Goodwine v. Government

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

EARL GOODWINE,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

v.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

GOVERNMENT,

21-CV-4238 (LDH) (LB)

Defendant.

LASHANN DEARCY HALL, United States District Judge:

Earl Goodwine (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to the Court’s

federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1332. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) is granted.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff previously brought an action against the National Railroad Passenger

Corporation (“Amtrak”) and individual defendants alleging that he was falsely arrested in New

York’s Pennsylvania Station in 2010. See Goodwine v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., et al., No.

12-CV-3882 (“Goodwine I”). On July 28, 2014, visiting Judge Tucker L. Melancon entered

judgment in favor of the individual defendants and dismissed all remaining claims for Plaintiff’s

failure to prosecute his case at trial. See Judgment, Goodwine I (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2014) (ECF

No. 312). Plaintiff’s subsequent appeal was denied by the Second Circuit as lacking “an

arguable basis in law or fact.” Goodwine v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., et al., No. 14-3214 (2d

1 The following facts taken from the complaint and certain federal court orders incorporated therein are assumed to

be true for the purposes of this memorandum and order.

1

Cir. Feb. 11, 2015). On July 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed “an injunction to compel having social,

medical, picture, criminal record sealed & deposition nulled.” Goodwine I, ECF No. 325. Judge

Brian M. Cogan denied the injunction, finding that, inter alia, Plaintiff did not identify a specific

docket entry to be sealed so “there [was] nothing for the Court to seal.” Id., ECF No. 326.

Plaintiff subsequently moved for reconsideration. By order dated October 5, 2017, Judge Cogan

granted in part Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and directed the Clerk of Court to seal

docket entry 146-20, which contained Plaintiff’s personal medical record. Id., ECF No. 328.

On July 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second action in this court alleging that defendants

Amtrak and New Jersey Transit (“NJT”) violated his civil rights when they obtained Plaintiff’s

medical records in connection with the Goodwine I matter. See Goodwine v. NJ Transit et al.,

No. 17-CV-4528 (“Goodwine II”). Judge Cogan dismissed the action as barred by the doctrine

of res judicata, finding Plaintiff “effectively recycled his injunction motion” which had

previously been decided. Id., ECF No. 8.

In 2019, Plaintiff filed yet another action against Amtrak in the Southern District of New

York, alleging that Amtrak failed to redact documents it obtained during the course of Goodwine

I. See Goodwine v. Amtrak, No. 19-CV-2599, 2019 WL 1595856, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15,

2019) (“Goodwine III”). In light of the court’s rulings in Goodwine I and Goodwine II, Judge

Colleen McMahon dismissed Plaintiff’s claim as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at *

2.

Although Plaintiff’s instant complaint is far from clear, he appears to allege that the

judges presiding over his prior actions violated his due process rights by denying his requests to

seal his medical records and that his social security number should be redacted from the Public

Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) website. (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff seeks, inter

alia, monetary damages and a new social security number. (Id. at 6.) Additionally, Plaintiff

moves to seal documents in Goodwine I containing his social security number.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir.

2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations contained

in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must be mindful that the plaintiff’s

pleadings should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after

Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).

Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an action

filed in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief.” An action is “frivolous” when either: (1) “the

‘factual contentions are clearly baseless,’ such as when allegations are the product of delusion or

fantasy”; or (2) “the claim is ‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’” Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

To the extent Plaintiff brings due process claims against Judges Melancon, Cogan, and

McMahon in connection with their respective rulings in Goodwine I, Goodwine II, and

Goodwine III, those claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. “[T]he United

States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.” Lehman v. Nakshian,

453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981) (quotation marks omitted); Cty. of Suffolk, N.Y. v. Sebelius, 605 F.3d

135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010), 605 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (“Absent an

unequivocally expressed statutory waiver, the United States, its agencies, and its employees

when functioning in their official capacities are immune from suit based on the principle of

sovereign immunity.”). “The doctrine of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, and

therefore to prevail, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that [his] claims fall within an

applicable waiver.” Makarova v. U.S., 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish any basis for the waiver of sovereign immunity and the

Court can think of none. See Bank v. Wolfe, No. 19-CV-441, 2020 WL 4748320, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) (noting that although plaintiff cites to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal

question statute, this statute does not serve as a waiver of sovereign immunity).

The Court typically grants a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, even where, as

here, the complaint is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court will not

entertain amendment. As a threshold matter, Plaintiff has effectively already had three bites at

the apple. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same set of facts considered in Goodwine I,

Goodwine II, and Goodwine III. And in each case the Court soundly rejected Plaintiff’s claims

as without merit. Moreover, any attempt to amend the complaint would be futile. See Ashmore

v. Prus, 510 F. App'x 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2013) (leave to amend is futile where barriers to relief

cannot be surmounted by reframing the complaint); see also Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99,

112 (2d Cir. 2000) (denying leave to amend a pro se complaint where amendment would be

futile). This is so because Plaintiff is unlikely to ever clear the jurisdictional hurdle of sovereign

immunity, but also because, even under a liberal review of the complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege

anything approaching actionable. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall not be permitted to file any further

submissions related to Goodwine I, Goodwine II, Goodwine III, or the instant action, other than

notices of appeal or papers relating to an appeal, without permission of the court.

* * * *

To the extent that Plaintiff requests to seal his medical records filed in Goodwine I, that

request is denied as moot. Again, by order dated October 5, 2017, Judge Cogan already directed

the Clerk of Court to seal the docket filing containing Plaintiff’s personal medical information.

See Goodwine I, No. 12-CV-3882, ECF No. 328. Plaintiff has not provided any indication that

such order was not followed. Plaintiff has, however, identified at least one document filed in

Goodwine I that contains his social security number and personal address. Plaintiff’s request to

seal that document is improperly brought in this case—Plaintiff is directed to file his motion

before Judge Cogan in Goodwine I to the extent he still seeks such relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED as barred by the doctrine of

sovereign immunity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s motion

for leave to file a motion for emergency relief is DENIED as MOOT. Plaintiff’s motion to seal

docket entry [41] in Goodwine I is DENIED as improperly filed. The Court certifies pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and

therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York /s/ LDH

February 10, 2022 LaSHANN DeARCY HALL

United States District Judge