Opinion

Pena v. Suffolk County Police Department

Court
District Court, E.D. New York
Filed
Aug 27, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.6%

“Monell expressly prohibits respondeat superior liability for municipalities” (citations omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • “Monell expressly prohibits respondeat superior liability for municipalities” (citations omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----------------------------------X

GABRIEL JOSE PENA,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

-against- 21-CV-2496(JS)(JMW)

SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

5th Precinct, Patchogue, N.Y.;

CHRISTIAN DEMERS, Badge # 6836; and

MICHELLE KNUDSEN,

Defendants.

----------------------------------X

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Gabriel Jose Pena, Pro Se

620029

22 Judith Drive

Coram, New York 11727

For Defendants: No Appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

On or around April 30, 2021, pro se plaintiff Gabriel

Jose Pena (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action while incarcerated

by filing a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

1983”), along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) and a Prisoner Authorization form pursuant to the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Compl., ECF No. 1; IFP App., ECF

No. 2; PLRA Form, ECF No. 6.) For the reasons that follow,

Plaintiff’s IFP application is GRANTED; claims against the Suffolk

County Police Department are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and, claims

against defendants Police Officer Christian Demers (“Officer

Demers”) and Michelle Knudsen (“Knudsen”) shall proceed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, using the Court’s form complaint for Civil

Rights actions under Section 1983, alleges:

On January 26, 2021 between the hours of 10:30

a.m. to 2:00 p.m. while being detained at the

Suffolk County Police Department[’]s 5th

Precin[c]t in Patchogue, N.Y., I was viscously

assaulted by multiple Police Officers while I

was handcuffed to the Bookings Table. Said

officers punched me numerous times in my right

eye giving me an instant black eye and causing

a laceration under my eye. Not only was I

physically assaulted but I was verbally abused

throughout this situation.

(Compl. ¶ IV.) As for a description of his injuries and medical

treatment, Plaintiff alleges:

I suffered a black eye & a laceration beneath

my right eye. I was taken to Good Samaritan

Hospital in Patchogue, N.Y. where they ran

numerous test & cleaned my wound while I was

unconscious because Officers in the 5th

Precin[c]t had the E.M.T.’s sedate me at the

Precin[c]t. I’ve been having reoccurring

migraines ever since the assault and my vision

has been blurry & extremely sensitive

afterwards.

(Id. ¶ IV.A.) Plaintiff seeks to hold the “person’s involved in

the assault . . . accountable” and a monetary award in the sum of

$1 million for the “pain & suffering and the mental anguish I’ve

experienced since I was physically & verbally abused by these

officers of the law while I was in their custody.” (Id. ¶ V.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Application is Granted

The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence this action without prepayment of the

filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

IFP application is GRANTED.

II. Legal Standards

A. Consideration of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an

in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). An action

is frivolous as a matter of law when, inter alia, it is based on

an “indisputably meritless legal theory” or when it “lacks an

arguable basis in law . . ., or [when] a dispositive defense

clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se

plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the “strongest

[claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Harris v. Mills, 572

F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). “But the ‘special solicitude’ in pro

se cases, has its limits –- to state a claim, pro se pleadings

still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain

statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Wynn

v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 21-CV-3503, 2021 WL 2018967, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (quoting Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475).

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States .

. . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at

least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law

and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed

under the Constitution of the United States.” Rodriguez v.

Shoprite Supermarket, No. 19-CV-6565, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

III. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915

A. Claims Against the Suffolk County Police Department

Plaintiff’s claims against the Suffolk County Police

Department (the “Police Department”) are DISMISSED with prejudice.

The Police Department cannot be sued because it is an

“administrative arm,” which does “not have a legal identity

separate and apart from the municipality.” Spagnuolo v. Suffolk

Cnty., No. 12-CV-4327, 2017 WL 4326510, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,

2017) (citation omitted) (Seybert, J.), aff’d sub nom. Spagnuolo

v. Howell, 814 F. App’x 614 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Sturgis v.

Suffolk Cnty. Jail, No. 12-CV-5263, 2013 WL 245052, *2 (E.D.N.Y.

Jan. 22, 2013) (sua sponte dismissing Section 1983 claims against

the Suffolk County Police Department, among others, because it is

an “administrative arm[] of the County of Suffolk [ ] [and] lack[s]

the capacity to be sued”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against

the Police Department are implausible and are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court construes the

Complaint against Suffolk County (the “County”). For the reasons

that follow, Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible Section 1983

claim against the County.

It is well-established that a municipality, like the

County, cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. City, 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Agosto v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 982

F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Monell expressly prohibits respondeat

superior liability for municipalities” (citations omitted)).

Rather, to state a claim against a municipality under Section 1983,

“the plaintiff is required to show that the challenged acts were

performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.” Tafolla v.

Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 17-CV-4897, 2021 WL 3675042, at *10 (E.D.N.Y.

Aug. 19, 2021) (Seybert, J.) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of N.Y.,

795 F.3d 297, 314 (2d Cir. 2015)). To establish the existence of

a municipal policy or custom, the plaintiff must allege:

(1) the existence of a formal policy which is

officially endorsed by the municipality;

(2) actions taken or decisions made by

municipal policymaking officials, i.e.,

officials with final decisionmaking

authority, which caused the alleged violation

of the plaintiff’s civil rights; (3) a

practice so persistent and widespread as to

practically have the force of law or that was

so manifest as to imply the constructive

acquiescence of senior policy-making

officials; or (4) that a policymaking official

exhibited deliberate indifference to

constitutional deprivations caused by

subordinates.

Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

May 18, 2021) (Seybert, J.) (cleaned up).

Here, when liberally construing the Complaint, there are

no factual allegations that a municipal policy or custom existed

that caused the alleged constitutional deprivations of which

Plaintiff complains. (See generally Compl.) There are similarly

no allegations from which the Court could reasonably construe a

plausible Section 1983 claim against the County. Thus, to the

extent asserted, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the County

is DISMISSED.

B. Claims Against Officer Demers and Knudsen

Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by “multiple

Police Officers” at the Police Department’s Fifth Precinct,

located at 125 Waverly Avenue, Patchogue, New York. Plaintiff

lists this address for both Officer Demers and Knudsen. Although

not a model of clarity, it appears that Plaintiff alleges both

Defendants participated in the challenged conduct. At this early

stage of the proceedings, the Court declines to sua sponte dismiss

Plaintiff’s excessive force claims against Officer Demers and

Knudsen. As such, these claims shall proceed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Plaintiff’s IFP application (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against

the Suffolk County Police Department are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii); and, to the extent

alleged, claims against Suffolk County are DISMISSED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s excessive force

claims against defendants Demers and Knudsen shall proceed; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall:

(1) issue Summonses to Defendants Demers and Knudsen, and

(2) forward the Summonses, the Complaint, and this Order, to the

United States Marshals Service for service; and (3) mail a copy of

this Order to the pro se Plaintiff at his address of record; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that any appeal from this Order

would not be in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status

is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

_ /s/ JOANNA SEYBERT

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: August 27 , 2021

Central Islip, New York

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.