Holloway v. Suffolk County Correctional Facility Medical

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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TARELL T. HOLLOWAY, 483024,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

-against- No. 21-CV-5011(JS)(JMW)

SUFFOLK COUNTY CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, Medical; JOHN DOE,

Suffolk County Medical Unit;

JOHN DOE, PBMC; JOHN DOE, Stony

Brook Medical;

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Tarell T. Holloway, pro Se

483024

Suffolk County Correctional Facility

110 Center Drive

Riverhead, New York 11901

For Defendants: No Appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

On or around September 27, 2021 and while incarcerated,

pro se plaintiff Tarell T. Holloway (“Plaintiff”) commenced this

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the

Suffolk County Correctional Facility, Medical (hereafter, “the

Jail”) and three “John Does” (hereafter, the “John Doe

Defendants”), who are alleged to be employed at the Jail’s Medical

Unit, the Peconic Bay Medical Center,1 and the Stony Brook Medical

1 Although Plaintiff names “PBMC”, the Court understands this to

be the Peconic Bay Medical Center which is located at the address

Plaintiff provides for PBMC in the Complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 1

at ¶ I. B.)

Center, respectively. (See Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Together, with

his Compliant, Petitioner filed an application to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) (hereafter, the “IFP Application”) and a Prisoner

Authorization form pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) (hereafter, the “PLRA Form”). (See IFP Application, ECF

No. 2; PLRA Form, ECF No. 3.) For the reasons that follow,

Plaintiff’s: (1) IFP Application is GRANTED; (2) claims against

the Jail are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and (3) claims against the

John Doe Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff alleges that, on March 31, 2021 at

approximately 1:30 p.m., he sprained his pinky finger while playing

basketball during recreation time. (Complaint at ¶ II (Statement

of Claim).) He alleges that he informed “rec yard staff” that he

needed to “see Medical.” (Id.) Plaintiff describes his hand as

being swollen. (See id.) Plaintiff was seen by the Jail doctor

who determined that Plaintiff’s pinky finger was sprained. (Id.)

Following days of Plaintiff’s complaints of pain and

loss of feeling in his pinky finger, Plaintiff was taken to the

Emergency Room on April 3, 2021, where he was diagnosed with a

2 In commencing this action, Plaintiff used the Court’s form

complaint for Civil Rights actions under Section 1983. The

“BACKGROUND” facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Excerpts

from the Complaint are reproduced here exactly as they appear in

the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have

not been corrected or noted.

dislocated pinky finger, rather than a sprain. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from numbness in his

right hand and arm for which he seeks to recover a damages award

in the sum of five million dollars due to “not receiving medical

treatment in a reasonable amount of time and for future side

effects . . . [as well as] pain and suffering and mental anguish.”

(Id. ¶¶ II.A., III.)

Plaintiff has annexed an eight-page handwritten document

to his Complaint entitled “Claim” wherein Plaintiff elaborates on

the information set forth in the Complaint form. (Id. at 6-13.)

There, Plaintiff adds that he did not receive any pain medication

when he visited the Jail doctor and alleges that, at that time,

the doctor examined his fingers and hand but did not take X-rays.

(Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiff, on April 2, 2021 at

approximately 9:15 a.m., he was called to the Jail’s Medical Unit

and, following an X-ray, was again diagnosed with a sprained pinky

finger. (Id. at 8.) On April 3, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by the

Jail doctor twice and, at approximately 4:15 p.m., he was taken to

the Emergency Room due to his complaints of pain and numbness.

(Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff claims that the Emergency Room doctor

diagnosed his injury as a dislocation, rather than a sprain, and

ordered Plaintiff to see a hand specialist within three days. (Id.

at 9.) Approximately three weeks later, Plaintiff was taken to a

hand specialist at Peconic Bay Medical Center who referred

Plaintiff for physical therapy. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to Stony Brook

Medical Center two times per week for three weeks for hand therapy.

(Id.) However, because Plaintiff was not improving, the treatment

provider at Stony Brook Medical Center allegedly surmised that

Plaintiff had nerve damage and referred Plaintiff for an MRI.

(Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff describes that the Jail medical staff

sent Plaintiff back to Peconic Bay Medical Center for an MRI but,

once there, the examining doctor opined that Plaintiff was not

suffering from nerve damage and declined to take an MRI. Rather,

Plaintiff contends that the doctor opined that Plaintiff needed

surgery but stated that “he didn’t feel comfortable doing it

because [Plaintiff was] in Jail but if another doctor wanted to do

the surgery he was ok with it.” (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff claims

that, as of the September 27, 2021 filing of the Complaint, he has

not had an MRI, has not had surgery, and “is still having problems

with [his] hand and pinky finger.” (Id. at 10.)

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff claims that the

“Suffolk County Medical Staff has violated my Constitutional

Eighth Amendment [right] when they sent me back to my housing unit

in pain instead of sending me to the hospital.” (Id. at 12.)

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered “cruel and unusual punishment

for 3 days because [he] wasn’t giving adequate medical care for 3

whole days. The Medical Staff failed to provide [Plaintiff]

treatment for a diagnosed finger injury.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims

that his injury has “affected me mentally to the point that I can’t

sleep at night because the pain is too much to handle. I wake up

in the night to numbness to my right hand and my pinky finger all

the way up my right arm.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff also claims to

suffer physical effects in that he cannot “hold anything heavy for

more than five minutes without my hand shaking or going numb.”

(Id.) Plaintiff also claims that he cannot fully open his hand

and suffers from numbness when gripping or writing. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Application is Granted

The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence this action without prepayment of the

filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

IFP Application (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.

II. Legal Standards

A. Consideration of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Section 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an IFP

complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 1915A(b). An action is frivolous as a

matter of law when, among other things, it is based on an

“indisputably meritless legal theory” or when it “lacks an arguable

basis in law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists

on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage

Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The

Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as it makes such

a determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-

CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021).

Courts are obligated to construe the pleadings of a pro

se plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the

“strongest [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “But the

‘special solicitude’ in pro se cases[] has its limits –- to state

a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to

make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Wynn v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 21-CV-

3503, 2021 WL 2018967, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (quoting

Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475).

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States .

. . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at

least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law

and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed

under the Constitution of the United States.” Rodriguez v.

Shoprite Supermarket, No. 19-CV-6565, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

III. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915

A. Claims Against the Jail

The Jail is a non-suable entity because, “‘under New York

law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a

municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from

the municipality and therefore, cannot sue or be sued.” Sturgis

v. Suffolk County Jail, No. 12-CV-5263, 2013 WL 245052, *2

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013) (Seybert, J.) (quoting Davis v. Lynbrook

Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)); Griffin

v. Fludd, No. 19-CV-0107, 2019 WL 3253181, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July

18, 2019)(Seybert, J.) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against the

Nassau County Jail with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims

against the Jail are implausible and are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A.

B. Claims Against Suffolk County

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court construes the

Complaint against Suffolk County (the “County”). It is well-

established that a municipality, like the County, cannot be held

liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. City, 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978); Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir.

2020) (“Monell expressly prohibits respondeat superior liability

for municipalities” (citations omitted)). Rather, to state a claim

against a municipality under Section 1983, “the plaintiff is

required to show that the challenged acts were performed pursuant

to a municipal policy or custom.” Tafolla v. County of Suffolk,

No. 17-CV-4897, 2021 WL 3675042, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2021)

(Seybert, J.) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297,

314 (2d Cir. 2015)). To establish the existence of a municipal

policy or custom, the plaintiff must allege:

(1) the existence of a formal policy which is

officially endorsed by the municipality; (2)

actions taken or decisions made by municipal

policymaking officials, i.e., officials with

final decisionmaking authority, which caused

the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s civil

rights; (3) a practice so persistent and

widespread as to practically have the force of

law or that was so manifest as to imply the

constructive acquiescence of senior policy-

making officials; or (4) that a policymaking

official exhibited deliberate indifference to

constitutional deprivations caused by

subordinates.

Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

May 18, 2021) (Seybert, J.) (cleaned up).

Here, when liberally construing the Complaint, there are

no factual allegations that a municipal policy or custom existed

which caused the alleged constitutional deprivations. (See

Complaint, generally.) Indeed, there are no allegations from which

the Court could reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 claim

against the County. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff asserts any

Section 1983 claims against Suffolk County, those claims are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)

and 1915A(b). Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an Amended

Complaint to address the pleading defects identified herein

regarding his claims against the County.

C. Claims Against the John Doe Defendants

To state a claim for relief under Section 1983 against

an individual defendant, a plaintiff must allege the personal

involvement of the defendant in the alleged constitutional

deprivation. See Farid v. Elle, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010).

The Supreme Court held in Iqbal that “[b]ecause vicarious liability

is inapplicable to . . . [Section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 at 1948. A complaint based upon a violation

under Section 1983 that does not allege the personal involvement

of a defendant fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.

See Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).

Moreover, as set forth above, a plausible Section 1983 claim must

allege that “the challenged conduct was attributable at least in

part to a person who was acting under color of state law.” See

supra at 7 (quoting Rodriguez, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2).

Here, Plaintiff does not include sufficient factual

allegations such that the identities of the intended individuals

could be ascertained. (See Complaint, generally.) Nor are

Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to establish that the

individuals alleged to work at Peconic Bay Medical Center and at

Stony Brook Medical are state actors. A private actor may be

considered to be acting under the color of state law for purposes

of Section 1983 if the private actor was a “‘willful participant

in joint activity with the State or its agents’”, Ciambriello v.

County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Adickes

v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)), or who “conspire[d]

with a state actor to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”

Christin Griskie, LLC v. Big Mach. Recs., No. 15-CV-3186, 2015 WL

3949015, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) (Seybert, D.J.) (citing

Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323–24)). In turn, in order to state a

Section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) an

agreement between a state actor and a private party [or actor];

(2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and

(3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”

Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 324–25 (citing Pangburn v. Culbertson,

200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)).

Moreover, even construing the Complaint liberally,

Plaintiff’s allegations do not set forth a plausible deliberate

indifference claim as a result of the alleged delay and/or denial

of adequate medical attention in violation of the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

(See id.) To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need, a plaintiff must show both that his medical

need was serious and that the defendants acted with a sufficiently

culpable state of mind.3 Paschal-Barros v. Balatka, No. 20-CV-

3150, 2021 WL 5268000, *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2021). Prison

officials and other state actors who act with mere negligence will

not be held liable for constitutional violations because “any

[Section] 1983 claim for a violation of due process requires proof

of a mens rea greater than mere negligence.” Darnell v. Pineiro,

849 F.3d 17, 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Grimmett v. Corizon

3 Although Plaintiff did not indicate in the Complaint whether he

is a sentenced prisoner or a pretrial detainee at the time of the

challenged conduct, he has alleged that his Section 1983 claims

arise under the Eighth Amendment. Because a convicted prisoner’s

deliberate indifference claim arises under the Eighth Amendment,

the Court has considered Plaintiff’s claims accordingly. However,

if Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, his deliberate indifference

claims would arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process

clause. Any Amended Complaint should include such information.

Med. Assocs. of N.Y., 15-CV-7351, 2017 WL 2274485, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

May 24, 2017) (holding that more than negligence is required to

hold a defendant liable for violating either the Eighth or

Fourteenth Amendment) (citing Darnell, 849 F.3d at 36). Negligence

that would support a claim for medical malpractice does not rise

to the level of deliberate indifference and is not cognizable under

Section 1983, see Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir.

2006); nor does a difference of opinion regarding what constitutes

an appropriate response and treatment. Ventura v. Sinha, 379 F.

App’x 1, 2-3 (2d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, rather than file an

Amended Complaint in this Court, Plaintiff may elect to pursue any

valid claims, including medical malpractice and/or negligence, in

state court.

Plaintiff’s claims against the John Doe Defendants “must

be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing

that anything that [they] personally did or failed to do violated

Plaintiff’s rights.” Moultrie v. Wright, No. 21-CV-3925, 2021 WL

3372031, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021). Further, Plaintiff does

not allege that the state of mind of any of the John Doe Defendants

was sufficiently culpable. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims

against the John Doe Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff

is GRANTED leave to file an Amended Complaint to address the

pleading deficiencies identified herein regarding his claims

against the John Doe Defendants.

V. Leave to Amend

In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff is

GRANTED leave to file an Amended Complaint in accordance with this

Order within 45 days from the date of this Order. In his Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff may continue to name individuals as “John

Doe” or “Jane Doe” if he does not now know their identities.

However, Plaintiff must include factual allegations relating to

the acts or omissions of the John Doe Defendants that give rise to

his claims as well as descriptive information, such as when and

where these acts or omissions occurred, for purposes of

ascertaining the identities of the John Doe Defendants. The

Amended Complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended Complaint” and

shall bear the case number, No. 21-CV-5011(JS)(JMW). Further,

because the Amended Complaint will completely replace the original

Complaint, it must include all factual allegations and claims that

Plaintiff seeks to pursue in this case.

PLAINTIFF IS WARNED: No extensions of this deadline

will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. PLAINTIFF IS

FURTHER CAUTIONED: If an Amended Complaint is not filed within 45

days from the date of this Order and/or fails to address the

pleading deficiencies identified herein, the Court may dismiss

this action with prejudice. Alternatively, rather than file an

Amended Complaint in this Court, Plaintiff may elect to pursue any

valid claims, including medical malpractice and/or negligence, in

state court.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

(A) Plaintiff’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;

(B) Plaintiff’s claims against the Jail are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-

(ii), 1915A(b);

(C) Plaintiff’s claims against Suffolk County and the John

Doe Defendants are dismissed WITHOUT PJREUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A (b)(1);

(D) Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED

COMPLAINT in accordance with the guidance set forth

above within 45 days from the date of this Order. The

Amended Complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended

Complaint” and shall bear the same case number as

identified in this Order, No. 21-CV-5011(JS)(JMW).

PLAINTIFF IS WARNED that if he does not file an

Amended Complaint within 45 days from the date of this

Order, judgment may enter and this case may be

dismissed without further notice;

(E) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court

certifies that any appeal from this Order would not

be in good faith and therefore IFP status is DENIED

for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962); and

(F) the Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Order

to the pro se Plaintiff at his address of record and

include the notation “Legal Mail” on the envelope.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT_____

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: November 16th, 2021

Central Islip, New York