Duran v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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RAFAEL DURAN,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against-

20-cv-4542 (KAM)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

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KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Rafael Duran (“Plaintiff”) appeals the final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or

the “Commissioner”) finding him not disabled within the meaning of

the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and not entitled to disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Act. Plaintiff and the

Commissioner have cross moved for judgment on the pleadings. For

the reasons herein, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED, the

Commissioner’s motion is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.

BACKGROUND

The parties have filed a joint stipulation of relevant

facts, which the court has reviewed and incorporates by reference.

(See generally ECF No. 21, Joint Stipulation of Facts.) Here, the

court briefly recounts the facts relevant to the instant motions.

On October 3, 2016,1 Plaintiff filed an application for

disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), alleging disability since

October 1, 2016. (ECF No. 17, Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”),

at 21.) Plaintiff claimed that he was disabled due to a heart

condition, diabetes, depression, learning problems, knee pain, and

a swollen foot. (Id. at 85.) His application was denied on

December 6, 2016. (Id. at 81.)

On December 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed a written request

for a hearing before an administrative law judge. (Id. at 87.)

Administrative Law Judge Ifeoma N. Iwuamadi (the “ALJ”) held a

hearing on December 4, 2018, during which Plaintiff appeared and

testified. (Id. at 49.) By a decision dated July 2, 2019, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 15.)

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council.

(Id. at 193.) On July 22, 2020, the Appeals Council denied review

of the ALJ’s decision, rendering it the final decision of the

Commissioner. (Id. at 1.)

1 Plaintiff’s memorandum of law in support of his motion for judgment on the

pleadings mistakenly notes this date as October 6, 2016. (Pl. Mem. at 2.)

Plaintiff initiated the instant action on September 24,

2020. (ECF No. 1, Complaint.) On September 29, 2020, the court

issued a scheduling order. (ECF No. 4, Scheduling Order.) On

October 14, 2021, Defendant filed the Administrative Transcript.

(Tr.)

On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff served his notice of motion

and memorandum of law in support of his motion for judgment on

the pleadings. (ECF Nos. 18, Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings; 18-1, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in

Support of his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (“Pl.

Mem.”).) On September 22, 2021, Defendant served its notice of

cross-motion and memorandum of law in support of its cross-motion

for judgment on the pleadings and in opposition to Plaintiff’s

motion. (ECF Nos. 19, Defendant’s Notice of Cross-Motion; 19-1,

Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Cross-Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings, (“Def. Mem.”).) Plaintiff then

served a reply memorandum of law in further support of his motion

for judgment on the pleadings on October 13, 2021. (ECF No. 20,

Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of Law.) The entire set of motion

papers was filed on October 14, 2021.

LEGAL STANDARD

To receive disability benefits, a claimant must be

“disabled” within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a),

(d). A claimant qualifies as disabled when he is unable to “engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. §

423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be of “such severity” that the

claimant is unable to do his previous work or engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). “The Commissioner must

consider the following in determining a claimant’s entitlement to

benefits: ‘(1) the objective medical facts [and clinical

findings]; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such facts;

(3) subjective evidence of pain or disability . . . ; and (4) the

claimant’s educational background, age, and work experience.’”

Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)

(quoting Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999)

(alterations in original)).

Unsuccessful claimants for disability benefits under

the Act may bring an action in federal district court seeking

judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits “within

sixty days after the mailing . . . of notice of such decision or

within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security

may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “A district court may set aside

the Commissioner’s determination that a claimant is not disabled

only if the factual findings are not supported by substantial

evidence or if the decision is based on legal error.” Burgess v.

Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial

evidence is more than a mere scintilla,” and must be relevant

evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d

Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 420 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

If there is substantial evidence in the record to

support the Commissioner’s factual findings, those findings must

be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Inquiry into legal error requires

the court to ask whether “the claimant has had a full hearing

under the [Commissioner’s] regulations and in accordance with the

beneficent purposes of the [Social Security] Act.” Moran v.

Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The

reviewing court does not have the authority to conduct a de novo

review, and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the

ALJ, even when it might have justifiably reached a different

result. Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.

2012).

Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the

Commissioner, a five-step sequential evaluation process is used

to determine whether the claimant’s condition meets the Act’s

definition of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. This process

is essentially as follows:

[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the

claimant is not working, (2) that he has a

‘severe impairment,’ (3) that the impairment

is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the

regulations] that conclusively requires a

determination of disability, and (4) that the

claimant is not capable of continuing in his

prior type of work, the Commissioner must find

him disabled if (5) there is not another type

of work the claimant can do.

Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

During this five-step process, the Commissioner must

consider whether the combined effect of all of the claimant’s

impairments, including those that are not severe (as defined by

the regulations), would be of sufficient severity to establish

eligibility for Social Security benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523,

404.1545(a)(2). At steps one through four of the sequential five-

step framework, the claimant bears the “general burden of

proving . . . disability.” Burgess, 537 F3.d at 128. At step

five, the burden shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner,

requiring that the Commissioner show that, in light of the

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education,

and work experience, the claimant is “able to engage in gainful

employment within the national economy.” Sobolewski v. Apfel,

985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

Lastly, federal regulations explicitly authorize a

court, upon reviewing decisions of the Commissioner, to order

further proceedings when appropriate. “The court shall have power

to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is warranted

where “there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has

applied an improper legal standard.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d

72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34,

39 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Remand is

particularly appropriate where further findings or explanation

will clarify the rationale for the ALJ’s decision. Pratts, 94

F.3d at 39. However, if the record before the court provides

“persuasive proof of disability and a remand for further

evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose,” the court may

reverse and remand solely for the calculation and payment of

benefits. See, e.g., Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir.

1980); Kane v. Astrue, 942 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ’s Disability Determination

Using the five-step sequential process, the ALJ

determined at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of

October 1, 2016. (Tr. at 23.) At step two, the ALJ determined

that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of coronary

artery disease, status-post stents, hypertension, diabetes

mellitus, bilateral knee derangement, major depressive disorder,

generalized anxiety disorder, and panic disorder. (Id.)

At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),

404.1525, and 404.1526). (Tr. at 24.) Specifically, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the criteria of major

dysfunction of a joint under Listing 1.02, disorders of the

cardiovascular system under Listing 4.00, depressive, bipolar, and

related disorders under Listing 12.04, and anxiety and obsessive-

compulsive disorders under Listing 12.06. (Id. at 24-27.)

Regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ

considered whether the “paragraph B” criteria of the

aforementioned mental impairment listings were satisfied. (Id. at

24.) To satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria, Plaintiff’s mental

impairments must result in at least one “extreme” or two “marked”

limitations in the following areas of mental functioning: (1)

understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)

interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or

maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. (Id. at

24.) Based on her review of Plaintiff’s medical records, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in the first

and third areas of mental functioning, and mild limitations in the

second and fourth areas. (Id. at 24-27.)

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a moderate

limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information,

based on: (1) the October 28, 2016 consultative psychiatric

examination by Dr. Michael Kushner, who opined that Plaintiff had

no limitations in understanding and following simple instructions,

and carrying them out independently, though he may have mild to

moderate limitations in doing the same for complex tasks and in

learning new tasks; and (2) Plaintiff’s November 1, 2016 Adult

Function Report, in which he noted that he was unable to follow

written instructions and had trouble remembering things. (Id. at

24-25.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a mild limitation

in interacting with others, based on the October 2016 consultative

examination, Plaintiff’s treatment records, both physical and

mental, the November 2016 Adult Function Report, and Plaintiff’s

hearing testimony. (Id. at 25.) As for the third area of mental

functioning, concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the

ALJ found that, based on the evidence as a whole, Plaintiff had,

at most, a moderate limitation. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ determined

that Plaintiff had a mild limitation in adapting or managing

oneself, having observed that Plaintiff consistently demonstrated

normal demeanor and behavior, and the ability to engage in personal

care and grooming, and did not appear to have any limitations in

making appropriate decisions. (Id. at 25-26.)

The ALJ also considered whether the “paragraph C”

criteria of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 were satisfied, and concluded

that “the evidence fails to establish the presence of the

‘paragraph C’ criteria.” (Id. at 27.)

At step four of the five-step sequential evaluation

process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light

work, with the following conditions: (1) sitting for 6 hours and

standing/walking for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, (2) occasionally

lifting and carrying 20 pounds, (3) frequently lifting and carrying

10 pounds, (4) occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, (5)

occasionally kneeling, crouching, and crawling, (6) occasionally

driving a motor vehicle, (7) never using foot controls with either

foot, (8) never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, (9) making

simple work-related decisions, and (10) performing simple, routine

tasks. (Id. at 27.)

In determining that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform

light work, with special conditions, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s

hearing testimony and medical records, which included pharmacy

records, hospital records, consultative examination reports of Dr.

Iqbal Teli (internist) and Michael Kushner, Ph. D. (psychologist),

and treatment records from Drs. Lubov Sychikov (internist) and

Nagmo Fatakhova (psychiatrist). (Id. at 36-38.) The ALJ concluded

that although Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, Plaintiff’s

statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of these symptoms were not entirely consistent with the

medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Id. at 36.)

Finally, at step five of the sequential evaluation

process, the ALJ found, based on Plaintiff’s RFC, that he was

capable of performing his past relevant work as a poultry dresser.

(Id. at 38.) In arriving at this conclusion, the ALJ relied on

the vocational expert’s testimony that Plaintiff retains the RFC

to perform the functional demands and job duties of a poultry

dresser. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not

“disabled” and thus not entitled to DIB under the Act. (Id.)

II. The ALJ’s Assessment of Opinion Evidence

Under the treating physician rule, the opinion of a

claimant’s treating physician as to “the nature and severity of

the [claimant’s] impairment is given ‘controlling weight’ if the

opinion is ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the

other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Greek v.

Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Burgess, 537 F.3d

at 128; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)).2

An ALJ who does not accord controlling weight to a

treating physician’s medical opinion must consider the following

non-exclusive Burgess factors in determining how much weight to

give to the opinion: (1) the frequency, length, nature, and extent

of treatment; (2) the amount of medical evidence supporting the

opinion; (3) the consistency of the opinion with the remaining

medical evidence; and (4) whether the physician is a

specialist. Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95‒96 (2d Cir.

2019) (citation omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); but see

Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We require

no such slavish recitation of each and every factor where the ALJ’s

reasoning and adherence to the regulation are clear.”). “The ALJ

2 In 2017, new regulations were issued that changed the standard for evaluating

medical opinion evidence for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520c. However, because Plaintiff filed his claims on October 3,

2016, the previous regulations, including the treating physician rule, still

apply.

must then ‘comprehensively set forth [her] reasons for the weight

assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.’” Cichocki v. Astrue,

534 F. App’x. 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Burgess, 537 F.3d at

129). “The failure to provide ‘good reasons for not crediting the

opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is a ground for

remand.’” Greek, 802 F.3d at 375 (quoting Burgess, 537 F.3d at

129-30).

However, “a treating physician’s conclusion that a

claimant is disabled is not entitled to controlling weight, as

this determination is reserved to the Commissioner.” Quiles v.

Saul, No. 19-cv-11181(KNF), 2021 WL 848197, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

5, 2021); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). “[W]hen an ALJ discounts

a treating physician’s opinion that a claimant is disabled, the

ALJ is obligated to give good reasons for doing so.” Id.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly apply

the treating physician rule in assessing the opinions of

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Lee, and treating

psychiatrist, Dr. Fatakhova. (Pl. Mem. at 4-7.) The court

discusses each of their opinions in turn.

A. The ALJ’s Assessment of Dr. Lee’s Opinion

The ALJ gave “[n]o weight” to Dr. Lee’s December 2018

opinion that Plaintiff could never stoop or bend, only occasionally

reach, only occasionally, or up to two hours in an eight-hour day,

lift and carry 5 to 10 pounds, sit for less than 6 hours per day,

and stand and/or walk for less than 2 hours per day. (Tr. at 30,

37, 451‒53.) The ALJ deemed Dr. Lee’s assessment of Plaintiff’s

limitations “excessive,” finding that “the medical evidence and

clinical findings of record do not support such extreme

limitations.” (Id. at 37.) In particular, the ALJ found that the

limitations Dr. Lee ascribed to Plaintiff were not consistent with

Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, conservative treatment for his

bilateral knee impairments, and daily activities. (Id.)

Although the ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Lee was

“reportedly a treating source,” the ALJ did not analyze Dr. Lee’s

opinion using the Burgess factors nor provide good reasons for not

according it controlling weight. (Id. at 30, 37.) In particular,

the ALJ failed to explain the supportability and consistency of

Dr. Lee’s opinion; her conclusory statements that Dr. Lee’s opinion

is not consistent with the medical evidence and clinical findings

in the record are not enough to allow the court to assess whether

the opinion was properly rejected. (Id.) See Rugless v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 548 F. App’x 698, 700 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)

(finding that the ALJ’s “conclusory explanation” for assigning

little weight to a treating physician’s opinion, namely, that the

opinion is “inconsistent with the record and not supported by any

facts or findings” is a cause for remand for further proceedings).

Further, the ALJ did not consider the frequency, nature, and extent

of Dr. Lee’s treating relationship with Plaintiff.3 (Id.) Though

“[i]t is not necessary that the ALJ recite each factor explicitly,”

her decision must “reflect[] application of the substance of the

[treating physician] rule.” Martinez-Paulino v. Astrue, No. 11-

cv-5485(RPP), 2012 WL 3564140, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2012).

Here, because the ALJ did not apply the treating

physician rule properly, remand is appropriate. See Kennedy v.

Astrue, 343 F. App’x 719, 721 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order)

(“Where an ALJ fails properly to acknowledge [the treating

physician rule] or to provide ‘good reasons’ for the weight given

to the treating physician’s opinion, we do not hesitate to

remand.”) (citation omitted). On remand, the ALJ is directed to

comprehensively apply the Burgess and regulatory factors to

determine the weight to be given to Dr. Lee’s opinion. If the ALJ

determines that a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to

controlling weight, the ALJ “must nonetheless articulate a basis

for the alternative weight assigned.” Knight v. Comm’r, No. 18-

cv-2474(KAM), 2020 WL 3085778 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020).

3 Defendant contends that “[a]lthough Dr. Lee indicated that she treated

Plaintiff for more than three years, the record contained no clear evidence of

a treating relationship as required to be entitled to deference as a ‘treating

source’ under the regulations.” (Def. Mem. at 8.) The ALJ’s decision, however,

does not reflect any determination on the ALJ’s part, express or implied, that

the treating physician rule did not apply to Dr. Lee’s opinion due to the

purported lack of a treating relationship between Dr. Lee and Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the court respectfully declines to adopt Defendant’s post-hoc

rationalization of the ALJ’s decision to accord no weight to Dr. Lee’s opinion

of Plaintiff’s physical functionality without properly applying the treating

physician rule.

B. The ALJ’s Assessment of Dr. Fatakhova’s Opinion

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “summarily rejected” Dr.

Fatakhova’s opinion. This argument is meritless. The ALJ gave

“considerable weight” to Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion related to

Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember, and apply

information, and concentration, persistence, and ability to

maintain pace. (Tr. at 37.) In assigning such weight, the ALJ

appropriately considered and gave deference to Dr. Fatakhova as a

treating source.4 (Id.) Indeed, the ALJ’s mental functioning

assessment that Plaintiff should be limited to performing simple,

routine tasks, and making simple work-related decisions is

consistent with the portions of Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion to which

the ALJ gave considerable weight.

The ALJ gave “less weight” to Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion

that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in adapting and managing

himself, and that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would

“substantially interfere with his productive work for more than

20% of the workday.” (Id.) The ALJ may “only credit portions of

a medical source opinion, or weigh different parts of the opinion

differently” so long as the ALJ “provid[es] sound reasons for the

discrepancy.” Destina v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-2382(ADS), 2018 WL

4964103, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2018). Here, the ALJ

4 The ALJ noted that Dr. Fatakhova had treated Plaintiff since December 2016,

and that Plaintiff had been receiving outpatient psychiatric treatment from Dr.

Fatakhova on a bimonthly basis since January 2017. (Tr. at 32‒35.)

appropriately examined the administrative record, explained which

portions of Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion were accorded less weight, and

explained why the selected portions were weighed differently. (Tr.

at 37.)

Regarding Plaintiff’s ability to adapt and manage

himself, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified to being able to

perform certain daily activities such as cooking, cleaning, and

buying groceries, and that he was “able to travel on vacation,

with minimal anxiety due to forgetting his psychiatric

medications.” (Id.); see also Kelly Ann C. v. Saul, No. 18-cv-

468(DJS), 2019 WL 3321923, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2019) (finding

substantial evidence supporting the assessment of mild limitations

adapting and managing oneself where the plaintiff was able to

“handle self-care and personal hygiene and prepare meals, pay

bills, go to doctors’ appointments, take medications, shop, and

read”); Dayle B. v. Saul, No. 20-cv-00359(TOF), 2021 WL 1660702,

at *13 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2021) (finding substantial evidence

supporting the assessment of mild limitations adapting and

managing oneself where the plaintiff “retained the capacity to

care for her personal needs, cook, clean, grocery shop, and drive”)

(internal quotation omitted). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff

had never been hospitalized for his psychiatric conditions and

that the results of Dr. Fatakhova’s mental health examinations of

Plaintiff stated that he was well groomed, cooperative, with calm

motor behavior, adequate insight, and good judgment. (Tr. at 32‒

35.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has mild

limitations in adapting and managing himself is supported by

substantial evidence, and the ALJ properly applied the treating

physician rule in according less weight to Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion

that Plaintiff has moderate limitations.

Similarly, the ALJ determined that Dr. Fatakhova’s

opinion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would “substantially

interfere with his productive work for more than 20% of the

workday” should be assigned less weight, based on Dr. Fatakhova’s

own treatment notes indicating that Plaintiff was responding well

to treatment, his symptoms were less prominent, and the results of

his mental status examinations were normal. (Tr. at 37.)

Therefore, the court finds that the ALJ properly applied the

treating physician rule in assigning less weight to this portion

of Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion, and that the decision to give less

than controlling weight is supported by substantial evidence. See

also Heaman v. Berryhill, 765 F. App’x 498, 501 (2d Cir. 2019)

(summary order) (approving the ALJ’s decision to partially

discount a treating provider’s opinions because those opinions

“were inconsistent with the moderate findings” reflected in the

notes); Ruff v. Saul, No. 19-cv-01515(SRU), 2020 WL 6193892, at

*11 (D. Conn. Oct. 22, 2020) (finding that the ALJ’s decision to

give partial weight to a treating source’s opinion based on

evidence of plaintiff’s symptom improvement with medication was

supported by substantial evidence); Muratovic v. Saul, No. 19-cv-

2290(SPM), 2020 WL 5642294, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2020)

(finding that the ALJ’s decision to discount part of a treating

source’s opinion based on conflicting evidence of plaintiff’s

appearance, daily activities, lack of inpatient treatment, and

improvement of symptoms with medication was supported by good

reasons based on substantial evidence).

III. ALJ’s Classification of Plaintiff’s Prior Work as “Poultry

Dresser,”

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s finding that

he can return to his past relevant work constitutes legal error

because his past work was incorrectly classified. (Pl. Mem. at 7-

10.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that his previous work

should have been classified as a composite job, combining “poultry

dresser,” Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 525.687-070,

and “poultry dresser worker,” DOT 525.687-082. (Id. at 8-10.) A

composite job “combines significant elements of two or more

positions . . . .” Izzo v. Saul, No. 18-cv-09681(NSR), 2020 WL

1189095, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2020). According to Plaintiff,

because the DOT job description for “poultry dresser” does not

capture the frequent lifting and carrying of up to 50 pounds, which

was an important part of his past job, (id. at 8; Tr. at 216), the

ALJ erred in classifying his previous employment according to its

“least demanding function.” (ECF No. 20, Plaintiff’s Reply

Memorandum of Law, at 5.)

At step four of the sequential five-step framework, a

“claimant has the burden to show an inability to return to her

previous specific job and an inability to perform her past relevant

work generally.” Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir.

2003) (citations omitted). The “inquiry requires separate

evaluations of the previous job and the job as it is generally

performed.” Id.

According to the DOT, the job of a poultry dresser

involves:

Slaughter[ing] and dress[ing] fowl in

preparation for marketing, performing any

combination of following tasks: Chop[ping] off

bird’s head or slit[ting] bird’s throat to

slaughter bird, using knife. Hang[ing] bird

by feet to drain blood. Dip[ping] bird into

scalding water to loosen feathers. Hold[ing]

bird against projecting rubber fingers of

rotating drum to remove feathers. Cut[ting]

bird open, remov[ing] viscera, and wash[ing]

bird and giblets. May pluck chickens by hand.

DOT 525.687-070. Relying on the testimony of the vocational

expert, ALJ determined that the demands of Plaintiff’s past

relevant work do not exceed his RFC and, therefore, Plaintiff could

perform “his past relevant work” as a poultry dresser, the way it

is “generally performed” in the national economy. (Tr. at 38.)

In determining whether a claimant can perform his past

relevant work as generally performed, “[t]he inquiry . . . is not

whether a claimant is able to perform the duties of [his] previous

job, but whether the claimant is able to perform the duties

associated with [his] previous ‘type’ of work.” Halloran, 362

F.3d at 33 (finding that plaintiff could perform her prior work as

a computer operator because she could perform the sedentary work

required of her “previous ‘type’ of work,” even though she could

not sit continuously for eight hours as specifically required by

her previous job (citing Jock v. Harris, 651 F.2d 133, 135 (2d

Cir. 1981) (finding that plaintiff could perform her past relevant

work as a cashier because she could perform the sedentary work

required of cashier positions that could be performed in the

sitting position, even though her previous cashier position at a

supermarket required extended periods of standing))).

Accordingly, because the job of a poultry dresser as generally

performed does not involve lifting and carrying of up to 50 pounds,

as Plaintiff prior work did, the ALJ did not err when she found

that Plaintiff remains able to perform his “previous ‘type’ of

work.” Halloran, 362 F.3d at 33.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, Defendant’s cross-motion for

judgment on the pleadings is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment remanding this

case, and to close the case.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 1, 2022

Brooklyn, New York

__________/s/_______________

HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO

United States District Judge