Bloom v. New York State Unified Court System

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ELIOT FRED BLOOM,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 19-CV-7115 (DRH)

NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM;

NEW YORK STATE APPELLATE DIVISION,

SECOND DEPARTMENT; NEW YORK STATE

GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE FOR THE NINTH

AND TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTS; JANET

DIFIORE, in her official capacity as Chief Judge

of the State of New York and Chief Judicial

Officer of the Unified Court System; CATHERINE

SHERIDAN, as Staff Counsel to the NEW YORK

STATE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE FOR THE

NINTH AND TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTS;

MICHAEL FUCHS, individually and as Staff

Counsel to the NEW YORK STATE GRIEVANCE

COMMITTEE FOR THE NINTH AND TENTH

JUDICIAL DISTRICTS; APRILANNE AGOSTINO,

as Chief Clerk of the NEW YORK STATE

APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT;

RANDALL ENG, as Presiding Judge of the NEW

YORK STATE APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND

DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff:

Raymond Negron, Esq.

234 North Country Road

Mt. Sinai, New York 11766

For Defendants

Letitia James

Attorney General of the State of New York

300 Motor Parkway, Suite 230

Hauppauge, New York 11788

By: Patricia M. Hingerton, Assistant Attorney General

HURLEY, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff Eliot Fred Bloom (“Plaintiff”), an attorney, commenced this action

against the New York State Unified Court System (the “UCS”), the New York State

Appellate Division, Second Department (the “Appellate Division”), the New York

State Grievance Committees for the Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts (the

“Grievance Committee”),1 Janet DiFiore, in her official capacity as Chief Judge of

the State of New York and Chief Judicial Officer of the UCS (“Chief Judge

DiFiore”), Catherine Sheridan, as Staff Counsel to the Grievance Committee

(“Sheridan”), Michael Fuchs, individually and as Staff Counsel to the Grievance

Committee (“Fuchs”); Aprilanne Agostino, as Chief Clerk of the Appellate Division

(“Agostino”); Randall Eng, as the former Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division

(“Justice Eng”) (collectively, “Defendants”), seeking damages for alleged violations

of his constitutional rights under the federal and New York State constitutions and

for tortious interference with his prospective economic relations. Presently before

the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint. (ECF 19). For the

reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in its entirety.

1 Though the captioned defendants include the New York State Grievance

Committees for the Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts, Plaintiff’s Complaint

defines the “Grievance Committee” defendants to include the Eleventh Judicial

District’s Grievance Committee and to exclude the Ninth’s. (Compl. ¶ 17 (ECF 1)).

This distinction has no bearing on the Court’s analysis. See Sections II.a & III

infra.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Complaint and other materials

properly considered on a motion to dismiss.2

Plaintiff was admitted to the New York State bar on September 24, 1986. A

myriad of disciplinary actions for professional misconduct checker his practice of

law. (See, e.g., In re Bloom (Bloom III), 114 N.Y.S.3d 471, 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)

(cataloguing his “extensive disciplinary history”); In re Bloom (Bloom II), 37

N.Y.S.3d 343, 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (same); In re Bloom (Bloom I), 949 N.Y.S.2d

136, 138–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (same)).3 The Court begins with the six-month

suspension of Plaintiff’s law license.

A former client’s complaint to the bar in 2014 led Defendant Grievance

Committee to investigate and prosecute Plaintiff for engaging in an undisclosed

2 In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court is

generally limited to the complaint and documents attached thereto. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(d); Nakahata v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 202 (2d

Cir. 2013). A court “‘may also consider matters of which judicial notice may be

taken.’” Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2016)

(quoting Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008));

see Bristol v. Nassau County, 2016 WL 2760339 (E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2016) (“On a

motion to dismiss, consideration is limited to the factual allegations in plaintiff's

amended complaint, which are accepted as true, to documents attached to the

complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in it by reference, to matters of which

judicial notice may be taken, or to documents either in plaintiff's possession or of

which plaintiff had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

3 Plaintiff does not dispute the Court’s consideration of the three In re Bloom

decisions (all relating to his professional misconduct), nor does he dispute any of the

other materials Defendants attach to their Motion to Dismiss. See Pl. Opp. The

Court, however, chooses not to rely on the three cases’ recitation of facts nor on

Defendants’ other materials. Instead, the Court charitably styles the facts to align

with Plaintiff’s understanding, as doing so still leads to dismissal.

conflicted representation. (Compl. ¶ 5.). Shortly before a hearing on the matter,

Plaintiff learned that Defendant Fuchs, who led the prosecution, misstated the

source of a certain document the prosecution sought to introduce into evidence. (Id.

¶¶ 29, 35.). In response, Plaintiff filed a separate grievance complaint against

Fuchs, which allegedly planted the seed of retaliation in the minds of all

Defendants. (See id. ¶¶ 7, 10, 29, 30). At the hearing on Plaintiff’s misconduct,

Fuchs offered the document into evidence, and the special referee upheld two of

three charges against Plaintiff. (See id. ¶ 35). On September 21, 2016, Defendant

Appellate Division, with Defendant Justice Eng presiding, confirmed the charges

against Plaintiff and suspended Plaintiff from the practice of law for six months,

commencing one month later. (See id. ¶¶ 5, 63).

Plaintiff sought reinstatement to the bar after his suspension lapsed. (See id.

¶¶ 46–62). But Defendants never calendared his reinstatement motion; they

allegedly “lost” his motion papers. (Id. ¶ 46). Plaintiff then began a letter campaign

seeking intervention from Defendants Chief Judge DiFiore, Justice Eng, Agostino,

and Appellate Division. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 48, 52–53, 78). Defendants nevertheless failed

to intercede. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 54, 58). Instead, Defendants held their decision on

Plaintiff’s reinstatement in abeyance, pending resolution of other misconduct

complaints against him. (See id. ¶¶ 48, 54, 58).

One such pending complaint against Plaintiff was the so-called “Wegner

Complaint.” (See id. ¶¶ 37–50). The Wegner Complaint, filed by a different former

client’s daughter, stemmed from Plaintiff’s conduct at and following a trial in 2014.

(Id. ¶ 38). The Nassau County Bar Association’s Grievance Committee, who first

handled the Wegner Complaint, dismissed the case with a letter of advisement in

2015. (Id. ¶¶ 39–40). But in March 2016, Defendant Sheridan advised Plaintiff

that the Wegner Complaint was held in abeyance. (Id. ¶ 43). Months later, after

the Appellate Division had issued its six-month suspension on the conflict-of-

interest matter, Defendants re-opened the Wegner Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 42).

Continuing his letter campaign, Plaintiff asked Defendants to timely resolve the

Wegner Complaint, to recuse themselves, to transfer the matter to another

department, and to send him a copy of the transcript of his testimony in the Wegner

matter. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 47, 65–69). Defendants denied each request. (Id.). During this

time, Plaintiff’s law license remained suspended. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 50, 62).

By the time Defendants held a hearing on the Wegner Complaint, Mr.

Wegner had passed away – thereby denying Plaintiff the opportunity to present

him, in-person, as live witness. (Id. ¶ 45, 49). Plaintiff was also denied the

opportunity to present lie detector results at the hearing. (Id. ¶ 70). In December

2019, the Appellate Division concluded the matter by suspending Plaintiff from the

practice of law for three years. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 50, 62).

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on December 19, 2019: one day

after the Appellate Division issued its three-year suspension. Plaintiff complains

that Defendants illegally retaliated against him by extending his suspension from

six months to three years through their intentional delay, unfair hearing, and

unequal treatment. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 62, 70–72, 76–83). He claims money damages

against each Defendant for: (1) violations of his due process rights under the

Constitution of the United States of America, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(2) violations of his due process rights under the Constitution of the State of New

York;4 and (3) a tortious interference with prospective business relations claim

under New York State law.

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss based on three principal arguments:

(1) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrines of Eleventh Amendment immunity,

absolute judicial immunity, and absolute quasi-judicial immunity; (2) the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine precludes federal district court jurisdiction; and (3) Plaintiff’s

three counts fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted. As the first two

suffice to defeat Plaintiff’s case, the Court does not reach the third argument.

I. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), a court should “draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff[‘s] favor, assume

all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648

F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plausibility

standard is guided by two principles. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

4 Plaintiff fails to cite a legal basis for his private right of action for violations of the

New York State Constitution. And he cannot – none exists where there is an

alternative remedy under § 1983. Allen v. Antal, 665 Fed. App’x 9, 13 (2d Cir.

2016).

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); accord Harris v. Mills, 572

F.3d 66, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2009).

First, the principle that a court must accept all allegations as true is

inapplicable to legal conclusions. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. Although “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,

they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. A plaintiff must provide

facts sufficient to allow each named defendant to have a fair understanding of what

the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for

recovery. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Second, only complaints that state a “plausible claim for relief” can survive a

motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but asks for more than a sheer

possibility that defendant acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that

are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line’

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57) (internal citations omitted); see In re Elevator

Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007). Determining whether a complaint

plausibly states a claim for relief is “a context specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679; accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72.

II. Immunity from Suit

a. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

“Absent consent to suit in federal court, or express statutory waiver, the

Eleventh Amendment bars a suit in federal court by a citizen of a state against that

state or one of its agencies.” Pratesi v. N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., 2010 WL 502950,

at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010) (internal quotations omitted). The Eleventh

Amendment immunity “extends beyond the states themselves to ‘state agents and

state instrumentalities’ that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Woods v. Roundout

Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d. Cir. 2006) (quoting

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)). It also extends to

state officials sued in their official capacities. Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 101–

02 (2d Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff argues that “there is no blanket immunity” available to Defendants,

citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and Monroe v. Pape, 365

U.S. 167 (1961) in support. See Pl. Opp. at 6 [ECF 19-3]. Plaintiff misunderstands

the law; his cited caselaw addresses qualified immunity, which is different from the

immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 165–67 (1985).

“New York State has not waived its immunity nor has Congress abrogated

it.” Li v. Lorenzo, 712 Fed. App’x 21, 22 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Trotman v. Palisades

Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 38–40 (2d Cir. 1977) and Dube v. State Univ.

of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990)). The Eleventh Amendment thereby

shields it, and its arms, from liability. Id. “[T]he New York State Unified Court

System is unquestionably an arm of the state” and therefore receives Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2009). For

the same reason, the Appellate Division and Grievance Committee defendants

similarly “enjoy sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.” See

Napolitano v. Saltzman, 315 Fed. App’x 351, 351 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Kentucky,

463 U.S. at 166–67). As such, the claims against the UCS, Appellate Division, and

Grievance Committee defendants are dismissed. To the extent Plaintiff sues Chief

Judge DiFiore, Sheridan, Fuchs, Agostino, and Justice Eng in their official

capacities, such claims are likewise dismissed. See Davis, 316 F.3d at 101–02.

b. The Absolute Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Immunities

The Court’s analysis does not end there, as Plaintiff sues Defendant Fuchs in

his individual capacity. Further, the Courts generously understands Plaintiff to

argue that, because he pleads that every Defendant allegedly acted “outside [their]

official authority,” he thereby sues them in their individual capacities and they are

not entitled to any immunity.5 The Court now turns to the absolute judicial and

quasi-judicial immunities. Pl. Opp. at 7.

“Immunity, either absolute or qualified, is a personal defense that is available

only when officials are sued in their individual capacities.” Almonte v. City of Long

Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). Because the UCS,

Appellate Division, and Grievance Committee defendants are not “persons”

amenable to suit under any of Plaintiffs theories, the Court dismisses all claims

against them in their personal or individual capacities, even before the immunity

analysis. See, e.g., Brown v. N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., 2006 WL 8450968, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2006) (UCS), aff’d 261 Fed. App’x 307, 307–08 (2d Cir. 2008);

Zuckerman v. App. Div., Second Dep’t, 421 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (Appellate

Division); Sassower v. Mangano, 927 F. Supp. 113, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Grievance

Committee), aff’d 122 F.3d 1057 (2d Cir. 1997).

1. Absolute Judicial Immunity

Judges have absolute immunity from suits arising from judicial acts

performed in their judicial capacities. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991).

“Whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself,

i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations

of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id.

(quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360 (1978)). A judge’s action “‘in

5 The caption expressly names Chief Judge DiFiore only “in her official

capacity.” The caption is silent as to all other Defendants, save for Fuchs, who is

sued “individually and as Staff Counsel.”

error, . . . done maliciously, or . . . in excess of [the judge’s] authority’ does not

undermine [the judge’s] claim to absolute immunity so long as it did not fall clearly

outside all official authority.” Finn v. Anderson, 592 Fed. App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir.

2014) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356).

Plaintiff’s claims against Chief Judge DiFiore and Justice Eng arise from

their actions, and inactions, related to the disciplinary processes which culminated

in his suspensions. Chief Judge DiFiore allegedly failed to supervise the entire

disciplinary process and failed to intercede on Plaintiff’s behalf. See, e.g., Compl.

¶¶ 10, 46, 53. Justice Eng allegedly delayed too long in deciding Plaintiff’s

reinstatement motion and, inter alia, rejected Plaintiff’s letter requests. E.g., id.

¶¶ 46, 54, 75. These acts are unquestionably within the ambit of their judicial

duties. See 22 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 100.3(D)(3) (“Acts of a judge in

the discharge of disciplinary responsibilities are part of a judge’s judicial duties”).

They both are entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and any claims against them

in their individual capacities are dismissed.

2. Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Those “perform[ing] functions closely associated with the judicial process”

receive absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200

(1985). For example, court clerks receive quasi-judicial immunity because their

ordinary responsibilities are judicial in nature. Peker v. Steglich, 324 Fed. App’x 38,

39–40 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Weiner v. State, 710 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (N.Y. App. Div.

2000) (“The normal work of a court clerk who participates in the processing of legal

proceedings is generally viewed as ‘quasi-judicial,’ thereby cloaking the clerk with

judicial immunity.”). Likewise, “[i]n the investigation of [disciplinary] complaints

and in the conduct of such proceedings, . . . , the bar association’s Grievance

Committee acts as a quasi-judicial body,” thus granting members of a Grievance

Committee absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See Anonymous v. Ass’n of the Bar of

N.Y., 515 F.2d 427, 433–34 (2d Cir. 1975). Moreover, the Second Circuit has

“consistently extended quasi-judicial immunity to attorney disciplinary

committees.” Neroni v. Coccoma, 591 Fed. App’x 28, 29–30 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing

Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y., 515 F.2d at 433).

Plaintiff’s claims against Agostino target her actions performed as Clerk of

the Court. She allegedly failed to calendar a hearing on his reinstatement motion

(thereby delaying its determination), “lost” his reinstatement motion, “issued an

order” holding Plaintiff’s motion in abeyance, and ignored Plaintiff’s letter requests.

E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 46, 51, 54, 67, 75. Agostino’s conduct falls within the scope of her

judicial duties as Clerk of the Court; she therefore receives absolute quasi-judicial

immunity. Cf. Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[E]ven if

viewed as performing an administrative task, the court clerks are entitled to

immunity for harms allegedly related to the delay in scheduling appellant’s

appeal.”). All claims against Agostino in her individual capacity are dismissed.

Plaintiff’s allegations toward Sheridan and Fuchs speak to their roles as staff

counsel to the Grievance Committee. Sheridan allegedly prosecuted Plaintiff

notwithstanding the Nassau County Bar Association’s contrary determination,

delayed resolution of the prosecutions and his reinstatement, and rebuffed his

requests for a copy of his examination under oath. E.g., id. ¶¶ 39, 45, 61, 65–69.

Fuchs allegedly did the same – in addition to misstating the source of a document

later admitted into evidence at a hearing on Plaintiff’s misconduct. E.g., id. ¶¶ 35,

42, 45, 61. In other words, Sheridan and Fuchs saw that Plaintiff was properly

investigated and prosecuted for his charged professional misconduct. They

therefore enjoy “absolute immunity for [their] actions as counsel to the Grievance

Committee, which are quasi-public adjudicatory [or] prosecutorial in nature.” See

Napolitano, 315 Fed. App’x at 351–52 (citing Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99

F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Court dismisses any claims against Sheridan and

Fuchs in their individual capacities.

III. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Plaintiff’s suit fails on another basis: it cannot be heard in federal district

court. “Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction

over cases that essentially amount to appeals of state court judgments.” Vossbrinck

v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014). The Rooker-

Feldman doctrine commands dismissal if: “(1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state

court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the

plaintiff invites review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state judgment

was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Id. at 426. Here,

(1) the Appellate Division rendered Plaintiff a “state-court loser” each time it

confirmed the special referees’ charges and suspended Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff’s

injuries trace to those suspensions and the lead up thereto; (3) a “challenge to a

state judge’s exercise of jurisdiction to suspend an attorney from practice is, in

effect, a request to review the state court’s judgment suspending the attorney from

practice,” Abraham v. Appellate Div. of Supreme Court, 311 Fed. App’x 474, 475 (2d

Cir. 2009) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284

(2005)); and (4) the state judgment issued a day prior to Plaintiff filing his

Complaint in this action.

Plaintiff argues the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because his suit

“is not to review a state court determination, but for illegal acts that caused

damages to the Plaintiff.” Pl. Opp. at 8. This is a distinction without a difference:

Plaintiff mimics claims whose dismissals are routinely affirmed by the Second

Circuit. E.g., Weissbrod v. Gonzalez, 2013 WL 12084506 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013),

aff’d 576 Fed. App’x 18 (2d Cir. 2014); Abraham v. Appellate Div. of Supreme Court,

473 F. Supp. 2d 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d 311 Fed. App’x 474 (2d Cir. 2009);

Sassower v. Mangano, 927 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d 122 F.3d 1057 (2d

Cir. 1997). All three of the plaintiffs in the just cited cases prayed for 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 damages caused by suspensions of their law licenses and the proceedings

leading up to them. Weissbrod, 2013 WL 12084506, at *1 (“Plaintiff, an attorney

who, as of January 1, 2013, has been suspended for six months from the practice of

law in the state of New York, brings this action alleging violation of her rights by

Defendants during the course of the proceedings that led to her suspension. . . .

Plaintiff also seeks unspecified monetary damages.”); Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 2d at

552, 558 (“This case arises from two court sanctions against Plaintiff which, coupled

with several other disciplinary violations, resulted in the suspension of his license

to practice law. . . . [P]laintiff seeks money damages for an alleged violation of

§ 1983.”); Sassower, 927 F. Supp. at 115 (“Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff . . .

brings the instant action . . . arising out of state disciplinary proceedings which

resulted in the suspension of her license to practice law.”). None avoided the

Rooker-Feldman bar. Neither can Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety. The Clerk of Court

is directed to enter judgment and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Central Islip, New York /s/ Denis R. Hurley

October 16, 2020 Denis R. Hurley

United States District Judge