Griffin v. Hon. James Doyle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

- --------------------------------------- X

RAYMOND GRIFFIN,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

12-CV-4359(JS)(GRB)

-against-

HON. JAMES DOYLE, individually and

in his official capacity; HON.

MICHAEL MULLEN, individually and

in his official capacity; DA

THOMAS J. SPOTA, individual and

in his official capacity; 18-B

ATTORNEY CHRISTOPHER BROCATO,

individually and in his official

capacity; JEFFREY LANGLAN,

individually and in his official

capacity; ROSALIND C. GRAY,

individually and in her official

capacity; BRIAN RAFFERTY,

individually and in his official

capacity; LAURAN TAN, individually

and in her official capacity; JAMES

HARNETT, Legal Aid, individually

and in his official capacity;

JOSEPH N. BRITELLI, Detective,

individually and in his official

capacity; JOSEPH C. LOEFFLER,

Detective, individually and in his

official capacity; KEVIN J. EARLY,

Detective, individually and in his

official capacity; WILLIAM R.

MALDONADO, Detective, individually

and in his official capacity; KEITH

JORDAN; ARRESTING OFFICER ID SPD

33418, Suffolk County Police

Officer, individually and in his

official capacity; ERIC T.

SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General,

individually and in his official

capacity; BRIAN J. O’DONNELL,

individually and in his official

capacity; MONICA A. CONNELL,

individually and in her official

capacity; CHARLES SANDERS,

individually and in his official

capacity; BRIAN FISCHER,

Department of Correctional and

Community Supervision

Commissioner, individually and in

his official capacity; ANDREA

EVANS, New York State Division of

Parole Chairwoman; LISABETH

ELOVICH, Parole Board

Commissioner; CHRISTINA HERNANDEZ;

KEVIN LUDLOW; HENRY LEMONS; JAMES

FERGUSON; MICHAELA HAGLAR; WALTER

SMITH JR.; COMMISSIONER SALLY

THOMPSON, individually and in

their official capacities;

YAPHANK CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

WARDEN, SUPERINTENDENT, OR

SHERIFF, individually and in their

official capacity; BRUCE S. YELICH,

Superintendent of Barehill

Correctional Facility, individually

and in his official capacity;

LAURIE ANN FOBARE, Law Library

Correctional Officer, individually

and in her official capacity;

SERGEANT KELLY, individually and in

his official capacity; D-1

DORMITORY OFFICER CLARK AND

DECOSSE, individually and in their

official capacities; JOHN AND JANE

DOES, individually and in their

official capacities,

Defendants.

- -------------------------------------- X

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Raymond Griffin, -pr-o- -se-

708 Corporate Drive

Goldsboro, NC 27534

For Legal Aid

Defendants: Wendy B. Shepps, Esq.

Podvey, Meanor, Catenacci, Hildner,

Cocoziello & Chattman, PC

570 Lexington Avenue

New York, New York

10022

State Defendants: Marsha W. Yee, Esq.

NYS Office of the Attorney General

200 Old Country Road, Suite 240

Mineola, New York 11501

Dorothy O. Nese, Esq.

Office of the New York State

Attorney General

200 Old Country Road, Suite 460

Mineola, New York 11501

County Defendants: Megan E. O’Donnell, Esq.

Suffolk County Attorney’s Office

H. Lee Dennison Building

100 Veterans Memorial Highway

P.O. Box 6100

Hauppauge, New York 11788

Officer 34418,

John Doe,

and Jane Doe: No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Pending before the Court is a motion by pro se Plaintiff

Raymond Griffin (“Plaintiff”) seeking: (1) an extension of time to

file an appeal, and (2) permission to proceed in forma pauperis.

(See Mot., ECF No. 81.) For the reasons that follow, the motion

is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The Court presumes familiarity with the underlying facts

of this case, which are discussed at length in its prior decisions.

(See June 30, 2014 Memorandum & Order (“M&O”), ECF No. 59; Feb.

10, 2016 Order (“February 2016 Order”), ECF No. 78.)

By way of its February 2016 Order, the Court denied

Plaintiff’s underlying motion to reopen this case and to reconsider

its dismissal of this action pursuant to its June 30, 2014 Order.

On March 8, 2016, Plaintiff timely appealed the Court’s February

2016 Order; however, he did so in the Second Circuit, moving for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (hereafter, the “IFP

Application”) and seeking an enlargement of time to file his appeal

(hereafter, the “Extension Request”; together with the IFP

Application, the “Appeal Motion”). (See Appeal Motion, ECF No.

81.) In accordance with Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, Plaintiff’s appeal was transmitted to this

Court for filing. (See Second Circuit Mar. 10, 2016 Transmittal

Letter, ECF No. 82.) The Court construes the Extension Request as

a notice of appeal of its February 2016, Order.

In his Extension Request, Plaintiff outlines appellate

arguments that he intends to present on appeal and requests

“plenary review” of these issues. (Appeal Motion at 16.) In his

IFP Application, Plaintiff asserts “that [his] appeal of D.E #78

is [taken] in good faith,” and that he is “financially unstable.”

(Id. at 7.) Notably, Plaintiff failed to file any documentary

evidence of his indigency along with his Appeal Motion. While the

Court did not explicitly certify that any appeal of its February

2016 Order would not be taken in good faith, it did so in its June

2014 M&O, stating that IFP status would not be granted for the

purposes of appeal because such appeal “would not be taken in good

faith.” (June 2014 M&O at 25-26.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Extension Request

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A),

“[i]n any civil case . . . [a] notice of appeal . . . must be

filed with the district clerk within thirty days after entry of

the judgment or order appealed from.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A)

(emphasis added). Since Plaintiff filed his Appeal Motion –-

construed as his Notice of Appeal -— twenty-seven days after the

Court’s denial of his motion to reopen, said Notice was timely.

Hence, his Extension Request unnecessary. Accordingly, to the

extent the Appeal Motion seeks an Extension Request, the Motion is

DENIED as MOOT.1

II. Plaintiff’s IFP Application

“The decision of whether to grant a request

to proceed in forma pauperis is left to the

District Court’s discretion under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. The Court’s discretion is limited in

that: ‘An appeal may not be taken in forma

pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing

that it is not taken in good faith.’” Fridman

v. City of New York, 195 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536

(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3)) (internal citations omitted); see

also FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(3)(A) (“A

party . . . may proceed on appeal in forma

pauperis . . . unless the district

court . . . certifies that the appeal is not

taken in good faith . . . .”). The standard for

“good faith” in pursuing an appeal is an

objective one. See Coppedge v. United States,

369 U.S. 438, 445, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d

1 Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks an extension of time to

file an appeal regarding this Court’s June 2014 M&O, such a request

21 (1962) (“We consider a defendant’s good

faith . . . demonstrated when he seeks

appellate review of an issue not frivolous.”);

see also Linden v. Harper & Row Publishers, 490

F. Supp. 297, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying

objective “good faith” standard to civil case).

Burda Media Inc. v. Blumenberg, 731 F. Supp. 2d 321, 322–23 (S.D.N.Y.

2010).

In its February 2016 Order, the Court noted that

“Plaintiff ma[de] only general and unsupported objections to the

June 2014 Order,” and that he did “not raise any issues that were

not already considered and ruled upon.” His motion for

reconsideration was yet another attempt by Plaintiff to re-raise

arguments that were already considered and rejected by the Court.

As is well-settled, arguments of this sort are inappropriately

raised in a motion to reconsider. See Wechsler v. Hunt Health

Sys., Ltd., 186 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[A] motion

for reconsideration ‘will generally be denied unless the moving

party can point to controlling decisions or data that . . . might

reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the

court.’”)

Since Plaintiff failed to raise any controlling law or

data not already considered by the Court, any appeal of the

February 2016 Order would not be taken in good faith. See

Coppedge, 369 U.S. at 444-45. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to

proceed IFP for the purposes of an appeal is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

A. The Extension Request portion of the Appeal Motion, seeking

an extension of time to file an appeal of this Court’s

February 2016 Order, is DENIED AS MOOT; and

B. The IFP Application portion of Plaintiff’s Appeal Motion,

seeking to proceed with his appeal of this Court’s February

10, 2016 Order without prepaying fees and costs is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: October 26, 2022

Central Islip, New York