Woods v. Sturim

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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LUMUMBA K. WOODS,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 22-CV-4389(JS)(AYS)

HON. HOWARD STURIM, Presiding

Judge; HON. NORMAN ST. GEORGE,

Administrative Judge; HON. TERESSA

K. CORRIGAN, Supervising Judge;

HON. JOHN DOE, Supreme Court Judge;

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Lumumba K. Woods, pro se

CC# 2020002259

Nassau County Correctional Center

100 Carman Avenue

East Meadow, New York 11554

For Defendants: No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Before the Court is the application to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2) filed by incarcerated pro se plaintiff

Lumumba K. Woods (“Plaintiff”) in connection with his Complaint

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against four

Nassau County Supreme Court, or acting-Supreme Court, justices:

Hon. Howard Sturim, Presiding Judge (“Judge Sturim”); Hon. Norman

St. George, Administrative Judge (“Judge St. George”); Hon.

Teressa K. Corrigan, Supervising Judge (“Judge Corrigan”); and

Hon. John Doe, Supreme Court Judge (“Judge Doe” and collectively,

“Defendants”). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s IFP

application is GRANTED; however, the Complaint is DISMISSED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A.1

BACKGROUND

I. The Complaint2

Plaintiff utilized the Court’s form Section 1983

complaint and attached an additional seven handwritten pages, as

well as twelve pages of exhibits. Generally, Plaintiff seeks to

challenge his on-going state court criminal prosecution.3 (See

generally Compl.) Plaintiff complains that he “was denied his

right to defend himself pro se in violation of his 6th amendment

rights” and was further denied the “right to file other civil

actions in court that have a reasonable basis in law and fact in

violation of his First Amendment rights.” (Id. at 7.) More

1 Together with his IFP application, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

an Order to Show Cause seeking a Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 6) and a Request for a Certificate

of Default (ECF No. 8). In light of the Court’s dismissal of the

Complaint, these applications are DENIED.

2 Excerpts from the Complaint are reproduced here exactly as they

appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and

grammar have not been corrected or noted.

3 According to the information maintained by the New York State

Office of Court Administration on its public website, Plaintiff

pled not guilty on September 21, 2021 to a six count indictment

which included felony charges of recklessly causing serious

physical injury to another person with a deadly weapon or a

dangerous instrument in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 120.5(4) and

vehicular assault in the second degree in violation of N.Y. Penal

Law § 120.03(1). See https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcrim_at

torney (last visited on October 11, 2022).

specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, after his application for

reassignment of defense counsel was granted, in open court and

while holding Plaintiff’s reassignment of counsel application,

Judge Sturim stated: “[N]o more of these . . . I have two talented

prosecutors here that will use what you say against you, do you

understand me?” (Id. at 9.) According to the Complaint, Plaintiff

responded “yes” because he felt “threatened.” (Id.) Next,

Plaintiff complains that he “filed an order to produce with the

Supreme Court . . . [but] was not produced and the motion was not

heard upon receipt.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff also complains that

his bail application and “two of [his] habeus corpus writs” were

denied by Judge Sturim. (Id. at 10-11.)

Regarding Plaintiff’s claims against Judge St. George

and Judge Corrigan, Plaintiff alleges that they each had “indirect

participation” in the challenged conduct of the other Defendants

due to the supervisory positions they hold as Administrative Judge

and Supervising Judge, respectively. (Id. at 8, 12.) Plaintiff’s

only allegation in the Complaint pertaining to Judge Doe is that

he “[f]ailed to act by not entertaining a protected action.” (Id.

at 12.)

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff alleges that his

injuries are “the adverse consequences which flow from the

petitioners constitutionally protected action.” (Id.; Infra

§ II.A. at 4.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks an order releasing him

on his own recognizance, punitive damages in the sum of $1,000

against each Defendant in their individual capacities, and a

declaratory judgment in his favor. (Id. at 6.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Application is Granted

The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence this action without prepayment of the

filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

IFP application is GRANTED.

II. Relevant Legal Standards

A. Consideration of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915,

1915A

Section 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an in

forma pauperis complaint if the action: (1) “is frivolous or

malicious;” (2) “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 1915A(b). An action is frivolous as a

matter of law when, inter alia, it is based on “an indisputably

meritless legal theory . . . it lacks an arguable basis in

law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists on the

face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,

141 F.3d 437-38 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court is required to dismiss

the action as soon as it makes such a determination. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A; Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se

plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the “strongest

[claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Harris v. Mills, 572

F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

B. The Court Abstains from Adjudicating Plaintiff’s Claims

Seeking Injunctive Relief

As a threshold matter, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s

requests for injunctive relief. Pursuant to Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its progeny, the Court must abstain from

adjudicating such claims.4 In Younger, the Supreme Court concluded

that although federal courts have the power to enjoin state

criminal proceedings “when absolutely necessary for protection of

constitutional rights . . . this may not be done, except under

extraordinary circumstances, where the danger of irreparable loss

is both great and immediate.” 401 U.S. 37 at 45. In Sprint

4 Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, his release from incarceration.

(See Compl. at 6.) However, the Supreme Court has established

that habeas relief is the exclusive remedy in federal court for a

state prisoner seeking release from custody. See Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding that when a prisoner

is challenging “the very fact or duration of his physical

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he

is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that

imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus”).

Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, the Supreme Court clarified that

Younger abstention is required in one of three types of state court

proceedings:

First, Younger precludes federal intrusion

into ongoing state criminal prosecutions.

Second, certain civil enforcement proceedings

warrant[ ] abstention. Finally, federal

courts should refrain from interfering with

pending civil proceedings involving certain

orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the

state courts’ ability to perform their

judicial functions.

571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see also Lowell v. Vermont Dep’t of Children & Families,

No. 19-CV-3987, 2020 WL 7038598, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 2020)

(affirming district court’s application of Younger abstention).

Here, insofar as Plaintiff seeks to have this Court

intervene in the on-going state court criminal proceedings against

him, this Court must abstain. The injunctive relief Plaintiff

seeks, which consists of releasing him from incarceration and a

declaration that certain state court orders were erroneously

decided (see Compl. at 10-12), would surely constitute “federal

intrusion into ongoing state criminal proceedings.” Sprint

Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 70. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege any

facts that would bring his case within any exception to the general

requirement that the federal court must abstain from intervening

in, or enjoining, pending state criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,

London v. Nassau Cnty Dist. Att’ys Off., No. 20-CV-3988, 2020 WL

7699644, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2020) (Seybert, D.J.) (finding

that “releasing Plaintiff from incarceration as sought by

Plaintiff would surely constitute federal intrusion into ongoing

state criminal proceedings”) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court ABSTAINS from

adjudicating Plaintiff’s constitutional claims seeking injunctive

relief due to his pending criminal case.

C. Plaintiff’s Remaining Damages Claims

1. Immunity

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law

or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one

of the United States by Citizens of another

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI. “The reach of the Eleventh Amendment

has . . . been interpreted to extend beyond the terms of its text

to bar suits in federal courts against states, by their own

citizens or by foreign sovereigns . . . .” State Emp’s.

Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2007)

(quoting W. Mohegan Tribe & Nation v. Orange Cnty, 395 F.3d 18, 20

(2d Cir. 2004)) (alterations in original). Eleventh Amendment

immunity also extends to suits for money damages against state

officials in their official capacities. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As

such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”

(internal citation omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff seeks money damages against Defendants,

who are state officials, for conduct undertaken in their official

capacities. Thus, Plaintiff’s damages claims are clearly barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Gilhooly v. Quiros, 21-CV-

0140, 2022 WL 252410, at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 27, 2022) (“Plaintiff’s

claims seeking compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants

in their official capacities for violating his federal

constitutional rights are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

Accordingly, such claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii), 1915A(b).

B. Judicial Immunity

“It is well settled that judges generally have absolute

immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions.”

Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations

omitted). The Supreme Court instructs that this immunity is “from

suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citation omitted). This immunity

applies to state court judges who are sued in federal court

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Pizzolato v. Baer, 551 F. Supp.

355, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

The 1996 Congressional amendments to § 1983 also bar

injunctive relief and provide that “‘in any action brought against

a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless

a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.’” Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999)

(per curiam) (quoting Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.

L. No. 104–317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996)(amending 42

U.S.C. § 1983)). Therefore, a judge is immune from all forms of

suit unless he or she has acted beyond his or her judicial

capacity, or “‘in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.’”

Bobrowsky v. Yonkers Courthouse, 777 F. Supp. 2d 692, 711 (S.D.N.Y.

2011) (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11).

Here, Plaintiff challenges various rulings made by Judge

Sturim during the underlying state court criminal prosecution. As

is readily apparent, the challenged rulings were made within Judge

Sturim’s judicial capacity and Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

from which the Court could reasonably find that Judge Sturim acted

beyond his judicial capacity or in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. (See generally Compl.) As such, Judge Sturim is

entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Similarly, to the extent

Plaintiff seeks to sue Judge St. George and Judge Corrigan in their

supervisory judicial roles,5 they too are entitled to absolute

judicial immunity. Since absolute “judicial immunity is not

overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice,” Mireles, 502 U.S.

at 11, Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants6 are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. See Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir.

2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial

immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the IFP statute].”).

C. Individual Capacity Claims

Although Plaintiff seeks to recover punitive damages

against Defendants in their individual capacities, Plaintiff’s

allegations make clear that he seeks to impose liability upon them

due to their respective roles within the New York State Court

System as related to his on-going criminal prosecution. As such,

5 Moreover, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Judge St.

George and Judge Corrigan in their supervisory capacities are not

plausible. As the Second Circuit recently made clear, in order

“[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must

plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional

violation directly against the official without relying on a

special test for supervisory liability.” Tangreti v. Bachmann,

983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff has not alleged any

conduct or inaction attributable to either Judge St. George or

Judge Corrigan, and Plaintiff seeks to impose Section 1983

liability upon them solely due to their supervisory roles within

the state court. Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against

Judge St. George and Judge Corrigan are DISMISSED pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b) for this additional reason.

6 Aside from alleging that Judge Doe “failed to act,” the Complaint

is devoid of any allegations against him. As such, not only is

Judge Doe immune from suit, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Doe

are dismissed for the same reasons his claims against Judge St.

George and Judge Corrigan are dismissed. (See supra note 7.)

for the reasons set forth above, Defendants are immune from suit

and Plaintiff has not alleged any plausible basis for individual

liability. While “[p]unitive damages are available in a § 1983

case ‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by

evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous

indifference to the federally protected rights of others,’” Mathie

v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 815 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Smith v. Wade,

461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)), Plaintiff’s scant allegations of conduct

or inaction attributable to Defendants are insufficient to allege

a cognizable individual capacity claim for punitive damages.

Consequently, such claims are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).

D. State Law Claims

To the extent Plaintiff asserts any state law claims,

the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such

claims. Federal courts “have supplemental jurisdiction over all

other claims that are so related to claims [over which the court

has] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Stated differently, “[t]he

state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of

operative fact.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 725 (1966). In deciding whether to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction, a district court should balance the “values of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie–

Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Generally,

“where the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state

claims should be dismissed as well.” Delaney v. Bank of America

Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2014).

Here, having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the

Court finds the factors of economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity do not support exercising supplemental jurisdiction over

any remaining state law claims. Accordingly, such claims are

DISMISSED without prejudice.

III. Leave to Amend

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an

opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects; however,

leave to amend is not required where an amendment would be futile.

See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011);

Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Since the

defects in Plaintiff’s Complaint cannot be cured with an amendment,

the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Plaintiff’s IFP application (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court ABSTAINS from

adjudicating Plaintiff’s claims seeking injunctive relief;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims seeking damages are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s state law claims

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3), any appeal from this Order would not be taken in

good faith. Therefore, in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the

purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.

438, 444-45 (1962); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall:

(1) Enter judgment accordingly;

(2) Close this case; and

(3) Mail a copy of this Memorandum & Order to Plaintiff at his

address of record, and include the notation “Legal Mail”

on the mailing envelope.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______

JOANNA SEYBERT, U.S.D.J.

Dated: October 13, 2022

Central Islip, New York