Brown v. Ukeiley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERU N.S  . D D ISIS TT RR ICIC TT  O C FO  NU ER WT   YORK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LONG ISLAND OFFICE

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ADRIENNE BROWN of Transitional Housing

& Resources; Transitional Housing & Resources,

Plaintiffs,

ORDER

-against- 22-CV-7214 (JMA)(AYS)

JUDGE STEPHEN UKEILEY, ET AL.,

Defendants.

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JOAN M. AZRACK, District Judge:

Before the Court is the in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application filed by pro se Plaintiff

Adrienne Brown (“Plaintiff”). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s IFP application is denied

without prejudice and with leave to renew upon completion of the AO 239 Long Form IFP

application (“Long Form”) attached to this Order. Alternatively, Plaintiff may remit the $402.00

filing fee.

The purpose of the IFP statute is to ensure that indigent persons have equal access to the

judicial system. See Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 10-cv-3812, 2010 WL 3419671, at *1

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (citation omitted). To qualify for IFP status, the Supreme Court has

long held that “an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or

give security for the costs [inherent in litigation] and still be able to provide himself and dependents

with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of whether an applicant qualifies for IFP

status is within the discretion of the district court. DiGianni v. Pearson Educ., No. 10-cv-0206,

2010 WL 1741373, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2010) (citation omitted). The court may dismiss a

case brought by a plaintiff requesting to proceed IFP if the “allegation of poverty is untrue.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A).

An initial review of Plaintiff’s IFP application reveals responses to the posed questions that

are largely non-responsive and/or indecipherable. For example, in the space that asks for a

description of any items owned of value, Plaintiff wrote: “I pay property tax’s on this property!!

Lights [indecipherable] of the [indecipherable].” (ECF No. 2, ¶ 5.) Plaintiff has similarly failed

to provide any of the requested financial information, including her regular monthly expenses, the

amount of money she contributes to support others dependent upon her for financial support, or

any debt or financial obligations. (Id. ¶¶ 6-8.) Moreover, although Plaintiff includes a

residential address of record and a telephone number, she does not include any monthly expenses

associated therewith. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.)

Given the absence of the required information, together with the fact that Plaintiff’s

responses raise more questions than they answer, Plaintiff’s application is denied without prejudice

and with leave to renew upon completion of the Long Form application enclosed with this Order

within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order. Alternatively, Plaintiff may remit the

$402.00 filing fee. Plaintiff is warned that, once paid, there are no refunds of the filing fee,

regardless of the outcome of the case.1 Further, Plaintiff is cautioned her failure to timely comply

with this Order may lead to the dismissal of the complaint without prejudice for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

Plaintiff has also included an entity, Transitional Housing & Resources, as a co-plaintiff.

However, the complaint is signed only by Plaintiff in her own capacity and the entity has not

1 Plaintiff may consult with the Hofstra Law School Pro Se Clinic located in the Central Islip Courthouse,

which can provide free information, advice, and limited scope legal assistance to non-incarcerated pro se litigants.

The Pro Se Clinic is not part of, nor affiliated with, the United States District Court. Consultations with the Pro Se

Clinic can be conducted remotely via telephone and may be scheduled by sending an email to PSLAP@Hofstra.edu

or by leaving a message at (631) 297-2575.

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submitted an IFP application. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, pro se plaintiffs “may plead and conduct

their own cases personally or by counsel.” As a non-lawyer, Plaintiff cannot represent anyone

other than herself. Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause pro se means

to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.

A person must be litigating an interest personal to him.”) (citation omitted); see also Shapiro,

Bernstein & Co. v. Continental Record Co., 386 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam)

(layperson may not represent a corporation.). Further, federal courts do not allow corporations,

partnerships, associations, and other artificial entities to appear in court without an attorney.

Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S.

Ct. 716, 721 (1993) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court dismisses any claims alleged on

behalf of Transitional Housing & Resources without prejudice and with leave to renew within

sixty (60) days by counsel entering an appearance on its behalf.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court shall mail a copy of this Order to the Plaintiff at her address of record.

SO ORDERED.

_____/s/ (JMA)_________

Dated: February 1, 2023 Joan M. Azrack

Central Islip, New York United States District Judge

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