Kiryat Belz Jerusalem v. Massachusets Mutual Life Insurance Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

KIRYAT BELZ JERUSALEM,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM & ORDER

20-CV-05810 (HG) (TAM)

MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Kiryat Belz Jerusalem (“Kiryat Belz”) brings this action against Defendant

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (“MassMutual”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332

for: (i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and

(iii) a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff is entitled to death benefits under two life insurance

policies. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking

dismissal of the complaint. ECF Nos. 29, 32, 33. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

Kiryat Belz is a charitable organization located in Brooklyn, NY, supported by the Belz

community. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl.’s 56.1”),1 ECF

No. 32-5 at 1. “In order to pay back various debts that the organization incurred from members

of the community, Kiryat Belz solicited donations of the beneficial interests in life policies that

were owned by members of the community.” Id. at 2. Through this program, members of the

1 Unless otherwise specified, the Court cites to the undisputed statements of fact in

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement. See ECF No. 32-5.

Belz community donated their life insurance policies to Kiryat Belz. Following the donor’s

death, some or all of the death benefit under the donated policy would be distributed to Kiryat

Belz. Id. In exchange, Kiryat Belz agreed to pay the insurance premium on behalf of the donors.

Id.

On July 2, 2007, MassMutual issued a Flexible Premium Adjustable Life Insurance

Policy (“Policy No. 84”) insuring the life of non-party Magdalena Knopfler. Kiryat Belz was a

partial beneficiary under the policy. Id. at 3. Policy No. 84 provided a death benefit of $600,000

and required a “planned periodic premium” of $5,700, payable quarterly. Id. On September 4,

2007, MassMutual issued a second Flexible Premium Adjustable Life Insurance Policy (“Policy

No. 27”), insuring the life of Ms. Knopfler and again listing Kiryat Belz as a partial beneficiary.

Id. at 4. Policy No. 27 provided a death benefit of $350,000 and required a “planned periodic

premium” of $3,400, payable quarterly. Id. at 4. In January 2008, Kiryat Belz “took over

ownership and control” of Policy No. 84 and Policy No. 27 (together, “Policies”) and was

thereafter “responsible for paying the premium for both Policies.” Id. at 5.

The Policies had a flexible payment structure—this permitted Kiryat Belz to pay into a

premium account when it chose, rather than requiring it to make premium payments on a specific

date. The Policies remained effective so long as each policy maintained a sufficient account

value to pay the monthly premium. Id. at 5; see also Flexible Premium Life Adjustable Life

Insurance Policy Application Materials for Policy No. 84, ECF No. 30-3 at 3 (“After the first

premium has been paid, there is no requirement that any specific amount of premium be paid on

any date. Instead, within the limits stated in the policy, any amount may be paid on any date

during the lifetime of the Insured.”); ECF No. 30-4 at 4 (identical language with respect to Policy

No. 27). However, if the account value was insufficient to cover the monthly premium, the

policy risked being terminated and entered a grace period during which the policyholder was

given 61 days to pay the past due premium. See ECF No. 30-3 at 7 (“This policy [Policy No. 84]

may terminate without value if, on any Monthly Charge Date, the account value is not sufficient

to cover the monthly charges due. . . . However, we allow a grace period for payment of the

amount of premium . . . needed to avoid termination. The grace period begins on the date the

monthly charges are due. It ends 61 days after that date or, if later, 31 days after [MassMutual]

mail[s] a written notice to the Owner and to any assignee shown in our records at their last

known addresses.”); ECF No. 30-4 at 7 (identical language with respect to Policy No. 27). If

MassMutual did not receive the required premium by the end of the 61-day grace period, it could

terminate the policy. Id. Both Policies “provided that MassMutual would ‘credit each net

premium to the account value of th[e] policy on the date [MassMutual] receive[s] the premium

payment.’” ECF No. 32-5 at 6 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).

On June 5, 2019, MassMutual sent a notice to Kiryat Belz at its mailing address stating

that “life insurance [Policy No. 27] is in danger of terminating” and “is in its grace period as a

result of not having met the required premium or account value to keep the policy in force.”

ECF Nos. 30-19 at 2 (Special Notice), 32-5 at 20. The notice warned that if a premium of

$4,099.85 was not received by August 6, 2019, Policy No. 27 would be terminated. ECF Nos.

30-19 at 2 (Special Notice), 32-5 at 20. On July 8, 2019, MassMutual sent a second notice to

Kiryat Belz indicating that it had not received the premium payment necessary to keep Policy

No. 27 in effect and once again warned Plaintiff that the policy was in danger of being

terminated on August 6, 2019. ECF Nos. 30-20 at 2 (second Special Notice), 32-5 at 21.

Defendant alleges (and Plaintiff does not dispute) that it did not receive the premium payment

necessary to keep the policy in force by August 6, 2019 and, thereafter, sent Kiryat Belz a

termination letter on that date, “explaining that coverage had expired because there was

insufficient value to cover the monthly charges.” ECF Nos. 32-5 at 21–22, 30-21 at 2

(Termination Notice).

With respect to Policy No. 84, MassMutual sent Kiryat Belz an annual policy statement,

“which provided that if no further premiums were paid after July 2, 2019, [Policy No. 84] would

terminate without value on that date.” ECF Nos. 32-5 at 12, 30-15 at 5 (Policy No. 84 Annual

Report). On July 3, 2019, as it did with Policy No. 27, MassMutual sent a notice to Kiryat Belz

at its mailing address stating that “life insurance [Policy No. 84] is in danger of terminating” and

“is in its grace period as a result of not having met the required premium or account value to

keep the policy in force.” ECF Nos. 30-16 at 2 (Special Notice), 32-5 at 13. The notice warned

that if a premium of $6,836.46 was not received by September 6, 2019, Policy No. 84 would be

terminated. ECF Nos. 30-16 at 2 (Special Notice), 32-5 at 13. On August 8, 2019, MassMutual

sent a second notice to Kiryat Belz indicating that it had not received the premium payment

necessary to keep the Policy No. 84 in effect and once again warned that the policy was in

danger of being terminated on September 6, 2019. ECF Nos. 30-17 at 2 (second Special Notice),

32-5 at 14. Defendant alleges (and Plaintiff does not dispute) that it did not receive the premium

payment necessary to keep the policy in force by September 6, 2019 and, thereafter, sent Kiryat

Belz a termination letter “explaining that coverage had expired because there was insufficient

value to cover the monthly charges.” ECF Nos. 32-5 at 15, 30-18 at 2 (Termination Notice).

MassMutual alleges that it received a check in the mail on November 13, 2019, for

$6,836.46 from Kiryat Belz intended for Policy No. 84. ECF No. 32-5 at 25. The check was

dated July 15, 2019. Id.; ECF No. 30-23 at 2 (image of check). MassMutual further alleges it

received a second check in the mail on November 14, 2019, for $4,099.85 from Kiryat Belz

intended for Policy No. 27. ECF No. 32-5 at 25. That check was also dated July 15, 2019. Id.;

ECF No. 30-22 at 2 (image of check). Kiryat Belz alleges that both checks “were sent via

regular mail within a week of the date given on the checks and has no knowledge as to what

caused any delay in the receipt of the checks.” ECF No. 32-5 at 25–26. On the days the checks

were received, “MassMutual’s system attempted to apply the payments, but a rejection notice

was automatically generated by the system after the payment was rejected” because both Policies

had already been terminated on August 6, 2019 (Policy No. 27), and September 6, 2019 (Policy

No. 84). ECF No. 32-5 at 29. MassMutual immediately returned the two checks to Kiryat Belz.

ECF No. 32-5 at 30.

On December 19, 2019, a Kiryat Belz representative called MassMutual to inquire about

the process for reinstating both Policies. ECF No. 32-5 at 30. MassMutual emailed the

representative explaining the reinstatement process and attaching the necessary documents. Id.;

ECF No. 30-33 at 2 (email between MassMutual and Kiryat Belz). Kiryat Belz never submitted

a reinstatement application. ECF No. 32-5 at 30. On April 6, 2020, Ms. Knopfler passed away.

ECF Nos. 32-5 at 30, 30-34 at 2 (death certificate). On June 11, 2020, Kiryat Belz submitted a

claim for death benefits under both Policies. ECF Nos. 32-5 at 31, 30-35 at 2 (Life Insurance

Claim Form). MassMutual did not pay the death benefit for either policy because the Policies

had lapsed prior to Ms. Knopfler’s death. ECF No. 32-5 at 31.

On December 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint. On June 21, 2022, Defendant

filed its motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 28. On July 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed its

opposition. ECF No. 32. On July 29, 2022, Defendant filed its reply. ECF No. 33.

LEGAL STANDARD

The interpretation of an insurance policy presents a question of law that can appropriately

be resolved through a motion for summary judgment. See Vam Check Cashing Corp. v. Fed. Ins.

Co., 787 F. Supp. 2d 264, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247 (1986). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “Where the moving

party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must come

forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material

fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, any ambiguities and inferences drawn from the

facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. LaFond v. Gen.

Physics Servs. Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 1995). In reviewing the evidence and inferences

that may reasonably be drawn, the court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the

evidence . . . . Credibility determinations . . . [are a] jury function[ ], not [that] of a judge.”

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment for the following reasons: (i) the

breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law because Defendant did not receive the necessary

premium payments for the Policies until after they had lapsed; (ii) the claim for breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is duplicative of Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim; and (iii) the declaratory relief claim fails because the requested relief necessarily overlaps

with the issues to be resolved in the litigation. The Court agrees and grants Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment in its entirety.

I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract

Claim Is Granted

“A federal action based upon diversity jurisdiction, brought to recover under an insurance

policy, is governed by state law.” Vam Check, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 268. Neither party disputes

that New York law applies here. See ECF Nos. 29 at 15, 32 at 8. “Under New York law, ‘an

insurance contract is interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the clear

language of the contract.’ If the contract language is ‘clear and unambiguous,’ courts will

simply enforce the contract ‘as written.’ On the other hand, ‘if the policy language is

ambiguous, . . . the ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured.’” Jeffrey M. Dressel,

D.D.S., P.C. v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-2777, 2021 WL 1091711, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22,

2021) (quoting Vill. of Sylvan Beach, N.Y. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 55 F.3d 114, 115 (2d Cir.

1995)).

Plaintiff alleges that the Policies constitute valid contracts and Defendant was under a

duty to provide the death benefits to Plaintiff, but unlawfully refused to do so. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 23–

27. The undisputed facts show that: (i) the terms of the Policies provide that MassMutual would

“credit each net premium to the account value of th[e] policy on the date [MassMutual]

receive[s] the premium payment,” ECF No. 32-5 at 6 (emphasis added) (alterations in original);

(ii) both Policies provide that “[m]onthly charges are deducted from the value of th[e] policy

each month. If the value cannot cover the monthly charges for a month, the policy may

terminate 61 days after the due date,” id. at 12, 18 (emphasis added); (iii) Defendant sent

Plaintiff initial grace-period notices dated June 5, 2019 and July 3, 2019 warning Plaintiff that

each policy “is in its grace period as a result of not having met the required premium or account

value to keep the policy in force” and that if MassMutual did not receive payment by August 6,

2019 and September 6, 2019, the policies would be terminated, ECF Nos. 30-16 at 2 (Special

Notice for Policy No. 84), 30-19 at 2 (Special Notice for Policy No. 27); (iv) MassMutual sent a

second round of notices on July 8, 2019 and August 8, 2019, once again warning Plaintiff that if

Defendant did not receive the necessary premium payments, the Policies would terminate, on

August 6, 2019 and September 6, 2019, ECF Nos. 30-17 at 2 (second Special Notice for Policy

No. 84), 30-20 at 2 (second Special Notice for Policy No. 27); (v) on August 6, 2019, 62 days

after it sent its initial grace-period notice regarding Policy No. 27, Defendant sent Plaintiff a

letter informing it that “the coverage provided by [Policy No. 27] has expired because there was

not sufficient value to cover the June 4, 2019 monthly charges,” ECF No. 30-21 at 2

(Termination Notice); (vi) on September 6, 2019, 65 days after it sent its initial grace-period

notice regarding Policy No. 84, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter informing it that “the coverage

provided by [Policy No. 84] has expired because there was not sufficient value to cover the July

2, 2019 monthly charges,” ECF No. 30-18 at 2 (Termination Notice); and (vii) for reasons

unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Defendant did not receive the payments for Policy No. 84 until

November 13, 2019 and Policy No. 27 until November 14, 2019, see ECF No. 32-5 at 25.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law because

the unequivocal terms of the Policies establish that a premium payment must be received by

MassMutual prior to the end of the grace period, which did not occur here. ECF No. 29 at 16–

18. The Court agrees that the language of the Policies is clear and unambiguous: the Policies

require receipt of the premium prior to the end of the grace period. Plaintiff argues that it “has

consistently testified that payments pursuant to any applicable grace-period notices were sent

within a week of the date given on the relevant checks” and that “issues of fact remain as to

when and where [the checks] were actually received and deposited by MassMutual.” ECF No.

32 at 10–11. This argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant received

the checks after the Policies were terminated. Rather, it merely alleges that “the checks were

sent via regular mail within a week of the date given on the checks and [Plaintiff] has no

knowledge as to what caused any delay in the receipt of the checks.” ECF No. 32-5 at 25–26.

The Policies, however, unambiguously provide that MassMutual would credit the accounts on

the date it received the insurance premium payments. ECF No. 32-5 at 6. As such, MassMutual

was entitled to terminate the Policies and the dates reflected on the checks are of no

consequence. See Zamora-Leon v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. 15-cv-9206, 2017 WL

4155403, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2017) (granting summary judgment to insurer where it did

not receive premium prior to due date and finding that language of policy controlled).

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant did not comply with the requirements of New

York Insurance Law § 3203(a)(1) because the “notices that the Policies have entered a grace

period were ambiguous and thus defective.” ECF No. 32 at 3. Under New York law, where life

insurance policies have flexible payment arrangements, as is the case here, “after payment of the

first premium, the policyholder is entitled to a sixty-one day grace period, beginning on the day

when the insurer determines that the policy’s net cash surrender value is insufficient to pay the

total charges necessary to keep the policy in force . . . .” N.Y. Ins. Law § 3203(a)(1) (2021).

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant provided more than the 61-day grace period for each

policy, see ECF No. 32-5 at 15, 22, but instead argues that it is not clear from the notices when

the grace period began. See ECF No. 32 at 11 (“The presence of this ambiguity, and construing

it in favor of Plaintiff, rendered the second notices defective and thus restarted the 61-day grace

period.”). The Court disagrees that it is not clear when the grace period began. Each of the

initial notices clearly states: “Your life insurance policy is in danger of terminating. It is in its

grace period as a result of not having met the required premium or account value to keep the

policy in force.” ECF Nos. 30-16 at 2 (Special Notice for Policy No. 84), 30-19 at 2 (Special

Notice for Policy No. 27) (bold text in original). These notices are clearly dated, explain when

the last premium was received, and provide that the Policies will terminate on August 6, 2019,

and September 6, 2019, if the premium is not received. Id. The second notices provide, “[w]e

have previously notified you that your policy is in its grace period. To date, we have not

received a payment from you. As a result, your life insurance policy is in danger of

terminating.” ECF Nos. 30-17 at 2 (second Special Notice for Policy No. 84), 30-20 at 2

(second Special Notice for Policy No. 27) (bold text in original). The notices are also clearly

dated and provide that if payment is not received by August 6, 2019, and September 6, 2019, the

Policies will terminate. Id. From that evidence, Plaintiff could easily have deduced when the

grace period began—no jury could reasonably find differently. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

Nevertheless, even if the Court were to agree with Plaintiff that the notices are unclear,

—which it does not—New York Insurance Law § 3203(a)(1) only requires that Plaintiff be

provided with a 61-day grace period, it does not require that the information concerning the start

of the grace period be presented in a specific manner. See Stein v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 34 F.

Supp. 3d 224, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that exact wording of a grace-period notice is not

necessary “as long as the information intended to be provided is conveyed”) (citation omitted).

Defendant provided Plaintiff with a 62-day (Policy No. 27) and a 65-day (Policy No. 84) grace

period. Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds that Defendant was within its rights

under the terms of the Policies to terminate the Policies and therefore grants Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

II. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Breach of the Implied

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim Is Granted

“Under New York law, parties to an express contract are bound by an implied duty of

good faith, but breach of that duty is merely a breach of the underlying contract.” GEICO

Marine Ins. Co. v. Mandel, No. 19-cv-3107, 2020 WL 6318948, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18,

2020) (quoting Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, 720 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013)). “New York

law . . . does not recognize a separate cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing when a breach of contract claim, based upon the same facts, is also pled.”

GEICO Marine Ins., 2020 WL 6318948, at *10 (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant owed it a “duty to act in good faith and conduct fair dealing” and that Defendant

breached that duty by causing the Policies to lapse and failing to provide any amount of the death

benefits under the Policies. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 32–33. This claim is premised on Defendant’s alleged

breach of contract for failing to provide the death benefits under the Policies. Id. ¶ 33. “No new

or different allegations elaborate upon the basis for the implied covenant claim. Plaintiff also

prays for the same damages, in identically-worded paragraphs, with respect to these claims.”

Smith v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 20-cv-4125, 2021 WL 4904572, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21,

2021); compare ECF No. 1 ¶ 29, with id. ¶ 34 (comparing identically worded paragraphs with

respect to damages in the complaint). See also Jane St. Holding, LLC v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co., No.

13-cv-2291, 2014 WL 28600, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2014), aff’d, 581 F. App’x 49 (2d Cir.

2014) (“When the alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is

intrinsically tied to the damages allegedly resulting from the breach of the insurance contract,

those claims are redundant.”).

“As in all contracts, implicit in contracts of insurance is a covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, such that a reasonable insured would understand that the insurer promises to investigate

in good faith and pay covered claims. However, an insurer is not liable in excess of the policy

limits for the breach of an insurance contract absent bad faith.” Jane St., 2014 WL 28600, at *10

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff implicitly alleges that Defendant acted

in bad faith by terminating the Policies “without justification.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 33. Plaintiff’s

claim rests solely on Defendant’s refusal to pay the death benefits. “Mere difference of opinion

between an insurer and an insured over the availability of coverage does not constitute bad faith;

to show bad faith the insured must demonstrate that no reasonable carrier would, under the given

facts deny coverage.” Jane St., 2014 WL 28600, at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has not “shown sufficient evidence or sufficiently pled allegations to support an

inference of bad faith.” Id. at *11. To the contrary, the undisputed facts show that MassMutual:

(i) sent Plaintiff two notices with respect to each life insurance policy warning of possible

termination, ECF No. 32-5 at 13–15, 20–22; (ii) terminated the Policies according to their

express terms, id.; and (iii) sent Plaintiff information about reinstating the Policies after Plaintiff

inquired, id. at 30. The allegations here present nothing more than a straightforward dispute over

the terms of a contract, and fall well short of alleging bad faith. Accordingly, the Court finds

Plaintiff’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim to be duplicative

of its breach of contract claim and grants summary judgment dismissing the claim on this basis.

III. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Declaratory Relief Claim

Is Granted

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that “there exists a valid agreement which

designates Plaintiff as beneficiary of the life insurance polici[es of Magdalena Knopfler].” ECF

No. 1 ¶¶ 37–38. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy

within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other

legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or

could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “In exercising its discretion over whether to adjudicate a

declaratory judgment claim, a district court must determine (1) whether the judgment will serve a

useful purpose in clarifying or settling the legal issues involved and (2) whether a judgment

would finalize the controversy and offer relief from uncertainty.” Ambac Assurance Corp. v.

U.S. Nat’l Assoc., No. 21-cv-70, 2021 WL 6060710, at *5 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2021) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

“[C]ourts have found declaratory judgment to be inappropriate where a party has already

invoked its right to a coercive remedy. Thus, courts have deemed [a] cause of action for a

declaratory judgment [a]s unnecessary and inappropriate when the plaintiff has an adequate,

alternative remedy in another form of action, such as breach of contract.” Zam & Zam Super

Mkt., LLC v. Ignite Payments, LLC, No. 16-cv-6370, 2017 WL 6729854, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.

31, 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). Here, the

Court finds that no useful purpose would be served by granting declaratory relief because this

claim is duplicative of the breach of contract claim. See Ambac, 2021 WL 6060710, at *5

(affirming district court’s dismissal of request for declaratory judgment which was duplicative of

breach of contract claim). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Hector Gonzalez_______

HECTOR GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

October 25, 2022