Machado v. Hershey Entertainment and Resorts Company

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LONG ISLAND OFFICE

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LINDA MACHADO and FABIAN MACHADO,

Plaintiffs,

-against- ORDER

21-CV-6434 (JMA) (ST)

HERSHEY ENTERTAINMENT AND RESORTS

COMPANY and PENN STATE HEALTH –

WILLIAM H. HERSHEY MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendants.

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AZRACK, United States District Judge:

Before the Court are motions filed by Defendants Hershey Entertainment and Resorts

(“HERC”) and Penn State Health Milton S. Hershey Medical Center1 (the “Medical Center” and

together with HERC, “Defendants”) that seek dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”), or in the alternative,

to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (ECF Nos. 22 & 23 (Defendants’ Motions)).

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts, set forth in the Complaint and the attached exhibits, are presumed true

for purposes of Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Linda Machado (“Linda”) and Fabian Machado (“Fabian” and together with

Linda, the “Machados” or “Plaintiffs”) are a married couple who reside in Huntington, New York.

(See Complaint (“Compl.”) ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 5-7).

1 The Complaint incorrectly captions the Medical Center as “Penn State Health – William H. Hershey

Medical Center.”

Both Defendants are Pennsylvania companies2 with their principal places of business in

Hershey, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.) HERC owns, operates, and manages multiple entertainment

and lodging facilities in Hershey, Pennsylvania – including Hershey Park and the Hershey Hotel

– that are open to, and patronized by “residents of New York and residents of other states within

the United States.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 8-9.) The Medical Center owns, operates, and manages a hospital

that, according to Plaintiffs “is an adjunct medical facility affiliated with [HERC].” (Id. ¶ 4.)

On the Hershey Hotel’s property is a restaurant and bar known as the Harvest Restaurant

(“Harvest”), which is accessible by a sidewalk allegedly owned, operated, and maintained by

HERC. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) On or about August 30, 2021, Linda tripped and fell while walking on the

sidewalk towards Harvest. (Id. ¶ 12.) As a result, Linda sustained a concussion and a gash above

her left eye, necessitating her immediate transfer to the Medical Center. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 19.)

Notwithstanding her injuries, the Medical Center allegedly “did not treat [Linda], who was

confined to a hospital bed and discharged the following day after spending eleven hours in an

emergency room and complaining of lack of treatment.” (Id. ¶ 20.) This failure allegedly resulted

in scarring and disfigurement, which will require corrective plastic surgery. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Based on the above, Plaintiffs initiated this action in the New York Supreme Court, Suffolk

County, on September 24, 2021. (See Compl.) The Complaint asserts negligence claims on

Linda’s behalf and loss of consortium claims on Fabian’s behalf. (Id.) In total, Plaintiffs seek

approximately $2.6 million in damages. (Id.) On or about November 18, 2021, HERC removed

the lawsuit to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (See generally ECF No. 1.)3 On May 10,

2 While the Complaint generally refers to each Defendants as a “company,” it does not specify either

Defendant’s actual corporate structure (i.e. – corporation, partnership, limited liability company, etc.).

3 Counsel for HERC inadvertently filed the Notice of Removal on behalf of both Defendants, but in a

November 24, 2021 letter motion to the Court pursuant to Local Rule 1.4, clarified the inadvertent action and sought

leave to withdraw on behalf of the Medical Center. (See ECF No. 7.) Notwithstanding the inadvertent action on behalf

of both Defendants, the Medical Center did not object to the removal.

2022, this Court directed the parties to proceed with briefing and filing the instant motions. (See

May 10, 2022 Electronic Order.)

For the following reasons, the Court finds that it cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over

the Defendants. The Court grants Defendants’ motions for transfer of venue and transfers this

action to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue are evaluated using

the same legal standard. Williams v. Preeminent Protective Servs., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 265, 269

(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 2005)). In each

case, the burden rests with the plaintiff to demonstrate that venue and jurisdiction are proper. Id.

(citing CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 364-65 (2d Cir. 1986)); -se -e -al-so- -M-e-tr-o-. -L-if-e

Ins. Co. v. Robertson–Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1996)).

“The showing a plaintiff must make to meet [this] burden is governed by a sliding scale,

which varies depending on the procedural posture of the litigation.” Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v.

Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken–Overpelt,

S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990)). At the pre-discovery stage, a plaintiff need only make a

prima facie showing of jurisdiction through allegations in the complaint or plaintiff’s own

affidavits and supporting materials. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 566 (citing Ball, 902 F.2d at

197); -se -e -al-so- -W-i-ll-ia-m-s-, at 269 (“plaintiffs satisfy [their] burden by pleading facts sufficient to

demonstrate a prima facie showing of jurisdiction or venue by way of the complaint’s allegations,

affidavits, and other supporting evidence, which are evaluated in the light most favorable to

them.”); Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., 148 F.3d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A prima facie case requires

non-conclusory fact-specific allegations or evidence showing that activity that constitutes the basis

of jurisdiction has taken place.”)

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the Court may

look beyond the four corners of the complaint and consider materials outside of the pleadings,

including accompanying affidavits, declarations, and other written materials. MTS Logistics, Inc.

v. Innovative Commodities Grp., LLC, 442 F. Supp. 3d 738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing

MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 2012)). The allegations in the complaint

are presumed true only to the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant’s affidavits.” Id.

(citing MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 727) (citation omitted).

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Courts in this District apply New York law to determine whether if there is personal

jurisdiction over a defendant. Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A district

court’s personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the state in which the court is located.”)

This two-part inquiry asks whether New York state law would allow the Court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over the defendant and whether exercising that jurisdiction would be permissible under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Williams, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 270 (citing

Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2002)).

“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)

corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so

‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (quoting

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).

Plaintiffs point to two provisions of the New York long arm statute that they say subject

Defendants to jurisdiction here. First, the Machados claim that the Defendants are subject to

general personal jurisdiction. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301. Second, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants

“transacted business” in New York and committed “tortious act[s]” that “caus[ed] injury to person

or property within [New York],” both of which subject Defendants to specific personal

jurisdiction. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a). Plaintiffs’ arguments are unavailing.

1. General Jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 301

New York’s C.P.L.R. § 301 (“Section 301”) allows courts to invoke that jurisdiction where

corporations have engaged in “such a continuous and systematic course of ‘doing business’ [in the

state] that a finding of [their] ‘presence’ [there] is warranted.” See Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander

& Alexander Servs., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 33 (1990).

The Supreme Court, however, has cautioned that general jurisdiction only extends beyond

an entity’s state of incorporation and principal place of business in “exceptional” cases, and

exerting it over corporations in states where those corporations are not “essentially at home” may

violate the Due Process Clause. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (quoting

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)); Sidik v. Royal

Sovereign Int’l., Inc., No. 17-cv-7020, 2020 WL 5441306, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2020) (“Only

in the ‘exceptional case’ will ‘a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of

incorporation or principal place of business…be so substantial and of such a nature as to render

the corporation at home in the state.’” (internal citations omitted)).

Here, the Court may quickly dispose of this issue because the record reveals no evidence

or support for general jurisdiction over the Defendants. Defendants are a pair of “legally formed

compan[ies], organized to do business in the state of Pennsylvania” with their principal places of

business in Hershey, Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3.) The Complaint alleges that the Court has

general jurisdiction over both Defendants based on: (i) HERC’s alleged solicitation of “the

residents of the State of New York and other states within the United States” to patronize its

entertainment facilities and hotels; and (ii) the “belief” that the Medical Center “is an adjunct

medical facility affiliated with [HERC].” (Id.) These allegations are insufficient to establish that

Defendants are “essentially at home” in New York. See Century Sports, Inc. v. Ross Bicycles,

LLC, No. 19-cv-4842, 2021 WL 1108639, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2021) (finding allegations

that this Court had general jurisdiction over a Delaware-registered LLC with a Nevada address

based on its “transact[ing] business in the State of New York and this District,” and “commit[ing]

tortious acts within the State, and/or without the State causing injury within the state” were

insufficient to confer jurisdiction); Kerman v. InterContinental Hotels Group Resources LLC, No.

20-cv-1085, 2021 WL 930253, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2021) (finding allegations that the

defendant is “authorized to do business in the State of New York” and “has a “massive presence”

in the state did “not elevate Defendant’s relationship with New York to the level of ‘essentially at

home’” where the plaintiff did not contend the defendant’s “operations were directed from New

York”).

Moreover, to the extent the Complaint seeks to confer jurisdiction over Defendants based

on HERC’s alleged use of television and internet advertisements to solicit New York residents to

patronize its entertainment facilities and hotels, such contacts do not rise to the level of “truly

exceptional case” so as to justify treating Defendants as “essentially at home” in New York. See

Nixon v. Inquisitr Ltd., No. 20-cv-1819, 2021 WL 3667154, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2021);

Kerman, 2021 WL 930253, at *3 (dismissing a slip-and-fall claim against a hotel chain, despite

the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant’s contacts with New York were “directed at advertising

and drawing business to [its] establishments world-wide,” because “the duty, breach, and injury

all arose or transpired in the foreign forum” where the plaintiff fell). In any case, Plaintiffs have

made no showing of “exceptional” circumstances that would render either Defendant “at home”

in New York. The Court thus lacks general jurisdiction over either Defendant under Section 301.

2. Specific Jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)

Under Section 302(a)(1), specific jurisdiction exists when a defendant “transacts business

within the state” and the plaintiff’s claim “arises out of defendant’s business activity in the state.”

Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Management, LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).

Transacting business must consist of purposeful commercial activity. Chloe v. Queen Bee of

Beverly Hills, L.L.C., 616 F.3d 158, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). Purposeful activities “are those with

which a defendant, through volitional acts, avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities

within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Fischbarg v.

Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375, 380 (2007). The New York Court of Appeals has instructed that not every

“transaction,” however, will give rise to jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1). DH Servs., LLC v.

Positive Impact, Inc., No. 12-cv-6153, 2014 WL 496875, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2014) (citing

SPCA of Upstate New York, Inc. v. Am. Working Collie Ass’n, 18 N.Y.3d 400, 404 (2012)).

Specifically, a plaintiff must also establish “some articulable nexus between the business

transacted and the cause of action sued upon.” Id. A court must consider “the totality of all

defendant’s contacts with the forum state must indicate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be

proper.” Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2005).

Ultimately, “it is the quality of the defendant[’s] New York contacts that is the primary

consideration” when determining whether jurisdiction is appropriate under Section 302(a)(1).

Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (“nature and

quality, and not the amount of New York contacts [which] must be considered by the court.”).

Applying these standards to the allegations at hand, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have

failed to plead facts sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to

Section 302(a)(1). Initially, Plaintiffs’ Section 302(a)(1) jurisdictional claim against HERC is

predicated on HERC’s solicitation of business to New York residents through internet and

television advertisements but lacks any specific facts regarding HERC’s in-state business

operations. (See Compl. ¶¶ 2, 9; Plaintiffs’ Opposition (“Pl. Opp.”), ECF No. 22-4.) Without

more, these allegations are insufficient to exercise Section 302(a)(1) jurisdiction over HERC.

For one, the “mere existence of a commercial website is insufficient to support exercising

personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant” under Section 302(a)(1). Lindsey Adelman Studio

LLC v. Lucretia Light. Pty, Ltd, No. 21-cv-9423, 2022 WL 4367399, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,

2022); -se -e -al-so- -IS-I- B-r-an-d-s- v-. -K-C-C- I-n-t’-l, -In-c-., 458 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he

existence of an interactive “patently commercial” website that can be accessed by New York

residents is not sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction unless some degree of

commercial activity occurred in New York.”); Savage Universal Corp. v. Grazier Const., Inc., No.

04-cv-1089, 2004 WL 1824102, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2004) (“It stretches the meaning of

“transacting business” to subject defendants to personal jurisdiction in any state merely for

operating a website, however commercial in nature, that is capable of reaching customers in that

state, without some evidence or allegation that commercial activity in that state actually

occurred.”). These principles, when combined with Plaintiffs’ failure to articulate any specific

facts regarding HERC’s purported solicitation of business via the internet, lead the Court to find

that they have failed to establish a basis for exercising Section 302(a)(1) jurisdiction over HERC.

Plaintiffs have similarly failed to plead that HERC “transacted business” in New York

when it paid for local television advertisements. Indeed, “the overriding criterion necessary to

establish a transaction of business is some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of

the privilege of conducting activities within New York.” V Cars, LLC v. Israel Corp., 902 F. Supp.

2d 349, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Licci, 673 F.3d at 61). Here, Plaintiffs neither allege that

HERC intended to, or did conduct any of its business activities in New York – only that it sought

to solicit people to patronize its Pennsylvania-based entertainment facilities. (See Compl. ¶¶ 2, 9.)

Plaintiffs’ alternate basis for conferral of the Court’s Section 302(a)(1) jurisdiction fails as well.4

Plaintiffs’ attempt to exercise Section 302(a)(1) jurisdiction over the Medical Center fails

for similar reasons. Plaintiffs insist that the Medical Center and HERC are related corporate

entities and that, as such, if there is jurisdiction over HERC there would also be jurisdiction over

the Medical Center. This argument is meritless. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ conclusory and

unsupported claim that the two Defendants are related corporate entities fails as a factual matter.

Moreover, even if they were related, as explained above, the Court lacks jurisdiction over HERC

and, thus, would also lack jurisdiction over the Medical Center upon this theory. Additionally,

any arguments that the Medical Center’s own actions establish jurisdiction also fail. Plaintiffs

have not pled that the Medical Center “transacts business” within New York, or that Plaintiffs’

claims arise out of these purported business transactions. See Chloe, 616 F.3d at 170; Sole Resort,

450 F.3d at 103. It is undisputed that the Medical Center is only licensed as a healthcare provider

in Pennsylvania and does not physically conduct any business in or with New York. For these

reasons, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Section

302(a)(1).

4 As Plaintiffs have failed to establish that HERC “transacted business” within New York for purposes of

Section 302(a)(1) jurisdiction, it is not necessary to evaluate the extent to which their injuries arise out of HERC’s

“business activity” within New York. See Sole, 450 F.3d at 103.

3. Specific Jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)

Under Section 302(a)(2), specific jurisdiction exists over a non-domiciliary defendant who

commits a tortious act within New York State. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2); see also Sidik, 2020

WL 5441306, at *4. The Second Circuit has consistently reaffirmed this principle, namely that a

“defendant’s physical presence in New York is a prerequisite to jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2).”

Bonhac World Corp. v. Mellin Works LLC, No. 21-cv-9239, 2023 WL 346950, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Jan. 20, 2023) (quoting Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779,

790 (2d Cir. 1999)); -se-e -al-so- -B-en-s-u-sa-n- R-e-s-ta-u-ra-n-t C--or-p-. -v.- K-i-n-g, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1997).

Here, Plaintiffs contend that the actions or omissions giving rise to the instant action

occurred in Pennsylvania, and that they were not injured while present in New York. (See Compl.

¶¶ 12-14, 19-20.) The Court thus lacks Section 302(a)(2) specific jurisdiction over Defendants.

4. Specific Jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)

Under Section 302(a)(3), specific jurisdiction exists over a non-domiciliary defendant if

that defendant commits a tortious act outside of New York that causes injury inside New York;

and, if the defendant either: (i) “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other

persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods or consumed or services

rendered, in the state”; or (ii) “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences

in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” N.Y.

C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3); see also D’Anzieri v Harrison Glob. LLC, No. 21-cv-8506, 2022 WL

17404254, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2022); Sidik, 2020 WL 5441306, at *4-5; Muraco v. Sandals

Resorts Int’l, No. 14-cv-4896, 2015 WL 9462103, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015). Specifically,

Section 302(a)(3) jurisdiction may only be conferred unto a non-domiciliary when the first effect

of the tort is felt in New York, even if the tort is committed outside of New York. See DiStefano

v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2001); -se -e -al-so- -M-a-re-n-o -v-. -R-ow--e, 910 F.2d

1043, 1046 (2nd Cir. 1990).

Here, because Plaintiffs appear to allege jurisdiction solely under Section 302(a)(3)(i), they

must show that each Defendant: (1) committed a tortious act outside of New York that caused

injury inside New York; and (2) “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other

persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods or consumed or services

rendered” in New York.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint is insufficient to confer this Court’s Section 302(a)(3)(i) jurisdiction.

Initially, the original events that allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ injuries – namely, HERC’s negligence

and the Medical Center’s nontreatment of Linda’s injuries – as well as the “first effects” of those

events both undisputedly occurred in Pennsylvania, not New York. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12-14, 19-20.)

These facts, by themselves, preclude this Court from exercising specific jurisdiction over

Defendants pursuant to Section 302(a)(3)(i).

Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate that Defendants committed tortious acts outside of

New York causing injuries within New York, they have not alleged that either Defendant conducts

substantial business in New York to justify conferring jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3)(i). To

begin with, Plaintiffs have not established that HERC, which operates, and provides services solely

within Pennsylvania “discernibly attempted to serve the New York market,” rather than advertise

its solely Pennsylvania-based business. See Century Sports, 2021 WL 1108639, at *5 (citing

Aaron Consulting Co. v. Snap Sols. LLC, No. 16-cv-6775, 2018 WL 4568800, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.

Sept. 24, 2018)). Section 302(a)(3)(i) jurisdiction over the Medical Center is similarly

inappropriate because Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead that the Medical Center, which only

operates a hospital and emergency department in Hershey, Pennsylvania, and does not outwardly

solicit its services, otherwise “conducted business” outside of Pennsylvania. Based on these

pleading failures, the Court finds that it cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over either Defendant

pursuant to Section 302(a).

C. Improper Venue and Motion to Transfer

“Because the Court has determined that it lacks both general and specific personal

jurisdiction over Defendants, venue is not proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).”

Bartosiewicz v. Nelsen, No. 6:20-cv-06513, 2021 WL 4451445, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2021)

(citing Powell v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., No. 15-cv-2162, 2016 WL 8711210, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.

Jan. 22, 2016)). Venue is further improper because, as discussed above, none of the events or

omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the Eastern District of New York. Id. The

Second Circuit has explained that venue is proper if significant events or omissions material to a

plaintiff’s claim occurred in the chosen district. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

“After [a] determination that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the

Court looks to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which provides that “[t]he district court of a district in which

is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest

of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted). “Courts enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether to

transfer a case in the interest of justice.” Id. (citing Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428

F.3d 408, 435 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Here, it is undisputed that this Court is accorded broad discretion to either dismiss this case

or transfer it another district where both venue is proper, and jurisdiction exists over the

Defendants. The Medical Center5 argues that, based on the Court’s above conclusions, as well as

5 Neither HERC nor Plaintiffs address, or object to transferring venue in their papers.

the fact that both Defendants reside in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and a substantial part

of events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in Pennsylvania sufficient to satisfy 28

U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), this matter should be transferred the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (See generally ECF No. 22-2.) The

Court agrees. See Bartosiewicz, 2021 WL 4451445, at *9 (granting transfer where, despite

“limited briefing,” defendant’s place of residence and where a substantial part of events took place

were “clear from the record.”) Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion to transfer this action

to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that it cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over

the Defendants. The Court grants Defendants’ motions for transfer of venue and transfers this

action to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2023

Central Islip, New York

/s/ (JMA)

JOAN M. AZRACK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE