Player v. Sini

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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DASEAN PLAYER,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

-against- 21-CV-5613(JS)(JMW)

TIMOTHY D. SINI, Suffolk County

District Attorney,

Defendant.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Dasean Player, pro se

559822

Yaphank Correctional Facility

110 Center Drive

Riverhead, New York 119011

For Defendant: No Appearance.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

On or around October 4, 2021, pro se plaintiff Dasean

Player (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action while incarcerated by

filing an unsigned Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

1983”) along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) and a Prisoner Authorization form pursuant to the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Compl., ECF No. 1; IFP App., ECF

No. 2; PLRA Form, ECF No. 3.) By Notice of Deficiency dated

1 Plaintiff has another case in this Court, 21-CV-3552, wherein he

has just filed a Notice of Change of Address to 143 N. 26th Street,

Wyandanch, New York 11798. (See ECF No. 9.) Given that Plaintiff

reports that he has been discharged from the Yaphank Correctional

Facility, the Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to

update his address on this case.

October 5, 2021, the Court instructed Plaintiff to sign the

enclosed copy of his Complaint and to return it within fourteen

(14) days. (See ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff timely filed a signed

Amended Complaint, which restated without modification Plaintiff’s

substantive allegations, as summarized below. (See ECF No. 8.)

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s IFP application

is GRANTED; however, his Complaint is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, using the Court’s form complaint for Civil

Rights actions under Section 1983, seeks the dismissal of state

criminal charges against him by Suffolk County District Attorney

Timothy D. Sini (“DA Sini”), the sole defendant in this case.2

(See generally Compl.) In addition, Plaintiff seeks to recover a

damages award in the sum of $20 million. (Id. ¶ III.) In its

entirety, the sparse Complaint alleges3:

Timothy Sini knows and has the authority to dismiss the

criminal charges against the Plaintiff after Plaintiff

submitted to a DNA that exonerated him as being the

driver of a car chase and crash. Timothy Sini having

this knowledge via DNA testing see Exhibit A. Still

refuses to release defendant thus violated Plaintiffs

6th and 14th Amendments.

2 According to the information maintained by the New York State

Unified Court System on its public database, Plaintiff is being

prosecuted in the Suffolk County First District Court under Case

No: CR-028720-20SU on petit larceny charges pursuant to New York

Penal Law § 155.25.

3 Excerpts from the Complaint are reproduced here exactly as they

appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and

grammar have not been corrected or noted.

Compl. ¶ II.4 As for a description of his injuries and medical

treatment needed and/or received, Plaintiff alleges that:

I am suffering mental and physical anguish. I

received serious injuries due to the accident

and suffers severally due to the lack of

physical therapy.

(Id. ¶ II.A.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Application is Granted

The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence this action without prepayment of the

filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

IFP application is GRANTED.

II. Analysis

A. Consideration of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Section 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an in

forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 1915A(b). An action is

frivolous as a matter of law when, inter alia, it is based on an

“indisputably meritless legal theory” or when it “lacks an arguable

basis in law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists

4 Although Plaintiff references “Exhibit A” in the Complaint, no

exhibits were received by the Court with his submission.

on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage

Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court is required to

dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL

1979077, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021).

Courts are obligated to construe the pleadings of a pro

se plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the

“strongest [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Harris v.

Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). “But the ‘special

solicitude’ in pro se cases, has its limits –- to state a claim,

pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and

plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Wynn v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 21-CV-3503, 2021 WL 2018967, at

*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (quoting Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475).

B. Abstention

In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court concluded that

although federal courts have the power to enjoin state criminal

proceedings “when absolutely necessary for protection of

constitutional rights . . . this may not be done, except under

extraordinary circumstances, where the danger of irreparable loss

is both great and immediate.” 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). In Sprint

Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013), the Supreme

Court clarified that Younger abstention is required in one of three

types of state court proceedings:

First, Younger preclude[s] federal intrusion into

ongoing state criminal prosecutions. Second, certain

civil enforcement proceedings warrant Younger

abstention. Finally, federal courts should refrain from

interfering with pending civil proceedings involving

certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state

courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.

571 U.S. at 78 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);

see also Lowell v. Vermont Dep’t of Children & Families, No. 19-

CV-3987, 2020 WL 7038598, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 2020) (affirming

district court’s application of Younger abstention).

Here, insofar as Plaintiff seeks to have this Court

intervene in the on-going state court criminal proceedings against

him, this Court must abstain. Dismissing the charges as sought by

Plaintiff would surely constitute “federal intrusion into ongoing

state criminal proceedings.” Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 70.

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that would bring his

case within any exception to the general requirement that the

federal court abstain from intervening in, or enjoining, pending

state criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court ABSTAINS from

adjudicating Plaintiff’s constitutional claims seeking injunctive

relief regarding his pending criminal case. However, because

Plaintiff also seeks a monetary damages award, the Court next

addresses such claims.

C. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States .

. . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at

least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law

and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed

under the Constitution of the United States.” Rodriguez v.

Shoprite Supermarket, No. 19-CV-6565, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Insofar as Plaintiff seeks monetary damages pursuant to

Section 1983, the Court finds that his claims are implausible for

the reasons that follow.

1. Malicious Prosecution

Affording the pro se Complaint a liberal construction,

it appears that Plaintiff alleges a malicious prosecution claim

against DA Sini. To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a

plaintiff must allege that criminal proceedings were initiated or

continued against him, with malice and without probable cause, and

were terminated in his favor. See Mitchell v. City of New York,

841 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Lanning v. City of Glens

Falls, 908 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 2018) (plaintiff must allege facts

suggesting “that the underlying criminal proceeding ended in a

manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence”). “Claims of

malicious prosecution accrue when the relevant criminal

proceedings terminate in a plaintiff’s favor.” Lesane v. Doe 1,

No. 21-CV-4746, 2021 WL 3173056, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2021)

(citing Bumbury v. City of New York, 62 A.D. 3d 621 (N.Y. App.

Div. 1st Dep’t 2009)).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that reasonably

suggest a plausible malicious prosecution claim. Given the on-

going criminal prosecution, Plaintiff has not -- and cannot at

this juncture -- allege that the proceedings ended in a manner

that affirmatively indicates Plaintiff’s innocence. Indeed, a

conviction would be fatal to his malicious prosecution claim,

because the proceedings would not terminate in his favor. Thus,

as is readily apparent, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is

premature, at best. Given that this claim is implausible at this

time, it is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).

D. Immunity

1. Prosecutorial Immunity

It is well established that prosecutors are absolutely

immune from civil suits for acts committed within the scope of

their official duties where the challenged activities are not

investigative in nature, but rather are “intimately associated

with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Simon v. City of New

York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013). The actions for which a

prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity “include deciding

whether to bring charges and presenting a case to a grand jury or

a court.” Simon, 727 F.3d at 171; Shmueli v. City of New York,

424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2005).

Here, Plaintiff challenges DA Sini’s decision to charge

him as the driver of the vehicle and alleges that, although DA

Sini knows that DNA testing “exonerated [Plaintiff] as being the

driver,” he “still refuses to release Defendant.” (Compl. ¶ II.)

The decision to bring charges and to pursue such charges are

squarely within the scope of the judicial phase of the criminal

process for which DA Sini is absolutely immune from suit.

Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had alleged a plausible malicious

prosecution claim (see infra at 6-7), DA Sini is shielded from

suit by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Accordingly, this claim

is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(2).

2. The Eleventh Amendment

Because Plaintiff seeks to recover a monetary award

against the Defendant in his official capacity, this claim is also

implausible because he is immune from suit under the Eleventh

Amendment. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986); Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–100 (1984).

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought by a state’s

own citizens in federal court. Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch.

Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006). The “Eleventh

Amendment . . . bars [plaintiff] from pursuing a claim for damages

against the individual defendants in their official capacities.”

Darcy v. Lippman, 356 F. App’x 434, 436–37 (2d Cir. 2009); Torres

v. Spota, No. 19-CV-00296, 2019 WL 3035522, at *3 n.4 (E.D.N.Y.

July 10, 2019) (citing Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d

522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993) (when a district attorney decides whether

to prosecute, he or she is representing the State not the county

and is, thus, entitled to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity)).

Here, because Plaintiff’s claim for damages against a

state employee sued in his official capacity is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67, and

n.14 (1985) (suit for damages against state officer in official

capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment), it is thus DISMISSED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b); 1915A(b).5

5 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against DA

Sini in his official capacity must be dismissed for the additional

reason that “[n]either a state nor . . . an official of that agency

sued in his or her official capacity is a ‘person’ under § 1983.”

Spencer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

III. Leave to Amend

Given the Second Circuit’s guidance that a pro se

complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless

amendment would be futile, Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112

(2d Cir. 2000), the Court has carefully considered whether leave

to amend is warranted here. Notably, Plaintiff has another action

in this Court, 21-CV-3552, with similar claims against different

defendants arising from the same events. Because the defects in

Plaintiff’s claims against DA Sini are substantive and would not

be cured if afforded an opportunity to amend, leave to amend the

Complaint is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Plaintiff’s IFP application (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims against DA Sini are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that any appeal from this Order

would not be in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status

is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall:

(1) ENTER JUDGMENT and mark this case CLOSED; and (2) mail a copy

of the Order to the pro se Plaintiff at the residential address

set forth in Footnote 1.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: November 1 , 2021

Central Islip, New York