the Fifth Amendment of the US

Constitution. Id., ¶ 57. Judge Higgins then adjourned the case for 364 days before ordering Burden

to return to court. Id., ¶ 63. In November 2019, Judge Higgins found Burden guilty and fined

him $250. Id., ¶ 65. After trial, but before rendering a decision and sentencing Burden, Judge

Higgins stated, in sum and substance, that she was under direct orders from the mayor to find

Burden guilty despite any lack of evidence or constitutional defenses, and to delay the verdict for

a year to teach him a lesson. Id., ¶ 71. Plaintiff paid the $250 fine. Id., ¶ 72.

In July 2021, a state appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction because the “Court

failed to render its verdict until 342 days after conducting a bench trial lasting barely over an hour,

and this court can discern no excuse or explanation for this nearly one-year delay.” People v.

Burden, 72 Misc. 3d 134(A) (N.Y. App. Term. 2021). Soon after the appellate court’s decision,

Murdocco made public statements, in sum and substance, that Burden was a dangerous person

who had violated numerous laws and Village Codes and that all Code Enforcement Officers had

to be on duty next time Justice Court was in session in order to protect court personnel from

Burden. DE 19, ¶ 80.

In August 2021, Burden requested a refund of the $250. To date, it has not been refunded.

Id., ¶¶ 86-87.

Procedural History

2 ”Whenever the people intend to offer at a trial (a) evidence of a statement made by a defendant to a public servant,

which statement if involuntarily made would render the evidence thereof suppressible upon motion pursuant to

subdivision three of section 710.20, or (b) testimony regarding an observation of the defendant either at the time or

place of the commission of the offense or upon some other occasion relevant to the case, to be given by a witness

who has previously identified him or her or a pictorial, photographic, electronic, filmed or video recorded

reproduction of him or her as such, they must serve upon the defendant a notice of such intention, specifying the

evidence intended to be offered.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.30.

In September 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants in this Court. DE 1. In

April 2022, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss as unopposed and on the merits, and

granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Electronic Order dated April 29, 2022.

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint making nearly identical factual allegations, but dropped

Judge Higgins as a defendant and added Mayor Garant and local prosecutor Martin. Compare DE

1 with DE 19. In May 2022, the defendants filed a pre-motion conference letter asking the Court

for leave to file a renewed motion to dismiss. DE 17. The Court deemed the motion made, and

plaintiff filed an opposition. Electronic Order dated May 20, 2022; DE 18.

Standard of Review

Motions to dismiss are decided under the well-established standard of review for such

matters, as discussed in Burris v. Nassau County District Attorney, No. 14-5540 (JFB) (GRB),

2017 WL 9485714, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL 1187709 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 29, 2017), and incorporated by reference herein. The gravamen of that standard is whether,

assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true, the complaint sets forth sufficient factual

material to render the claims plausible.

Legal Standards

Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for

redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d

Cir. 1993). To maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) acted

under color of state law (2) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the Constitution or

federal law. See id.

Discussion

The facts alleged in the amended complaint are materially the same as those in the initial

complaint which was already dismissed, see Electronic Order dated April 29, 2022; the main

difference in the documents consists of the substitution of certain defendants who have not been

served.3 Thus, the amended complaint is similarly subject to dismissal on many of the same

grounds previously ruled on. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, the Court now examines the

grounds upon which defendants move to dismiss.

First Amendment Claims

Count One alleges that charging Burden for disorderly conduct represented retaliation for

plaintiff’s exercise of his right to free speech. “A plaintiff asserting a First Amendment retaliation

claim must establish that: (1) his speech or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the

defendant took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between this

adverse action and the protected speech.” Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 172 (2d

Cir. 2015) (quoting Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. School Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2011)).

As “the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed

at police officers,” City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987), “the Second Circuit has held

3 Plaintiff admits that they have not served the new defendants named in the Amended Complaint, Mayor Garant

and local prosecutor Martin. See DE 18 at 1. Plaintiff offers no explanation other than that they “have never before

seen or heard about a municipality that demanded or encouraged the personal service of a summons upon any of its

municipal employees who are to be indemnified.” DE 18 at 1. Thus, under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the action is dismissed as to defendants Garant and Martin because they were not served within 90 days

after the filing of the amended complaint. Moreover, even if Martin were properly served, any claims against him

would fail because “a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a

criminal prosecution is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d

231, 236 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). As to the conclusory allegations of a conspiracy among the defendants,

see DE 19, ¶¶ 88–89, these claims are barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. See Broich v Inc. Village of

Southampton, 650 F. Supp 2d 234, 246–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).

that speech directed at police officers is protected unless it is ‘likely to produce a clear and present

danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or

unrest.’” Barkai v. Mendez, No. 21-CV-4050 (KMK), 2022 WL 4357923, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

20, 2022) (quoting Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 1999)). The

causal element requires but-for causation and the “plaintiff[] [must] plead and prove the absence

of probable cause” or “present[] objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly

situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.” Nieves v.

Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722–23, 1727 (2019).

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s First Amendment claim fails because Murdocco had

probable cause to charge Burden with disorderly conduct and Burden fails to allege with specificity

what was said to Murdocco. DE 17 at 2.

The Village’s disorderly conduct code provides that:

No person shall indulge in disorderly, noisy or disturbing conduct within the Village. Any

person who commits any of the following acts will be considered in violation of this article

if said person:

A. Uses or indulges in offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language,

conduct or behavior.

B. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct or be offensive to

others.

Village Code § 181-6 (A & B). Under New York law, “a person may be guilty of disorderly

conduct only when the situation extends beyond the exchange between the individual disputants

to a point where it becomes a potential or immediate public problem.” People v. Weaver, 16

N.Y.3d 123, 128 (2011) (alterations omitted). “In assessing whether an act carries public

ramifications, relevant factors to consider are the time and place of the episode under scrutiny; the

nature and character of the conduct; the number of other people in the vicinity; whether they are

drawn to the disturbance and, if so, the nature and number of those attracted; and any other relevant

circumstances.” Id. at 128.

Assuming the allegations in the amended complaint are true, plaintiff makes out a plausible

First Amendment claim. It is plausible that Burden’s words and conduct were protected speech

because, unless likely to pose a clear and present danger, even provocative speech toward an

officer is protected under the First Amendment. See Posr, 180 F.3d at 415, 418–19 (statement to

court officer that “One day you’re gonna get yours” may be protected under the First Amendment).

Although defendants argue that Burden fails to allege what was said to Murdocco verbatim, the

allegations are sufficiently specific to make out a plausible claim. In terms of speech, the Amended

Complaint alleges Burden refused to answer Murdocco’s questions regarding his property, asked

Murdocco to produce identification, and told Murdocco the police were coming – all without

making any threats. DE 19, ¶¶ 20, 23, 26, 32. As explained, these assertions are sufficient to make

out a plausible claim under the standard set forth in Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d

409, 415 (2d Cir. 1999).

With regards to causation, plaintiff alleges that Murdocco said he did not care if Burden

did not violate any law. DE 19, ¶¶ 39, 43. These allegations plausibly establish but-for causation

between the adverse action and the protected speech. See Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d

229, 233, 242 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding an adequately alleged retaliatory motive where an officer

told plaintiff “I’m going to teach you a lesson”). Although normally a conviction is conclusive

evidence of probable cause which would negate the causal element, the conviction here cannot

support that inference because it was reversed on appeal. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852

(2d Cir. 1996) (“[a] conviction that has been reversed on appeal is no evidence of the existence of

probable cause[.]”). According to the amended complaint, Burden merely asked Murdocco to

produce identification and refused to answer Murdocco’s questions about his residence. DE 19,

¶¶ 20, 23. Neither the defendants nor this Court can find any case standing for the proposition that

merely refusing to answer an officer’s questions and asking him to produce identification provide

probable cause for a disorderly conduct charge. Compare Weaver, 16 N.Y.3d at 126–29 (evidence

was sufficient to support disorderly conduct conviction where defendant yelled obscenities at his

wife and police officer in the vicinity of a parking lot) with Posr, 180 F.3d at 415, 418–19

(statement to court officer that “One day you’re gonna get yours” is not probable cause for

disorderly conduct arrest). Finally, defendants do not contest that charging Burden with disorderly

conduct constituted an adverse action. Thus, plaintiff has satisfactorily pleaded a plausible First

Amendment retaliation claim.

False Arrest

Count Two alleges that defendants detained and charged plaintiff without probable cause

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. “A § 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth

Amendment right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without

probable cause is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Weyant,

101 F.3d at 852 (citation omitted). “To state a claim for false arrest under New York law, a plaintiff

must show that (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious

of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement

was not otherwise privileged.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

A person is “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes “when [an] officer, by means of

physical force or show of authority, . . . in some way restrain[s] the liberty of a citizen.” Salmon

v. Blesser, 802 F.3d 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).

“To explain when a sufficient ‘show of authority’ effects restraint, the Supreme Court has relied

on a totality-of-the-circumstances test, asking whether a reasonable person would believe that he

was ‘not free to leave.’” Id. (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)). However, “this

objective requirement ‘states a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for seizure[.]’” United

States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.

621, 628 (1991)). “Whether conduct constitutes submission to police authority will depend ... on

the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” United States v. Huertas, 864 F.3d 214, 216

(2d Cir. 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As such, “conduct that amount[s]

to evasion of police authority is not submission.” Id.

Plaintiff’s false arrest claim fails because there was no Fourth Amendment “seizure.”

According to the amended complaint, when Burden told Murdocco that the police were on their

way, Murdocco ordered Burden to stay on the street and motioned his hand near his gun. DE 19,

¶¶ 25–27. A Suffolk County police officer then arrived and refused to charge Burden. Id. ¶ 38.

Although Burden stayed per Murdocco’s order, this occurred after Burden had his brother call the

police about Murdocco. By directing the call to the police, Burden’s conduct was an evasion of –

not a submission to – Murdocco’s authority. See Huertas, 864 F.3d at 216–17 (suspect who

“remain[ed] still and answer[ed] questions . . . to quiet suspicion . . . [before he] ran” was evading

police authority); Stevens v. Vill. of Red Hook, No. 20 CV 08152 (NSR), 2022 WL 11970629, at

*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2022) (finding no submission to authority to support a Fourth Amendment

seizure where the officers left plaintiff’s home after she called a retired judge who advised she was

not required to let the officers inside or take her into custody). Because Burden did not submit to

Murdocco’s show of authority, there was no Fourth Amendment seizure. Burden’s later

arraignment and criminal trial also are not cognizable “seizures” under the Fourth Amendment.

See Lacey v. Yates Cnty., 30 F. Supp. 3d 213, 225 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (“An appearance in a local

criminal court, even when required pursuant to a criminal summons, does not amount to

confinement that will support a false arrest claim.”); Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir.

2010) (“issuance of a pre-arraignment, non-felony summons requiring a later court appearance,

without further restrictions, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure”). Accordingly,

Burden’s false arrest claim is dismissed.

Speedy Trial

Counts Six and Seven allege that defendants violated plaintiff’s right to a speedy trial and

due process of law by intentionally delaying his guilty verdict for a year. “The Sixth Amendment’s

Speedy Trial Clause homes in on the . . . period[] from arrest or indictment through conviction.

The constitutional right . . . does not attach until . . . a defendant is arrested or formally accused.”

Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 441 (2016). A speedy trial claim is evaluated using a four-

part balancing test that takes into consideration the: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay,

the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Tigano,

880 F.3d 602, 611–12 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).

“Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found post-accusation

delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.” Doggett v. United States,

505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992). With regards to the reason for delay, “Barker established a spectrum

of weights, in which ‘deliberate’ attempts to delay trial weighed most heavily against the

government.” Tigano, 880 F.3d at 612. The last factor, prejudice, is the most serious and “should

be assessed in regard to those interests the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is designed to

protect, namely, ‘(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and

concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’” Id. at

618 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). “[N]one of the four factors . . . [are] either a necessary or

sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S.

at 533. “Rather, they . . . must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be

relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult

and sensitive balancing process.” Id.

The Court finds that plaintiff has not pled a plausible speedy trial claim. Plaintiff was

arraigned in Village’s Justice Court in October 2018, only two months after Murdocco issued him

a ticket for disorderly conduct, and the following month Judge Higgins held a bench trial.

Inexplicably, “the Justice Court failed to render its verdict until 342 days” later, in a case where

“there were no complicated issues [and] no posttrial submissions or administrative impediments

to the prompt rendering of a verdict.” Burden, 72 Misc. 3d 134(A) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). Allegedly, after trial, but before rendering a decision, Judge Higgins stated that

she was under direct orders from the mayor to delay the verdict for a year to “teach him a lesson.”

DE 19, ¶ 71. Nonetheless, Burden did not object to an adjournment when the court informed him

that it would reserve decision and mail it to him later. Burden, 72 Misc. 3d 134(A). Defendant

has not identified any prejudice such as pretrial incarceration, the impairment of a defense, or even

anxiety as a result of the nearly year-long gap between the trial and Judge Higgins’ decision. In

addition to the lack of prejudice and Burden’s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial, the

relatively minor nature of the disorderly conduct charges and modest fine also weigh in favor of

finding no speedy trial violation. See Davis v. Nassau Cnty., No. 06-CV-4762 ADS WDW, 2011

WL 5401663, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2011) (dismissing Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim

where trial for traffic violation was set three years later). Thus, upon consideration of the relevant

factors and in light of all the circumstances, the Court finds Burden’s speedy trial claim

implausible.

As “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized[] that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment ‘has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay,’” United States v.

Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789

(1977)), Burden’s due process claim premised upon the delay in securing his conviction fails as

well. Also falling under the rubric of due process is Count Eight’s claim that defendants refused

to refund plaintiff his $250 fine. “[I]nsofar as Appellant . . . rais[es] a due process claim based on

the defendants’ failure to refund a prepaid fine after Appellant successfully challenged his

[conviction],” Burden’s claim must fail “because a post-deprivation remedy was available, in the

form of an Article 78 mandamus proceeding.” De Asis v. New York City Police Dep’t, 352 F.

App’x 517, 518 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing New York State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d

156, 168 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Fair Trial and Fifth Amendment

Counts Three and Four allege that the failure of defendants to serve plaintiff a Huntley

notice, offering statements plaintiff allegedly made to defendants, and defendants’ failure to

sustain plaintiff’s evidentiary objections at trial violated both his right to a fair trial and his right

against self-incrimination. It is well established that “a violation of state law is not cognizable

under § 1983.” Pollnow v. Glennon, 757 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1985). Thus, Counts Three and

Four fail insofar as they are based off alleged state law violations. Insofar as Burden’s claims are

based upon the Fifth Amendment, they must fail as well because Burden has not alleged he was

coerced into making any statements. See Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 346

(2d Cir. 1998) (“The key inquiry for Fifth Amendment purposes is whether the statement

introduced in a judicial proceeding was obtained . . . by coercion—an inquiry determined by the

totality of the circumstances[.]”). Plaintiff’s last fair trial claim under Count Five asserts that he

was found guilty without evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “A defendant’s right to a

fair trial is violated when exculpatory evidence is withheld, i.e., when a Brady violation occurs . .

. , and also when an officer forwards fabricated evidence to prosecutors[.]” Ying Li v. City of New

York, 246 F.Supp.3d 578, 626 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);

Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997)). Because plaintiff has failed to allege

either a Brady violation or the fabrication of evidence, plaintiff’s fair trial claim fails.

Slander

Count Nine asserts a claim against Murdocco for slander. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s

defamation claim fails because “he does not assert non-conclusory, plausible factual assertions as

to how the alleged defamatory statements were made, to whom, when and where, nor even does

plaintiff specify what the defamatory comments were other than be indicating ‘in sum and

substance.’” DE 17 at 3. Plaintiff’s response fails to address the defamation claim. See DE 18.

As such, the Court will deem plaintiff’s defamation claim abandoned. See Laface v. E. Suffolk

BOCES, No. 2:18-CV-01314(ADS)(AKT), 2019 WL 1959489, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019) (“In

the Second Circuit, ‘[a] plaintiff’s failure to respond to contentions raised in a motion to dismiss

claims constitute an abandonment of those claims.’”) (collecting cases).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2023

Central Islip, New York

__/s/ Gary R. Brown_______________

HON. GARY R. BROWN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE