Coppedge v. New York State

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ALBERT COPPEDGE,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 21-CV-4718(JS)(ARL)

NEW YORK STATE, NEW YORK STATE

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

HON. ANDREW CUOMO, and

THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Supervising/Administrator,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Albert Coppedge, pro se

215953

Suffolk County Correctional Facility

110 Center Drive

Riverhead, New York 11901

For Defendants: No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

On or around August 19, 2021, incarcerated pro se

plaintiff Albert Coppedge (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action by

filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)

against New York State, the New York State Department of Social

Services, then-Governor Andrew Cuomo, and an unidentified

supervisor or administrator at the Department of Social Services

(collectively, “Defendants”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did

not file an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) nor

remit the filing fee with his Complaint. By Notice of Deficiency

dated August 20, 2021, Plaintiff was instructed to complete an IFP

application and a Prisoner Authorization form pursuant to the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) within fourteen (14) days.

(Notice of Deficiency, ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff timely filed an IFP

application and PLRA form. (IFP App., ECF No. 6; PLRA Form, ECF

No. 7.) For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s IFP application

is GRANTED; however, the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Despite the brevity of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which was

submitted on the Court’s form complaint for civil rights actions

pursuant to Section 1983, it is incomprehensible and non-sensical.

(See generally Compl.) In its entirety, Plaintiff alleges:1

First claim is against Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York

State. By which the certificate of live birth proves

unlawful and assumable jurisdiction, under seal of New

York State, this document forges denaturalization a

federal crime. Pursuant the 13th amendment which

abolished slavery and its names (Negro, black, colored

etc.) Plaintiff is Moorish-American non-14th Amendment

person (commercial property). Date 4/17/74.

Second claim/complaint, is against the Department of

Social Services, for allowing Mr. Celus Coppedge via the

Suffolk County Family courts to adopt I the plaintiff

Albert R. Gordon – El Ex rel, without having any proof

of Birth, of consanguinity. C. 4/17/84.

(Id. ¶ IV.) In the space on the form Complaint that calls for a

description of any injuries suffered and/or any medical treatment

needed and/or received, Plaintiff responded:

1 Excerpts from the Complaint are reproduced here exactly as they

appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and

grammar have not been corrected or noted.

Mental anguish, was treated and diagnosed as needing

psychiatric treatment via the Department of Social

Service Records. Thus determined to have antisocial

disorder, and exempt to work.

(Id. ¶ IV.A.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks “to be compensated

$90,000,000 U.S.D. and the correction of my proper status via

nationality of my forefathers. Relief et al. by the crime of human

trafficking.” (Id. ¶ V.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Application is Granted

The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence this action without prepayment of the

filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

IFP application is GRANTED.

II. Relevant Legal Standards

A. Consideration of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915,

1915A

Section 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an in

forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 1915A(b). An action is

frivolous as a matter of law when, inter alia, it is based on an

“indisputably meritless legal theory” or when it “lacks an arguable

basis in law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists

on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage

Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court is required to

dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL

1979077, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se

plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the “strongest

[claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Harris v. Mills, 572

F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). “But the ‘special solicitude’ in pro

se cases has its limits –- to state a claim, pro se pleadings still

must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Wynn v. Regus

Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 21-CV-3503, 2021 WL 2018967, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.

May 17, 2021) (quoting Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also

requires that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and

direct.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1). Indeed, pleadings must give

“‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests’” in order to enable the opposing party to

answer and prepare for trial, and to identify the nature of the

case. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), overruled in

part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007)).

Under Rule 8, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, a pleading that only

“tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement”

will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). And a court may dismiss a complaint that

is “so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that

its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Salahuddin v.

Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988); Tawfik v. Georgatos, No.

20-CV-5832, 2021 WL 2953227, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 14,

2021)(Seybert, J.).

C. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States .

. . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at

least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law

and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed

under the Constitution of the United States.” Rodriguez v.

Shoprite Supermarket, No. 19-CV-6565, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). In addition, “personal involvement of defendants in

alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award

of damages under § 1983.” Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 36 (2d

Cir. 2019) (citation and quotations omitted). To establish

personal involvement under Section 1983, the plaintiff must “plead

and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution,’” that is, personally participated in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609,

618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675).

III. Application of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A

Applying these standards to Plaintiff’s Complaint, even

with the special solicitude afforded to pro se pleadings, it is

readily apparent that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.

First, to the extent Plaintiff asserts any claims

against the State of New York, “[i]t is well established that ‘New

York State has not waived its sovereign immunity from Section 1983

claims.’” Harrison v. New York, 95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 314 (E.D.N.Y.

2015)(quoting Nolan v. Cuomo, No. 11-CV-5827, 2013 WL 168674, at

*7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013)); see also KM Enters., Inc. v.

McDonald, 518 F. App’x 12, 13 (2d Cir. 2013) (“As a general matter,

states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in federal court, even

if the claim arises under federal law.” (citing U.S. Const. amend.

XI)). As such, Plaintiff’s claims against New York State are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Second, Plaintiff’s claims are untimely. Pursuant to

New York Law, Section 1983 claims are governed by a three-year

statute of limitations. See Wheeler v. Slanovec, No. 16-CV-9065,

2019 WL 2994193, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2019) (instructing that

federal claims pursuant to Section 1983 are governed by the

applicable state’s statute of limitations for persona injury torts

and “federal courts in New York apply a three-year statute of

limitations for personal injury actions to [Section] 1983 claims”

(citations omitted)). Plaintiff indicated his first claim accrued

on April 17, 1974 and that his second claim accrued on April 17,

1984. (See Compl. at 4.) As such, the conduct giving rise to

Plaintiff’s claims occurred decades outside of the applicable

three-year statute of limitations. In other words, Plaintiff is

barred from bringing his two claims; therefore, they must be

dismissed.

Third, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations to be

fanciful and delusional to the point which renders his claims

baseless and frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

327-28 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)

(“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the

facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly

incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts

available to contradict them.”); Mecca v. U.S. Gov’t, 232 F. App’x

66, 67 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming district court dismissal of

complaint that was “replete with fantastic and delusional

scenarios”); Samuel v. Bloomberg, No. 13-CV-6027, 2013 WL 5887545,

at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s allegations--even

under the very liberal reading we accord pro se pleadings (and

even if plaintiff himself believes them to be true)--can only be

described as delusional and fantastic.” (citing Denton, 504 U.S.

at 33)).

Although difficult to decipher, the Court distills

Plaintiff’s two claims as follows: (1) that Plaintiff’s birth

certificate issued by New York State is unlawful and illegally

subjects him to the jurisdiction of this State, which,

consequently, is a form of slavery and violates the Thirteenth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) that the Department of

Social Services committed human trafficking by facilitating the

adoption of Plaintiff. “Since the complaint is devoid of any basis

in law or fact, defects which cannot be cured by amendment, this

frivolous action is dismissed.” Samuel, 2013 WL 5887545, at *1

(citing Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437).

IV. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit against Ruthie Elis and Judge Saladino

In his Complaint, Plaintiff indicates that he has

another pending case in the Eastern District of New York against

“Ruthie Elis and Judge Saladino” that was filed on July 6, 2021.

(See Compl. at 1.) Although Plaintiff attached a letter to his

Complaint in the instant action which appears to refer to the

purported separate action against Ruthie Elis and Judge Saladino

(hereafter, the “Letter”) (see id. at 6), a search of the Court’s

filing system did not yield any evidence of this alleged separate

action. However, in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court

will construe the Letter as Plaintiff’s Complaint for a separate

action against Ruthie Elis and Judge Saladino and directs the Clerk

of Court to assign it a separate docket number. Thereafter, the

Court will address it separately.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Plaintiff’s IFP application (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims are

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A and that

this case is CLOSED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall open

a new case under a separate docket number and docket the Letter

(ECF No. 1 at 6) as the complaint for Plaintiff’s claims against

Ruthie Elis and Judge Saladino, which is to be deemed filed as of

July 6, 2021;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3), any appeal from this Order would not be taken in

good faith. Therefore, in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the

purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.

438, 444-45 (1962); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall

mail a copy of this Memorandum & Order to the pro se Plaintiff at

his address of record and include the notation “Legal Mail” on the

envelope.

SO ORDERED.

_/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT ____

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: January 6, 2022

Central Islip, New York