Quintin v. County Of Nassau

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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LUKAS E. QUINTIN and YEHYA FARES,

Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

18-CV-5852 (JS)(ARL)

-against-

COUNTY OF NASSAU; NASSAU COUNTY

POLICE DEPARTMENT; DETECTIVE

JOSEPH HILL, in his individual and

official capacities; OFFICERS

ROBERT CANDELA, EDWARD MERCEDES,

in their individual and official

capacities,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiffs: Guido Moreira, Esq.

Law Office of Guido Moreira

6804 Bliss Terrace

Brooklyn, New York 11220

Christopher H. Fitzgerald, Esq.

Law Office of Christopher H. Fitzgerald

233 Broadway, Suite 2348

New York, New York 10279

For Defendants: Andrew Robert Fuchs, Esq.

Jeremy James Scileppi, Esq.

Laurel R. Kretzing, Esq.

Office of the Nassau County Attorney

1 West Street

Mineola, New York 11501

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Lukas Quintin (“Quintin”) and Yehya Fares (“Fares”)

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against the

County of Nassau (the “County”), the Nassau County Police

Department (“NCPD”), Detective Joseph Hill (“Hill”), Officer

Robert Candela (“Candela”), and Officer Edward Mercedes

(“Mercedes”) (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for false arrest,

failure to intervene, and municipal liability. (See generally Am.

Compl., ECF No. 29.) Pending before the Court is Defendants’

motion for summary judgment, which Plaintiffs oppose. (See Defs.

Mot., ECF No. 32; Support Memo, ECF No. 34; Opp’n, ECF No. 38;

Reply, ECF No. 39.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion

is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

On October 10, 2016 at approximately 10:00 a.m., agents

from the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Enforcement Group

met with detectives from the NCPD at a precinct in Westbury, New

York. (See DEA Report of Investigation (“DEA Report”) ¶ 1, ECF

No. 36.) Present at the briefing was DEA agent “CS,” whose

identity is classified. (Id. ¶ 1; Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) At 11:30

a.m., agents and detectives established surveillance in the

vicinity of a Staples parking lot in Jericho, New York, in

1 The facts are drawn from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement

and Plaintiffs’ Local Rule 56.1 Counterstatement. (See Defs. 56.1

Stmt., ECF No. 35; Pls. 56.1 Counterstmt., ECF No. 24-2.) The

Court notes any relevant factual disputes. Unless otherwise

stated, a standalone citation to a Local Rule 56.1 Statement or

Counterstatement denotes that either the parties agree or the Court

has determined that the underlying factual allegation is

undisputed. Citation to a party’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement or

Counterstatement incorporates by reference the document(s) cited

therein.

anticipation of a meet between CS and an unidentified individual

for the purpose of purchasing synthetic cannabinoids. (DEA Report

¶ 3.) CS was also in contact with “other subjects” discussing

drug transactions from September 14, 2016 through October 11, 2016.

(Id.)

Surveillance was re-established at 1:00 p.m. in

anticipation of another meet between CS and an unidentified

individual. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11; DEA Report ¶ 8.) Fifteen

minutes later, Agents Calcano and Abbattiscianni observed a Silver

Ford Escape (the “Silver Ford”), with a Virginia registration and

four male occupants, approach CS’s vehicle. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt.

¶ 12.) The four males were later identified as Plaintiffs Quintin

and Fares, as well as Bakhos Maroun (“Maroun”) and Luis Delvalle-

Vasquez (“Delvalle-Vasquez”). (Id.) Agents Calcano and

Abbattiscianni observed Maroun exit the front, passenger-side door

of the Silver Ford and approach the driver’s door of CS’s vehicle.

(Id. ¶ 13.) After CS and Maroun had a brief conversation, Maroun

returned to the Silver Ford which then began to follow CS’s

vehicle. (Id.) Then, at approximately 1:20 p.m., Defendants

Candela and Mercedes, both NCPD detectives, conducted a DEA-

directed stop of the Silver Ford. (Id. ¶ 14.) Shortly thereafter,

Detective Schmit and Agent Popowicz joined Candela and Mercedes in

the stop. (Id.) It was at this point that law enforcement

identified the Silver Ford’s occupants, with Plaintiff Quintin as

the driver and Plaintiff Fares as a passenger in the rear.

(Id. ¶ 15.)

It is undisputed that all occupants of the Silver Ford

provided the officers with verbal consent to search the vehicle.

(Id. ¶ 16; Pls. 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 16.) During the search,

officers observed a black plastic bag on the floor mat in the

front, passenger-side of the vehicle which contained a large amount

of money. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 17.) Agent Popowicz asked who owned

the money and Plaintiff Fares claimed it, stating there was

approximately $16,000 in the bag and that he had an additional

$6,000 on his person. (Id.) According to the Amended Complaint,

Fares is the owner of a grocery store and gas station called “Stop

and Save” in New Bedford, Massachusetts. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) Fares

told Agent Popowicz that he had the money to “purchase clothes,

and other merchandise, to sell back in Massachusetts.” (Defs.

56.1 Stmt. ¶ 17.) Agent Popowicz seized the money as “drug

proceeds,” which was ultimately deposited into the “High Value

Seized Item Vault” at the DEA’s New Jersey Division.2 (Id. ¶ 18.)

All four occupants of the Silver Ford were then arrested,

transported to the NCPD, and charged with conspiracy to distribute

2 Altogether, the DEA seized $25,200.00 from Fares. (Defs. 56.1

Stmt. ¶ 25.) The DEA posted notice of the seized property on

Forfeiture.gov and mailed notice to each occupant of the Silver

Ford; however, nobody filed a claim to the property which resulted

in a forfeiture of the full amount to the United States. (See id.

¶¶ 26-28.)

synthetic cannabinoids. (Id. ¶ 19.) Each of them was released

“pending future federal proceedings”; however, Plaintiffs were

never prosecuted or charged with any federal crimes.

(Id. ¶¶ 19-20.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs commenced this action on October 18, 2018

against the County and numerous John Doe police officers and

supervisory officers. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) With

the Court’s leave, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on August

27, 2020 to amend the caption to include the names of the officers

involved in the allegations at issue. (See Aug. 3 & 18, 2020 Elec.

Orders; Am. Compl.) On September 9, 2020, Defendants filed an

Answer to the Amended Complaint. (See Answer, ECF No. 31.) The

instant summary judgment motion followed.

ANALYSIS

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Material

facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law, and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Wagner v. Chiari & Ilecki, LLP, 973 F.3d 154,

164 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499

F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The movant bears the burden of establishing that there are no

genuine issues of material fact in dispute. CILP Assocs., L.P. v.

PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP, 735 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2013).

Once the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must proffer

specific facts demonstrating “a genuine issue for trial.” Giglio

v. Buonnadonna Shoprite LLC, No. 06-CV-5191, 2009 WL 3150431, at

*4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Conclusory allegations or denials will not defeat

summary judgment. Id.

In reviewing the record, “the court is required to

resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual

inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is

sought.” Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Vadaris Tech.

Inc., No. 13-CV-5286, 2015 WL 6449420, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,

2015) (quoting McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.

1997)). The Court considers the “pleadings, deposition testimony,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with

any other firsthand information including but not limited to

affidavits.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011).

II. Discussion

Plaintiffs have brought claims for false arrest and

failure to intervene against the individual Defendants as well as

a claim for municipal liability against the County. As an initial

matter, to the extent any of Plaintiffs’ claims are asserted

against the Nassau County Police Department, those claims are

DISMISSED because the NCPD is a non-suable entity that does not

have a legal identity separate and distinct from the County.

Anderson v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead, No. 15-CV-1485, 2022 WL

267875, at *5, n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2022).

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs assert claims against

Defendant Hill, those claims are also DISMISSED. Section 1983

provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting

under color of state law, deprives another of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws

of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Cornejo v. Bell, 592

F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter

state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive

individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide

relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504

U.S. 158, 161 (1992). Further, it is well-settled that to

establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must “plead

and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution,’” that is, personally participated in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609,

618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675

(2009)) (rejecting “special rule for supervisory liability” and

holding constitutional violations “must be established against the

supervisory official directly”). The competent evidence before

the Court does not leave any indication that Defendant Hill had

any personal involvement of the “alleged constitutional

deprivations” Plaintiffs complain of, which “is a prerequisite to

an award of damages under § 1983.” See Barnes v. Malavi, 412 F.

Supp. 3d 140, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58

F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)).

The Court turns to Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against

Candela, Mercedes, and the County.

A. False Arrest

1. Applicable Law

To succeed on a Section 1983 claim for false arrest, the

plaintiff must show “(1) the defendant intended to confine the

plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3)

the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the

confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Avant v. Miranda, No.

21-CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021) (quoting

Wheeler v. Kolek, No. 16-CV-7441, 2020 WL 6726947, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Nov. 16, 2020)). The existence of probable cause is a complete

defense to a claim for false arrest. Ackerson v. City of White

Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2012).

At the arrest stage, the Second Circuit has described

probable cause as “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information

of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person

of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested

has committed . . . a crime.” Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84,

89 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d

Cir. 2006)). “To assess probable cause, a court considers only

the facts ‘available to the officer at the time of the arrest and

immediately before it.’” Ashley v. City of New York, 992 F.3d

128, 136 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Stansbury, 721 F.3d at 89).

“‘[S]ubjective intentions’ of the arresting officer ‘play no role

in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis.’”

Selvaggio v. Patterson, 93 F. Supp. 3d 54, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

(quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).

2. Application

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants do not

contest the first three elements of Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim.

(See Support Memo at 7.) Rather, Defendants argue that this claim

fails because probable cause existed to conduct a traffic stop and

arrest Plaintiffs based upon the representations made to them by

the DEA. (Id.) To rebut Defendants’ probable cause defense,

Plaintiffs contend: (1) the DEA never communicated to Defendants

that probable cause existed; (2) the DEA’s direction for Defendants

to stop the Silver Ford is not the “equivalent of communicating

probable cause for an arrest” because a traffic stop is only

supported by reasonable suspicion; and (3) Defendants did not

“develop probable cause to arrest . . . [P]laintiffs based on the

results of the traffic stop.” (Opp’n at 3-5.) However, each of

Plaintiffs’ arguments misses the mark.

Pursuant to the “collective or imputed knowledge

doctrine, an arrest or search is permissible where the actual

arresting or searching officer lacks the specific information to

form the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion but

sufficient information to justify the arrest was known by other

law enforcement officials initiating or involved with the

investigation.” United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d

Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230-33

(1985)). “The rule exists because, in light of the complexity of

modern police work, the arresting officer cannot always be aware

of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to

arrest a suspect is based on facts known only to his superiors or

associates.” United States v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.

1986); see also United States v. Fleming, No. 18-CR-0197, 2019 WL

486073, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2019) (“Under [the collective

knowledge] doctrine, a police officer may act reasonably in relying

on information from other law enforcement officers, even if he is

not personally aware of the facts that provided the probable cause

underlying the information he received.” (citing Colon, 250 F.3d

at 135)).

In view of these principles, Defendants contend that the

instant case is analogous to Williams v. City of New York, which

involved arrests made following a “buy and bust” operation. See

409 F. Supp. 3d 137, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). In Williams, while two

undercover officers were taking a lunch break at a fast-food

restaurant, the plaintiff arrived at the restaurant and gave his

son an envelope containing cash. Id. at 140. The undercover

officers observed the plaintiff “remove a dark, shiny object, which

looked like it was wrapped in a plastic bag, from his pants

pocket.” Id. The plaintiff then gave this object to his son who

placed it in his right waist area, leading the undercover officers

to believe the exchange was a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction.

Id. After the exchange, the plaintiff left the restaurant by foot;

his son left by car. Id. at 141. The undercover officers then

called in their observations to a sergeant, who was riding in an

NYPD vehicle with two detectives and consequently, relayed the

information to the detectives. One of the detectives found the

plaintiff walking, stopped and frisked him and found no contraband,

but executed an arrest. Id. The sergeant and other detective

stopped the son’s vehicle in the restaurant parking lot, found a

firearm and ammunition on his person, and arrested him as well.

Id. No other contraband was found, except that another officer

recovered $4,375 in cash from the vehicle the son was in. Id.

The sergeant then made the decision to arrest the plaintiff and

his son; however, one of the detectives was assigned as the

“arresting officer.” Id. The plaintiff was charged with criminal

possession of a weapon and ammunition, but that charge was

dismissed on speedy-trial grounds. Id. Charges against the son

proceeded separately in federal court. Id. In granting the

“arresting” detective’s motion for summary judgment on the

plaintiff’s false arrest claim, the Williams court held probable

cause for the plaintiff’s arrest existed because the detective was

entitled to rely upon the allegations relayed to him by the

sergeant from the undercover officers. Id. at 142-43.

Here, the Court similarly finds that Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment. The DEA conducted a sting operation

with the assistance of the NCPD regarding the sale of synthetic

cannabinoids at a location where law enforcement had reason to

believe such a sale would take place due to the involvement of an

undercover DEA agent, and individuals, including Plaintiffs, who

met the undercover agent at this location and proceeded to follow

the agent’s vehicle. Then, after observing these events, the DEA

contacted Defendants Candela and Mercedes -- who are NCPD

officers -- and instructed them to stop Plaintiffs’ vehicle.

Plaintiffs contend that the DEA’s operation did not supply probable

cause to arrest them (see Opp’n at 4); however, whether the DEA

had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs or explicitly told

Defendants probable cause to arrest existed is not the pertinent

inquiry. Plaintiffs have not proffered any competent evidence to

create an issue of material fact as to why it could have been

unreasonable for Defendants to rely upon the information provided

to them by the DEA to stop the Silver Ford and consequently arrest

Plaintiffs. In fact, Plaintiffs did not submit a single exhibit

in opposition to Defendants’ motion. Moreover, to the extent

Plaintiffs argue that no illegal contraband was found in their

vehicle (Opp’n at 4), the fact that no drugs “were subsequently

recovered from [Plaintiffs] is immaterial to the probable cause-

analysis, which turns on only ‘those facts available to the officer

at the time of the arrest and immediately before it.’” Williams,

409 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (quoting Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.2d 388,

395 (2d Cir. 2006)). As such, for the reasons the arresting

detective in Williams was entitled to rely upon the information

provided by the undercover officers, Defendants here were entitled

to rely upon CS’s instruction to stop Plaintiffs’ vehicle and

consequently arrest them. In addition, the Court also notes that

prior to arresting Plaintiffs, Defendants recovered a large sum of

cash from Fares which is an another fact that lends further support

to the existence of probable cause. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim for false

arrest is GRANTED.

B. Failure to Intervene

Plaintiffs’ failure to intervene claim “is grounded in

the widely recognized rule that ‘all law enforcement officials

have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional

rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement

officers in their presence.” Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F.

Supp. 2d 418, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Branen, 17,

F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994)). However, a “failure to intervene

claim is contingent upon the disposition of the primary claims

underlying the failure to intervene claim.” Id. (citing Coleman

v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-1051, 2010 WL 571986, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2010)). In light of the Court’s finding that

probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs existed, their claim for

failure to intervene necessarily fails as well. See Williams, 409

F. Supp. 3d at 143 (citing Simcoe v. Gray, 670 F. App’x 725, 727

(2d Cir. 2016)). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to Plaintiffs’ failure to intervene claim is GRANTED.3

3 In their Opposition, Plaintiffs fail to address their failure

to intervene claim. As such, even if the Court found that

Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

false arrest claim, the Court would still dismiss this claim as

abandoned. See Avola v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 2d

381, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Ostroski v. Town of Southold,

443 F. Supp. 2d 325, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Because plaintiff’s

opposition papers did not address defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on this claim, the claim is deemed abandoned and summary

judgment could be granted on that basis alone.”).

C. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields government officials from

civil liability resulting from the performance of their

discretionary functions only where their conduct “does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Wallace v. Suffolk County

Police Dep’t, 396 F. Supp. 2d 251, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Seybert,

J.) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To

determine whether qualified immunity applies, courts consider

“whether the facts shown make out a violation of a constitutional

right and whether the right at issue was clearly established at

the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Tankleff v.

County of Suffolk, No. 09-CV-1207, 2017 WL 2729084, at *17

(E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2017) (quoting Estate of Devine v. Fusaro, 676

F. App’x 61, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up)). Whether a right was

clearly established should be analyzed from the perspective of a

reasonable official, and the relevant inquiry is whether “it would

be clear to a reasonable offic[ial] that his conduct was unlawful

in the situation he confronted.” Id. (quoting Devine, 676 F. App’x

at 63).

Because the Court has concluded Plaintiffs’ rights were

not violated, it need not address the issue of qualified immunity.

Bonhag v. Colavita, No. 07-CV-5714, 2010 WL 6243308, at *10

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2010). However, even if the Court reached the

opposite conclusion, it would still find that Defendants Candella

and Mercedes were entitled to qualified immunity because it was

objectively reasonable for them to determine probable cause to

arrest Plaintiffs existed based upon the DEA’s direction to stop

Plaintiffs’ vehicle following the “sting operation” coupled with

their discovery of thousands of dollars in cash on Plaintiff Fares’

person and in the Silver Ford that Plaintiffs’ occupied.

D. Municipal Liability

It is well established that a municipality such as the

County cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 691 (1978); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d

Cir. 2008). Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate the

municipality, through its deliberate conduct, “was the moving

force behind the alleged injury.” Roe, 542 F.3d at 37. To that

end, a plaintiff must plead and prove three elements: “(1) an

official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be

subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Lucente v.

County of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Wray

v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)).

As discussed above, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their

Section 1983 claims against the individual defendants, Candela and

Mercedes. Thus, because “no underlying constitutional violation

was committed, no liability against [the] County under Monell can

exist as a matter of law.” Leogrande v. Suffolk County, No. 08-

CV-3088, 2016 WL 889737, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016) (citing

Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006)); see

also Hirsch v. New York, 751 F. App’x 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2018)

(“Because the district court properly found no underlying

constitutional violation, its decision not [to] address the

municipal defendants’ liability under Monell was entirely

correct.” (citing Segal, 459 F.3d at 219)). Accordingly,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Plaintiffs’ claim for municipal liability against the County.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 32) is GRANTED.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly

and mark this case CLOSED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/_JOANNA SEYBERT______

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: March 25, 2022

Central Islip, New York