The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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KEVIN GRANADOS-COREAS,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
-against- CV 18-6092 (AYS)
NASSAU COUNTY, Corrections Officers
MICHAEL McCANN, BRIAN JOHNSON,
TIMOTHY BARNET, and KEVIN BERRY,
Defendants.
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ANNE Y. SHIELDS, United States Magistrate Judge:
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff, Kevin Granados-Coreas (“Plaintiff”), pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the use of excessive force and failure to intervene. The incident
forming the b§asis of this action took place when Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in the custody of
Defendant County of Nassau (“Nassau” or the “County”). In addition to naming the County as a
Defendant, Plaintiff names as defendants three individual Nassau County Corrections Officers.
This case is trial ready. Presently before the Court are the parties’ several motions in limine. As
set forth below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part, without prejudice to the extent
noted herein.
DISCUSSION
I. Factual Background
The presently operative pleading is Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, appearing as Docket
Entry (“DE”) [15] herein. As set forth therein, this action arises out of an incident that took place
on November 1, 2017, when Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Nassau County Correctional
Center (“NCCC”). The incident occurred in and around the time that Plaintiff was escorted by
Defendant Corrections Officer (“CO”) Michael McCann (“McCann”) to an area where Plaintiff
could visit with his mother and a friend. Plaintiff alleges that the visit was abruptly cancelled and
that he was thereafter assaulted. It appears that the visit cancellation and altercation arose out of
a dispute regarding the hem of Plaintiff’s pants. Plaintiff alleges that the pants were rolled up
because they were too big; Defendants allege that the rolling of pants is associated with
concealment of contraband by gang members. Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted first by
Defendant CO McCann and was thereafter assaulted and restrained by Defendant COs Brian
Johnson (“Johnson”), Timothy Barnet (“Barnet”) and Kevin Berry (“Berry”). The facts will be
developed and veracity determined by a jury at trial. As to his claims, Plaintiff alleges the
violation of his Constitutional rights in the form of the use of excessive force (First Cause of
Action, DE [15] at 39-43), Municipal Liability (Second Cause of Action, DE [15] at 44-49), and
Failure to Intervene (Fifth Cause of Action, [DE 15] at 57-60).1 Defendants deny all allegations.
II. Procedural Background
A. The Close of Fact Discovery and Dispositive Motion Practice
Although this case was commenced in 2018, discovery was delayed because of
Plaintiff’s pending criminal case. Nonetheless, on March 12, 2021, Defendants reported that the
depositions of all Defendants were complete. Logistical difficulties regarding the taking of
Plaintiff’s deposition were reported, but the parties anticipated that his deposition and any
independent medical examination (“IME”) would be conducted within thirty days of the letter,
i.e., by April 12, 2021. On November 16, 2021, this Court entered a status report order
summarizing prior discovery orders, noting that pursuant to its nearly eleven months’ earlier
1 Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss claims previously alleged for conspiracy to violate his civil
rights, as set forth in his Third and Fourth Causes of Action. See Amended Joint Pretrial Order,
DE [44] at 9.
Order, dated January 26, 2021, all discovery was to have been completed by October 3, 2021,
and that the deadline for the making of any dispositive motions was set at November 2, 2021.
See Electronic Order of Shields, M.J., dated Jan. 26, 2021. As both deadlines had passed, this
Court assumed that discovery was complete and that no party intended to interpose a dispositive
motion. See Electronic Order of Shields, M.J., dated Nov. 16, 2021.
Thereafter, on November 30, 2021, Defendants reported that Plaintiff’s deposition had
not taken place – either within the thirty-day period referred to in the March 2021 letter, nor prior
to the expiration of the discovery deadline. (DE [29].) By way of excuse, the County relied on
staffing changes and a busy trial schedule. See id. In response thereto, on December 2, 2021, this
Court entered an order denying Defendants’ request to reopen discovery for a period of sixty
days to take the Plaintiff’s deposition and to conduct an IME. In support of that ruling, this Court
noted that Defendants first requested Plaintiff’s availability for a deposition in January 2021.
Plaintiff’s availability was provided the next day. Defendants again requested Plaintiff’s
availability for a deposition in March 2021. Plaintiff’s counsel provided information regarding
her client’s availability that same day. No action to schedule that deposition took place. The
Deputy County Attorney referenced in Defendants’ letter seeking additional time in which to
depose Plaintiff did not leave the County Attorney’s Office until June 2021. This gave
Defendants ample time prior to his departure to conduct a deposition of Plaintiff and his IME.
Defendants also had ample time since that June 2021 departure (and prior to the close of
discovery) to take Plaintiff’s deposition and conduct his IME. They simply chose not to do so,
despite the cooperation of Plaintiff’s counsel in providing her client’s availability on more than
one occasion.
Based on all of these facts, Defendants’ request to reopen fact discovery was denied. See
Scheduling Order dated Dec. 2,2021. This Court also noted that the time to initiate dispositive
motions had expired with neither party commencing motion practice. In accord with its rulings
regarding the close of discovery, this Court held that the time to make any such motion was also
deemed closed.
B. The Joint Pretrial Order and Consent to this Court’s Jurisdiction
In addition to deeming discovery and dispositive motion practice closed, counsel
were directed to submit a joint pre-trial order (the “JPTO”), consistent with the rules of the then-
assigned District Court Judge, on or before January 6, 2022. That date was thereafter extended to
January 27, 2022. See Electronic Order of Shields, M.J., dated Jan. 24, 2022. The parties’ joint
pretrial order was thereafter timely filed on January 27, 2022. (DE [33].) Shortly thereafter,
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against non-appearing “John Doe” defendants, and the
District Court approved the parties’ consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court. (DE
[34]-[36].)
C. Scheduling of the Trial and Amendment of the JPTO
This Court held a final pre-trial conference on February 22, 2022, setting jury
selection for May 12, 2022. Although this date presented a possible conflict with Plaintiff’s state
court criminal trial, the parties thereafter advised the Court that the Plaintiff herein (who is the
Defendant in the state court criminal proceeding) pleaded guilty, and the criminal trial which
presented the conflict would not proceed. Plaintiff is currently in custody in connection with that
plea of guilty. Despite Plaintiff’s availability for trial since May of 2022, logistical problems,
including a backlog in criminal cases and the precedence of transporting prisoners in those cases
(over civil cases) to attend criminal matters in the Federal Courthouse, have resulted in delay of
this civil matter. Although there is not now a trial date certain, see Electronic Scheduling Order
dated Oct. 11, 2022, the lapse in time has resulted in this Court’s decision to re-visit its earlier
order regarding Defendants’ request to amend the joint pretrial order. (DE [55].)
Despite the lack of certainty for a date of the trial in this civil matter, the Court will move
to decide the pending pre-trial motions. This approach allows the Court to rule in advance of trial
as to the admissibility and use of “forecasted evidence.” See James v. Vogel, 1:18-CV-801, 2019
WL 3387998, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2019) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2
(1984)) (additional citation omitted). With regard to such evidence, motions seeking to exclude
are properly granted when the evidence at issue “is clearly inadmissible on all potential
grounds.” James, 2019 WL 3387998, at *1 (citing Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. Novatek Med, Inc.,
No. 94-cv-5220, 1998 WL 665138, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998)). Where, on the other hand,
the nature of the evidence is unclear and/or subject to change, the court may reserve decision
until trial and/or “in the exercise of sound judicial discretion . . . alter or change a previous in
limine ruling” at trial as “the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what
was contained in the [movant’s] proffer.” James, 2019 WL 3387998, at *1 (quoting Luce, 469
U.S. at 41-42). With these general standards governing trial in mind, the Court turns to the merits
of the parties’ pretrial motions in limine, so that once the trial commences, the case will proceed
without further delay.
III. The Motions in Limine
While the parties have interposed several motions, many are mirror images of each other.
For example, Defendants seek an order allowing admission in evidence of Plaintiff’s felony
convictions and gang affiliation (even if for only limited purposes or for cross-examination),
while Plaintiff seeks to exclude such evidence for any purpose. For the sake of brevity, the Court
addresses each issue on the merits without reference to particular motions.2
IV. Legal Principles
The Federal Rules of Evidence that apply to the pending motions are as follows:
A. Rule 402
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides for the admissibility of relevant evidence
and the inadmissibility of irrelevant evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 402.
B. Rule 403
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the court to exclude relevant
evidence if the probative value thereof is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. When determining
prejudice under Rule 403, the Court considers whether the prejudice is unfair, as opposed to
merely harmful.
C. Rule 404
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 provides rules regarding the use of character
evidence. In pertinent part, it provides as follows:
Rule 404(a): Character Evidence
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or character
trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character or trait.
2 The parties also argue procedural impropriety with respect to whether motions are
allowed under the scope of those set forth in the pretrial order and/or with respect to this Court’s
Individual Rules. Rather than ruling on these motions based upon such procedural grounds, the
Court addresses each motion on the merits. The fact that the Court has allowed amendment of
the JPTO and the trial date is not yet set makes this approach preferable.
* * *
(3) Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness’s character may
be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.
See Fed. R. Evid. R. 404(a)
Rule 404(b): Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on
a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Where evidence is admitted for the limited purposes set forth in Rule 404(b)(2), “it
makes no difference whether the acts occurred before or after the events at issue.” Lombardo v.
Stone, No. 99 Civ. 4603, 2002 WL 113913, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2002). However, admission
for these limited purposes is improper when such admission violates Rule 403. See Id.
D. Rule 609
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 governs the use of criminal convictions for
impeachment purposes in civil actions. As to felony convictions, it provides that where, as here,
the party against whom the evidence is sought to be used is the Plaintiff, such evidence “must be
admitted, subject to Rule 403.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(A). Thus, in cases involving felony
convictions, Rule 609 requires admission of the evidence of conviction, unless the Court
determines, pursuant to Rule 403, that the probative value of that evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. The determination as to the use of criminal felony convictions is within the sound
discretion of the district court. See United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 621 (2d Cir. 2005).
When balancing the probative value of the conviction evidence against prejudice, as
instructed by Rule 609, courts consider: “(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the
remoteness of the prior conviction, (3) the similarity between the past crime and the conduct at
issue, and (4) the importance of the credibility of the witness.” Espinosa v. McCabe, No. 9:10-
cv-497, 2014 WL 988832, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2014) (quoting Daniels v. Loizzo, 986 F.
Supp. 245, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). While all of these factors are to be considered, “prime among
them is the first factor, i.e., whether the crime, by its nature, is probative of a lack of veracity.”
Espinosa, 2014 WL 9888352, at *2 (quoting United States v. Brown, 606 F. Supp. 2d 306, 312
(E.D.N.Y. 2009)) (additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As to non-felony matters, the Court looks to Rule 609(a)(2). Such evidence must be
admitted if the witness has been convicted of a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement.”
This is true without regard to “the severity of the punishment or any resulting prejudice.” Fed. R.
Evid. 609(a)(2). This prong of Rule 609(a) is meant to apply to convictions “peculiarly probative
of credibility,” such as those for “perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the
commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on
the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.” United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 616 n.3
(2d Cir. 2005).
V. Disposition of the Motions
A. Motion to Dismiss Defendants Johnson, Barnet and Berry
Defendants seek to dismiss individual Defendants Johnson, Barnet and Berry
from this action. In support of this motion, Defendants rely on the deposition transcripts of each
defendant. Reliance on such material would be proper not in the context of a motion to dismiss,
but in the context of a motion for summary judgment. In any event, as described above, the dates
for the making of any such dispositive motions have long passed. Moreover, a review of this
branch of the motion shows the presence of material issues of fact. Accordingly, the Court denies
the motion at this time. This denial is without prejudice to renewal under the proper Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure at the close of the Plaintiff’s case.
B. Motion to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiff’s Mother and Friend
Defendants seek to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s mother and friend on the
grounds that they lack information about the incident at issue, that their testimony would be
cumulative, and that it would serve only to elicit sympathy in violation of Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in support of their motion in
limine refers to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Presumably, they meant to
refer to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As referred to above, that Rule allows a
Court to exclude relevant evidence if the probative value thereof is substantially outweighed by
the danger of: unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of
time or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Applying these
standards, the Court holds first that the testimony of these two witnesses is relevant. According
to Plaintiff, they will testify as to their presence at the NCCC immediately before the incident,
and the abrupt cancellation of their visit with the Plaintiff. The Court holds further that the
relevance of their testimony is not outweighed by any Rule 403 factor. Accordingly, the motion
to prohibit Plaintiff’s mother and friend from testifying regarding what occurred on the date of
the incident forming the basis of this action is denied.
C. Motion to Preclude Plaintiff from Offering
Testimony Regarding Indemnification of Defendants
Defendants move to preclude Plaintiff from offering evidence of Defendants’
indemnification by Nassau County on the grounds that such evidence is both irrelevant and
prejudicial. Additionally, Defendants state that they will not offer evidence of their financial
resources.
Under the circumstances herein, the Court agrees with Defendants that evidence of
indemnification is not relevant, and even if such evidence were relevant, introduction thereof
would be outweighed by the factors of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues and misleading the
jury. Accordingly, the motion to exclude such evidence is granted.
D. Motion to Preclude Evidence of Defendants’ Disciplinary Investigatory History
Defendants move to preclude the introduction of any disciplinary, investigatory
and/or litigation history as to the named Corrections Officers. Defendants argue that such
evidence amounts to inadmissible character evidence in violation of Rule 404(b). While such
propensity evidence would likely be inadmissible, similar act evidence “offered to show intent is
admissible in a section 1983 case because the defendant’s intent is a relevant element of the
constitutional tort.” Lombardo, 2002 WL 113913, at *6. Thus, while such evidence is not
admissible to show propensity to act in a particular way at a particular time, it may be allowed
for other limited purposes, such as to show a defendant’s intent to cause harm or failure to
intervene - necessary elements of Plaintiff’s two Section 1983 claims. See id. at *7.
There does not appear to be any opposition by Plaintiff to this portion of Defendant’s
motion. However, it is also not clear that any such evidence will be offered at trial. For these
reasons, the Court denies the motion at this time, without prejudice to renewal at the time of trial,
should the issue arise.
E. Motion to Bifurcate the Trial
Defendants move to bifurcate the trial into liability and damages. The Court
denies the motion on the ground that bifurcation of this already-delayed relatively short trial will
serve no purpose.
F. Motion to Allow Evidence of Plaintiff’s Gang Affiliation
In support of this motion, Defendants argue that the specific way in which
Plaintiff’s pants were altered (to allow the smuggling of contraband) is a type of apparel
alteration used by members of MS-13. They argue that gang affiliation is relevant to the nature
of the inspection conducted prior to Plaintiff’s scheduled visit with family, and therefore relevant
to the issues to be tried. It is not.
First, it is difficult to believe that corrections officers only inspect the trousers of
prisoners who are suspected or known gang members, and/or that their inspections are somehow
particularized to look into a distinctive type of tailoring. Defendants do not, and cannot, argue
that they do not thoroughly inspect all prisoners (including their pants) before they come into
contact with members of the visiting public. Indeed, the Court can scarcely imagine a scenario
where corrections officers only inspect the apparel of gang members for contraband smuggling
prior to visits, and that those same officers readily allow all other prisoners to engage in
visitation with outsiders without such inspection. Defendants can testify as to their inspection of
Plaintiff’s clothing for contraband without going into the particular gang-specific smuggling
techniques used by NCCC detainees.
Even if there were a type of pants-hemming particular to gang members, that issue is of
no relevance to the central issue for trial, i.e., whether Plaintiff was subject to the use of
excessive force. Further, even if the Court accepted Defendants’ torturous argument for
relevance, the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by the danger of prejudice and
jury confusion. To be clear, this is a case about whether or not the Plaintiff’s civil rights were
violated when he was allegedly assaulted by Defendants. The issues that the jury will be asked to
decide have nothing to do with Plaintiff’s gang association. Defendants’ motion to admit
evidence of any gang affiliation is denied. Plaintiff’s corresponding motion to exclude such
evidence is granted.
G. Motion to Allow Evidence of Plaintiff's Prior Felony Convictions
1. Rule 609(a)(1)
As noted, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) generally allows for the use
of felony convictions for the purpose of impeaching witness credibility. Such use is, however,
subject to the considerations set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403. At issue here are two
criminal felony convictions that followed two separate pleas of guilty. Both convictions followed
the incident forming the basis of this lawsuit. First, on July 11, 2019, Plaintiff was convicted of
attempted possession of contraband at the NCCC. Second, on April 13, 2022 (shortly before the
first scheduled trial herein), Plaintiff was convicted of murder in the second degree.
In apparent recognition of the Rule 404(b) prohibition of the use of character evidence,
Defendants state that they do not seek to introduce evidence of these convictions to show that
Plaintiff is a violent and aggressive person. (Def. Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pl. Mot. in Limine
2.) Instead, they seek to introduce such evidence only for the limited purpose of attacking
Plaintiff's credibility. (See id.) To accomplish this purpose, Defendants propose to ask Plaintiff
on cross-examination only what he was convicted of, and the term of his sentence. (See id. at 3.)
Plaintiff opposes even the limited questioning that Defendants propose.
While the Federal Rules of Evidence allow for the use of Plaintiff’s felony convictions,
there is undoubtedly a danger that the jury will be prejudiced by the introduction of such
evidence. This is especially true here, where the claim is that Defendants used excessive force
against Plaintiff while he was in custody. It is not a far leap to imagine the substantial prejudice
to Plaintiff where the jury will be limited to considering only the conduct on the date of the
incident at issue, and not Plaintiff’s overall character and propensity for violence. The same is
true with respect to Plaintiff’s prior conviction for attempted possession of contraband. As noted,
the use of such propensity evidence is precluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Upon
application of the Rule 403 balancing factors, the Court holds that Defendants will not be
allowed to introduce evidence of Plaintiff’s felony convictions. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion
to use such evidence, even for the limited purpose of impeachment, is denied. Plaintiff’s
corresponding motion to preclude the use of such evidence is granted.
2. Rule 609(a)(2)
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s murder conviction must be admitted
under Rule 609(a)(2) because his plea of guilty to murder in this case transforms the crime of
murder here to a crime involving the making of false statements. If the crime of murder falls
within this section of Rule 609, it is presumptively admissible. See Brown v. Cornell, No. 9:17-
CV-1036, 2021 WL 2711511, at * 4 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 2021). In support of this argument,
Defendants point to Plaintiff’s explanation of the murder during his plea allocution, wherein he
stated that he falsely lured the murder victim into a park on the false pretense of smoking
marijuana with him. Instead, as Plaintiff allocuted, the victim was lured into the park to be
murdered. These facts of the allocution do not transform a murder conviction into a crime of
dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). “While much successful
crime involved some quantum of stealth, all such conduct does not, as a result, constitute [a]
crime of dishonesty or false statement for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2).” Estrada, 430 F.3d at 614.
Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to admit Plaintiff’s felony convictions on the ground
that they fall within the definition of those set forth in Rule 609(a)(2). Accord Espinosa, 2014
WL988832, at *4.
H. Motion to Allow Evidence of Plaintiff’s Jail Disciplinary Infractions
For similar reasons to those set forth above, evidence of Plaintiff’s jail
disciplinary infractions will not be admitted into evidence. See Lombardo, 2002 WL 113913, at
*3. The Court also holds that that evidence of such infractions will not be allowed even for
impeachment purposes on the ground that such use would violate Rule 403. Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion to allow use of Plaintiff’s jail disciplinary records is denied and Plaintiffs’
corresponding motion to preclude such use is granted. See Starmel v. Tompkin, No. 9:20-CV-
00089, 2022 WL 6737723, at * 3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2022) (denying motion to use plaintiff’s
disciplinary records character evidence to show plaintiff’s “disregard for law and order”).
I. Motion to Preclude Reference to Plaintiff’s Immigration Status
Plaintiff has moved to preclude reference to Plaintiff’s immigration status. A
review of the motion papers reveals that Defendants do not intend to offer any such evidence.
Even if such evidence were offered, the Court would not allow its introduction. Plaintiff’s
immigration status has no relevance to the issues to be tried.
J. Motion to Allow Plaintiff to Appear in Civilian Clothes and Without Restraints
At this point in time, it is unclear whether Plaintiff will be appearing to testify in
person in this trial. Because this is a civil trial, Plaintiff does not have the absolute right to appear
for in-person testimony. See Vaughan v. Sposato, No. CV-11-3097, 2013 WL 5774880, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013) (“Although due process prohibits denial of access to the courts, a
prisoner does not have a constitutional right to attend the jury trial of his civil rights claim . . . .”)
(collecting cases). Indeed, to avoid further delay and imposition on law enforcement authorities
who are busy transporting individuals to criminal proceedings, it is more than likely that Plaintiff
will testify from a remote location. See id. at *2 (noting that the factors to be considered when
deciding whether to permit an incarcerated plaintiff to appear in person for trial include, inter
alia, “the costs and inconvenience of transporting a prisoner from his place of incarceration to the
courtroom” and “any potential danger or security risk which the presence of a particular inmate
would pose to the court.”) (quoting Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976)). In
any event, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to appear in civilian clothes. In the event that
Plaintiff testifies in person, the Court will defer to law enforcement professionals to determine
whether Plaintiff should be restrained. If Plaintiff testifies remotely, it is almost certain that he
will appear to the jury in a room that does not require the use of restraints. Accord Vaughan,
2013 WL 5774880, at *3 (noting that at least one court has found that allowing an incarcerated
plaintiff to participate at trial via videoconference “would actually ‘lessen the risk that the jury
would be prejudiced or misled’ by the presence in court of the security measures necessary to
secure public safety and the plaintiff’s continued confinement”) (quoting Oritz v. Burnias, No.
2:09-cv-0396, 2012 WL 3237161, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 7, 2021)).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
November 1, 2022
/s/ Anne Y. Shields
ANNE Y. SHIELDS
United States Magistrate Judge