Ates v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----------------------------------------X

MURAT ATES, a free sovereign living

soul,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- TO SHOW CAUSE

20-CV-4334(JS)(AYS)

UNITED STATES, STATE OF NEW YORK,

GARY R. BROWN, in his personal

capacity and in his official capacity

as a Justice of Federal Court; JOAN M.

AZRACK, in her personal capacity and

in her official capacity as a Justice

of Federal Court; TOURO COLLEGE JACOB

D. FUCHSBERG LAW CENTER; ANDREW CRECCA,

in his personal capacity and in his

official capacity as Justice of the

Supreme Court of New York, 10th Judicial

District; PATRICK LEIS, III, in his

personal capacity and in his official

capacity as Justice of the Supreme Court

of New York, 10th Judicial District;

VICTORIA GUMBS-MOORE, in her personal

capacity and in her official capacity

as Justice of the Family Court of New

York, 10th Judicial District; VICTIMS

INFORMATION BUREAU OF SUFFOLK (VIBS);

and FERDAG DILAY ALTINER,

Defendants.

-----------------------------------------X

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Murat Ates, pro se1

(631) 790-1080

muratates.ny@gmail.com

For Defendants: No appearances.

1 Plaintiff alleges that he is homeless and therefore does not

provide a mailing address.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Murat Ates (“Plaintiff”) has initiated five frivolous

actions in this District, inclusive of this Action, since

March 13, 2020. See Ates v. Altiner, No. 20-CV-1477 (Azrack, J.)

(“Ates I”); Ates v. Altiner, No. 20-CV-1479 (Azrack, J.)

(“Ates II”); Ates v. Azrack, No. 20-CV-3590 (Brown, J.)

(“Ates III”); and Ates v. Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law

Center, No. 20-CV-3729 (Brown, J.) (“Ates IV”). For the reasons

that follow, Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis

is GRANTED, the Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and leave to amend is DENIED as futile.

Plaintiff is further ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE as to why the Court

should not enter a filing injunction barring Plaintiff from filing

a new action in this Court without permission, as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiff’s Litigation History in this Court

On March 13, 2020, Plaintiff commenced Ates I by filing

a complaint against (1) his estranged wife Ferdag Dilay Altiner

(“Altiner”); (2) the State of New York; (3) the justices of the

New York State Supreme Court and Family Court who presided over

the underlying state court proceedings;2 (3) Judge Janet DiFiore,

2 Judges Andrew Crecca, Patrick Leis, III, and Victoria Gumbs-

Moore in their personal and official capacities as Justices of

either the Supreme or Family Courts of New York, 10th Judicial

District.

Chief Justice of the New York State Court of Appeals; (4) the

justices of the New York State Appellate Division, Second

Department;3 (5) the members of the New York State Commission on

Judicial Conduct;4 (6) the Victims Information Bureau of Suffolk

(“VIBS”); (7) Catherine DeSanto; (8) Lance Simon; and (9) Penny

Slomovitz-Glaser. (Ates I, Compl., D.E. 1.) Plaintiff alleged

that New York state domestic relation laws and family laws are

unconstitutional and that he was treated unfairly during state

court matrimonial and family court proceedings. (See generally

Ates I, Compl.) On May 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed an updated AO 239

in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application and an Amended Complaint.

(See Ates I, Am. Compl., D.E. 12; IFP Mot., D.E. 13.) Plaintiff

sought to disqualify and impeach several state court judges, a

declaration that the New York State Family Court Act and certain

Domestic Relations Laws are unconstitutional, and other orders

addressing perceived instances of bias in the underlying

matrimonial and family court proceedings. Plaintiff also

3 Judges Alan D. Scheinkman, William F. Mastro, Reinaldo E. Rivera,

Mark C. Dillion, Leonard B. Austin, Ruth C. Balkin, John M.

Leventhal, Cheryl E. Chambers, Robert J. Miller, Sandra L. Sgroi,

Betsy Barros, L. Priscilla Hall, Valerie Brathwaite Nelson, Linda

Christopher, Paul Wooten, Joseph J. Maltese, Colleen Duffy, Sylvia

O. Hinds-Radix, Sheri S. Roman, Jeffrey A. Cohen, Francesca E.

Connolly, Hector D. LaSalle, and Angela G. Iannacci.

4 Joseph W. Belluck, Paul B. Harding, Jodie Corngold, John A. Falk,

Taa Grays, Leslie G. Leach, Angela L. Mazzarelli, Robert J. Miller,

Marvin Ray Raskin, and Akasia Garcia Yeboah.

requested an order regarding custody of his children, alimony, as

well as property and money he believes Altiner owed him.

On March 16, 2020, Plaintiff commenced Ates II by filing

a complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Ates

II, Compl., D.E. 1; IFP Mot., D.E. 2.) There, Plaintiff named

Altiner, Judge Crecca, Judge Leis, Judge Gumbs-Moore, VIBS, and

Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (“Touro”) as

defendants. The allegations were substantially similar to those

asserted in Ates I except that in Ates II, Plaintiff alleged that

the judges who presided over his matrimonial and family court

proceedings caused Touro to deny him admission to the law school.

(Ates II, Compl. ¶¶ 36-42.) Plaintiff sought, among other things,

$17 billion in damages and a declaration that Touro violated his

constitutional rights. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.)

On June 19, 2020, Judge Joan M. Azrack issued an order

dismissing the complaints in both Ates I and Ates II. (See Ates

I, June 19, 2020 Order, D.E. 17; Ates II, June 19, 2020 Order,

D.E. 9.) Judge Azrack granted Plaintiff’s requests to proceed in

forma pauperis, consolidated the Amended Complaint in Ates I with

the Complaint in Ates II, and dismissed both actions without

prejudice. Specifically, Judge Azrack dismissed Plaintiff’s

claims for lack of subject matter pursuant to the domestic

relations exception finding that Plaintiff sought “to challenge

rulings made during the underlying state court matrimonial action

and child custody proceedings.” (Ates I, June 19, 2020 Order at

8-11.)5 Judge Azrack next held that Plaintiff’s claims were barred

by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they asked the Court to

“review and reject the state court decisions awarding custody of

his children to his former spouse, child support and alimony

payments, and the entry of orders of protection.” (Id. at 11-13.)

Judge Azrack denied leave to amend and stated “Plaintiff may pursue

any valid state law claims that he may have against the defendants

in state court.” (Id. at 13-14.)

On or around August 6, 2020, Plaintiff initiated Ates

III by filing a complaint and an application to proceed in forma

pauperis. (Ates III, Compl. D.E. 1; IFP Mot., D.E. 4.) There,

Plaintiff asserted many of the same claims alleged in Ates I and

named Judge Azrack as a defendant. (See Ates III, Compl.) On or

around August 14, 2020, Plaintiff commenced Ates IV by filing a

complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Ates

IV, Compl., D.E. 1; IFP Mot., D.E. 2.) The Ates IV complaint

asserted many of the same claims alleged in Ates II and named Judge

Azrack as a defendant. (See Ates IV, Compl.) On August 20, 2020,

Judge Gary R. Brown entered Electronic Orders in both Ates III and

Ates IV granting Plaintiff’s applications to proceed in forma

5 Judge Azrack issued the same order in both actions. For ease of

reference, the Court cites to the Memorandum and Order posted in

Ates I at Docket Entry 17.

pauperis and sua sponte dismissing the actions with prejudice as

frivolous and malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).6 (See

Ates III, Aug. 20, 2020 Elec. Order (citing Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter,

185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) and Miller v. Doe, No. 20-CV-0930,

2020 WL 4616322, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020)).

II. This Action7

Plaintiff commenced this Action on or around September

15, 2020 by filing a Complaint against the United States, the State

of New York, Judge Brown, Judge Azrack, Touro, Judge Crecca, Judge

Leis, Judge Gumbs-Moore, VIBS, and Altiner (collectively,

“Defendants”). (Compl., D.E. 1.) The Complaint asserts

“violations of certain protections guaranteed to him by the First,

Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of

the Constitution” against the “judges in the Supreme Court of New

York and Family Court of New York” and “the private defendants”

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1961, 1985, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1964,

241, 245, and 249, a “Bivens Action” against Judge Azrack and Judge

Brown, and claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2000d against Touro and

VIBS. (See Compl. at 2, ¶ II.) Plaintiff alleges that he is

6 Judge Brown issued the same Electronic Order in both actions.

For ease of reference, hereafter, the Court cites to the Electronic

Order posted to the Ates III docket.

7 The Court cites to the Complaint exactly as filed. Unless noted,

errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been

corrected.

“homeless (as a result of Defendants’ hate crimes, religious and

racial discrimination and crimes committed under the color of

law),” is a “Free Sovereign Living Soul,” and is attending

Quinnipiac University School of Law. (Compl. at 2.) Here, too,

Plaintiff asserts claims regarding the constitutionality and

fairness of the underlying state court proceedings and arising out

of the denial of his admission to Touro. (See generally Compl.)

He also asserts that Judge Azrack and Judge Brown deliberately,

and in bad faith, “dismissed [his] federal lawsuit[s]” and:

frivolously and deliberately prevented the

homeless & penniless Plaintiff from pursuing

Appeals of their illegal, unconstitutional

dismissals of the Plaintiff Civil Rights

Claims by unconstitutionally denying the

Plaintiff his Rights to fair trial, equal

protection of laws and due process, also

denying the Plaintiff his right to pursue

redress of the real, proven injuries caused by

the illegal acts of the defendants using

Unconstitutional Federal Codes 28 U.S.C. §§

1915 (a)(3), (e)(2)(B)(i)

(Compl. at 6, ¶ 12-14.) Plaintiff further alleges that the United

States:

deliberately and frivolously operates a

Racketeering Operation through its Judiciary

and protects such Racketeering Operation from

the Constitutional penalties by granting the

Same Racketeering Organization rights to make

case laws and statutes that immunizes the

Racket from the Constitution. UNITED STATES

facilitates the RACKET to dismiss complaints

against itself by providing -- endless and

infinitely many -- Unconstitutional,

arbitrary and baseless codes, statutes or case

law as a justification for dismissal

(Compl. at 7, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff seeks, among other things, a

declaration that:

(1) ALL defendants as co-conspirators and

acco[]mplices to UNITE[D] STATES, committed an

armed robbery, robbing the Plaintiff of his

property and assets valued at seventeen

billion dollars;

***

(5) [the] Domestic Relations Laws and Family

Court Acts of ALL 50 STATES [are]

Unconstitutional;

(6) [the] Character and Fitness assessments of

ANY educational or professional organization

receiving Federal Funds as a part of their

admission process is UNCONSTITUIONAL;

(7) 28 U.S.C. § 1915 [is] UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

(8) [the] “Domestic Relations Exception[,]”

“Rooker/Feldman Doctrine” and the

“Plausability” standard of Ashcroft v. Iqbal

are UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and

***

(10) Free Sovereign People and Common Law

Courts formed by Free Sovereign People have

exclusive jurisdiction on ANY complaint

against ANY Governmental Entity.

(Compl. at 7-8, ¶¶ 1-11.)

DISCUSSION

I. In Forma Pauperis Application

Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma

pauperis. (IFP Mot., D.E. 1-1.) Upon review of the application,

the Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified to commence this Action

without prepayment of the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is

GRANTED.

II. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court must

dismiss an in forma pauperis action if it “(i) is frivolous or

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Further, while 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) mandates dismissal on any of the above-stated

grounds, the Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris

v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to

raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v.

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

A complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d

929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173

L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. While “‘detailed factual

allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels

and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555).

III. The Complaint Fails to Allege a Plausible Claim for Relief

Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1983,

1985 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 245, 249, 1961, and 1964. (Compl. at

2 ¶ II, 7 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff also asserts claims against Touro and

VIBS pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d(1)-(7).8 (Compl. at 2 ¶ II,

5 ¶ 5, 7 ¶ 2.) As stated herein, the Complaint fails to state a

plausible claim for relief under any of these statutes.

A. Res Judicata

“The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion,

holds that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes

the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or

could have been raised in that action.” Brown Media Corp. v. K&L

Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Res judicata bars a subsequent

litigation where a prior decision was “(1) a final judgment on the

merits, (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a case

involving the same parties or their privies, and (4) involving the

same cause of action.” Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc.,

691 F.3d 218, 221–22 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). As for

the fourth element, courts look to “whether the same transaction

8 Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims against Touro

and VIBS pursuant to both 18 U.S.C. § 2000d and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

The Court construes these claims to arise under Title 42 as no

such section exists under Title 18. (Compl., D.E. 1 at 2, 5 ¶ 5,

7 ¶ 2.)

or series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence

is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential

to the second were present in the first.” Brown Media, 854 F.3d

at 157 (citation omitted).

Other than adding Judge Brown as a defendant, this Action

is nearly identical to Ates III and Ates IV. Insofar as Plaintiff

seeks to assert the same claims raised and dismissed before Judge

Brown in Ates III and Ates IV, those claims are DISMISSED as

precluded by res judicata. Judge Brown dismissed Ates III and

Ates IV “with prejudice as frivolous and malicious under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(i).” (Ates III, Aug. 20, 2020 Elec. Order.)

Plaintiff, therefore, cannot relitigate those claims here. Castro

v. Cusack, No. 15-CV-6714, 2019 WL 3385218, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July

26, 2019) (dismissing claims as barred by res judicata where the

plaintiff’s prior action was dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)). In an abundance of caution, however, the Court

proceeds to the merits.

B. Claims Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 245, and 249

Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,

245, and 249. (Compl. at 2.) However, these are criminal

statutes and do not provide a private right of action. Sheehy v.

Brown, 335 F. App’x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order)

(“[C]laims based on the violation of federal criminal statutes,

such as [18 U.S.C. § 241], . . . are not cognizable, as federal

criminal statutes do not provide private causes of action.”);

Pierce v. N.Y.S. Police (Troop D Lowville), No. 05-CV-1477, 2011

WL 1315485, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2011) (“[A]lthough the Second

Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, district courts have held

that the federal criminal hate crime statute, 18 U.S.C. § 249(a),

does not create a private right of action.”) (collecting cases);

McNeil v. Aguilos, 831 F. Supp. 1079, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)

(dismissing claim asserted under 18 U.S.C. § 245 because “the

statute confers no private right of action”). Thus, “[a] private

citizen cannot prosecute a criminal action in federal court,”

Rochester v. Carter, No. 20-CV-3427, 2020 WL 2857158, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020), and Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 18

U.S.C. §§ 241, 245, and 249 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, see 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

C. Claims Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1964

Plaintiff attempts to invoke the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and asserts conspiracy

claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1964.9 The federal RICO

statute provides a private right of action to “[a]ny person injured

in his business or property by reason of a violation of section

1962” of the RICO Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). To state a plausible

RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege:

9 The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1961 as brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961.

(1) that the defendant (2) through the

commission of two or more acts

(3) constituting a ‘pattern’ (4) of

‘racketeering activity’ (5) directly or

indirectly invests in, or maintains an

interest in, or participates in (6) an

‘enterprise’ (7) the activities of which

affect interstate or foreign commerce.

Williams v. Affinion Grp., LLC, 889 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2018)

(quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir.

1983)); see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c). Because “‘the core of a RICO

civil conspiracy is an agreement to commit predicate [RICO] acts,’

such a complaint, ‘at the very least, must allege specifically

such an agreement.’” Wolhendler v. Goldberg, No. 19-CV-0457, 2020

WL 5658790, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2020) (quoting Sky Med. Supply

Inc. v. SCS Support Claims Servs., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 207, 230

(E.D.N.Y. 2014)). Thus, “a RICO conspiracy claim will be

dismissed where the plaintiff alleges no facts to show specifically

that the defendants had any meeting of the minds in the alleged

violations.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Conclusory allegations that the defendants ‘agreed to commit’ the

violations are insufficient.” Id. (quoting F.D. Prop. Holding,

Inc. v. U.S. Traffic Corp., 206 F. Supp. 2d 362, 373-74 (E.D.N.Y.

2002)).

As a threshold matter, a complaint must plead that

Plaintiff suffered injury to “business or property . . . [that]

belong[s] to the plaintiff.” Wolhendler, 2020 WL 5658790, at *3

(quoting Pappas v. Passias, 887 F. Supp. 465, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1995))

(alteration in original). “A plaintiff cannot sue under RICO for

psychic or emotional injuries, because such injuries are not to

‘business or property.’” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). Here,

Plaintiff has not “alleged facts sufficient to establish statutory

standing to pursue a civil RICO claim” where, as here, he does not

allege to have been “‘injured in his business or property by reason

of’ an underlying RICO violation.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff

“lacks standing to assert a RICO claim in his own right, because

he fails to allege facts in his complaint that, if true, would

establish that the defendants’ conduct has caused injury to ‘his

business or property.” Pappas, 877 F. Supp. at 473 (quoting 18

U.S.C. § 1964(c)) (emphasis in original).

Assuming Plaintiff established standing, he fails to

allege a plausible civil RICO claim. The Complaint does not

adequately allege any predicate acts, much less a pattern of RICO

activity, nor does it sufficiently allege the existence of a RICO

enterprise that affects interstate or foreign commerce. (See

generally Compl.) Further, wholly absent are any factual

allegations from which the Court could reasonably construe an

agreement among the Defendants to commit RICO violations. Rather,

Plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion, that the Defendants all

conspired against him. (See Compl. at 4, 5 ¶ 6, 6 ¶¶ 13-14, 7

¶ 15 (generally alleging that the United States, Judge Azrack,

Judge Brown, and VIBS are either part of, or serve to protect, a

racketeering organization).) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s RICO claim

is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

D. Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985

The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 as alleging that Defendants conspired

to violate Plaintiff’s “constitutionally protected rights.”10

(See, e.g., Compl. at 7 ¶ 3 (requesting that the Court adjudicate

all defendants “and co-conspirators” to have violated “Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.”).) These claims must also be dismissed

for failure to state a claim. To state a conspiracy claim pursuant

to Section 1983, a plaintiff must show “(1) an agreement between

two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private

entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional

injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal

causing damages.” Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d

Cir. 1999). A conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3) requires:

(1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of

depriving a person or class of persons of the

equal protection of the laws, or the equal

privileges and immunities under the laws;

(3) an overt act in furtherance of the

conspiracy; and (4) an injury to the

plaintiff’s person or property, or a

deprivation of a right or privilege of a

citizen of the United States.

Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 1999). The Section

10 The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s Section 1985 claim as

brought pursuant to subsection (3) which protects against, as

relevant here, a conspiracy to deprive of a “person or class of

persons of the equal protection of the laws. . . .” See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3).

1985 “conspiracy must also be motivated by some racial or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators’ action.” Id. “Vague and unsupported assertions of

a claim of conspiracy, either under § 1983 or § 1985(3), will not

suffice.” Rochester, 2020 WL 2857158, at *5 (citations omitted).

Here, the Court finds that the Complaint asserts “vague

and unsupported” allegations regarding a conspiracy that are

devoid any facts. (See generally Compl.) Thus, Plaintiff’s

claims under Sections 1983 and 1985 are DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

E. Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d

Plaintiff asserts claims against Touro and VIBS pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d which provides that:

No person in the United States shall, on the

ground of race, color, or national origin, be

excluded from participation in, be denied the

benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance.

“Title VI affords a private right of action only for intentional

discrimination, . . . and requires a plaintiff to ‘plausibly . . .

allege that (1) the action was discriminatory based on race, color,

or national origin; (2) such discrimination was intentional; and

(3) the discrimination was a ‘substantial or motivating factor’

for defendants’ actions.’” Moore v. Bitca, No. 19-CV-0035, 2020

WL 5821378, *22 (D. Vt. Sept. 30, 2020) (citing Alexander v.

Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) and quoting Tolbert v. Queens

Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Plaintiff complains that Touro denied his admission

notwithstanding that Touro offers “guaranteed admission” to

applicants who score a minimum of 148 on the LSAT and he scored a

154. (Compl. at 4 ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges, among other

things, that his denial was based on “his religion, race, gender,

national origin and personal biases of the Touro Law Admission

Council in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.” (Compl. at 5 ¶¶ 5-

6.)

With regard to claims against VIBS, Plaintiff complains

that “VIBS provided a FREE ATTORNEY to the BILLIONAIRE Defendant

ALTINER simply because she is a woman.” (Compl. at 4 ¶ 1.)

Plaintiff claims that VIBS

is a racist, female supremacist racketeering

organization doing business in the Domestic

Violence Industry, providing women,

purportedly “victims of domestic violence by

men[,]” legal support to commit perjury and

legal fraud at family courts, funded by the

Public Funds of New York and federal grants.

(Compl. at 4.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a Title VI

claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Plaintiff has not stated any

facts from which one could reasonably infer any discriminatory

intent or motivation with respect to religion, race, gender, or

national origin on the part of Touro or VIBS. In any event,

Plaintiff undercuts his claim of Touro’s discriminatory intent by

alleging that Touro denied his admission due to a “subjective

assessment of [Plaintiff’s] character.” (Compl. at 5 ¶ 6.) As

such, Plaintiff’s wholly conclusory allegations are insufficient

to allege a cause of action and the claims are DISMISSED pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35

F.3d 709, 712–14 (2d Cir. 1994) (“A plaintiff alleging racial or

gender discrimination by a university must do more than recite

conclusory assertions.”); cf. Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F.

Supp. 2d 504, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the plaintiff

sufficiently alleged that the defendant had intentionally

discriminated against her and that her race was a substantial or

motivating factor in the defendants’ actions where she alleged

facts detailing how she was treated differently from students of

other races).

F. Sovereign and Judicial Immunity Bars Claims against the

United States, Judge Azrack, Judge Brown, New York State,

Judge Crecca, Judge Leis, and Judge Gumbs-Moore

Even if Plaintiff alleged plausible claims under any of

the above-referenced statutes, his claims against the United

States, Judge Azrack, Judge Brown, New York State, Judge Crecca,

Judge Leis, and Judge Gumbs-Moore are barred by the doctrines of

sovereign and judicial immunity.

1. Sovereign Immunity

The Court considers claims against the United States,

Judge Azrack, and Judge Brown together because “[a] suit against

a federal judge in her [or his] official capacity for actions taken

by her [or him] in connection with her [or his] judicial duties is

a suit against the United States.” McCulley v. Chatigny, 390 F.

Supp. 2d 126, 129–30 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing Robinson v. Overseas

Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994)). “As

sovereign, the United States is immune to suit for damages for

alleged constitutional torts unless the Government explicitly

waives that immunity.” Id. at 130 (citing Up State Fed. Credit

Union v. Walker, 198 F.3d 372, 374 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also

Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2004)(“It is,

of course, ‘axiomatic’ under the principle of sovereign immunity

‘that the United States may not be sued without its consent and

that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.’”

(citation omitted)). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

that his “claims fall within an applicable waiver.” Makarova v.

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).

Here, the Complaint does not allege that the United

States has waived sovereign immunity nor does the Complaint present

facts from which the Court could plausibly infer that Plaintiff’s

claims fall within an applicable waiver. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claims against the United States, Judge Azrack, in her official

capacity, and Judge Brown, in his official capacity, are barred by

sovereign immunity and are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).11

2. Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff also asserts claims against Judge Azrack and

Judge Brown in their personal capacities.12 Judges have absolute

immunity from suit for judicial acts performed in their judicial

capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288,

116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity is an

immunity from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment of

damages.”). This absolute “judicial immunity is not overcome by

allegations of bad faith or malice,” nor can a judge “be deprived

of immunity because the action [she or] he took was in error . . .

or was in excess of [her or] his authority.” Id. at 11, 13, 112

S. Ct. at 288-89 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98

S. Ct. 1099, 1105, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978)); see also Bliven v.

11 For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against New York

State are barred by sovereign immunity. Harrison v. New York,

95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“As a general matter,

states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in federal court, even

if the claim arises under federal law.” (quoting KM Enters.,

Inc. v. McDonald, 518 Fed. App’x 12, 13 (2d Cir. 2013))).

12 For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge

Crecca, Judge Leis, and Judge Gumbs-Moore are barred by absolute

judicial immunity as well as by sovereign immunity. Bloom v. N.Y.

State Unified Ct. Sys., No. 19-CV-7115, 2020 WL 6118828, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2020) (“The Eleventh Amendment immunity . . .

extends to state officials sued in their official capacities.”

(citing Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2002))).

However, as stated above, the Court does not address these claims

given that Judge Brown dismissed claims against Judge Crecca, Judge

Leis, and Judge Gumbs-Moore with prejudice thus precluding

consideration here.

Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209-14 (2d Cir. 2009).

Here, as is readily apparent, Plaintiff’s allegations

relate to actions taken by Judge Azrack and Judge Brown in their

judicial capacities. Indeed, Plaintiff, dissatisfied with Judge

Azrack’s dismissal of Ates I and Ates II, sued Judge Azrack in

Ates III and Ates IV. Dissatisfied with Judge Brown’s dismissal

of Ates III and Ates IV, Plaintiff initiated this Action seeking

to impose liability against Judge Azrack and Judge Brown. These

claims are precisely those that absolute judicial immunity was

designed to preclude. See, e.g., Dekom v. Seybert, No. 17-CV-

4176, 2017 WL 6729853, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017) (dismissing

claims against the undersigned and Judges Azrack, Locke, and

Lindsay finding, inter alia, they were absolutely immune “for the

actions that they took in their judicial capacities when assigned

to Plaintiff’s prior actions.”). Therefore, Judge Azrack and

Judge Brown are immune from suit and Plaintiff’s claims against

them are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

IV. Plaintiff is not Entitled to Leave to Amend

The Second Circuit has cautioned that “[d]istrict courts

should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint without permitting

at least one opportunity to amend, but granting leave to amend is

not necessary when it would be futile.” Lamb v. Cuomo, 698 F.

App’x 1, 2 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (citing Cuoco v.

Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Shipman v.

Charles Schwab & Co., No. 14-CV-4568, 2016 WL 11472831, at *7

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2016) (citing O’Neil v. Ponzi, 394 F. App’x

795, 796-97 (2d Cir. 2010)) (“[T]he court need not grant leave to

amend ‘where the substance of the claim pleaded is frivolous on

its face.’ ”).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), “[a]n action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact--i.e., where

it is ‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory’ or presents

‘factual contentions [which] are clearly baseless.’” Scanlon v.

Vermont, 423 F. App’x 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order)

(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827,

1832, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)) (alteration in original); see also

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L. Ed.

2d 340 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate

when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the

wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable

facts available to contradict them.”). As explained by the

Supreme Court, “the in forma pauperis statute, unlike Rule

12(b)(6), ‘accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim

based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual

allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are

clearly baseless.’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32, 112 S. Ct. at 1733,

(citation omitted). The Court may dismiss a claim “as factually

frivolous only if the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ a

category encompassing allegations that are ‘fanciful,’

‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Id. at 32–33, 112 S. Ct. at 1733

(citation omitted).

Here, the Complaint, when read with the “special

solicitude” afforded to pro se litigants, “can only be construed

as falling within the ambit of the kind of pleading described in”

Denton. Armstrong v. Sylvestre, No. 19-CV-5378, 2020 WL 2933320,

at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2020). Two Judges in this District have

already dismissed Plaintiff’s prior actions asserting claims of

alleged bias in the state court proceedings and with respect to

Touro’s denial of Plaintiff’s admission to its law school. (See

Ates I, June 19, 2020 Order; Ates III, Aug. 20, 2020 Elec. Order.)

In fact, Judge Brown dismissed Ates III and Ates IV with prejudice.

While Plaintiff alleges that Judge Azrack and Judge Brown denied

him his “right from pursuing Appeals,” among other things,

Plaintiff never sought to appeal Judge Azrack’s or Judge Brown’s

dismissal orders. Moreover, here, Plaintiff seeks relief that is

“simply not cognizable,” such as a declaration that the defendants

“committed an armed robbery” against him in an amount “valued at”

$17 billion dollars. Armstrong, 2020 WL 2933320, at *2; see Compl.

at 7-8 ¶¶ 1-11. Therefore, the Complaint is DISMISSED as frivolous

and leave to amend is DENIED as futile.

V. Litigation Injunction Under the All Writs Act

Under the All Writs Act, a federal court may issue “all

writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective

jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The All Writs Act “grants district courts

the power, under certain circumstances, to enjoin parties from

filing further lawsuits.” MLE Realty Assocs. v. Handler, 192 F.3d

259, 261 (2d Cir. 1999). Those circumstances include situations

where a litigant repeatedly files frivolous actions. See Malley

v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 112 F.3d 69, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (per

curiam) (filing injunction may issue if numerous frivolous

complaints are filed based on the same events); see also Yanping

Xu v. Suffolk Cnty., No. 19-CV-1362, 2020 WL 3975471, at *8

(E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2020). Such an injunction, while protecting

the courts and parties from frivolous litigation, should be

narrowly tailored so as to preserve the right of access to the

courts. Moreover, the Court must provide plaintiff with notice

and an opportunity to be heard before imposing a filing injunction.

Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

This Action, together with Ates I (No. 20-CV-1477), Ates

II (No. 20-CV-1479), Ates III (No. 20-CV-3590), and Ates IV, (No.

20-CV-3729), suggest that upon dismissal, Plaintiff may file a new

frivolous action in this Court relating to the subject matter of

this Action and the complaints in Ates I, Ates II, Ates III, and

Ates IV, and may assert claims against the undersigned. The Court

has an “obligation to protect the public and the efficient

administration of justice from individuals who have a history of

litigation entailing vexation, harassment and needless expense to

other parties and an unnecessary burden on the courts and their

supporting personnel.” Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d

Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations

omitted).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s repeated filing

of frivolous complaints constitutes an abuse of the judicial

process. Accordingly, the Court now ORDERS PLAINTIFF TO SHOW

CAUSE BY FILING AN AFFIDAVIT WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM THE DATE

OF THIS MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WHY AN ORDER SHOULD NOT BE ENTERED

BARRING HIM FROM FILING A NEW COMPLAINT AGAINST ANY OF THE

DEFENDANTS NAMED IN THIS COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFF’S PRIOR

COMPLAINTS AND/OR RELATING TO OR ARISING FROM THE SUBJECT MATTER

OF HIS PRIOR COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING HIS UNDERLYING STATE COURT AND

FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS AND/OR HIS DENIAL OF ADMISSION TO TOURO,

UNLESS IT IS ACCOMPANIED BY A SEPARATE APPLICATION SEEKING

PERMISSION TO FILE.13 PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVIT SHALL BE CLEARLY

LABELED “AFFIDAVIT IN RESPONSE TO THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE” AND

SHALL BEAR ONLY THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THIS CASE, 20-CV-

4334(JS)(AYS). Plaintiff is advised that a failure to file an

affidavit in accordance with this Order to Show Cause will lead to

the entry of an order barring Plaintiff from filing any new

complaint as set forth above unless it is accompanied by a separate

application seeking leave to file the new complaint and the Court

will direct the Clerk of the Court to return to Plaintiff any such

13 This Order is without prejudice to Plaintiff properly filing any

appeal.

filing without docketing.

Finally, Plaintiff is CAUTIONED that Rule 11 of the

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure applies to pro se litigants, see

Maduakolam v. Columbia Univ., 866 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Rule

11 applies both to represented and pro se litigants. . .”), and

should he file another frivolous complaint, it is within the

Court’s authority to consider imposing sanctions upon him. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 11.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is

GRANTED. However, for the reasons set forth above, the Complaint

is sua sponte DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Moreover, the Court finds that the Complaint is frivolous and leave

to amend is DENIED as futile. Plaintiff is further ORDERED TO

SHOW CAUSE BY FILING AN AFFIDAVIT WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF THIS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WHY AN ORDER SHOULD NOT BE ENTERED BARRING

HIM FROM FILING A NEW COMPLAINT AGAINST ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS NAMED

IN THIS COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFF’S PRIOR COMPLAINTS AND/OR RELATING

TO OR ARISING FROM THE SUBJECT MATTER OF HIS PRIOR COMPLAINTS,

INCLUDING HIS UNDERLYING STATE COURT LITIGATION AND/OR HIS DENIAL

OF ADMISSION TO TOURO, UNLESS IT IS ACCOMPANIED BY A SEPARATE

APPLICATION SEEKING PERMISSION TO FILE. PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVIT

SHALL BE CLEARLY LABELED “AFFIDAVIT IN RESPONSE TO THE ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE” AND SHALL BEAR ONLY THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THIS CASE,

20-CV-4334(JS)(AYS). Plaintiff is advised that a failure to file

an affidavit in accordance with this Order to Show Cause will lead

to the entry of an order barring Plaintiff from filing any new

complaint as set forth above unless it is accompanied by a separate

application seeking leave to file the new complaint and the Court

shall direct the Clerk of the Court to return any such filing to

Plaintiff without docketing.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to provide the pro se

Plaintiff with a copy of this Memorandum and Order.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)

that any appeal from this Memorandum and Order would not be taken

in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for

the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369

U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT _

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: October 22 , 2020

Central Islip, New York