The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JING WANG and WAI-LEUNG CHAN,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiffs, 20-CV-3040 (NGG) (SJB)
-against-
TESLA, INC.,
Defendant.
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Wai-Leung Chan was involved in a car accident while
driving a vehicle he purchased from Defendant Tesla, Inc.
(“Tesla”) under the name of his spouse, Plaintiff Jing Wang.
Plaintiffs brought this action for breach of express and implied
warranties, failure to warn, deceptive and misleading business
practices and false advertising, common law fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation against Tesla. (Am. Compl. (Dkt. 18).) Before
the court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ fraud claim
and Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive and exemplary damages pursu-
ant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and Defendant’s Motion to Strike
several paragraphs of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(f). (Tesla Mot. to Dismiss (“Tesla Mot.”) (Dkt. 24-
1); Pls.’ Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Opp.”) (Dkt. 24-
3); Tesla Reply to Opp. (“Tesla Reply to Opp.”) (Dkt. 24-4).)
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Partial
Dismissal and Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in
part. The court grants dismissal of Plaintiffs’ fraud claim, but de-
nies Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive
and exemplary damages and Defendant’s motion to strike por-
tions of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
In or around 2015, Plaintiff Chan became interested in purchas-
ing a Tesla vehicle for his daily commutes through Long Island
traffic. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24.) He was especially intrigued by
Tesla’s Autopilot feature, which, according to Tesla, is designed
to help drivers navigate “the burdensome parts of driving.” (Id.
¶¶ 9, 24.) Tesla vehicles equipped with Autopilot technology as-
sist drivers in a number of ways: the cars can steer, accelerate,
and brake automatically; they can match their speed to surround-
ing traffic; they are able to accelerate and decelerate to maintain
a specified distance behind the nearest vehicle; they can change
lanes on the highway; and they can detect nearby cars to prevent
accidents. (Id. ¶ 7.) Tesla touts one of its vehicles equipped with
Autopilot, the Model X, as “the safest, quickest, and most capable
sport utility vehicle in history” and “the safest SUV ever.” (Id. ¶
6.)
Prior to his purchase of a Tesla vehicle, Plaintiff Chan states that
he visited Tesla’s website almost weekly to learn about Tesla ve-
hicles’ capabilities. (Id. ¶ 23.) Based on his research on the
company’s website, Chan believed that a Tesla vehicle would be
uniquely suited to his transportation needs. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff
Chan visited showrooms in Syosset, New York and Manhasset,
New York to test drive the Model S and Model X vehicles, respec-
tively. (Id. ¶¶ 25-30.) During Plaintiff’s visit to the Manhasset
showroom, an agent assured him that the Autopilot feature
would be well-suited to his commutes and that “he could take
the Tesla into the HOV lane . . . and then close his eyes and ‘re-
lax.’” (Id. ¶ 29).
Relying on what he learned from Tesla’s website and from his
showroom visits, Chan purchased a Model X, which he claimed
in Tesla’s Brooklyn, New York showroom in September 2016. (Id.
¶¶ 32-33.) Plaintiffs allege that neither Tesla nor its representa-
tives ever warned Plaintiffs about the limitations of Model X and
the Autopilot feature or provided proper instructions on operat-
ing Model X and the Autopilot feature, either through Tesla’s
website or during Plaintiff Chan’s visits to Tesla’s showrooms. (Id.
¶¶ 33-35.)
On December 13, 2017, Plaintiff Chan got into an accident while
driving the Model X on the Long Island Expressway through
dense traffic. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38.) Plaintiffs contend that as a white
Audi merged in between Chan’s car and a tractor-trailer in front
of him, the Autopilot feature failed to react, warn Chan of an im-
pending collision, or operate its “Automatic Emergency
Breaking” function. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.) With just one second to react,
Plaintiff Chan steered to the left, attempting to avoid a collision,
and he instead collided with two other cars. (Id. ¶ 42.) The Au-
topilot feature did not recognize this impending collision, either,
and it again failed to engage its “’Automatic Emergency Break-
ing’” function. (Id.) Plaintiff Chan claims he operated the vehicle
in a reasonable manner and was alert the entire time. (Id. ¶¶ 39,
44.) The collision caused severe damage to Plaintiffs’ Model X,
which was deemed a total loss, and damage to two other vehi-
cles; there is no allegation that it caused bodily injury. (Id. ¶ 43.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to re-
lief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)).1 A complaint must contain facts that do more than
1 When quoting cases, and unless otherwise noted, all citations and quota-
tion marks are omitted, and all alterations are adopted.
present a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlaw-
fully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To decide Defendants’ motions to
dismiss, the court “will accept all factual allegations in the [c]om-
plaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [Plaintiffs’]
favor.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 429 (2d
Cir. 2011). However, the court will “identify[] pleadings that, be-
cause they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court must then
evaluate the “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
This plausibility analysis “does not impose a probability require-
ment at the pleading stage,” but requires the complaint to
provide “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that dis-
covery will reveal evidence of illegality.” Arista Records, LLC v.
Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).
B. Motion to Strike Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)
Motions to strike “are not favored and will not be granted unless
. . . the allegations in question can have no possible bearing on
the subject matter of the litigation.” Lynch v. Southampton Animal
Shelter Found. Inc., 278 F.R.D. 55, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). “Rule
12(f) motion[s] to strike matter as impertinent or immaterial,
will be denied, unless it can be shown that no evidence in support
of the allegation would be admissible.” Id. By the same token,
matters should be struck due to impertinence only where “the
allegation bears no possible relation whatsoever to the subject
matter of the litigation.” AdvanceMe, Inc. v. Lenders Int’l, No. 11-
CV-3624(VB), 2011 WL 6425488, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2011). To prevail on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) motion to strike, the
movant must establish that: “(1) no evidence in support of the
allegations would be admissible; (2) the allegations have no
bearing on the relevant issues; and (3) permitting the allegations
to stand would result in prejudice to the movant.” Lynch, 278
F.R.D. at 63 (citing Roe v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 495,
510 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).2
III. DISCUSSION
Tesla moves to dismiss on two grounds. First, Tesla argues that
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for fraud under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). (Tesla Mot. at 5.) Second, Tesla argues that Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint does not state a cognizable claim that per-
mits punitive or exemplary damages. (Id. at 9.) Tesla also moves
to strike several paragraphs from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint
as immaterial and impertinent to Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id. at 10.)
A. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fraud Claim
In the sixth cause of action raised in their Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs allege that Tesla has “intentionally made false represen-
tations of material fact regarding its vehicles, including that its
Autopilot function is safe and ready to be used in common traffic
situations and specifically in heavy highway traffic.” (Am. Compl.
¶ 97.) They argue that the statements Tesla has made directly to
Plaintiffs and to the public, through Tesla’s website and show-
room agents, “were likely to deceive a reasonable consumer and
did deceive Plaintiffs into purchasing a Tesla vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 99.)
Furthermore, according to Plaintiffs, these misrepresentations
about the Model X and its ultimate failure to perform as repre-
sented are the direct and proximate cause of Chan’s accident. (Id.
¶ 104.)
To state a claim for fraud, Plaintiffs must establish “ a misrepre-
sentation or a material omission of fact which was false and
known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of induc-
ing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other
2 Because the relevant claims in this action arise under state law, the court
applies New York substantive law in deciding the motion to strike.
party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury.”
Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 668 N.E. 2d 1370, 1373
(N.Y. 1996). Additionally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that, “[i]n
alleging fraud . . . , a party must state with particularity the cir-
cumstances constituting fraud[.]” In order to satisfy this
particularity standard, a complaint alleging fraud must ordinar-
ily: “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were
fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when
the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements
were fraudulent.” United States ex rel. Ladas v. Exelis, Inc., 824 F.
3d 16, 25 (2d Cir. 2016). Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) “is designed to pro-
vide a defendant with fair notice of a plaintiff’s claim, to
safeguard a defendant’s reputation from improvident charges of
wrongdoing, and to protect a defendant against the institution of
a strike suit.” O’Brien v. Nat’l Prop. Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d
674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991).
Tesla argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for fraud,
as they have not pleaded all the requisite elements of a common
law fraud claim. Tesla also argues that Plaintiffs have made only
vague allegations that fail to satisfy the particularity standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Moreover, Tesla contends
that even if Plaintiffs did make out a claim for fraud and meet
the particularity standard, their claim still fails because the al-
leged fraud is predicated on an omission and there is no fiduciary
relationship between the two parties.
Plaintiffs allege that they justifiably relied on misrepresentations
about the Autopilot technology made on Tesla’s website. (Am.
Compl ¶ 99.) Their Amended Complaint cites specific statements
touting the safety and efficacy of the Model X and Autopilot Tech-
nology that appeared on Tesla’s website at the time Plaintiffs
drafted their complaint, including that the Model X is the “safest,
quickest, and most capable sport utility vehicle in history” and
“the safest SUV ever” and that the Autopilot feature assumes “the
burdensome parts of driving.” (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) However, the
Amended Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs viewed and
relied upon these specific statements on Tesla’s website in 2015
or 2016, when they made the decision to purchase a Model X.
Indeed, it is not clear from the complaint what representations
on Tesla’s website Chan read and allegedly relied upon prior to
Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Model X. Because Plaintiffs do not iden-
tify the specific representations on Tesla’s website that they relied
upon, their fraud allegations regarding Tesla’s website fall short
of Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.3
Plaintiffs also allege that they were misled by statements made
by Tesla representatives in the Manhasset and Syosset show-
rooms, including “routine[] misrepresent[ations] and
overstate[ments] [of] the capabilities of Autopilot and the re-
quired operator involvement,” such as representations that the
Model X was uniquely suited to Plaintiff Chan’s needs, that it
would perform well in traffic, and that Chan could close his eyes
and relax after putting the car in Autopilot. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17,
26-27, 29-31.) Plaintiffs argue that their allegations are suffi-
ciently specific to support a fraud claim, as they have identified
the fraudulent statements on which they base their claim, identi-
fied the speakers, designated the time period and place, and
described the nature of the statements. (Opp. at 6.) However,
aside from the alleged statement by a Manhasset showroom
agent that Chan could “close his eyes and relax” when utilizing
3 Plaintiffs state that their fraud allegations are adequate because pleading
on “information and belief” is allowed in certain instances. (Opp. at 6.)
However, where pleading is allowed on information and belief, “a com-
plaint must adduce specific facts supporting a strong inference of fraud or
it will not satisfy even a relaxed pleading standard.” Wexner v. First Man-
hattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d. Cir. 1990). Here, Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint suggests in vague terms that Plaintiffs were misled by their re-
view of Tesla’s website. They have not alleged with any particularity, either
with knowledge or upon information and belief, what representations they
relied upon.
the Autopilot technology, Plaintiffs do not allege specific misrep-
resentations that were made during Chan’s visits to the
showrooms. That statement, by itself, does not meet the elements
of a fraud claim. Plaintiffs have failed to present facts that “give
rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.” See S.Q.K.F.C., Inc.
v. Bell Atlantic TriCon Leasing Corp., 84 F.3d 629, 634 (2d Cir.
1996). To demonstrate a strong inference of fraudulent intent,
plaintiffs must allege “facts indicating that the defendant[] had
both motive and opportunity to commit fraud or facts that
amount to strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehav-
ior or recklessness.” Carmona v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 08-
cv-4475 (LAK), 2009 WL 890054, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2009). The facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fail to
give rise to an inference of that nature.
Plaintiffs also allege that Tesla committed fraud by failing to ad-
equately disclose the defects or limitations of the Autopilot
technology. To allege fraud based on a failure to disclose under
New York law, one party must have “information that the other
party is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them.” United States. v.
Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 211 (2d Cir. 2002). A fiduciary relationship
“may exist where one party reposes confidence in another and
reasonably relies on the other’s superior expertise or knowledge,
but an arms-length business relationship does not give rise to a
fiduciary obligation.” In re Refco Sec. Litig., 759 F. Supp. 2d 301,
323 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “When parties deal at arms length in a com-
mercial transaction, no relation of confidence or trust sufficient
to find the existence of a fiduciary relationship will arise absent
extraordinary circumstances.” In re Mid-Island Hosp., Inc., 276
F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2002).
“However, there may be a relationship of trust and confidence
sufficient to give rise to a duty to disclose under the ‘special facts
doctrine.’” Travelers Indem. Co. of Illinois v. CDL Hotels USA, Inc.,
322 F. Supp. 2d 482, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). “‘Under [the special
facts doctrine], a duty to disclose arises where one party’s supe-
rior knowledge of essential facts renders a transaction without
disclosure inherently unfair.’” Woods v. Maytag Co., 2010 WL
4314313, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2010) (quoting P.T. Bank
Cent. Asia v. ABN AMRO Bank N.V., 301 A.D.2d 373, 378 (1st
Dep’t 2003)). To state a claim under the special facts doctrine, a
plaintiff must allege that: “(1) one party has superior knowledge
of certain information; (2) that information is not readily availa-
ble to the other party; and (3) the first party knows that the
second party is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge.”
Banque Arabe et Internationale D’Investissement v. Maryland Nat.
Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 155 (2d. Cir. 1995).
Because Plaintiffs and Tesla were engaged in an arm’s-length
transaction, Tesla had an affirmative duty to disclose only if the
special facts doctrine applied. Plaintiffs argue that Tesla’s supe-
rior knowledge of essential facts regarding the Autopilot
technology’s limitations and defects established a duty to dis-
close. (Opp. at 8.) Plaintiffs, however, have not alleged with any
specificity what alleged defects were concealed from them, nor
have they adequately alleged that information regarding the lim-
itations of the technology was unavailable to them via Tesla’s
website, the Model X owner’s manual, or other publicly available
sources. Accordingly, the facts alleged do not give rise to a claim
that Tesla committed fraud by failing to affirmatively disclose
“special facts” that were known to Tesla and unknowable by
Plaintiffs.
B. Motion to Dismiss Prayer for Punitive and Exemplary
Damages
Under New York law, a plaintiff may recover an award for puni-
tive damages on a tort claim where the defendant’s actions rise
to the level of “gross, wanton, or willful fraud or other morally
culpable conduct.” Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d
504, 509 (2d Cir. 1991). Notably, the trend among courts apply-
ing New York law seems to be to deny attempts to dismiss prayers
for punitive damages at the motion to dismiss stage because it is
“not even clear that there is a requirement that a complaint seek-
ing punitive damages must plead specific facts that would
support an award of such damages.” Amusement Indus., Inc. v.
Stern, 693 F. Supp. 2d 301, 318 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “A motion
to dismiss is addressed to a ‘claim’ – not to a form of damages.”
Id. Additionally, “there is no separate cause of action in New York
for punitive damages.” Martin v. Dickson, 100 F. App’x 14, 16 (2d
Cir. 2004). “[W]hether there is sufficiently egregious conduct to
support an award of punitive damages is an evidentiary matter
that cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.” New York Is-
landers Hockey Club, LLP v. Comerica Bank—Texas, 71 F. Supp.
2d 108, 120-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). As such, “[b]ecause punitive
damages are a form of damages, not an independent cause of
action, a motion to dismiss a prayer for relief in the form of pu-
nitive damages is procedurally premature.” Hunter v. Palisades
Acquisition XVI, LLC, 16 Civ. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs’ Complaint demands punitive and
exemplary damages on underlying causes of action. See Amuse-
ment Indus., Inc., 693 F. Supp. at 318 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Accordingly, the court denies Tesla’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
prayer for punitive damages as procedurally premature. See
Hunter, 2017 WL 5513636, at *9.
C. Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint
Tesla also moves to strike six paragraphs of Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, which allege facts concerning the safety of
Tesla’s vehicles, including a 2019 car accident involving a differ-
ent Tesla model and a 2020 report by the National
Transportation Safety Board. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege in the
relevant paragraphs that:
14. Tesla tries to distance itself from potential lia-
bilities by initially referring to the Model X
operating software as being in a “beta-testing
phase.” After Germany’s Federal Office for Motor
Vehicles refused to approve Autopilot for use on
German roads, Tesla explained that the word
“beta” is not used in the standard sense of the
word but was used to make sure Tesla drivers do
not get too comfortable with its autopilot system.
15. Rather than providing transparent disclosures,
Tesla tells its customers and regulators that when
Autopilot fails, the driver is the fallback option to
resume control of the vehicle. This fallback plan is
unreliable and unsafe. Not only has Tesla been
warned by the NTSB that drivers of their automo-
biles may become overly reliant on the Autopilot
technology, but Tesla also knows or should know,
based on scientific and engineering publications,
that drivers have a limited ability to execute a
“take over response” when Autopilot does not
measure up. Indeed, the “takeover response” time
for humans varies greatly depending on the cir-
cumstances: the type of stimuli, the type of control
necessary, and the driving situation. Even the most
attentive drivers need a certain amount of time to
perform a takeover response. The malfunctioning
and defective Autopilot system does not allow for
that margin of time, nor does it provide a sufficient
warning to enable the driver to properly respond.
In other words, Tesla knows that reasonable driv-
ers will not, and more significantly, perhaps
cannot safely use Autopilot. . . .
18. The NTSB has investigated several Tesla-re-
lated fatalities. For example, in Mountain View,
California, a Tesla’s Autopilot malfunctioned, and
the vehicle accelerated into a cement median at a
merge point of two intersecting highways, killing
the driver. The NTSB investigation resulted in a re-
port published on March 23, 2020 which stated, in
part:
Probable Cause – The National Transportation
Safety Board determines that the probable cause
of the Mountain View, California, crash was the
Tesla Autopilot system steering the sport utility ve-
hicle into a highway gore area due to system
limitations, and the driver’s lack of response due
to distraction likely from a cell phone game appli-
cation and overreliance on the Autopilot partial
driving automation system. Contributing to the
crash was the Tesla vehicle’s ineffective monitor-
ing of driver engagement, which facilitated the
driver’s complacency and inattentiveness.
19. Furthermore, the NTSB’s report noted the fol-
lowing:
a. The Tesla Autopilot did not provide an effective
means of monitoring the driver’s level of engage-
ment with the driving task;
b. Because monitoring of driver-applied steering
wheel torque is an ineffective surrogate measure
of driver engagement, performance standards
should be developed pertaining to an effective
method of ensuring driver engagement; and
c. In order for driving automation systems to be
safely deployed in a high-speed operating environ-
ment, collision avoidance systems must be able to
effectively detect and respond to potential haz-
ards, including roadside traffic safety hardware
and be able to execute forward collision avoidance
at high speeds.
20. The NTSB ultimately recommended that Tesla
incorporate system safeguards that limit the use of
automated vehicle control systems to those condi-
tions for which they were designed, or the
operational design domain (“ODD”).
21. Prior to the Mountain View, California acci-
dent, in March 2019, in Delray Beach, Florida, a
2018 Tesla Model 3 struck a semi-trailer truck
when the truck entered the highway without stop-
ping. At the time of the crash, the Tesla’s Autopilot
system was active, and the Tesla was traveling at
68 mph in a 55-mph posted speed limit area. The
Autopilot system and collision avoidance systems
did not classify the crossing truck as a hazard, did
not attempt to slow the vehicle, and did not pro-
vide a warning to the driver of the approaching
crossing truck. Further, the driver did not take eva-
sive action in response to the crossing truck.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15, 18-21)
Tesla argues that these paragraphs should be struck from the
Amended Complaint because they do not directly pertain to, and
therefore bear no relevance to, the vehicle that Plaintiffs pur-
chased or the accident in which that vehicle was involved. (Mem.
at 10-11.) Plaintiffs argue, in response, that these factual allega-
tions “directly bear[] on Plaintiff’s claims that Tesla’s automated
features (including Autopilot) do not operate as expressly and
implicitly represented to consumers.” (Opp. at 14.)
While the challenged factual allegations are at most tangentially
relevant to Plaintiffs’ legal claims, they do relate to the subject
matter of the litigation: alleged defects with Tesla’s Autopilot
technology and the extent to which Tesla knew of and disclosed
those alleged defects. In addition, evidence of similar accidents
may be relevant to illustrate that the incident was not an isolated
occurrence. See Randi A.J. v. Long Is. Surgi-Ctr., 46 A.D.3d 74,
85-86 (2d Dep’t 2007). Thus, Tesla cannot meet the high stand-
ard for success on a Rule 12(f) motion to strike. See AdvanceMe,
Inc., No. 11 CV 3624 (VB), 2011 WL 6425488, at *2; see also
Lynch, 278 F.R.D. at 63. Tesla’s motion to strike paragraphs 14,
15, 18, 19, 20, and 21 of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is de-
nied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Tesla’s Partial Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED IN PART, with respect to Plaintiffs’ fraud claim, and
DENIED IN PART, with respect to Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive
and exemplary damages. Tesla’s Motion to Strike certain factual
allegations from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
July 16, 2021
_/s/ Nicholas G. Garaufis_
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS
United States District Judge