Brooks v. Suffolk County First Precinct

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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CHRISTOPHER BROOKS, 218996,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

-against- 21-CV-4546(JS)(ARL)

SUFFOLK COUNTY FIRST PRECINCT,

ALEXANDER SEBA, Police Officer,

S. COREY, D/Sgt. #652, N/A Det

1642/310/tel, Q. ADAM #3418/1642,

and T. CFOR, P.O. #6708/1101,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Christopher Brooks, pro Se

218996

Suffolk County Correctional Facility

110 Center Drive

Riverhead, New York 11901

For Defendants: No Appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

On or around August 9, 2021, pro se plaintiff Christopher

Brooks (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against the Suffolk

County First Precinct (“First Precinct”) and five Suffolk County

law enforcement officers (“Officer Defendants”), while

incarcerated by filing a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(“Section 1983”), along with an application to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) and a Prisoner Authorization form pursuant to the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Compl., ECF No. 2; IFP

App., ECF No. 3; PLRA Form, ECF No. 4.) For the reasons that

follow, Plaintiff’s IFP application is GRANTED; however, his

claims against the First Precinct are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and

his claims against the Officers are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Complaint is difficult to comprehend and

decipher.1 Using the Court’s form complaint for Civil Rights

actions under Section 1983, Plaintiff alleges that, on May 17,

2021 at 9:58 a.m.:

I was arrested for criminal possession of

stolen property in the fourth degree. I was

denied medical attention/medication due to the

factors of continuous bias & prejudice view of

prisoner of color better yet African descent

by S. Corey D/Sgt. #652 denied. Fellow

colleagues as well. A. Seba Q. Adam 3418/624.

Refuse Brooks, C. #218996 medical attention

consistently of this hatred of abuse of

authority position as usual of an individual

of color that’s not the same as there police

officers so “NO” RETALIATION WHAT SO EVER.

Justice finally from this Precinct “first &

all other persons.”

(Compl. ¶ II.) In the space on the form that calls for a

description of his injuries and medical treatment, Plaintiff

alleges:

“I was denied” medical attention cruel &

unusual punishment of color & continuous abuse

of authority positions of these biases

officers.

(Id. ¶ II.A.) For relief, Plaintiff requests that: “All subjects

1 Excerpts from the Complaint are reproduced here exactly as they

appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and

grammar have not been corrected or noted.

be terminated from Suffolk County Precincts also no where else for

these subject’s continuous abuse of authority, cruel & unusual

punishment of people of color that not the same as these bias &

prejudice officers $850,000.” (Id. ¶ III.)

In addition, on August 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed a nine-

page letter which the Court liberally construes as a supplement to

the Complaint. (See Letter, ECF No. 7.) The letter contains a

list titled “Excessive Force” which appears to name nineteen

different court cases; however the list does not provide any case

numbers, citations, or an explanation why this information was

submitted. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff has also included copies of

his Notice of Claim to the Suffolk County Attorney as well as an

August 17, 2021 letter by Deputy County Attorney Susan A. Flynn

which apprises Plaintiff of purported deficiencies in his Notice

of Claim. (Id. at 4-6.) Lastly, Plaintiff attached a letter dated

August 25, 2021 that he wrote to Deputy County Attorney Flynn, in

which he asked for guidance to correct his deficient Notice of

Claim. (Id. at 7-8.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Application is Granted

The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence this action without prepayment of the

filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

IFP application is GRANTED.

II. Legal Standards

A. Consideration of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Section 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an in

forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 1915A(b). An action is

frivolous as a matter of law when, inter alia, it is based on an

“indisputably meritless legal theory” or when it “lacks an arguable

basis in law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists

on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage

Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The

Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as it makes such

a determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-

CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021).

Courts are obligated to construe the pleadings of a pro

se plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the

“strongest [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “But the

‘special solicitude’ in pro se cases[] has its limits –- to state

a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to

make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Wynn v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 21-CV-

3503, 2021 WL 2018967, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (quoting

Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475).

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United

States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at

least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law

and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed

under the Constitution of the United States.” Rodriguez v.

Shoprite Supermarket, No. 19-CV-6565, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

III. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915

A. Claims Against the First Precinct

The First Precinct is a non-suable entity “because it is

an ‘administrative arm,’ which does ‘not have a legal identity

separate and apart from the municipality.’” Spagnuolo v. Suffolk

Cnty., No. 12-CV-4327, 2017 WL 4326510, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,

2017) (Seybert, J.)(quoting Rose v. Cnty. of Nassau, 904 F. Supp.

2d 244, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)), aff’d sub nom. Spagnuolo v. Howell,

814 F. App’x 614 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Sturgis v. Suffolk Cnty.

Jail, No. 12-CV-5263, 2013 WL 245052, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013)

(sua sponte dismissing Section 1983 claims against the Suffolk

County Police Department because it is an “administrative arm[] of

the County of Suffolk . . . [and] lack[s] the capacity to be sued”

(citing Carthew v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 709 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195

(E.D.N.Y. 2010))). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the

First Precinct are implausible and are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A.

B. Claims Against Suffolk County

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court construes the

Complaint against Suffolk County (the “County”). It is well-

established that a municipality, like the County, cannot be held

liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. City, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978);

Agosto v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir.

2020) (“Monell expressly prohibits respondeat superior liability

for municipalities” (citations omitted)). Rather, to state a claim

against a municipality under Section 1983, “the plaintiff is

required to show that the challenged acts were performed pursuant

to a municipal policy or custom.” Tafolla v. Cnty. of Suffolk,

No. 17-CV-4897, 2021 WL 3675042, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2021)

(Seybert, J.) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297,

314 (2d Cir. 2015)). To establish the existence of a municipal

policy or custom, the plaintiff must allege:

(1) the existence of a formal policy which is

officially endorsed by the municipality;

(2) actions taken or decisions made by

municipal policymaking officials, i.e.,

officials with final decisionmaking

authority, which caused the alleged violation

of the plaintiff’s civil rights; (3) a

practice so persistent and widespread as to

practically have the force of law or that was

so manifest as to imply the constructive

acquiescence of senior policy-making

officials; or (4) that a policymaking official

exhibited deliberate indifference to

constitutional deprivations caused by

subordinates.

Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

May 18, 2021) (Seybert, J.) (cleaned up).

Here, when liberally construing the Complaint, there are

no factual allegations that a municipal policy or custom existed

which caused the alleged constitutional deprivations Plaintiff

complains of. (See generally Compl.) Similarly, there are no

allegations from which the Court could reasonably construe a

plausible Section 1983 claim against the County. Thus, to the

extent Plaintiff asserts any Section 1983 claims against Suffolk

County, those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff is GRANTED

leave to file an Amended Complaint to address the pleading defects

identified herein regarding his claims against the County.

C. Claims Against the Officer Defendants

Although not readily discernible from the Complaint, the

remaining Defendants, Alexander Seba, S. Corey, N/A Det

1642/310/tel, Q. Adam, and T. Cfor, all appear to be police

officers, detectives, or sergeants at the First Precinct. To state

a claim for relief under Section 1983 against an individual

defendant, a plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of the

defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Farid v.

Elle, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court held in

Iqbal that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . .

[Section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-

official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,

has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 at 1948.

A complaint based upon a violation under Section 1983 that does

not allege the personal involvement of a defendant fails as a

matter of law and should be dismissed. Johnson v. Barney, 360 F.

App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).

Here, of the five officers Plaintiff named in the

Complaint, Plaintiff’s factual allegations only refer to three:

S. Corey, A. Seba, and Q. Adam. (See Compl. II.) Construing the

Complaint liberally, Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion that

these three Defendants racially discriminated against him and

denied him medical attention in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (See id.) The

Complaint is otherwise devoid of factual allegations or any

personal involvement by the Officer Defendants. As such,

Plaintiff’s claims against the Officer Defendants “must be

dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that

anything that [they] personally did or failed to do violated

Plaintiff’s rights.” Moultrie v. Wright, No. 21-CV-3925, 2021 WL

3372031, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claims against the Officer Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (b)(ii); 1915A(b).

Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an Amended Complaint to address

the pleading deficiencies identified herein regarding his claims

against the Officer Defendants.

IV. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a

pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 8(d)(1). However, the short and plain statement must be

“sufficient to give the defendants fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Jones

v. Nat’l Commc’ns & Surveillance Networks, 266 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Indeed, pleadings must give “‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’” in order to enable

the opposing party to answer and prepare for trial, and to identify

the nature of the case. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.

336, 346, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1643, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2005) (quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80

(1957), overruled in part on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at

544)).

Under the now well-established Iqbal/Twombly standard,

a complaint satisfies Rule 8 only if it contains enough allegations

of fact to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its

face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This

“plausibility standard” is governed by “[t]wo working principles.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670, 678; accord Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66,

71-72 (2d Cir. 2009). First, although the Court must accept all

allegations as true, this “tenet” is “inapplicable to legal

conclusions; thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555, 557 (a pleading that offers “labels and conclusion” or “naked

assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement” does not

satisfy Rule 8). Second, only complaints that state a “plausible

claim for relief” can survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679. Determining whether a complaint does so is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.; accord Harris,

572 F.3d at 72.

“When a complaint does not comply with the requirement

that it be short and plain, the court has the power, on its own

initiative or in response to a motion by the defendant, to strike

any portions that are redundant or immaterial . . . or to dismiss

the complaint.” Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42; see also Shomo v.

State of N.Y., 374 F. App’x 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished

opinion) (“a court has the power to dismiss a complaint that . . .

has a ‘surfeit of detail’”).

Here, as is readily apparent, Plaintiff’s Complaint

does not comport with the pleading requirements of Rule 8. The

sparse Complaint is bereft of any facts to elaborate as to what

happened on May 17, 2021, the date Plaintiff was allegedly denied

medical attention. Plaintiff does not allege why he needed medical

attention nor provide the Court with details concerning any acts

or omissions by the Officer Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not include “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and is

DISMISSED WIHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8.

V. Leave to Amend

In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff is

GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint in accordance with

Rule 8 and this Order within 45 days from the date of this Order.

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff may name individuals as “John

Doe” or “Jane Doe” if he does not now know their identities.

However, Plaintiff must include factual allegations relating to

the acts or omissions of Defendants that give rise to his claims

as well as descriptive information, such as when and where these

acts or omissions occurred, for purposes of ascertaining the

identities of the Defendants. The Amended Complaint shall be

clearly labeled “Amended Complaint” and shall bear case number 21-

CV-4546(JS)(ARL). Further, because the Amended Complaint will

completely replace the original Complaint, it must include all

factual allegations and claims that Plaintiff seeks to pursue in

this case.

Plaintiff is warned that no extensions of this deadline

will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. Plaintiff is

further cautioned that if an amended complaint is not filed within

45 days from the date of this Order and/or fails to address the

pleading deficiencies identified herein, the Court may dismiss

this action with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Plaintiff’s IFP application (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against

the First Precinct are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against

Suffolk County and the Officer Defendants are dismissed

WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

(ii) and 1915A (b)(1); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO

FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT in accordance with the guidance set forth

above within 45 days from the date of this Order. The Amended

Complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended Complaint” and shall

bear the same case number as identified in this Order, No. 21-CV-

4546(JS)(ARL). Plaintiff is WARNED that if he does not file an

Amended Complaint within 45 days from the date of this Order,

judgment will enter and this case will be dismissed; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that any appeal from this Order

would not be in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status

is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court

shall mail a copy of this Order to the pro se Plaintiff at his

address of record and include the notation “Legal Mail” on the

envelope.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: November 4, 2021

Central Islip, New York