Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. The County of Suffolk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 20-CV-2656(JS)(AKT)

THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK,

Defendant.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Nicholas A. Duston, Esq.

Norris McLaughlin, P.A.

7 Times Square, 21st Floor

New York, New York 10036

For Defendant: Drew W. Schirmer, Esq.

Suffolk County Attorney’s Office

P.O. Box 6100

100 Veterans Memorial Highway

Hauppauge, New York 11788

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (“Plaintiff”)

commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)

against the County of Suffolk (the “County”), arising out of

allegations that the County seizes vehicles without notice to

properly recorded lienholders in violation of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States and New York state

Constitutions, inter alia. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Before the Court

is the County’s motion to dismiss the Complaint. (Mot., ECF No.

16; County Br., ECF No. 16-3; Pl. Opp., ECF No. 181; Reply, ECF

No. 20.) For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an

Amended Complaint.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff is a corporation that provides financing for

the purchase of vehicles and is the holder of duly recorded liens

and security interests in certain vehicles (the “Subject

Vehicles”). (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10.) In brief, Plaintiff alleges that

the County unconstitutionally seized and deprived Plaintiff of its

interest in the Subject Vehicles by: (1) refusing to comply with

due process as mandated by the Second Circuit in Ford Motor Credit

Co. v. New York City Police, 503 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2007);

(2) failing to surrender possession of the Subject Vehicles unless

Plaintiff executed a general release of liability and/or

indemnification in favor of the County; (3) imposing possessory

liens over the Subject Vehicles and refusing to return possession

until the liens were paid; (4) detaining the Subject Vehicles

1 The County correctly points out that Plaintiff did not request

permission to file a brief in excess of this Court’s page

limitation requirements. (Reply at 1-2.) While the Court does

not condone Plaintiff’s failure to abide by this Court’s Individual

Rules, in its discretion, the Court waives Plaintiff’s

noncompliance and considers the merits.

2 The facts are drawn from the Complaint and are assumed to be true

for purposes of this Memorandum and Order.

without warrant, or without an exception to the warrant requirement

(collectively, the “Deprivations”). (Id. ¶¶ 21(a)-(d).)

Generally, Plaintiff alleges that the County justified

its initial seizure of the Subject Vehicles as a forfeiture based

on criminal conduct by the vehicle owners. (Id. ¶¶ 1(a), 23.)

Thereafter, the County determined that its initial justification

for the seizures did not apply because Plaintiff (1) held a

property interest in the Subject Vehicles, and (2) did not engage

in acts related to alleged criminal conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 24-26.) Upon

expiration of the initial justification, the County had no reason

to retain possession of the Subject Vehicles pending forfeiture.

(Id. ¶¶ 25-27.) The Complaint thus alleges that the County

violated Plaintiff’s right to due process and of its Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights because the County seized and detained

the Subject Vehicles without a warrant, or without an exception to

the warrant requirement, after the initial justification for the

seizure expired. (Id. ¶ 1(a), 21(d), 27-30.)

The Complaint also alleges that the County did not file

any forfeiture proceedings related to the Subject Vehicles, does

not have a procedure that permits lienholders to participate in

forfeiture proceedings, and does not have a procedure to commence

forfeiture proceedings within a reasonable time after a

lienholder’s demand. (Id. ¶¶ 1(a), 20, 21(a), 25, 44(a).)

Plaintiff alleges that the County does not provide Plaintiff or

other interested parties with notice and/or a procedure to recover

the Subject Vehicles or to challenge the Deprivations. (Id. ¶¶

31-36.) Therefore, the County allegedly deprived Plaintiff of its

property interests in the Subject Vehicles, or money and other

legal rights, without due process. (Id. ¶¶ 37-39.)

By way of specific example, Plaintiff alleges it has a

money security interest and lien in a vehicle sold to non-party

Stanley Baez (the “Baez Vehicle”). (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) The Baez

Vehicle was titled in New York on December 16, 2019, with Baez

listed as the vehicle’s owner and Plaintiff listed as the first

priority lienholder. (Id. ¶ 13.) On or about January 13, 2020,

the County, through its police officers, took possession of the

Baez Vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) On January 13, 2020, the County

notified Plaintiff that the Baez Vehicle was detained for

forfeiture purposes because Baez, the driver, used the vehicle to

unlawfully flee from a police officer. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 23.) On

February 10, 2020, Plaintiff requested that the County commence a

forfeiture action pursuant to Ford Motor Credit. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)

The County did not commence a forfeiture action and, as of June

16, 2020, the date of the Complaint, retained possession of the

Baez Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff asserts that the County

illegally seized the Subject Vehicles in the same manner described

in connection with the Baez Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 20.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 16, 2020, Plaintiff initiated this Section 1983

action against the County by asserting four causes of action.

Count I asserts an array of civil rights violations arising out of

the Deprivations, defined supra. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-53.) First,

Plaintiff alleges that the Deprivations violated Plaintiff’s right

to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment because the

County has (1) no procedure that permits lienholders to

participate in forfeiture proceedings or to commence forfeiture

proceedings within a reasonable time; (2) no procedure affording

Plaintiff, or similarly interested parties, with notice and an

opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker to

challenge the Deprivations or to recover the Subject Vehicles;

(3) no procedure that notifies Plaintiff of the means by which it

could recover the Subject Vehicles; and (4) no reasonable

justification to condition release of the Subject Vehicles on

Plaintiff’s execution of a general release of liability in the

County’s favor. (Id. ¶¶ 44(a)-(d), 48-51.) Second, in Count I,

Plaintiff also alleges that the County violated its right to be

free from unreasonable seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth

Amendment because, after the initial justification for the

seizures expired and/or were no longer applicable, the County

detained and held the Subject Vehicles without legal justification

and/or without a warrant. (Id. ¶ 45.) Accordingly, the foregoing

constitutes the County’s standard policy and procedure, which runs

afoul of the constitutional protections outlined in Ford Motor

Credit, County of Nassau v. Canavan, 802 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 2003),

and Krimstock v. Kelly, 464 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Krimstock

III”). (Id. ¶¶ 48-53.)

As for the remaining causes of action, Count II asserts

a claim for unreasonable seizure and deprivation of property

without due process under the New York state constitution. (Id.

¶¶ 54-55.) Count III asserts a claim for declaratory relief,

seeking an order that: (1) any release/hold-harmless/injunction

obtained by the County is null, void, and of no force or effect;

(2) the County is liable to Plaintiff under Sections 1983 and 1988;

(3) Suffolk County Code, Chapter 818, is unconstitutional because

there is no procedure to address a lienholder’s demand for release

of a vehicle under Ford Motor Credit; and (4) the County must

unconditionally release the Subject Vehicles to Plaintiff. (Id.

¶¶ 56-59.) Finally, Count IV asserts a claim for replevin,

alleging Plaintiff’s right to immediately repossess of the Subject

Vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 61-62.)

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). This plausibility standard is not a “probability

requirement” and requires “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citation omitted). When

reviewing such a motion, the Court must liberally construe the

complaint, accept “all factual allegations in the complaint as

true, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s

favor.” Bacon v. Phelps, 961 F.3d 533, 540 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)).

At this stage, the Court considers only those “facts stated on the

face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or

incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which

judicial notice may be taken.” Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc.,

945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991).

II. Analysis

The County moves to dismiss the Complaint (1) pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1), arguing that

Plaintiff lacks standing (County Br. at 4-5); (2) pursuant to Rules

12(b)(1) and (6), arguing that Plaintiff fails to plead a claim

for declaratory relief (id. at 6-8); (3) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7),

arguing that Plaintiff failed to name the Subject Vehicle owners

as necessary parties (id. at 8-9); and (4) pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), arguing that (a) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

Monell liability (id. at 10-12); (b) the state law claims must be

dismissed (id. at 12-14); and (c) Plaintiff cannot recover

punitive damages from the County (id. at 15).

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Documents Considered

Plaintiff submitted four documents in support of its

opposition: (1) a County Form Affidavit and Release (the “County

Form”); (2) the January 13, 2020 notice from the County to

Plaintiff regarding the Baez Vehicle; (3) the February 10, 2020

letter from Plaintiff to the County demanding a forfeiture

proceeding; and (4) a retail installment contract for the Baez

Vehicle. (Exs. A through D, attached to Duston Decl., ECF Nos.

18-2 through 18-5.) The County asks the Court to disregard these

documents. (Reply at 2-4.) The Court does not consider these

documents. “Although these documents were discussed throughout

the Complaint and may even be integral to it . . . , given the

conclusions reached herein, use of these documents would be

premature.” Booker v. E.T. Browne Drug Co., No. 20-CV-3166, 2021

WL 4340489, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2021).

B. State Law Claims and the Request for Punitive Damages

Plaintiff voluntarily withdraws its state law claims and

its request for punitive damages. (Pl. Opp. at 34.) Accordingly,

Counts II and IV are DISMISSED and the Complaint’s request for

punitive damages is DISMISSED as WITHDRAWN.

C. Procedural Due Process and Fourth Amendment Claims

Although not explicitly stated in the Complaint, the

County clarifies that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the County’s

Vehicle Seizure Program (the “Vehicle Seizure Program”), under

which “vehicles driven by individuals arrested for [driving while

intoxicated], aggravated unlicensed operation, engaging in a speed

contest, or for unlawfully fleeing from police, may be seized and

forfeited” under certain circumstances. (County Br. at 1 (citing

Suffolk County Admin. Code (the “Code”) §§ 420-5 et seq., 818-13

et seq., 818-21 et seq., and 818-37 et seq.).) The Court

understands that Plaintiff does not challenge the County’s

authority under the Code for the initial seizure of the Subject

Vehicles. Rather, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment and Due Process claims as asserting the County: (1) fails

to initiate forfeiture proceedings within a reasonable time;

(2) fails to recognize Plaintiff’s demands that the County

institute forfeiture proceedings; and (3) does not allow Plaintiff

to promptly challenge the legitimacy of, and justification for,

the County’s continued retention of the Subject Vehicles and/or

the County’s conditions of release of the Subject Vehicles to

Plaintiff, inter alia.

Before turning to the merits, the Court first summarizes

the constitutional guideposts relevant to resolve the motion.

1. Krimstock (and Its Progeny) and Ford Motor Credit

In Krimstock v. Kelly, the plaintiffs challenged the

City of New York’s (the “City”) practice of seizing motor vehicles

of individuals “accused of driving while intoxicated and of

committing other crimes for which a motor vehicle could be

considered an instrumentality” and “maintain[ing] possession of

these vehicles in the hope of one day gaining title to them by

prevailing in civil forfeiture proceedings.” 306 F.3d 40, 43-44

(2d Cir. 2002) (“Krimstock I”). The Second Circuit held that “the

City’s continued retention of vehicles after their warrantless

seizure by the police and prior to the ultimate resolution of the

forfeiture action in court” was an “intermediate deprivation,

lasting months or sometimes years without any prompt hearing before

a neutral fact-finder” and “constitutionally infirm.” Id. at 48.

As such, “[i]n the absence of a showing that continued impoundment

constitutes a valid deprivation, seized vehicles must be released

during the pendency of civil proceedings.” Id. As a remedy, the

Second Circuit ordered the City to provide “prompt post-seizure

retention hearing[s], with adequate notice, for motor vehicles

seized as instrumentalities of crime” pursuant to N.Y.C. Code §

14-140(b), emphasizing that “at a minimum, the hearing must enable

claimants to test the probable validity of continued deprivation

of their vehicles, including the City’s probable cause for the

initial warrantless seizure[.]” Id. at 68–69. In reaching this

conclusion, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district

court to “fashion appropriate procedural relief[.]” Id. at 69.

On remand, the district court “fashioned what is now

known as a ‘Krimstock hearing,’” where the municipality:

has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that a) probable cause existed

for the arrest of the vehicle’s operator,

b) it is likely the City would prevail in an

action to forfeit the vehicle, and c) it is

necessary that the vehicle remain impounded in

order to ensure its availability in the

eventual civil forfeiture action.

Krimstock v. Kelly, 506 F. Supp. 2d 249, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

(“Krimstock IV”); see also Canavan, 802 N.E.2d 616 (the New York

Court of Appeals adopting a similar standard for post-seizure

deprivation procedures). In Jones v. Kelly, 378 F.3d 198, 204 (2d

Cir. 2004) (“Krimstock II”), the Second Circuit affirmed these

procedures as they relate to “cars held for forfeiture” but

remanded the case for additional proceedings as it relates to “cars

held as arrest evidence.” In Krimstock v. Kelly, 464 F.3d 246,

255 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Krimstock III”), the Second Circuit held that

due process required a “neutral fact-finder” to review a

prosecutor’s decision to retain a seized vehicle as potential

evidence for a criminal proceeding.

In Ford Motor Credit, the plaintiff, a secured creditor

of vehicles seized by the City, challenged the City’s forfeiture

proceedings and argued that the City deprived it of due process by

refusing to consider “secured creditors [as] ‘interested persons’

entitled to notice of and an opportunity to be heard in forfeiture

proceedings,” inter alia. 503 F.3d at 189-90. The Second Circuit

first held that the plaintiff “has a property interest in the

present value of a seized vehicle.” Id. at 190-91. The Second

Circuit then considered the amount of process due and agreed with

the district court that: (1) the City’s regulations were properly

interpreted to include secured creditors, like the plaintiff, as

“interested” parties entitled to notice and an opportunity to be

heard prior to forfeiture, id. at 192-93; and, (2) the City was

required to “commence the forfeiture action within twenty-five

days from the date that [the plaintiff-secured creditor] makes a

demand on the vehicle, provided that a claimant would otherwise be

entitled to make a demand on the vehicle.” Id. at 195; see also

id. at 193-95 (noting that the district court afforded the

plaintiff “the same rights” as a vehicle owner, and thus, “the

City has a constitutional obligation to institute forfeiture

proceedings within a reasonable time when an interested party,

such as a [secured creditor] like [plaintiff], seeks a disposition

with respect to a vehicle in which it holds a cognizable property

interest” (first alteration in original; citation omitted)).

2. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claims3

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

To state a violation of due process, a plaintiff must allege:

“1) whether plaintiffs possess a liberty or property interest

protected by the Due Process Clause; and, if so, 2) whether

existing state procedures are constitutionally adequate.” Ford

Motor Credit, 503 F.3d at 190 (quoting Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d

105, 112 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Here, the Complaint alleges that the County violated

Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights in various ways. As an

initial observation, it appears that both parties conflate

arguments relevant to vehicle forfeiture proceedings with

arguments relevant to actions alleging due process violations,

such as a due process right to demand that the County initiate a

forfeiture proceeding within a reasonable time. (See County Br.

at 9 (citing New York state cases disposing of forfeiture

proceedings and wherein lienholders claim a superior right of

3 Neither party addresses the Complaint’s allegations regarding

Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 37-38.)

As such, the Court declines to consider the viability of such a

claim sua sponte.

possession to seized vehicles based upon the vehicle owners’

defaults under financing agreements); see id. at 5 (same); see

also Pl. Opp. at 15-16 & n.9 (citing New York state vehicle

forfeiture cases wherein the courts determine the parties’

possessory rights to a seized vehicle)). In Ford Motor Credit,

the due process considerations were limited to whether the

Fourteenth Amendment required the City to recognize a lienholder

as a valid participant in a forfeiture proceeding and to treat the

plaintiff-lienholder “as a claimant for purposes of triggering the

City’s duty to commence a forfeiture action within twenty-five

days.” 503 F.3d at 193. Thus, the due process protections

articulated in Ford Motor Credit require only that the County abide

by its “constitutional obligation to institute forfeiture

proceedings within a reasonable time when an interested party,

such as [Plaintiff here . . . ,] seeks a disposition with respect

to a vehicle in which it holds a cognizable property interest.”

Id. at 194-93 (citation omitted); see also id. at 195 & n.13

(noting “only that [the Second Circuit reads] the district court’s

opinion to afford Ford Motor Credit the same rights in this respect

as a claimant, and no more” (emphasis added)).

The Complaint fails to incorporate how the procedures,

or lack thereof, under the Code or County policy are

constitutionally infirm as they relate to vehicle owner’s rights

and lienholder’s rights.4 Further, and as will be addressed below,

Plaintiff’s claims are wholly misplaced to the extent that they

rest on the argument that Krimstock (and its progeny) and Ford

Motor Credit establishes that Plaintiff has a present possessory

right to the Subject Vehicles such that the County must

automatically release the seized Subject Vehicles to Plaintiff.

(See, e.g., Pl. Opp. at 5-6, 10.) Similarly, the County’s

arguments are misplaced to the extent they rest on the assumption

that its due process obligations are triggered only after Plaintiff

establishes its “superior possessory interest” in a seized

vehicle. (See, e.g., County Br. at 4.)

Against this background, the Court begins its analysis.

a. Plaintiff Alleges a Valid Property Interest

The County argues that Plaintiff lacks standing because

it does not have a present possessory interest in the seized

Subject Vehicles that is superior to the vehicle owners’ rights.

(County Br. at 4-5; Reply at 5-8.) Although the County

characterizes this assertion as a standing argument, the argument

is better understood as claiming Plaintiff lacks a valid property

interest in the Subject Vehicles and fails to adequately state a

4 Indeed, the Complaint’s two references to the Code are variations

of a request to: “[c]onfirm[] that Suffolk County Code, Chapter

818, is unconstitutional in that there is no procedure to address

a lienholder’s demand for release of a vehicle” under Ford Motor

Credit. (Compl. ¶¶ 59, 60(c).)

procedural due process claim. Thus, the pertinent question is

whether Plaintiff, as a lienholder over the Subject Vehicles, has

a recognizable property interest protected by due process. The

Second Circuit in Ford Motor Credit answered this question in the

affirmative and explicitly “disagree[d]” that the plaintiff’s

“only cognizable property interest is in a vehicle’s sale

proceeds.” 503 F.3d at 190-91. Given the Second Circuit’s holding

that a lienholder “also has a property interest in the present

value of a seized vehicle,” id. at 191, Plaintiff, as a lienholder,

has plausibly alleged a property interest in the present value of

the Subject Vehicles.

However, this conclusion is limited to Plaintiff’s

property interest in the Baez Vehicle, in which the Complaint

alleges that Plaintiff “obtained a purchase money security

interest and lien.” (Compl. ¶¶ 11-19.) To the extent Plaintiff

alleges that it was deprived of its interests in other, unspecified

Subject Vehicles (other than the Baez Vehicle), the Complaint’s

references to “Subject Vehicles,” without more, is too “vague,

conclusory, and speculative” to support a due process claim. Pelt

v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-5633, 2013 WL 4647500, at *7 n.10

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013). Should Plaintiff elect to file an

amended complaint, it must specify the property, i.e., the Subject

Vehicles, that it claims were seized and retained without due

process of law.5

Moreover, Plaintiff is mistaken to the extent it

suggests that Ford Motor Credit provides that a lienholder has a

protected property interest in “the immediate right to take

possession” of a seized vehicle. (Compl. ¶ 42.) “Although federal

law controls what process is due, property interests themselves

‘are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or

understandings that stem from an independent source such as state

law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that

support claims of entitlement to those benefits.’” Ford Motor

Credit Co. v. New York City Police Dep’t, 394 F. Supp. 2d 600, 609

(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Ford Motor Credit II”) (quoting Velez v. Levy,

401 F.3d 75, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)). To that end, “it must be

emphasized that unlike” titled vehicle owners, Plaintiff, as “the

innocent lienholder, does not have a present possessory right” to

the seized vehicles. Prop. Clerk v. Leon, 960 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup.

Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2010); accord Prop. Clerk of N.Y.C. Police Dep’t v.

Molomo, 613 N.E.2d 567, 567 (N.Y. 1993) (the lienholder “had no

present possessory right in the vehicle”); Malafi v. 2002 Dodge,

Vin No. ID7HU18Z92J206663, 836 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty.

2006) (“It is well settled that the [lienholder] does not, at this

5 Although limited to the Baez Vehicle, for convenience, the Court

continues to refer to the “Subject Vehicles” throughout this Order.

time, have a possessory right to the subject vehicle”). Rather,

as stated above, a lienholder like Plaintiff has a property

interest in the present value of a seized vehicle subject to a

lien, “and the same rights as a vehicle claimant-owner to expect

that a civil forfeiture action be promptly instituted and then be

afforded due process and an opportunity to be heard as an active

participant in such action.” Leon, 960 N.Y.S.2d 341 (citing Ford

Motor Credit, 503 F.3d at 193-95). Therefore, Plaintiff has no

property interest in the “present possessory right to” the Subject

Vehicles.

Finally, because Plaintiff has a property interest in

the Subject Vehicle’s present value separate and apart from the

vehicle owner’s property interests, the Court denies the portion

of the County’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) for

failure to name necessary parties. (See County Br. at 8-9.)

b. The Process Plaintiff is Due

Having established that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged

a property interest in the “present value of a seized vehicle,”

Ford Motor Credit, 503 F.3d at 190-91, the question turns on

whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the County deprived

Plaintiff of its property interest without due process. The

inquiry necessarily depends on how much process is due, which the

parties fail to meaningfully address. As discussed below, the

Complaint plausibly alleges that, in certain circumstances, the

County deprived Plaintiff of its property interest without due

process. However, the Court is left to surmise the remaining bases

of Plaintiff’s due process claim. At this stage, the Court

declines to engage in guesswork and grants Plaintiff leave to amend

to clarify its claims.

i. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard in

Connection with Forfeiture Proceedings

and the Imposition of Liens

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that its property

interest in the present value of the Subject Vehicles entitles it

to notice of, and the right to participate in, forfeiture

proceedings to protect its interest in the Subject Vehicles, in

the same manner that the County (or the Code) affords vehicle

owners the right to a speedy disposition of the forfeiture process.

Ford Motor Credit, 503 F.3d at 192-95. As such, the Court

carefully parses the Complaint and finds that it plausibly alleges

that the County has a policy and procedure of (1) refusing to

recognize Plaintiff’s demands that the County institute forfeiture

proceedings; and/or (2) failing to implement a procedure whereby

lienholders can demand that the County institute forfeiture

proceedings; and/or (3) failing to initiate forfeiture proceedings

within a reasonable time after Plaintiff’s demands. (Compl. ¶¶

17-22, 39); Ford Motor Credit, 503 F.3d at 195.

The County argues that Plaintiff’s due process claim is

unavailing because the Code “provides that a forfeiture action may

be commenced ‘within 180 days after the disposition of the summons

or arrest for the offense[.]’” (Reply at 8 (citing Code § 818-

40(F)).) Although the Complaint does not explicitly claim that

the Code is unconstitutional as written and as applied, “[t]he Due

Process Clause ‘requires the Government to commence a forfeiture

action within a reasonable time of seizure.’” Ford Motor Credit

II, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (quoting United States v. Banco Cafetero

Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1163 (2d Cir. 1986)). Neither party briefs

whether 180 days is a “reasonable” amount of time for the

Government to commence a forfeiture action. The Court declines to

make that determination on the undeveloped record.

Moreover, the Complaint plausibly alleges that the

County has a policy and procedure of depriving Plaintiff of its

property without a meaningful opportunity to challenge the

imposition of possessory liens on the Subject Vehicles. (Compl.

¶¶ 21(c), 31, 43(c), 51); HVT, Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York &

New Jersey, No. 15-CV-5867, 2018 WL 3134414, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.

15, 2018) (“Temporary deprivations in the form of liens require

due process protections” and “the attachment of a lien constitutes

a deprivation of property as well, even if it is only temporary”

(citing Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 (1991))), report and

recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1409821 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2018);

see also Am. Honda Fin. Corp. v. Twp. of Aston, No. 20-CV-3267,

2021 WL 2681289, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2021) (noting that

“towing and storage fees impaired Honda’s interest by effectively

subordinating the priority of the Company’s lien”); but see HVT,

Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, No. 15-CV-5867, 2021

WL 3400550, at *6 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2021) (noting “that it may

be constitutionally permissible for some fee accrual post-seizure

and prior to when the vehicle is retrieved or the hearing is held,

but also not[ing] that permissible fee accrual may be dependent

upon how soon the hearing can take place.”), report and

recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 3828475 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2021).

ii. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard in

Connection with Krimstock Hearings

The Court struggles to distinguish whether Plaintiff’s

due process claims are also rooted in allegations that (1) the

County fails to provide Plaintiff with notice of a Krimstock

hearing; and/or that (2) due process requires that the County must

permit Plaintiff to appear at a Krimstock hearing to contest

retention of the subject vehicle on the basis that the County will

not succeed at a forfeiture proceeding as result of Plaintiff’s

lien. (See Compl. ¶ 51(c) (citing the County’s violation of the

constitutional parameters of Krimstock); id. ¶ 48 (alleging that

the “conduct of Suffolk in not following Ford Motor Credit . . .

and in not seeking to have a prompt impartial review of its

detention was consistent with” an alleged unconstitutional

“procedure and policy”); see also id. ¶ 44(b); Pl. Opp. at 4-5

(arguing that the County violates due process by “not relinquishing

possession where it has no likelihood of succeeding in accordance

with Krimstock”).)

As to the first point, the Complaint alleges that

Plaintiff received notice of a Krimstock hearing, so claims arising

out of an alleged lack of notice are arguably moot. (Compl. ¶

16.) As to the second point, due process does not entitle

lienholders to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a Krimstock

retention to challenge the continued retention of a seized vehicle

or to argue the merits of a forfeiture proceeding. “In gauging

the constitutional adequacy of procedures, the familiar Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 . . . (1976), balance framework applies,”

and the Court must balance:

(1) the private interest that will be affected

by the official action; (2) the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through

the procedures used, and the probable value,

if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards; and (3) the Government’s

interest, including the function involved and

the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.

Ford Motor Credit II, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (citation omitted).

In Krimstock I, the Second Circuit balanced these

factors and held that claimants, whose cars had been seized as

instrumentalizes of a crime, were entitled to prompt post-

deprivation hearings to challenge the seizure and the City’s

retention of those vehicles. The court reasoned: “[a] car or

truck is often central to a person’s livelihood or daily

activities” and “an individual must be permitted to challenge the

City’s continued possession of his or her vehicle during the

pendency of legal proceedings where such possession may ultimately

prove improper and where less drastic measures than deprivation

pendent lite are available and appropriate.” 306 F.3d at 44. In

Property Clerk of Police Department of City of New York v. Harris,

the New York Court of Appeals recognized that neither Canavan,

cited supra, nor Krimstock considered the “due process rights of

innocent co-owners,” balanced the Mathews factors, and concluded

that “due process requires that an innocent co-owner [of a seized

vehicle] be given an opportunity to demonstrate that his or her

present possessory interest in a sized vehicle outweighs the City’s

interest in continuing impoundment.” 878 N.E.2d 1004, 1005 (N.Y.

2007). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals stressed

that its decision was “a narrow one, concerned only with due

process protection of innocent co-owners’ present possessory

interest in the use of impounded vehicles to obtain critical life

necessities.” Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).

In Ford Motor Credit II, the district court held that

the plaintiff “must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard

in connection with forfeiture proceedings relating to vehicles in

which it holds a security interest.” 394 F. Supp. 2d at 613. The

district court explained that “[i]f a forfeiture action is

successful, the lienholder’s security interest will be

extinguished. If a forfeiture action is not successful, the

lienholder’s security interest may persist. Accordingly

lienholders, . . . , possess a substantial interest in the outcome

of the forfeiture proceedings relating to the vehicles in which

they hold security interests.” Id. at 610–11. The court continued

that “the destruction of a cognizable property interest” –- i.e.,

the extinguishment of a lien –- “without due process of law

violates the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 611–12. The Second

Circuit in Ford Motor Credit agreed. 503 F.3d at 193 (noting a

lienholder’s ability to “protect its interest in the present value

of a seized vehicle” by, for example, “expedit[ing] [forfeiture]

litigation by moving the court to dismiss the action for failure

to prosecute” or “seeking an order dismissing the case on account

of the vehicle owner’s delinquency in meeting deadlines” (emphases

and citations omitted)).

Applying the foregoing analysis here, the Court

concludes that lienholders do not possess a similar “substantial

interest” in a Krimstock retention hearing because the outcome of

such a hearing does not result in the “destruction of a cognizable

property interest.” Moreover, unlike co-owners who have a valid

“possessory interest in the use of impounded vehicles to obtain

critical life necessities,” the same cannot be said for innocent

lienholders. Cf. Harris, 878 N.E.2d at 1011-12. At most, a

Krimstock hearing may result in the retention of a seized vehicle

pending a forfeiture proceeding, which Plaintiff is entitled to

demand, participate in, and assert defenses at -– such as its right

to repossess the Subject Vehicles -- under Ford Motor Credit.

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff is alleging a stake

in the outcome of a Krimstock hearing, Krimstock I forecloses

Plaintiff’s claim that it is entitled to appear at a Krimstock

hearing to demand a full-blown hearing –- akin to a hybrid

replevin/forfeiture proceeding -- regarding the County’s alleged

inability to succeed at forfeiture due to Plaintiff’s lien over

the seized vehicles. The Second Circuit explicitly rejected this

fast-track to forfeiture request, stating:

We hasten to point out that we do not envision

the retention hearing as a forum for

exhaustive evidentiary battles that might

threaten to duplicate the eventual forfeiture

hearing. Inasmuch as the purpose of the

hearing is the limited one of determining

whether the vehicle should be returned to its

owner during the pendency of proceedings, due

process should be satisfied by an initial

testing of the merits of the City’s

case. . . .

Krimstock I, 306 F.3d at 69–70 (emphases added). Therefore, while

due process entitles lienholders to notice and an opportunity to

be heard prior to forfeiture of a seized vehicle, due process does

not entitle lienholders to notice and an opportunity to be heard

at a Krimstock retention hearing to challenge the County’s

likelihood of success at a forfeiture proceeding. Thus, to the

extent Plaintiff’s Complaint can be construed to raise such a

claim, it is not plausibly alleged.

iii. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard in

Connection With the Recovery and/or

Repossession of the Subject Vehicles

The Complaint also asserts that the County violates

Plaintiff’s due process rights by failing to provide notice and an

opportunity to be heard regarding Plaintiff’s alleged right to

recover and/or repossess the Subject Vehicles, separate from a

Krimstock retention hearing. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the

County has a policy and procedure of requiring conditions of

payment and/or general releases before releasing seized vehicles

to Plaintiff, as a lienholder. See, e.g., Fasciana v. County of

Suffolk, 996 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Seybert, J.)

(concluding that a vehicle owner stated a due process claim based

on allegations that the County “maintained a practice under which,

at the conclusion of retention hearings within which the County

does not satisfy the Krimstock three prong test, its hearing

officers essentially order the County to retain continuing

possession of seized vehicles indefinitely, unless and until each

respective owner signs a General Release in favor of the County”

(emphases in original)); see also Ruane v. County of Suffolk, No.

12-CV-1658, 2015 WL 2337329, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2015)

(granting the County’s motion for summary judgment, finding that

the evidence did not support a finding that the County “has a

policy or practice of requiring a general release from the vehicle

owner when the forfeiture court has dismissed the forfeiture

proceeding and ordered the vehicle returned to the owner[.]”).

The Court pauses because Plaintiff does not have a

present possessory interest in the Subject Vehicles, as discussed

supra. Moreover, the parties do not indicate when a

plaintiff/lienholder’s right in the present value of the Subject

Vehicles is transformed into a present possessory right to the

Subject Vehicles, whether by default or breach of relevant

financing agreements between vehicle owners and Plaintiff.

Indeed, Plaintiff does not provide any authority for its conclusion

that a lienholder is entitled to immediate repossession, i.e., “a

present possessory right,” in the Subject Vehicles “every single

time [the County] seizes any vehicle for forfeiture on which

[Plaintiff] holds a lien by virtue of the forfeiture itself.”6

6 In opposition, Plaintiff cites to the County Form to support the

contention that the County requires lienholders “to provide

information regarding its lien and the default under [Plaintiff’s]

contract with its customer which would permit [Plaintiff] to retake

possession of a particular vehicle.” (Pl. Opp. at 6 (citing County

Form, Ex. A, ECF No. 18-2).) However, as stated above, the Court

declines to consider the County Form at this time. In any event,

the Complaint’s references to the County Form are limited to the

requirement that lienholders execute a general release, inter

alia, in favor of the County. (Compl. ¶¶ 21(b), 32-37, 43(b),

44(d), 49.) The Court will not allow Plaintiff to amend its

pleading through its opposition papers to allege facts surrounding

its alleged right to repossess the Subject Vehicles and/or the

County’s general procedures for releasing the Subject Vehicles.

(Pl. Opp. at 16; id. at 15-16); cf. Leon, 960 N.Y.S.2d 341

(“Pursuant to UCC § 9–609 et seq., based on a contract default, a

secured creditor may seek to recover possession of collateral with

or without judicial process” (emphasis added)). Therefore, based

upon the limited record, the Court does not consider what process

is due, if any, in this context.

Alternatively, the question may be better framed as

whether a lienholder, with a property interest in the present value

of a Subject Vehicle, is entitled to notice and an opportunity to

be heard regarding its right to recover the seized vehicles,

including the conditions of payment and/or general release, in

situations where the County: (1) declines to move forward with

forfeiture; or (2) fails to meet its burden at a Krimstock hearing;

or (3) is ordered to return the seized vehicles by a forfeiture

court, inter alia. The parties do not discuss the lienholders

rights vis-à-vis the vehicle owner’s rights, including a vehicle

owner’s presumptive right to notice and an opportunity to be heard

regarding a lienholder’s repossession of the seized vehicle.

Moreover, neither party has provided the Court with arguments

regarding the “familiar Mathews v. Eldridge, . . . , balance

Hurley v. Town of Southampton, No. 17-CV-5543, 2018 WL 3941944, at

*18 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2018) (“[I]t is well settled that

‘[p]laintiffs cannot amend their complaint by asserting new facts

or theories for the first time in opposition to [d]efendants’

motion to dismiss.’” (quoting K.D. ex rel. Duncan v. White Plains

Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 2d 197, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2013))).

framework” that the Court must consider in “gauging the

constitutional adequacy of procedures,” including whether the

County must provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to request and/or

contest repossession of the Subject Vehicles. Ford Motor Credit

II, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (quoting Nat’l Org. for Women v. Pataki,

261 F.3d 156, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2001)). At this juncture, the Court

declines to pass on the merits of these particular claims without

clarification from Plaintiff as to the bases of its due process

claims and without the benefit of the parties’ input.

***

For all of the foregoing reasons, the County’s motion to

dismiss the due process cause of action is denied only to the

extent that Plaintiff plausibly states a violation of its due

process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard at

forfeiture proceedings and regarding the imposition of liens; the

County’s motion seeking dismissal of the due process claim(s) is

otherwise granted as provided herein. Plaintiff is granted leave

to file an amended complaint consistent with this Order.

3. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claims

In addition to various violations of due process, Count

I of the Complaint asserts that the County violates the Fourth

Amendment by: (1) retaining the Subject Vehicles indefinitely

without initiating any forfeiture proceedings, resulting in

unreasonable seizures of the Subject Vehicles; (2) retaining the

Subject Vehicles without holding any Krimstock hearings, resulting

in unreasonable seizures of the Subject Vehicles; (3) failing to

acknowledge and provide Plaintiff, as a lienholder, with a method

to challenge the Deprivations, including the County’s continued

seizure of the Subject Vehicles at a Krimstock hearing or a

forfeiture proceeding.

“The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment

protects claimants against unreasonable seizure of their property

in the civil forfeiture context.” Krimstock I, 306 F.3d at 49

(collecting cases). In Krimstock I, the Second Circuit considered

the role of the Fourth Amendment in context of civil forfeiture

and reiterated that “the seizure and forfeiture of property are

two distinct events under the [federal] civil forfeiture laws.”

306 F.3d at 50 (emphasis added; brackets in original) (quoting

Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1119, 1124 (2d

Cir. 1993)). “While both events require the government to have

probable cause, the government is not required to demonstrate

probable cause until the forfeiture trial unless a claimant

challenges the validity of the seizure before trial.” Id.

(emphasis in original) (quoting Marine Midland Bank, 11 F.3d at

1124). “If the government, once challenged, cannot establish

probable cause for the initial seizure or offer post-seizure

evidence to justify continued impoundment, retention of the seized

property runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Accordingly,

the Second Circuit ordered that “claimants be given a prompt post-

seizure retention hearing,” because “some risk of erroneous

seizure exists in all cases, and in the absence of prompt review

by a neutral fact-finder, we are left with grave Fourth Amendment

concerns as to the adequacy of an inquiry into probable cause that

must wait months or sometimes years before a civil forfeiture

proceeding takes place.” Id. at 50-51 (emphasis added). In direct

response to these concerns, inter alia, the district court

“fashioned” the contours of a Krimstock hearing. Id. at 70;

Krimstock IV, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 252.

Although attenuated, the Complaint states a Fourth

Amendment claim only to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that the

County has a policy or procedure of: (1) indefinitely detaining

Subject Vehicles and refusing to commence forfeiture proceedings,

notwithstanding Plaintiff’s requests for the County to initiate

forfeiture proceedings; and/or (2) requiring conditions of payment

and a general release from liability after the forfeiture court

ordered a Subject Vehicle returned to the Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶

1(b), 19-20, 21(a)-(c), 41(a)-(c), 48-49); Krimstock I, 306 F.3d

at 50-51; Hines v. City of Albany, 542 F. Supp. 2d 218, 232

(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss, citing Krimstock I,

and finding that a plaintiff adequately stated a Fourth Amendment

illegal seizure claim where the complaint alleged that “Defendants

seized [the plaintiff’s] vehicle without a warrant, retained

possession of the vehicle for over one year despite repeated

requests for its return, and failed to provide [the plaintiff]

with a hearing”); see also Fasciana, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 181-83

(observing, in context of Krimstock hearings and vehicle owners,

that when a vehicle must be returned, the release “is not

contingent on any other condition, agreement, or circumstance” and

“such contingency would render” forfeiture proceedings a

“nullity”).

Plaintiff’s remaining allegations and arguments are

better categorized as due process violations. This includes

whether the County must provide Plaintiff with a procedure or

method to recover and/or repossess the Subject Vehicles, discussed

supra. Ferrari v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 790 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 n.12

(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Seybert, J.) (when “a government ‘seize[s]

property not to preserve evidence of wrongdoing, but to assert

ownership and control over the property itself,’ such as when it

seeks ‘forfeiture,’ the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments control.” (quoting United States v. James

Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 51–52 (1993))).

The Complaint also alleges that once the County

determines that the initial seizure justification expired, i.e.,

the County determines the Subject Vehicle is subject to a lien,

the County’s continued retention of the Subject Vehicles without

a renewed warrant or legal justification constitutes an

unreasonable seizure. (Compl. ¶¶ 21(d), 23-30, 41-42, 43(d), 45.)

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim arising out of this theory

necessarily fails because it “has challenged only the [County’s]

retention of the seized [Subject Vehicles] -– not their initial

seizure.” Bennett v. Dutchess Cnty., New York, 832 F. App’x 58,

60 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order). As stated above, Plaintiff

does not challenge the County’s authority (through its officers)

under the Code to seize the Subject Vehicles pursuant to the

Vehicle Seizure Program. And, as recently articulated by the

Second Circuit, “‘a seizure claim based [solely] on the unlawful

retention’ of property that was lawfully seized has been recognized

as ‘too novel a theory to warrant Fourth Amendment protection.’”

Id. (quoting Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist,

363 F.3d 177, 187 (2d Cir. 2004)). Thus, “[t]o the extent the

Constitution affords . . . any right with respect to a government

agency’s retention of lawfully seized property, it would appear to

be procedural due process.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

Shaul, 363 F.3d at 187); accord Tammaro v. City of New York, No.

13-CV-6190, 2018 WL 1621535, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018).

Finally, through its opposition, Plaintiff appears to

argue that: (1) the existence of liens over the Subject Vehicles

renders it impossible for the County to prove a likelihood of

success on the merits at a forfeiture proceeding, the second factor

the County must prove at a Krimstock hearing; (2) therefore, the

County must immediately release those vehicles without a Krimstock

hearing; and, (3) the County’s continued retention of the Subject

Vehicles after discovering the lien(s) is an unreasonable seizure

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Pl. Opp. at 17-20.)

Plaintiff does not cite to any authority for the proposition that

Krimstock hearings or forfeiture proceedings are unnecessary in

these circumstances. (See id. at 17-18 (citing a favorable quote

from Krimstock I, and arguing that the County cannot succeed on

the merits of a forfeiture proceeding due to certain Code

provisions).) Like the plaintiffs in Krimstock I, the Court

queries whether Plaintiff here seeks to fast-track the forfeiture

process and obviate Krimstock hearings and forfeiture actions.

See Krimstock I, 306 F.3d at 48 (noting that the plaintiffs

“essentially” sought “an early opportunity to test the City’s

likelihood of success on the merits of the forfeiture action”).

At this juncture, the Court declines to find that the County

commits a Fourth Amendment violation in every situation that it

seizes a vehicle subject to a lien, without more.

***

Accordingly, the County’s motion to dismiss the Fourth

Amendment claim is denied only to the extent that Plaintiff

plausibly alleges Fourth Amendment claim arising out of an alleged

County policy or procedure of: (1) indefinitely detaining Subject

Vehicles and refusing to commence forfeiture proceedings,

notwithstanding Plaintiff’s requests that the County initiate

forfeiture proceedings; and/or (2) indefinitely detaining Subject

Vehicles and requiring conditions of payment and/or general

releases after the forfeiture court ordered a Subject Vehicle’s

return. The remaining portion of the motion seeking dismissal of

the Fourth Amendment claim is otherwise granted as provided herein,

and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to clarify this claim.

D. Plaintiff’s Monell Liability Claims

The County argues that Plaintiff fails to state a valid

Monell claim, arguing that the Complaint asserts “nothing more

than speculative, vague and conclusory allegations of deprivation

of its Constitutional rights.” (County Br. at 10-12.) While a

close call, the Court disagrees.

“To state a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a plaintiff must show three elements: ‘(1) an official

policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to

(3) a denial of a constitutional right.’” Corbley v. Cnty. of

Suffolk, 45 F. Supp. 3d 276, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Zahra v.

Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir.1995)). “A plaintiff

can satisfy the municipal policy requirement by alleging ‘a

practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly

authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising

policy-maker must have been aware.’” Newson v. City of New York,

No. 16-CV-6773, 2019 WL 3997466, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2019)

(quoting Benitez v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-3827, 2018 WL

2973387, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 13, 2018)). “The plaintiff may also

show ‘a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or

supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into

contact with the municipal employees.’” Id. (quoting Benitez,

2018 WL 2973387, at *6). Further, the “pleading standard for

Monell claims is no greater than for any other claim subject to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).” Id. (citations omitted).

It is true that “a plaintiff who ‘mere[ly] assert[s]’ that a

municipality has a custom or policy condoning or ratifying

unconstitutional conduct, ‘in the absence of allegations of fact

tending to support, at least circumstantially, such an inference’

has not adequately pleaded a Monell claim.” Id. (quoting Montero

v. City of Yonkers, New York, 890 F.3d 386, 403-404 (2d Cir. 2018)

(subsequent history omitted)). “But this is simply a restatement

of the standard applicable to notice pleading generally, namely,

that a complaint must ‘plead[ ] factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678).

Here, as recited above, Plaintiff adequately alleges the

deprivation of some constitutional rights. See generally supra.

The question thus becomes whether Plaintiff has pled the County’s

liability for those deprivations. The Complaint alleges that it

is the County’s “standard procedure and policy” to disregard Ford

Motor Credit by retaining the Subject Vehicles without providing

Plaintiff, as lienholder, with notice and opportunity to be heard

at a forfeiture proceeding or regarding the Deprivations, inter

alia, and that the County failed to properly train or supervise

subordinates “regarding the process due in conjunction with the

seizure, detention and assertion of charges and liens against

vehicles is contrary to well-settled constitutional law.” (Compl.

¶¶ 48-53.) Plaintiff further cites to the County’s seizure of the

Baez Vehicle as an example of the County’s “established practices

for handling vehicles which are ostensibly held for forfeiture

purposes.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-22.) At this stage, these allegations are

sufficient to plausibly state a claim for municipal liability under

Section 1983. Corbley, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 283 (finding a complaint

adequately alleged Monell liability where it “references thirty-

three cases other than his own to allege that it was a custom

and/or policy of the County to disregard the Krimstock standards

when seeking continued retention of seized vehicles, that the

County failed to adequately train or supervise County-appointed

hearing officers in the findings required by law, or ensure

neutrality by them.”) (collecting cases); Ferrari, 790 F. Supp. 2d

at 45 (finding the plaintiff adequately alleged Monell liability

arising out of a failure to train theory where the complaint

alleged the County “knowingly train[s] and/or deliberately

permit[s], the hearing officers who ‘preside’ over retention

hearings to deliberately and systematically refuse to comport with

the requirements of Due Process or the Suffolk County Code”). The

portion of the County’s motion seeking dismissal of the Monell

claim is thus denied.

E. Plaintiff’s Request for Declaratory Relief

The County argues that the claim for declaratory relief

(Count III) must be dismissed because Plaintiff “has not

sufficiently ple[]d a continuing or imminent concrete injury, as

the complaint is devoid of any facts sufficient to establish an

actual case or controversy warranting” judicial intervention.

(County Br. at 6-8.)

“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself

show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief .

. . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”

Corbley, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 283 (quoting City of Los Angeles v.

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)). While past harms cannot support a

claim for injunctive relief, “[t]o establish irreparable harm, a

party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must show that there

is a continuing harm which cannot be adequately redressed by final

relief on the merits and for which money damages cannot provide

adequate compensation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2002)).

The Complaint alleges that the County continues to

commit constitutional violations because the County continues to

retain and detain the Baez vehicle. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Therefore,

when viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the Complaint plausibly states a claim for declaratory

and injunctive relief. However, the Complaint does not support

Plaintiff’s contention that it is “likely to continue to suffer

harm as a result of [the County’s] unconstitutional policies and/or

customs because [the County] will continue to seize vehicles on

which [Plaintiff] has a lien.” (Pl. Opp. at 30 (citing Compl. ¶

8).) These specific allegations are noticeably absent from the

Complaint, and it is well-settled that a plaintiff cannot amend

its complaint by asserting new facts or theories in opposition to

a motion to dismiss. See Hurley, 2018 WL 3941944, at *18. This

portion of the motion is thus granted in part and denied in part.

III. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff requests leave to file an amended complaint.

(Pl. Opp. at 34.) It is “within the sound discretion of the

district court to grant or deny leave to amend,” which should be

freely given “when justice so requires.” McCarthy v. Dun &

Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007); FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)(2). “[A] district court may deny leave to amend” when

“amendment would be futile because the problem with the claim ‘is

substantive . . . [and] better pleading will not cure it.’”

Reynolds v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 14-CV-1481, 2015 WL 1514894,

at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting

Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)).

While it is true that Plaintiff has not attached a

proposed amended complaint to its opposition papers (see Reply at

4), the Second Circuit has stated that “the court should not

dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a

liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid

claim might be stated.” Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).

Here, the Court finds that a more detailed and organized pleading

may cure many of the pleading deficiencies identified herein,

including the failure to identify the Subject Vehicles other than

the Baez Vehicle, the failure to separate and identify each alleged

constitutional deprivation, the failure to separate each cause of

action as standalone counts, and the failure to incorporate the

Code, or explain its significance, to the claims at issue, inter

alia. Plaintiff is thus GRANTED leave to file an Amended Complaint

within thirty (30) days of, and consistent with, this Order.

***

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the County’s motion to dismiss

(ECF No. 16) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff

voluntarily withdraws its state law claims (Counts II and IV) and

its request for punitive damages; accordingly, those claims and

that request are DISMISSED. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an

Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of, and consistent with,

this Memorandum and Order.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT _____

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: September 30 , 2021

Central Islip, New York