Martinez v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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DAMIEN MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

20-CV-6095 (KAM)

-against-

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

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KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Damien Martinez appeals the final decision of

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the

“Commissioner”), which found that Plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and thus

not entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplemental

security income under the Act. Plaintiff and the Commissioner

have cross moved for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons

set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED, the Commissioner’s

cross-motion is DENIED, and this action is REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND

The parties have filed a joint statement of stipulated

facts detailing Plaintiff’s medical history and the administrative

hearing testimony, which the court has reviewed and incorporates

by reference. (See ECF No. 25 (“Stip.”).) On August 25, 2017,

Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income, alleging disability due to type 1

diabetes, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression,

high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and kidney damage. (ECF

Nos. 29 to 29-1 (together, the “Administrative Record” or “A.R.”)

at 219-29, 248.) Plaintiff’s applications were denied on January

3, 2018. (Id. at 120-28.) On February 21, 2018, Plaintiff

requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. (Id. at

129-33.) ALJ Robert Schriver held a hearing on Plaintiff’s claims

on May 24, 2019, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert

testified. (Id. at 69-96.)

In a decision dated July 24, 2019, the ALJ concluded

that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Id. at 39-51.)

Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals

Council granted on June 11, 2020. (Id. at 201-13.) On November

2, 2020, the Appeals Council issued a decision adopting the ALJ’s

findings and concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the

Act. (Id. at 7-12.) The Appeals Council found that the ALJ

committed a legal error by failing to enter into the record and

consider records from Sparks Medical Center Van Buren regarding

Plaintiff’s inpatient treatment for diabetic ketoacidosis in

January 2017. (Id. at 7-8.) After reviewing the records from

Sparks Medical Center Van Buren, however, the Appeals Council

concluded that the records did not provide a basis for changing

the ALJ’s decision. (Id.) Accordingly, the Appeals Council

affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under

the Act. (Id. at 8.) On December 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed the

instant action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s

decision.

LEGAL STANDARD

Unsuccessful claimants for disability insurance benefits

or supplemental security income may bring an action in federal

court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of

benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3), 405(g). The reviewing court

does not have the authority to conduct a de novo review and may

not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even when it

might have justifiably reached a different result. Cage v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012). Rather, “[a]

district court may set aside the Commissioner’s determination that

a claimant is not disabled only if the factual findings are not

supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on

legal error.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008)

(internal quotations and citation omitted).

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla,”

and must be relevant evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362

F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See Brault

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The

substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, [the

court] can reject those facts ‘only if a reasonable factfinder

would have to conclude otherwise.’” (citations omitted)). If there

is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s

factual findings, those findings must be upheld. 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). Inquiry into legal error requires the court to ask whether

“the claimant has had a full hearing under the [Commissioner’s]

regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the

[Social Security] Act.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d

Cir. 2009) (quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)

(internal quotations omitted)).

To receive disability insurance benefits or supplemental

security income, a claimant must be “disabled” within the meaning

of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3)(A).1 A claimant

qualifies as disabled when he is unable to “engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id.; see

also Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2000). The

1 The statutory definitions of disability are identical under both Title II

Disability Insurance and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income Programs.

Compare 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) with 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3). Moreover, “[c]ases

under 42 U.S.C. § 423 are cited interchangeably with cases under 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3).” Lopez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-cv-7564(JGK), 2020 WL

364172, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2020).

impairment must be of “such severity” that the claimant is unable

to do his previous work or engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner set

forth a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining

whether a claimant meets the Act’s definition of “disabled.” See

20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The Commissioner’s process is essentially as

follows:

[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant

is not working, (2) that he has a “severe impairment,”

(3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix

1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a

determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant

is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work,

the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is

not another type of work the claimant can do.

Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Green-Younger v.

Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003)); accord 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(a)(4). During this five-step process, the Commissioner

must consider whether the combined effect of all of a claimant’s

impairments, including those that are not severe, would be of

sufficient severity to establish eligibility for Social Security

benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.923(c).

“The claimant has the general burden of proving . . .

his or her case at steps one through four of the sequential five-

step framework established in the SSA regulations.” Burgess, 537

F.3d at 128 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “However,

because a hearing on disability benefits is a nonadversarial

proceeding, the ALJ generally has an affirmative obligation to

develop the administrative record.” Id. (internal quotations and

citations omitted). “The burden falls upon the Commissioner at

the fifth step of the disability evaluation process to prove that

the claimant, if unable to perform her past relevant work, is able

to engage in gainful employment within the national economy [given

her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work

experience].” Sobolewski v. Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y.

1997).

“The Commissioner must consider the following in

determining a claimant’s entitlement to benefits: ‘(1) the

objective medical facts [and clinical findings]; (2) diagnoses or

medical opinions based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence of

pain or disability . . . ; and (4) the claimant’s educational

background, age, and work experience.’” Balodis v. Leavitt, 704

F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Brown v. Apfel, 174

F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999)).

THE APPEALS COUNCIL’S ADOPTION OF THE ALJ’S DISABILITY

DETERMINATION

Applying the five-step sequential process described

above, at step one the Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s finding

that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity on

or after May 1, 2014, the alleged onset date. (A.R. at 8.)

At step two, the Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s

finding that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, diabetes

mellitus, peripheral neuropathy, and asthma. (Id.) The Appeals

Council also adopted the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s diabetic

retinopathy did not qualify as a severe impairment. (Id.)

At step three, the Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s

finding that Plaintiff’s impairments, considered singly or in

combination, did not meet or medically equal the severity of the

listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

(Id.) The Appeals Council specifically adopted the ALJ’s findings

that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not meet or equal the

criteria for listing 12.04, “Depressive, Bipolar, and Related

Disorders,” or listing 12.15, “Trauma and Stressor Related

Disorders.” (Id.) In particular, the Appeals Council found that

Plaintiff had moderate limitations in understanding, remembering,

or applying information; mild limitations in interacting with

others; moderate limitations in concentrating, persisting, or

maintaining pace; and mild limitations in adapting or managing

oneself. (Id. at 8-9.)

At step four, the Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s

finding that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant

work as a sales attendant and a cashier. (Id. at 9.) The Appeals

Council adopted the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work as defined

in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a),2 except that Plaintiff

can perform only simple tasks; can make only simple work-related

decisions; and can have no exposure to respiratory irritants.

(A.R. at 9.)

At step five, the Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s

finding that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in

the national economy that Plaintiff could perform based on his

age, education, work experience, and RFC. In adopting the ALJ’s

finding, the Appeals Council relied on the testimony of a

vocational expert who testified that Plaintiff could perform

occupations such as charge-account clerk, order clerk, and call-

out operator. (Id. at 10.) Accordingly, the Appeals Council

adopted the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under

the Act and therefore was not entitled to disability insurance

benefits or supplemental security income. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ Failed To Adequately Explain His Reasons for

Discounting The Opinions of Plaintiff’s Treating Psychiatrist

Plaintiff argues that remand is warranted because the

ALJ failed to adequately explain his decision to discount the

2 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and

occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small

tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a

certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job

duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally

and other sedentary criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Faisal

Chaudhry. (ECF No. 24 (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 22-23.) The court agrees.

A. New Regulations Governing the Evaluation of Medical

Opinion Evidence

The SSA adopted new regulations effective March 27,

2017, revising the standard for evaluating medical opinion

evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. Because Plaintiff filed his

claims on August 25, 2017, the new regulations apply.

Under the new regulations, the Commissioner no longer

“defer[s]” or gives “controlling weight” to a claimant’s treating

medical sources. Id. § 416.920c(a). Instead, when evaluating the

persuasiveness of medical opinions, the Commissioner considers the

following five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3)

the relationship of the medical source with the claimant (taking

into account the length of the treatment relationship, the

frequency of examinations, the purpose of the treatment

relationship, the extent of the treatment relationship, and

whether the relationship is an examining relationship); (4) the

medical source’s specialization; and (5) other factors, including,

but not limited to, “evidence showing [the] medical source has

familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an

understanding of [the SSA] disability program’s policies and

evidentiary requirements.” Id. § 416.920c(c).

Supportability and consistency are the most important

factors in evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion.

Id. § 404.1520c(a). With respect to the supportability factor,

the regulations provide that “[t]he more relevant the objective

medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a

medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or

prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the

medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will

be.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). As to the consistency factor, the

regulations provide that “[t]he more consistent a medical

opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the

evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the

claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior

administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id.

§ 404.1520c(c)(2). The ALJ must explain how she considered the

“supportability” and “consistency” factors for a medical source’s

opinion. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ may, but is not required

to, explain how she considered the remaining factors. Id.

B. Assessment of Dr. Chaudhry’s Opinions

On January 10, 2019, Dr. Chaudhry completed a form

entitled “Physician’s Report for Claim of Disability Due to Mental

Impairment.” (A.R. at 629-34.) Between June 26, 2017 and October

16, 2018, Plaintiff received weekly psychotherapy from Dr.

Chaudhry and saw him every three months. (Id. at 629.) Dr.

Chaudhry noted that during Plaintiff’s manic periods, he exhibited

“insomnia, irritability, increased goal directed behavior . . .

and racing thoughts.” (Id. at 630.) Dr. Chaudhry also noted that

Plaintiff had a history of suicidal ideation and suicide attempts,

fits of rage, difficulty concentrating, and distractibility.

(Id.)

Dr. Chaudhry assessed that Plaintiff had slight

limitations in his activities of daily living due to mania-induced

overexertion and the physical side effects of Plaintiff’s

diabetes. (Id. at 631.) He assessed marked limitations in

maintaining social functioning because Plaintiff becomes highly

irritated due to his bipolar disorder, ADHD, and irregular blood

sugar levels. (Id. at 632.) He assessed marked limitations in

Plaintiff’s concentration, persistence, or pace due to Plaintiff’s

ADHD. (Id. at 633.) He further noted that Plaintiff had

experienced one or two episodes of decompensation. (Id.)

On May 10, 2019, Dr. Chaudhry completed a psychiatric

report. (Id. at 662-67.) Dr. Chaudhry assessed no restriction in

activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining

social functioning, and marked deficiencies in concentration,

persistence, or pace. (Id. at 663-64.) He noted that Plaintiff’s

condition makes it difficult for him to follow through on tasks

such as reading and responding to notices in a timely manner. (Id.

at 664.) He indicated that Plaintiff’s condition had not resulted

in any episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or a

work-like setting. (Id. at 665.) Dr. Chaudhry assessed that

Plaintiff’s mental condition was likely to persist at the level of

severity described in the report, noting that Plaintiff had been

“consistently symptomatic” and that “his issues seem chronic.”

(Id.) He assessed that Plaintiff was unable to make occupational

adjustments. (Id. at 666.)

The ALJ concluded that Dr. Chaudhry’s opinions were “not

persuasive” because they were “provided in checkbox form with

limited explanations.” (Id. at 49.) In addition, the ALJ stated

that Dr. Chaudhry’s conclusions were “inconsistent with the record

and not supported by the mental health treatment notes.” (Id.)

The ALJ did not specify how Dr. Chaudhry’s opinions were

unsupported by the record or mental health treatment notes.

C. Analysis

The court concludes that remand is appropriate because

the ALJ failed to adequately address the supportability and

consistency of Dr. Chaudhry’s opinions under the regulations.

“Remand is required when the ALJ fails adequately to explain the

supportability or consistency factors, or bases [his] explanation

upon a misreading of the record.” Barnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

2022 WL 4096623, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2022) (quotations and

citation omitted); see also, e.g., Keeby v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

2022 WL 4451004, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2022) (“An ALJ’s failure

to properly consider and apply the requisite factors is grounds

for remand.”); Santos v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 4354372, at (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 20, 2022) (“The failure to properly consider and apply

supportability and consistency is grounds for remand.” (quotations

and citation omitted)).

With respect to the supportability factor, the ALJ in

the instant case found in a conclusory fashion that Dr. Chaudhry’s

opinions were “not supported by the mental health treatment notes.”

(A.R. at 49.) “Such a conclusory statement is an insufficient

explanation of the supportability factor and is grounds for

remand.” Prieto v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 3475625, at *13

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021). The ALJ did not explain, for example,

“which parts of the [treatment notes]” failed to support Dr.

Chaudhry’s opinions. Keeby, 2022 WL 4451004, at *8. Similarly,

with respect to the consistency factor, the ALJ conclusorily found

that Dr. Chaudhry’s opinions were “inconsistent with the record.”

(A.R. at 49.) Again, the ALJ failed to adequately explain “which

parts of the record were [in]consistent with” Dr. Chaudhry’s

opinions. Keeby, 2022 WL 4451004, at *9. In sum, the ALJ’s

“conclusory statements offer no insight into how well [Dr.

Chaudhry] supported and explained [his] opinion, and are

insufficient to withstand review.” Ayala v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL

3211463, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2022) (quotations and citation

omitted); see also, e.g., Estrada v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL

3337753, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2022) (“Without a more fulsome

explanation of why the ALJ rejected the opinions of [the

plaintiff’s] treating providers, the Court is not in a position to

review whether the ALJ’s conclusions are supported by substantial

evidence.” (quotations and citation omitted)).

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ adequately

justified his decision to discount Dr. Chaudhry’s opinions by

explaining that the opinions were “provided in checkbox form with

limited explanations.” (Id. at 49; see ECF No. 27 (“Def’s Mem.”)

at 7 & n.4.) There is no rule, however, that “the evidentiary

weight of a treating physician’s medical opinion can be discounted

by an ALJ based on the naked fact that it was provided in a check-

box form.” Colgan v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 353, 361 (2d Cir. 2022).

“Rather, the critical inquiry is whether the opinion is supported

by substantial evidence in the record and whether the ALJ has

adequately articulated a basis for discounting or rejecting it.”

Shadha A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 4591308, at *7 (W.D.N.Y.

Sept. 30, 2022). As explained above, the court finds that the ALJ

did not articulate an adequate basis for discounting Dr. Chaudhry’s

opinions. In addition, as Plaintiff notes (see Pl.’s Mem. at 22),

Dr. Chaudhry did not simply check a box, but rather provided

explanations for his opinions, as set forth above. Compare, e.g.,

Cristian A.J. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 623443, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2022) (declining to remand where the treating

physician’s opinion “was provided via a ‘check-box’ form without

a supporting narrative and/or citations to the underlying record”

(emphasis added)).

The court recognizes that, in limited circumstances, an

ALJ’s failure to adequately analyze the supportability and

consistency factors may be considered a harmless error that does

not require remand. See, e.g., Santos v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL

4354372, at *7 (explaining that the court need not remand where

“application of the correct legal principles to the record could

lead only to the same conclusion” (citation omitted)). Here,

however, the court finds that the record does not “compel only one

conclusion.” Estrada, 2022 WL 3337753, at *15. The court is not

compelled to conclude that Dr. Chaudhry’s opinions were

inconsistent with the evidence in the record, for example, because

the ALJ rejected other medical opinions on the ground that

Plaintiff had more severe limitations than were specified in those

other opinions. (A.R. at 48.) Accordingly, the court concludes

that remand is warranted for the ALJ to adequately analyze the

supportability and consistency of Dr. Chaudhry’s opinions.

II. The RFC Determination Was Not Supported By Substantial

Evidence

Plaintiff also argues that remand is warranted because

the ALJ’s RFC determination, which was adopted by the Appeals

Council, was not supported by substantial evidence. (Pl.’s Mem.

at 17-18.) Again, the court agrees.

“Because an RFC determination is a medical

determination, an ALJ who makes an RFC determination in the absence

of supporting expert medical opinion has improperly substituted

his own opinion for that of a physician.” Lao v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 2020 WL 4194210, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2020) (citation

omitted). “An ALJ commits legal error when he makes a [RFC]

determination based on medical reports that do not specifically

explain the scope of claimant’s work-related capabilities.” Van

Dyne v. Saul, 2021 WL 1210460, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021)

(citation omitted). Although the ALJ may “choose between properly

submitted medical opinions,” he may not “set his own expertise

against that of physicians who submitted opinions to him.” Ianazzi

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 4386835, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,

2022) (quoting Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 179, 183 (2d Cir.

2010)).

Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform

sedentary work, “except that he can perform simple tasks only,

make only simple work-related decision[s], and can have no exposure

to respiratory irritants.” (A.R. at 44.) In making this finding,

however, it appears that the ALJ improperly “determined the RFC

based on [his] own lay understanding of the medical records.”

Latifu v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 2532193, at *19 (S.D.N.Y.

May 4, 2022). As Plaintiff notes, the ALJ rejected – in whole or

in part – every opinion in the record. (See Pl.’s Mem. at 17-18.)

Although the ALJ discounted several of the opinions because he

concluded that Plaintiff had more significant limitations than

were stated in the opinions (see A.R. at 47-49), the ALJ did not

explain what those more significant limitations were, or explain

why those more significant limitations failed to support Dr.

Chaudhry’s opinions.

In short, it appears that the ALJ rejected or limited

every medical opinion before formulating Plaintiff’s RFC based on

his own interpretation of the medical data. See, e.g., Lee v.

Saul, 2020 WL 5362619, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2020) (“Given the

lack of any controlling medical opinion – or at least one that the

ALJ did not largely discount – the ALJ has improperly filled this

evidentiary void with his own medical judgment and interpretation

of these records.”). Accordingly, remand is warranted because the

court “is left without a clear indication of how the ALJ reached

the RFC determination without resorting to impermissible

interpretation of raw medical data.” Sherry v. Berryhill, 2019 WL

441597, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2019); see also, e.g., Pearson v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 3373132, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021)

(“[A]n ALJ’s RFC determination must be supported by a medical

opinion in the record at that time.”); Morse v. Saul, 2020 WL

2781702, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 29, 2020) (remanding where the ALJ

“rejected every medical opinion and improperly substituted his own

medical judgment over that of any physician”).

III. The ALJ Failed to Adequately Develop the Record

For similar reasons, the court concludes that the ALJ

failed to adequately develop the record. (See Pl.’s Mem. at 23.)

“[B]ecause a hearing on disability benefits is a nonadversarial

proceeding, the ALJ generally has an affirmative obligation to

develop the administrative record.” Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128.

“The duty to develop obligates the Commissioner to develop a

complete medical record” that is “detailed enough to allow the ALJ

to determine the claimant’s RFC.” Dennis-Pendarvis v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 4641584, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022)

(citations omitted). “Failing to adequately develop the record is

an independent ground for vacating the ALJ’s decision and remanding

for further findings.” Id. (collecting cases); see also, e.g.,

Catalano v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 4539375, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.

Sept. 28, 2022) (explaining that where “psychiatric impairments

are at issue, an ALJ has a heightened duty to develop the record

due to the difficulties associated with evaluating a mental

illness’ impact on a claimant’s ability to function adequately in

the workplace” (citation omitted)).

As noted above, the ALJ partially or completely rejected

every opinion that he considered for reasons that reflect an

inadequate development of the record. (A.R. at 47-49.) With

respect to Plaintiff’s physical impairments, for example, the ALJ

found the opinion of Dr. C. Levit not persuasive because the record

“establishe[d] greater physical limitations than those Dr. Levit

specified.” (Id. at 47; see id. at 48 (rejecting the opinion of

Dr. Marisela Gomez because the record “establishe[d] many more

physical limitations than those Dr. Gomez specified”).) With

respect to Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ found the

opinion of Dr. Beth Ehrenpreis unpersuasive because Plaintiff’s

“psychological limitations [went] beyond [her] opinion.” (Id. at

48; see id. (rejecting the opinion of Dr. E. Gagan because

Plaintiff’s “psychiatrist treatment records were not available at

the time of review”).) Moreover, when rejecting the opinion of

Dr. Jean-Etianne Thibaud, the ALJ specifically noted that she

offered “no explanations that can be used to formulate the

claimant’s residual functional capacity.” (Id. at 48.) Thus, the

ALJ “effectively discounted all of the listed medical opinions,

leaving an evidentiary void in the record that necessitates

remand.” Lee, 2020 WL 5362619, at *16.

IV. The ALJ’s Analysis of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to properly

assess his subjective complaints. (Pl.’s Mem. at 25-30.) Because

the court remands on the grounds described above, it need not reach

this argument. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021

WL 2219276, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021) (“Because the Court

remands for further consideration of the medical evidence, and

because the ALJ based his assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility on

the consistency of his statements with the medical evidence, the

Court will not address whether the ALJ properly evaluated

Plaintiff’s credibility.”). On remand, the ALJ will have another

opportunity to consider and explain Plaintiff’s credibility after

further developing the record and reevaluating the medical

evidence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, Defendant’s cross-motion for

judgment on the pleadings in DENIED, and this case is REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and

close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Hon. Kiyo A. Matsumoto

United States District Judge

Eastern District of New York

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

October 12, 2022