United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Health Programs of America, Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against-

14-CV-3673 (KAM)(JO)

UNITED HEALTH PROGRAMS OF AMERICA,

INC., and COST CONTAINMENT GROUP, INC.,

Defendants.

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MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) commenced this action against defendants

United Health Programs of America, Inc. (“UHP”), and Cost

Containment Group, Inc. (“CCG”) (collectively, “defendants”),

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII”) on behalf of a group of defendants’ former employees –

Danielle Diaz, Jennifer Honohan, Regina Maldari, Cynthia

Pegullo, Elizabeth Safara, Sandra Benedict, and Karen Josey (the

“claimants”). Three claimants – plaintiff-intervenors Elizabeth

Ontaneda, Francine Pennisi, and Faith Pabon (“plaintiff-

intervenors,” and, collectively with EEOC, “plaintiffs”) –

intervened in this action, seeking relief pursuant to Title VII

and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”). The case

was tried for three weeks and submitted to a jury, which

returned a verdict partially in plaintiffs’ favor and partially

in defendants’ favor, and awarded plaintiffs a total of

$5,102,060 in compensatory and punitive damages on April 15,

2018. Presently before the court are defendants’ motions for

judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial or, in the

alternative, for remittitur (the “Motion”). For the reasons

discussed below, defendants’ motions are denied.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The court presumes familiarity with the factual and

legal background of this matter, as recited in its summary

judgment Memorandum and Order, EEOC v. United Health Programs of

Am., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Onionhead I”),

motions in limine Memorandum and Order (ECF No. 131, Memorandum

and Order re Motions in Limine), and December 28, 2018 post-

trial Memorandum and Order (ECF No. 224), and provides

procedural history only as necessary to resolve the instant

motions.

In their submissions, plaintiffs claimed that they

were subjected to, inter alia, religious discrimination, reverse

religious discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work

environment in defendants’ workplace in violation of Title VII

and NYSHRL. In the fall of 2007, defendants’ CEO, Robert Hodes,

hired his aunt, Denali Jordan, who introduced religious and

spiritual practices and teachings to the workplace.1 Defendants’

supervisors and officers, including Denali, imposed certain

practices and beliefs, often referred to as “Onionhead” and

“Harnessing Happiness,” on plaintiffs.2 On September 30, 2016,

the court granted claimants’ motion for partial summary judgment

on the discrete issue of whether certain practices and beliefs

(referred to herein as “Onionhead” and “Harnessing Happiness”)

constitute a religion for purposes of Title VII, and granted in

part and denied in part defendants’ cross-motion for summary

judgment. Specifically, the court denied defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on plaintiffs’ reverse religious discrimination

claims and hostile work environment claims premised on reverse

religious discrimination. Onionhead I, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d at

398-402.

On April 2, 2018, the parties began a three-week jury

trial on plaintiffs’ claims that defendants had subjected nine

claimants to a hostile work environment based on employer-

imposed religious practices, subjected eight claimants to

disparate treatment (including wrongful termination) based on

1 As discussed in the court’s Memorandum and Order dated December 28, 2018,

COO Bourandas introduced Denali as a “boss[],” whom the claimants understood

to exercise influence over hiring, discipline, and terminations. Denali also

exercised supervisory authority and managerial responsibility at defendants’

company. (ECF No. 224, Memorandum and Order at 12-15, 17.)

2 The events underlying this action involve both Onionhead and Harnessing

Happiness. The court refers to the programs collectively as Onionhead or

Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness, except where the distinction is relevant.

claimants’ resistance or objections to defendants’ religious

practices, and subjected one claimant to disparate treatment

(including wrongful termination) and retaliation based on that

claimant’s personal religious beliefs. For the purposes of

trial and based on the court’s Memorandum and Order on summary

judgment, the parties stipulated that certain of defendants’

alleged practices were religious, including, among other things:

texts, beliefs, concepts, and practices concerning Onionhead,

including Onionhead workshops; statements by Chief Executive

Officer (“CEO”) Hodes and his aunt, Denali Jordan (“Denali”),

that employees are “chosen”; praying in the workplace; and

emails referencing God, divine power, spirits, spirituality, and

demons. (ECF No. 184, Jt. Stip. Regarding Practices Deemed

Religious; Trial Tr. at 15-16.)

On April 25, 2018, the jury returned a unanimous

verdict in favor of all plaintiffs on all of their hostile work

environment claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL, and

plaintiff-intervenor Pabon’s wrongful termination claim under

Title VII and the NYSHRL. The jury returned a verdict in favor

of defendants on the remainder of the claims. The jury awarded

plaintiffs a total of $5,102,060, consisting of compensatory and

punitive damages. The jury awarded a total of $3,011,000 in

compensatory damages as follows: $225,000 to Benedict; $190,000

to Diaz; $570,000 to Honohan; $180,000 to Josey; $308,000 to

Maldari; $590,000 to Ontaneda; $180,000 to Pegullo; $248,000 to

Pennisi; $80,000 to Safara; and $440,000 to Pabon. The jury

awarded a total of $2,091,060 in punitive damages as follows:

$400,000 to Diaz; $900,000 to Ontaneda; $160,000 to Pegullo;

$381,000 to Pennisi; and $250,000 to Pabon. (ECF No. 207, Ct.

Ex. 9, Verdict Form.)

In the court’s December 28, 2018 Memorandum and Order,

the court noted:

Title VII caps compensatory and punitive damages

awards based on an employer’s size. 42 U.S.C. §

1981a(b)(3). Because defendants had more than 14

and fewer than 100 employees during the relevant

period, here compensatory and punitive damages

under Title VII are capped at $50,000 per claimant.

Id. The NYSHRL allows for and does not cap

compensatory damages for employment

discrimination, N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c)(iii),

but it does not allow for punitive damages, Tse v.

UBS Financial 55 Services, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d

274, 309 n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Thoreson v.

Penthouse, Int’l, Ltd., 80 N.Y.2d 490, 494 (N.Y.

1992)).

(ECF No. 224, Memorandum and Order dated 12/28/18

54.)

Furthermore, the court noted that plaintiff-intervenors

– Ontaneda, Pabon, and Pennisi – who had brought claims pursuant

to Title VII and the NYSHRL, had uncapped compensatory damage

awards but punitive damages awards capped at $50,000. (Id. at

55.) The remaining claimants – Benedict, Diaz, Honohan, Josey,

Maldari, Pegullo, and Safara – had brought claims pursuant only to

Title VII. Thus, each of their combined compensatory and punitive

damages must be capped at $50,000. (Id.) Without prejudice to

defendants’ right to move for remittitur following the entry of

judgment, the parties agreed that judgment should be entered

against defendants as follows:

•

Ontaneda: $640,000 (consisting of $590,000 in

compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive

damages);

•

Pennisi: $298,000 (consisting of $248,000 in

compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive

damages);

•

Pabon: $490,000 (consisting of $440,000 in

compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive

damages);

•

Diaz: $50,000 (consisting of $40,000 in compensatory

damages and $10,000 in punitive damages);

•

Pegullo: $50,000 (consisting of $40,000 in

compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive

damages);

•

Benedict: $50,000 (consisting of $50,000 in

compensatory damages);

•

Honohan: $50,000 (consisting of $50,000 in

compensatory damages);

•

Josey: $50,000 (consisting of $50,000 in

compensatory damages);

•

Maldari: $50,000 (consisting of $50,000 in

compensatory damages); and

•

Safara: $50,000 (consisting of $50,000 in

compensatory damages).

(ECF No. 210-1, Pl. Mem. Relief & Damages 25-27; ECF No. 212,

Def. Opp. Relief & Damages 35-36; ECF No. 217, Pl. Reply Relief

& Damages 10.) The court agreed, and ordered that judgment be

entered as described above without prejudice to defendants’

right to move for remittitur. (ECF No. 224, Memorandum and

Order dated 12/28/18 at 56.)

On December 28, 2018, the court granted EEOC’s motion

to stay the action until the federal government shutdown was

concluded, or for thirty days, whichever was earlier, and

ordered that any additional motions, including those made

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59,must be

filed within 28 days of the lifting of the stay. (Dkt. Order

dated 12/28/18.) On January 29, 2019, the court issued a docket

order reminding the parties that the stay was lifted as of

January 28, 2019, per the court’s docket order dated December

28, 2018, and directed the parties to file any post-trial

motions within 28 days of the lifting of the stay. (Dkt. Order

dated 1/29/19.) On March 21, 2019, the EEOC requested the

court’s permission to file an opposition memorandum up to 10

pages in excess of the court’s 30-page limitation. (ECF No.

233, Letter Motion to File Excess Pages, dated 3/21/19.) On

March 22, 2019, defendants objected to the EEOC’s request to

file extra pages. (ECF No. 234, Opposition re Letter Motion for

Leave to File Excess Pages, dated 3/22/19.) By docket order

dated March 22, 2019, the court granted the EEOC’s request for

an additional 10 pages for its response, and also granted

defendants an additional 10 pages for their reply. (Dkt. Order

dated 3/22/19.)

Defendants subsequently renewed their motion for

judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 50 (“Rule 50”) and moved, in the alternative, for a

new trial; alternatively, defendants moved for remittitur

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 (“Rule 59”).

(ECF No. 235, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

and for a New Trial or, in the Alternative, for Remittitur

(“Def. Mot.”); ECF No. 236, Defendants’ Memorandum in Support re

Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New Trial or,

in the Alternative, for Remittitur (“Def. Mem.”).)3 EEOC filed

its opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 237, Plaintiff’s

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for

Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New Trial or, in the

Alternative, for Remittitur (“Pl. Mem.”).) Defendants filed a

reply memorandum. (ECF No. 238, Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in

3 As defendants noted in their opening memorandum: “Defendants do not seek to

alter the [court’s Decemb er 28, 2018] Order with respect to Intervenors as a

result of a confidential settlement between Defendants and Intervenors.”

(Def. Mem. 1 n. 1.)

Support re Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New

Trial or, in the Alternative, for Remittitur (“Def. Rep.”).)

In their memoranda, defendants have asserted that (i)

no reasonable jury could have found for Benedict or Josey on

their hostile work environment claims; (ii) the evidence does

not support the garden variety emotional distress damages

awarded to claimants; and (iii) no reasonable jury could have

found punitive damages for Diaz or Pegullo, or the weight of the

evidence does not support such a finding. (See generally Def.

Mem.) Conversely, the EEOC has asserted that (i) the evidence

supports the jury’s finding that defendants’ workplace was

objectively hostile based on religion, and that Benedict and

Josey subjectively perceived defendants’ workplace as hostile

based on religion; (ii) the compensatory damages awarded to the

claimants are reasonable and thus not excessive; and (iii) the

jury’s award of punitive damages is supported by the evidence.

(See generally Pl. Mem.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law under Rule 50 or for

a New Trial under Rule 59

“If a party believes that ‘a reasonable jury would not

have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis’ to find for its

adversary on a particular issue, it may move for judgment as a

matter of law during trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

50(a) and renew the motion after trial under Rule 50(b).”

Cangemi v. Town of E. Hampton, 374 F. Supp. 3d 227, 232

(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (a)-(b)). “In ruling

on the renewed motion, the court may: (1) allow judgment on the

verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new trial;

or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 50(b).

“When evaluating a motion under Rule 50, courts are

required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to

the party against whom the motion was made and to give that

party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury

might have drawn in [its] favor from the evidence.” ING Glob.

v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis Supply Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 97 (2d

Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“The court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence,

pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its

judgment for that of the jury, and must disregard all evidence

favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to

believe.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);

see also This is Me, Inc. v. Taylor, 157 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.

1998) (“A district court may not grant a motion for a judgment

as a matter of law unless the evidence is such that, without

weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise

considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one

conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could

have reached.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The same standard that applies to a pretrial motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure also applies to motions for judgment as a matter of

law during or after trial pursuant to Rule 50. Id.

A court may grant a Rule 50 motion only if “there

exists such a complete absence of evidence supporting the

verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the result

of sheer surmise and conjecture,” Kinneary v. City of New York,

601 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2010), or after “viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-movant, [it] concludes

that a reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the

view of the moving party.” Jackson v. Tellado, 295 F. Supp. 3d

164, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Cash v. Cty. Of Erie, 654 F.3d

324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011)).

A party “fil[ing] a renewed motion for judgment as a

matter of law . . . may include an alternative or joint request

for a new trial under Rule 59.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). “The

court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the

issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new

trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal

court[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a); Newton v. City of New York,

171 F. Supp. 3d 156, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

“The general grounds for a new trial are that (1) the

verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) the

trial court was not fair; (3) substantial errors occurred in the

admission or rejection of evidence or the giving or refusal of

instructions to the jury; or (4) damages are excessive.” Lawson

v. Cty. of Suffolk, 920 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

In some respects, the standard for a Rule 59 motion is

less onerous for the movant. “In contrast to a Rule 50 motion

for a new trial, a Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial ‘may be

granted even if there is substantial evidence supporting the

jury's verdict.’” Greenaway v. Cty. of Nassau, 327 F. Supp. 3d

552, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde

Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998)). “Moreover, a trial

[court] is free to weigh the evidence [itself], and need not

view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.” DLC

Mgmt. Corp., 163 F.3d at 134.

The Second Circuit, however, has stated that “[a]

trial court should not grant a motion for a new trial unless it

is ‘convinced that the jury . . . reached a seriously erroneous

result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.’” Ali

v. Kipp, 891 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Amato v. City of

Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1999)). “A

court considering a Rule 59 motion . . . should only grant such

a motion when the jury’s verdict is egregious . . . and should

rarely disturb a jury’s evaluation of a witness’s credibility.”

DLC Mgmt. Corp., 163 F.3d at 134 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding that

Defendants Subjected Benedict and Josey to a Hostile Work

Environment.

Under Title VII, a hostile work environment is one

form of disparate treatment on the basis of ‘race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.’” Raniola v. Bratton, 243

F.3d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 2001). “Whereas other disparate

treatment claims may scrutinize discrete harms such as hiring or

discharge, a hostile work environment claim analyzes a workplace

environment as a whole to discover whether it is abusive.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Conduct that

is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively

hostile or abusive work environment – an environment that a

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive – is beyond

Title VII’s purview.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.

17, 21-22 (1993). Under the standard of reasonableness, the

harassment must be “of such quality or quantity that a

reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment

altered for the worse[.]” Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632

(2d Cir. 1997). “Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively

perceive the environment to be abusive,” there is no cognizable

hostile work environment claim under Title VII. Id.

“[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’

can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.

These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;

its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”

Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The “court may not . . . consider the

record in piecemeal fashion, trusting innocent explanations for

individual strands of evidence[.]” Kaytor v. Electric Boat

Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010).

The court is to focus on the totality of the

circumstances and the nature of the environment itself.

Raniola, 243 F.3d at 617. Thus, an individual plaintiff who

experiences a hostile work environment need not be the target of

other instances of hostility to support her claim if the

plaintiff has knowledge of hostility directed at other employees

and of the general hostile work environment. Whidbee, 223 F.3d

at 63; Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 547.

There is abundant evidence in the trial record

supporting the jury’s finding that defendants “create[d] an

objectively hostile or abusive work environment” on the basis of

religion. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. Upon “looking at all the

circumstances,” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, as opposed to a

“piecemeal” review of the record, Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545, and

considering the evidence in the light most favorable to

claimants, the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have

been compelled to find in defendants’ favor with respect to

claimants Benedict’s and Josey’s hostile work environment

claims. Even weighing the evidence under Rule 59, the court

cannot find that the jury reached an egregious or seriously

erroneous result in crediting Benedict’s and Josey’s testimony

regarding the hostile work environment during their employment

by defendants. As described in detail below, and as discussed

in footnote three, Benedict and Josey offered testimony that the

jury found credible, regarding the hostile work environment, and

that was consistent with the trial record as a whole and with

the verdict. Thus, the court respectfully denies defendants’

motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial with

respect to Benedict’s and Josey’s hostile work environment

claims.

a. Severity and Pervasiveness of Onionhead Practices in the

Workplace

The record is replete with examples of the severity

and pervasiveness of Onionhead’s religious practices and

imagery, in the workplace, the unreasonable interference with

the employees’ work and the alteration of work conditions for

the worse.4 (Tr. 203-05 (candles burned daily after Denali

arrived and instructed employees to not use overhead lighting);

Tr. 218 (encountering angels, Buddha statues, incense, and

religious texts “every day”); Tr. 250 (Onionhead logo was

erected on external façade of the CCG building); Tr. 380-81

(Denali instructed employees not to use overhead lights because

“demons come through the overhead lights”); Tr. 690-91 (employee

directed to light candles “to keep the bad spirits away” and to

“keep the place pure” as well as to put on “meditation music”

every day); Tr. 1221-1233 (use of “universal truth cards,”5

Onionhead characters, and receiving Onionhead-related gifts

during the holidays).) Plaintiff notes that Onionhead became

“intertwined with the very fabric of the company, and was an

inescapable part of the work environment,” (Pl. Mem. 7.), as

employees were instructed to wear Onionhead pins every day, use

Onionhead cards with “teachings,” and Onionhead posters,

4 As the court has previously determined, Onionhead practices were religious

in nature for purposes of Title VII. (ECF No. 88, Memorandum and Order dated

9/30/16, 36-43.) The court specifically found that references to God,

spirituality, demons, Satan, divine destinies, miracles, “higher guidance

teachings,” and a grail were religious references. (Id. at 36.) The court

also found that documentary evidence, including the Onionhead dictionary and

the Onionhead Keys and Codes to Living Good - which reference divinity,

spirituality, souls, and heaven – were religious in nature. (Id. at 36-40.)

The court further found that the religiosity of Onionhead and Harnessing

Happiness was underscored by Denali’s frequent references to God and

spiritual matters in the workplace, as well as defendants’ instruction to

employees to pray at work. (Id. at 40-43.)

5 Josey testified regarding the feeling cards: “Each card was an emotion and .

. . on one side there was like a face and it kind of showed what that face

looked like, and then on the back, it gave a blurb as to . . . how [to]

identify[] the emotion and how to cope[.]” (Tr. 878; Jt. Ex. 4.)

banners, flags, and pictures, including an Onionhead character

with angel wings, filled the workplace. (Tr. 232-33 (employee

described “little pictures all around the office of Onionhead

[and] pins that were in a glass bowl in the reception area that

[employees] were encouraged to wear”); Tr. 428-30 (employees

instructed to wear Onionhead pins); Tr. 611 (Onionhead pins,

flags, books, and “universal truth cards” were “all over the

offices”); Tr. 703 (employees reported to Denali regarding

compliance with pin-wearing); Tr. 810-11 (Onionhead pins were

displayed in reception and wearing them was a mandatory

practice); Tr. 858 (employees required to wear Onionhead pins);

1230 (flaming chalice with angel wings depicted on Harnessing

Happiness catalog); Tr. 1240 (use of Onionhead truth and feeling

cards and an Onionhead dictionary in mandatory workshop meetings

with the COO and managers).)

After Denali’s arrival at the workplace in 2007, she

implemented changes that altered working conditions and “turned

[the office] into almost like a mosque or a church . . . [with]

incense burning away, like you would smell if you walked into a

religious building, or the way you have that music, that organ

soft music, with the religious statues and the candles and the

dim lighting . . . . And then the ways that, every time you did

talk to [Denali] there was talk of God or love or spirits, and

then there was the prayer.” (Tr. 1177.) Further, defendants

transformed the office utility closet into a “sanctuary” or

“meditation room” filled with religious symbols, rosary beads,

pictures of angels, spiritual books, and other religious

material. (Tr. 1471; 1487-88.)

Moreover, defendants required their employees to

attend regular Onionhead workshops during the workday led by COO

Tracy Bourandas and/or Denali. (Tr. 270-71, 275, 712-13, 879,

881, 884, 1233-35.) The Onionhead workshops took place in the

conference room, featuring dim light, candles, and instrumental

“spa-type” music. (Tr. 271.) One Onionhead workshop, the “Keys

and Codes to Living Good Workshop,” ran weekly from December

2010 through December 2011. (Tr. 270-72.) The employees were

required to attend the Keys and Codes to Living Good Workshop,

which used Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness materials, provided by

COO Bourandas and Denali, describing Keys and Codes as “part of

the divine plan from the beginning of time. Every sacred tribe

and religion have codes hidden within their scripts, books and

scrolls. It was and still is a way to integrate our heavenly

nature into our human nature.” (Tr. 272.) Employees were

instructed to read passages from the Onionhead/Harnessing

Happiness workshop materials and then answer questions relating

to their personal lives. (Tr. 272-73.) As claimant Honohan

testified, the Onionhead workshops “felt like forced therapy.”

(Id.) As claimant Diaz testified, the Onionhead workshop

readings “were always spiritually involved. They would want to

know your inner-most emotional feelings. It was a lot about

family and how you’re feeling, absolutely nothing [to] do with

your actual jobs.” (Tr. 1238.) In one-on-one meetings and

group Onionhead workshops led by Denali, employees were required

to hold hands and close their eyes while Denali led them in

prayer, hug and kiss Denali and/or their coworkers, and tell

their coworkers “I love you.” (Tr. 226, 613, 882-83, 1156-62,

1258.)

In addition, the jury heard testimony that the

spiritual and religious changes implemented by Denali adversely

affected the workplace environment. (Tr. 729 (“[W]hen [Denali]

brought Onion[head] into the business, everything just became so

psychotic. . . . It wasn’t a normal workplace.”); 883 (“I don’t

just hug people that I don’t know that well. It was just weird.

It wasn’t a normal work setting.”); 1145 (the changes ushered in

by Denali “had a negative impact on our workplace and on the

people that worked there because you could see how things

started to decline internally once all of that started, and it

wasn’t the same as it was”); 1158 (“I didn’t like [having to

pray with Denali or hold hands.] It was something that made me

very uncomfortable and it almost made the workplace feel

hostile, in the sense that I was beginning to dislike being

there very much.”); 1176 (“[T]he whole atmosphere was different

when [Denali] was there and it wasn’t in a good way.”); 1178

(“It was hostile and the people weren’t the same, and it just

wasn’t the same company”).)

Defendants have urged the court to disregard the other

claimants’ testimony in determining whether the trial evidence

supports that Benedict and Josey experienced a hostile work

environment, even though the other claimants’ testimony is

generally consistent with Benedict’s and Josey’s testimony.

(Def. Reply 2-3.)

First, defendants assert that Benedict’s and Josey’s

employment did not overlap with all of the other claimants’

employment. (Def. Reply 3 n. 2.) There was, however,

substantial overlap in employment periods with nearly half of

the other claimants: Pegullo’s employment partially overlapped

with Josey’s employment; Josey’s employment partially overlapped

with Benedict’s employment; Diaz’s and Honohan’s employment

overlapped with Benedict’s and Josey’s employment; and, contrary

to defendants’ assertion, intervenor Pabon’s employment

overlapped with both Benedict’s and Josey’s employment. (ECF

No. 175, Second Am. Joint Pre-Trial Order 15-17.) The trial

testimony of Pabon, Pegullo, Diaz, and Honohan is clearly

probative of “the overall hostile or abusive environment”

experienced by Benedict and Josey, and the court may

appropriately consider Pabon’s, Pegullo’s, Diaz’s, and Honohan’s

testimony regarding the working environment in determining

whether to grant defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of

law or for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 50 and Rule 59.

Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 71.

Second, defendants have not articulated any factual or

legal basis why trial testimony from the other claimants or

intervenors were not properly considered by the jury as

probative and corroborating evidence of the hostile work

environment experienced by Benedict and Josey. Defendants

assert that “Plaintiff offers absolutely no evidence that

Benedict and Josey can or do base their HWE claims upon

harassing behavior directed at others that they either witnessed

or learned second-hand.” (Def. Reply. 3.) Defendants’

position, however, conflicts not only with the weight of the

trial evidence, but also with the weight of Second Circuit

precedent. See generally Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 71 (“[I]ncidents

of harassment that occurred outside the presence of the

plaintiffs” are probative of “persistently offensive conduct

[that] created an overall hostile or abusive environment [that]

exacerbated the effect of the harassment [plaintiff] experienced

individually”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);

Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 547 (emphasizing that other instances of

hostility not directly experienced by plaintiff, but of which

plaintiff was aware, can support a plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim); Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143,

150-51 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The propriety of the court’s exclusion

of . . . evidence of sexual harassment not witnessed personally

by [plaintiff] is . . . questionable. Since one of the critical

inquiries with respect to a hostile environment claim is the

nature of the environment itself, evidence of the general work

atmosphere is relevant.”); Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d

106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The mere fact that Schwapp was not

present when a racially derogatory comment was made will not

render that comment irrelevant to his hostile work environment

claim. Just as a racial epithet need not be directed at a

plaintiff in order to contribute to a hostile work environment,

the fact that a plaintiff learns second-hand of a racially

derogatory comment or joke by a fellow employee or supervisor

also can impact the work environment.”). A plaintiff “need not

be the target of other instances of hostility in order for those

incidents to support her [hostile work environment] claim.”

Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 63. To the extent that the other

claimants’ testimony provides a more complete picture of the

pervasive nature of the hostile work environment experienced by

Benedict and Josey, the jury and the court properly considered

all of the claimants’ and intervenors’ testimony.

Defendants also contend that Benedict’s and Josey’s

claims do not meet the threshold of objectively or subjectively

severe or pervasive conduct to create a hostile work

environment. (Def. Mem. 5, 9.)

i. Benedict

Benedict, who worked for defendants in the Caring for

Children Globally project from approximately September 2011

until May 2012, testified that, for the duration of her

employment by defendants,6 Onionhead’s religious practices and

paraphernalia permeated the workplace on a continuing basis.

Defendants’ offices featured Onionhead religious literature and

symbols, including Onionhead posters, pins, literature, flags

and banners, and universal truth cards throughout Benedict’s

employment. (Tr. 610-11, 638.) Benedict was required to

attend, at Denali’s instruction, between one and three of the

above-described Onionhead workshops during the workday, every

time Denali and Benedict were in the office together, despite

Benedict being “very uncomfortable” while working in defendants’

premises. (Tr. 611-12 (testifying that her attendance at the

Denali-led Onionhead workshops was “not at all” voluntary); 614

(responding that she complied with Denali’s instruction that she

attend the Onionhead workshops); 600, 617, 643 (while working

6 As plaintiff correctly clarifies, Benedict’s exposure was more substantial

than defendants seemingly had mischaracterized in their opening brief. (Def.

Mem. 10.) Benedict testified at trial that she was physically in the

defendants’ office for one week per month, or for approximately 35 days over

the nine months of her employment, and most frequently when Denali was

present. (Tr. 585-86, 596, 643.)

daily at home, Benedict communicated regularly with Denali,

reporting by telephone or email every day.) At the Onionhead

workshops, Benedict testified that Denali would typically lead

the employees through their “usual kind of hand-holding prayer .

. . candles . . . a running fountain . . . . So [the employees]

would start with a prayer, most often, holding hands, and kind

of sat at attention for the session.” (Tr. 613.)

Benedict also testified that Denali suggested to her

“several times that [she] get guidance from the universe and

talk to God.” (Tr. 654-55.) In addition, Denali frequently

pried into issues in Benedict’s personal life. (Tr. 616-19.)

Benedict explained that she never told Denali that such

discussions regarding her personal life made her uncomfortable

because Denali was her boss and “it was really difficult to

reason with Denali because . . . what she said, in her mind,

came from the heavens. So it would be like arguing with God or

the universe[.]” (Tr. 616-18.) Benedict also testified that

she had attended regular Onionhead meetings at CEO Robert Hodes’

house in the evenings, that the material and content used at the

meetings were the same as in the Onionhead workshops that

occurred in the office, and that such meetings involved prayer.7

(Tr. 620-21.)

7 Defendants assert that “Benedict and Josey have not proven that actual

prayer occurred during th e meetings they attended.” (Def. Reply 6.) This

assertion is contradicted by ample trial evidence from multiple witnesses

Benedict testified that Denali’s imposition of

spirituality in the office and her daily work life made her feel

as if she were being indoctrinated “into the fold” or “cult,”

and that she incurred Denali’s anger by attempting to challenge

her. (Tr. 622-24, 631.) For weeks, Denali criticized

Benedict’s ex-husband and obtained a photo of Benedict’s

daughter; Denali then stated that her nephew, Robert Hodes,

defendants’ CEO, was the father of Benedict’s daughter because

they were “connected” and, in Denali’s view, shared the same

hair color and curly hair. (Tr. 609-10.) Benedict found this

particularly upsetting and felt that it crossed a boundary, so

she attempted to extract herself from Denali. (Id.)

ii. Josey

Josey, who worked for UHP from approximately March

2011 until November 2011, offered testimony similar to others

that the office environment was permeated with a religious,

spiritual atmosphere: “very dim-lit [with] no overhead

lighting,” there were “desk lamps like that you would have in

your living room,” and Onionhead materials that were more

appropriate for church or an intimate setting with friends.

(Tr. 869, 879, 906-07.) Approximately three months into her

that prayer occurred in defendants’ workplace. Though defendants correctly

note that some of Benedic t’s trial testimony contained purported admissions,

see Def. Mem. 10-11, as discussed herein, there is also substantial evidence

upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Benedict perceived her

environment to be abusive and hostile.

employment, Josey received Onionhead materials from COO

Bourandas, including a workbook for the workshops, two boxes of

truth and feeling cards, and an Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness

dictionary. (Tr. 874-878; Pl. Ex. 1 (truth cards); Jt. Ex. 4

(feeling cards).) Like Benedict, Josey also attended multiple

Onionhead workshops during her employment at UHP because she

understood that attendance and participation were mandatory.8

(Tr. 880-882.) She testified feeling like if she did not “drink

the cool aid [sic] . . . you were an outsider.” (Tr. 917-18.)

At each Onionhead workshop, Josey, like other employees, was

given homework assignments to complete before the next Onionhead

workshop, on her own time. (Tr. 880; Jt. Ex. 6.) Josey

testified that she “thought [attending the Onionhead workshops]

was a waste of my time. It wasn’t related to work and I wasn’t

being paid to do anything outside of working hours, so . . . I

8 Defendants further assert that “Plaintiff [] presents no evidence that any

such participation in Oni onhead generally or the workshops specifically were

mandatory for Benedict and Josey.” (Def. Reply 6.) Defendants have

highlighted what they perceive to be countervailing evidence to Benedict’s

and Josey’s testimony in the record, but ultimately the jury assessed the

witnesses’ credibility at trial, and weighed the evidence finding in favor of

plaintiff, claimants, and intervenors. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000) (for Rule 50 purposes, “Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate

inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”)

(internal quotations and citation omitted); Dunlap-McCuller v. Riese Org.,

980 F.2d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he jury is empowered and capable of

evaluating a witness’s credibility, and this evaluation should rarely be

disturbed.”). As the court noted in its Memorandum and Order concerning the

parties’ motions for summary judgment: “It is an affirmative

misrepresentation of the evidence to argue that the workshops were

‘indisputably’ voluntary.” (ECF No. 88, Memorandum and Order dated 9/30/16

at 80, n. 23.)

felt that it should have been optional. I shouldn’t have [had]

to fill out any extra work. I didn’t have time to do it.” (Tr.

881.) Josey testified that the Onionhead workshops led by

Denali were “way more intense, emotionally – [] very mentally

draining” compared to the Onionhead workshops led by COO

Bourandas. (Tr. 882.)

Further, Josey testified that with Denali-led

Onionhead workshops, “[W]e would hug each other goodbye, say we

love you. We would have . . . a moment of, I guess, prayer or

meditation. We would hold hands like in a circle and then we

would leave.” (Id.) When asked how she felt about having to

hug her coworkers and tell them “I love you,” Josey testified:

“It was uncomfortable but, you know, it was like okay, it’s only

a few minutes, let’s get this over with . . . . I don’t just hug

people that I don’t know that well. It was just weird. It

wasn’t a normal work setting.” (Tr. 883.) Josey further

testified that she didn’t like having to conform to those

practices, and that she didn’t want to do them. (Id.) Josey

also testified that she “didn’t feel comfortable having these

open discussions and [felt] obligated to discuss my personal

business in a setting where I wouldn’t [normally]. . . . The

crying and all of that stuff, it really made me feel

uncomfortable, and then I’d have to go back to my desk and

perform my job like none of that just happened.” (Tr. 885.)

On one occasion, following a fight with her husband,

Josey was ushered, crying, into the meditation room by Denali,

i.e. their second meeting since Josey commenced her employment

at UHP. April Levine had previously informed Josey that the

purpose of the meditation room was “meditation” and “prayer.”

(Tr. 896.) Denali asked Josey what had transpired earlier, and

told Josey: “[Y]ou need to leave your husband. . . . Do you

understand what I’m saying to you.” (Tr. 896-97.) Josey

further testified: “[Denali] was giving me a directive. She

wasn’t saying, well, maybe you guys – if you guys can’t work it

out, you know, maybe you should consider leaving,” and Denali

told her several times during that conversation to leave her

husband. (Tr. 897.) Josey reported feeling “very offended” and

“very taken aback” by Denali’s comments and became “very

guarded, very aware and careful” of the things she said at work.

(Tr. 898-99.) She also testified: “I felt very vulnerable

because there was just too much of my life that people at work .

. . knew now” and that the atmosphere that resulted from the

Onionhead workshops where people shared their personal feelings

partly contributed to the work environment that caused her to

feel “vulnerable,” as though there were “no boundaries as to

where your work life began and your personal life ended.” (Tr.

899.)

After Josey’s second meeting with Denali, she

expressed her discomfort and disagreement with the workplace

culture, but was warned by unspecified individuals “to not do

that out loud, to be very careful who heard [her] say that.”

(Tr. 900.) She testified that, had she been given the choice or

felt that she had the choice to attend the Onionhead workshops,

she would not have attended them; that she did not use the

materials she was given during the Onionhead workshops because

she did not want to; and she was given Onionhead pins that

everybody wore, but she did not wear them after the first day.

(Tr. 902.) Josey referenced a horror film to describe her

experience at defendants’ workplace. (Tr. 917-18.)

At one particular Onionhead workshop, Josey observed

that Denali appeared to have a “disappointed” reaction upon

learning that Josey was still with her husband and that she

could “tell by the look on [Denali’s] face [that] she’s not

happy.” (Tr. 904.) Further, after Josey was fired, she

testified that she had a telephonic conversation with Denali

during which Denali stated: “I bet you’ll learn your lesson this

time . . . . [Y]ou didn’t listen and you know these are the

consequences.” (Tr. 914.) Josey understood Denali to have been

referring to their earlier conversation wherein Denali

instructed Josey to leave her husband. (Tr. 914-15.)

b. Sufficient Basis for Jury Verdict

Based on the record before the court, the court finds

that there was more than sufficient evidence for the jury to

conclude that Benedict and Josey experienced an objectively

hostile work environment based on a workplace permeated with

Onionhead’s religious practices, and that Benedict and Josey

subjectively perceived their work environment as hostile based

on the same. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir.

1997).

As discussed above, ample evidence in the record

established that numerous religious images and practices

permeated the office environment, and that employees were

required to participate in such religious practices. Among

other things, defendants’ office environment was cluttered with

pervasive religious imagery, including rosary beads, Buddhas,

and Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness literature, posters and

banners; employees were given Onionhead feeling and truth cards

and Onionhead workshop materials and instructed to use them;

employees were strongly encouraged or instructed to wear

Onionhead pins; employees were scheduled for attendance and

participation at the Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness workshops,

which employees understood were mandatory. As further noted

above, the Onionhead religion motivated certain idiosyncratic

office practices, including the dismantling of overhead lights,

use of candles, incense, and table lamps, hugging and kissing of

coworkers, praying and meditation, and coworkers being directed

to say “I love you.” All of these practices, taken together,

could be found to have “unreasonably interfere[d] with an

employee’s work performance” and altered the conditions of an

employee’s work environment for the worse. Harris, 510 U.S. at

23; Torres, 116 F.3d at 632.

Defendants have asserted that “discomfort or finding

something strange, or even inappropriate or offensive, is not

sufficient to support a hostile work environment claim.” (Def.

Mem. 5.) The Second Circuit has, however, implicitly rejected

this argument, in reversing the granting of summary judgment on

hostile work environment claims where the plaintiffs had alleged

that the defendants’ conduct caused plaintiffs to feel

“uncomfortable.” See Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d

166, 169, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2012); Schiano v. Quality Payroll

Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 601 (2d Cir. 2006).

Defendants have cited Kunzler v. Canon, USA, 257 F.

Supp. 2d 574, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), arguing that “feelings of

discomfort cannot support a hostile work environment claim.”

(Def. Mem. 5.) Plaintiff has responded that this case is

inapposite because the plaintiff in Kunzler cited only a single

line from his deposition testimony stating he was “made

uncomfortable” by the supervisor’s advances toward a customer.

(Pl. Mem. 11.) This court agrees with plaintiff that Kunzler

provides scant, if any, support for defendants’ position, and

further notes that, critically, the Kunzler court found that the

supervisor’s harassment of a non-employee customer “does not

amount to conduct that violates Title VII.” Kunzler, 257 F.

Supp. 2d at 582.

Similarly, defendants’ citation to Lewis v. Eric

County Medical Center Corp. is unpersuasive. In that case, the

court found that two isolated comments were insufficient to

establish a racially-based hostile work environment where the

comments were “not explicitly racist.” Lewis, 907 F. Supp. 2d

336, 348 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). By contrast, Benedict’s and Josey’s

hostile work environment claims are not founded upon a few

isolated remarks over many months, but rather upon a pervasive

daily presence of religiously-based employment conditions and

conduct, religious imagery, and religious practices that would

cause a reasonable employee to find that the conditions of her

employment were altered for the worse. Torres v. Pisano, 116

F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997). Moreover, contrary to defendants’

position, the Second Circuit has made clear that even a single

severe incident could create a hostile work environment “even in

isolation, unrepeated and unaccompanied by other conduct.”

Schiano, 445 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2006).

Defendants had previously conceded that coercion is

not an element of a hostile work environment claim. (Tr. 1729.)

Nevertheless, the court notes that there is abundant evidence

that coercion of defendants’ employees existed regarding their

participation in Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness, and religious

practices associated with those two programs were mandatory and

were widely perceived to be mandatory. The claimants

consistently testified that, if they did not appear to agree to

participate in those religious practices, they could suffer

termination or other adverse consequences. (Tr. 203-05, 273,

428-30, 611-12, 614, 703.)

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable

to plaintiff under Rule 50, the court finds that there was a

legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for

claimants Benedict and Josey on their hostile work environment

claims, and thus, defendants’ Rule 50 motion for judgment as a

matter of law on Benedict’s and Josey’s hostile work environment

claims is denied. ING Glob. v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis Supply

Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2014). Additionally, because

the jury’s finding for Benedict and Josey was neither a

“seriously erroneous result,” nor effectuated a “miscarriage of

justice,” the court also denies defendants’ motion for a new

trial pursuant to Rule 59. Ali v. Kipp, 891 F.3d 59, 64 (2d

Cir. 2018) (citing Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170

F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1999)).

II. The Trial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Award of Emotional

Distress Damages for Benedict, Josey, Diaz, Honohan,

Maldari, Pegullo, and Safara.9

a. Legal Standard on a Motion to Set Aside or Reduce a Jury’s

Damage Award

It is well-settled that the trial court has

discretionary authority to “overturn[] verdicts for

excessiveness and order[] a new trial without qualification, or

conditioned on the verdict winner’s refusal to agree to a

reduction (remittitur).” Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,

Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433 (1996). Remittitur, “the process by

which a court compels a plaintiff to choose between reduction of

an excessive verdict and a new trial,” is employed in two types

of cases: “(1) where the court can identify an error that caused

the jury to include in the verdict a quantifiable amount that

should be stricken . . . and (2) more generally, where the award

is ‘intrinsically excessive’ in the sense of being greater than

the amount a reasonable jury could have awarded, although the

surplus cannot be ascribed to a particular, quantifiable

error[.]” Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45,

49 (2d Cir. 1984). “Where there is no particular discernible

error, [the Second Circuit has] generally held that a jury’s

damage award may not be set aside as excessive unless ‘the award

9 Though it may not always be apparent from the trial record, the court notes

that many of the claimant s who testified showed signs of visible emotional

distress on the stand.

is so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a

denial of justice.’” Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127,

177 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148

F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 1998); DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 183

(2d Cir. 2003) (same); Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d

Cir. 1990) (standard generally applies to “damage awards,

whether compensatory or punitive”).

In determining whether a compensatory damage award is

excessive, courts consider “amounts awarded in other, comparable

cases.” DiSorbo, 343 F.3d at 183 (citing Mathie v. Fries, 121

F.3d 808, 813 (2d Cir. 1997); Ismail, 899 F.2d at 186

(“Reference to other awards in similar cases is proper.”).

Though “a review of comparable cases is appropriate, ‘[courts]

need not average the high and low awards; [courts] focus instead

on whether the verdict lies within [the] reasonable range.’”

Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 113 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Zeno

v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 671 (2d Cir.

2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Each case should be

examined “individually as a unique set of facts and

circumstances.” Id.

Title VII claimants may recover “compensatory damages

. . . for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,

inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and

other nonpecuniary losses.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); Bergerson

v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 652 F.3d 277, 286 (2d

Cir. 2011). Defendants assert that, in order to prove emotional

distress damages, “something more than the subjective statements

of the plaintiff is required.” (Def. Reply 14; Patrolmen’s

Benevolent Ass’n of City of New York v. City of New York, 310

F.3d 43, 55 (2d Cir. 2002.) Since Patrolmen’s Benevolent

Association, the Second Circuit has clarified, and numerous

lower courts have acknowledged, that “testimony establishing . .

. subjective distress,” without more, is sufficient to establish

garden variety emotional distress damages. Lore, 670 F.3d at

177; see also MacMillian v. Millennium Broadway Hotel, 873 F.

Supp. 2d 546, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Jowers v. DME

Interactive Holdings, Inc., No. 00-CV-4753 (LTS)(KNF), 2006 WL

1408671, at *3, *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2006) (“A compensatory

award for emotional distress in a discrimination action may be

based on testimonial evidence alone and ‘is not preconditioned

on whether [the plaintiff] underwent treatment, psychiatric or

otherwise.’”); Ravina v. Columbia Univ., 2019 WL 1450449, at *11

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019) (noting that “garden variety” emotional

distress awards are typically upheld where there is “evidence of

mental suffering [that] is generally limited to the testimony of

the plaintiff, who describes his or her injury in vague or

conclusory terms”) (citation omitted).

“Emotional distress awards within the Second Circuit

can generally be grouped into three categories of claims:

‘garden-variety,’ ‘significant’ and ‘egregious.’” Olsen v.

Cnty. of Nassau, 615 F. Supp. 2d 35, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)

(citation omitted). A plaintiff may be able to establish

emotional distress damages exceeding the “garden variety”

category by showing, inter alia, that her emotional distress had

“specific consequences [as corroborated by] medical evidence,”

or that the emotional distress “threatened Plaintiff’s ability

to earn a living and practice her profession.” Mugavero, 680 F.

Supp. 2d at 578; see also Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774

F.3d 140, 163 (2d Cir. 2014) (upholding emotional distress

damages award of $1.32 million, where “years of grotesque

psychological abuse [led] to a marked decline in [plaintiff’s]

mental health and well-being” and he was “hospitalized and

diagnosed with, inter alia, post-traumatic stress disorder,

depression, and panic disorder as a result of the harassment”

that he endured).

Because plaintiff has not asserted that “significant”

or “egregious” emotional distress damages are warranted for any

of the seven claimants, nor presented corroborating medical

evidence or testimony of more serious or lasting consequences

(e.g., inability to resume work), the present case seeks “garden

variety” emotional distress damages, and the court therefore

reviews the compensatory damages awards with that understanding

in mind. The court identifies no error that caused the jury to

award a quantifiable amount of damages that should be stricken.

Instead, the court considers whether the jury’s awards were

“‘intrinsically excessive,’ in the sense of being greater than a

reasonable jury could have awarded.” Shu-Tao Lin, 742 F.2d at

49.

In the Second Circuit, “‘garden variety’ emotional

distress claims generally merit $30,000 to $125,000 awards,” and

courts have declined to reduce even much higher emotional

damages awards. MacMillan v. Millennium Broadway Hotel, 873 F.

Supp. 2d 546, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotations and

citation omitted); Olsen v. Cnty. of Nassau, 615 F. Supp. 2d at

46 (declining to reduce emotional distress damages awards to

between $5,000 and $35,000, where jury had awarded compensatory

damages of $500,000, $400,000, and $100,000, where plaintiffs

had testified to feeling disappointment, stress, anxiety, and

experiencing nightmares); Lore, 670 F.3d at 177 (“This Court has

. . . affirmed awards of $125,000 each to plaintiffs for

emotional distress resulting from age discrimination where the

evidence of emotional distress consisted only of ‘testimony

establishing shock, nightmares, sleeplessness, humiliation, and

other subjective distress.’ As well as awards of $175,000 each

where in addition there were either physical sequelae – i.e.

secondary physical results or consequences – or professional

treatment[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);

Mugavero v. Arms Acres, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 544, 578 (S.D.N.Y.

2010) (garden variety emotional distress claims “generally merit

$30,000 to $125,000 awards”).

Defendants argue that in “garden variety” cases,

emotional distress damages in excess of $35,000 are

inappropriate, citing Moore v. Houlihan’s Restaurant, Inc., No.

07-CV-3129, 2011 WL 2470023, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011), and

Rainone v. Potter, 388 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

Most recent cases in this district, including Olsen, have

specifically discounted Rainone for being on the “low end of the

range of damages”: “[D]efendants rely on a 2005 case, Rainone v.

Potter . . . . More recent cases find this range [for “garden

variety” claims] to be significantly higher.” Olsen, 615 F.

Supp. 2d at 46, n. 4 (and noting that courts have upheld awards

of more than $100,000 without discussion of protracted

suffering, truly egregious conduct, or medical treatment); see

also Mugavero, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 578 (“Rainone v. Potter. . .

sets forth a substantially lower range for garden-variety

emotional distress claims than more recent cases.”). In

Rainone, the court remitted the emotional distress damages from

$175,000 to $50,000, which is the amount of the compensatory

damages awards at issue here. Rainone, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 126

(“There will be a new trial on damages, unless the plaintiff

agrees to the reduction [from $175,000] to the sum of $50,000

for his emotional distress damages.”). The court will not cap

garden variety emotional distress damages at $35,000 on the

basis of Moore, an outlier among recent cases in this circuit,

and which cites to Rainone for its damages range, a case that

courts have acknowledged is quite outdated and is now considered

a lower-than-normal damages range.

b. Benedict and Josey

Defendants assert that Benedict and Josey did not

prove that they were each subjected to a hostile work

environment or, even if they did, they did not suffer emotional

distress damages as a result. (Def. Mem. 16.) The jury found

that Benedict and Josey had proved their hostile work

environment claims, and awarded Benedict $225,000 in

compensatory damages, and Josey $180,000 in compensatory

damages, which the court subsequently reduced to $50,000 each.

(ECF No. 224, Memorandum and Order dated 12/28/18 at 56.) As

discussed supra, the court has found that Benedict and Josey

have proved their hostile work environment claims with adequate

evidence. As set forth below, the court finds that Benedict and

Josey are entitled to “garden variety” compensatory damages for

emotional distress under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), and

upholds their respective reduced damages awards of $50,000 each.

Although Benedict characterized working for CCG as

“pleasant” when she “first began” working there, defendants have

failed to explain why Benedict’s purported admission regarding

her initial experience in defendants’ workplace negates her

emotional distress damages resulting from worsening changes in

the work environment. (Def. Mem. 16.) As defendants have

acknowledged, Benedict’s testimony establishes that she grew

increasingly “uncomfortable” during her employment, as a result

of what she perceived to be “inappropriate” workplace practices.

Having an initial favorable impression of the company does not

disqualify Benedict for emotional distress damages for

subsequent occurrences, and to conclude otherwise would have the

practical effect of disqualifying virtually all potential

claimants who suffer emotional distress, after an initial period

of relative job satisfaction. Similarly, as to Josey’s

purported admission that she found the workplace “harmonious”

when she first began working for UHP, the same logic applies;

the court finds that Josey’s initial perception of her

employment with defendants does not negate her emotional

distress damages. (Def. Mem. 16; Tr. 872.)

As noted supra, Benedict testified to being made to

feel “very uncomfortable” and having “mixed feelings” when she

was required to attend, at Denali’s instruction, Onionhead

workshops during the workday, during which Denali would lead

employees through “hand-holding prayer.” (Tr. 611-13.)

Denali’s routine prying into Benedict’s personal life, during

which Denali disparaged Benedict’s ex-husband and often

suggested that Benedict “get guidance from the universe and talk

to God,” also made Benedict uncomfortable, and she told some of

her former colleagues of her discomfort with Onionhead

practices. (Tr. 614, 616-19, 654-55, 676.) After Denali

commented to Benedict that CEO Rob Hodes was Benedict’s

daughter’s father, Benedict attempted to “shield the kids and .

. . didn’t bring them around again.” (Tr. 621.) Benedict

further voiced her discomfort with the prospect of moving to

Long Island and becoming “indoctrinated” or “get[ting] closer

with this family sort of cult.” (Tr. 622, 624.) Moving to Long

Island, at Denali’s behest, “was a boundary” that Benedict did

not feel comfortable crossing for the sake of the company. (Tr.

624.)

Defendants have also asserted that Josey testified at

her deposition, in March 2015, that she was not then

experiencing emotional distress. (Def. Mem. 16; Tr. 949.) As

noted above, Josey was terminated in November 2011. The fact

that Josey was not suffering lingering emotional distress or

trauma, over three years after her employment had ended, is not

probative of a lack of emotional distress at the time of her

employment, or shortly after her employment had ended, and

defendants have not cited any cases supporting their contention.

Nor must Josey, or any claimant, proffer a medical diagnosis

relating to alleged emotional distress in order to sustain

“garden variety” emotional damages. Mugavero, 680 F. Supp. 2d

at 578; Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 163 (2d

Cir. 2014).

The trial evidence establishes “garden variety”

emotional distress damages for Josey. Perhaps most notably,

Josey testified that the Onionhead workshops, which she abhorred

attending and where she participated minimally, were emotionally

“intense” and “very mentally draining.” (Tr. 882.) Josey found

the workplace practices of being directed to hug her coworkers

and tell them “I love you” to be “uncomfortable,” “weird,” and

not “normal.” (Tr. 883.) Josey repeatedly described the

Onionhead workshops as causing her to “feel uncomfortable” and

struggle with “go[ing] back to my desk and perform[ing] my job

like none of that just happened.” (Tr. 885.) Josey also

reported feeling “very offended,” “very taken aback,” and

“vulnerable” as a result of Denali’s personal comments,

directing her to leave her husband. (Tr. 898-99.)

After the jury awarded $225,000 in compensatory

damages to Benedict, and $180,000 in compensatory damages to

Josey, the court reduced the awards to $50,000 each. (ECF No.

224, Memorandum and Order dated 12/28/18 at 56.) As there is

sufficient evidence in the trial record supporting the award of

emotional damages, and because $50,000 is toward the low end of

garden variety emotional distress damages in this circuit, the

court finds that the award of $50,000 each to Benedict and Josey

does not shock the judicial conscience. Accordingly, the court

will not further reduce the awards for Benedict and Josey, and

denies defendants’ motions. See, e.g., MacMillan v. Millennium

Broadway Hotel, 873 F. Supp. 2d 546, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

c. Diaz

Defendants assert that Danielle Diaz’s testimony does

not support an emotional distress damages award of $50,000, and

instead contend that the “appropriate value is $20,000 or

less.”10 (Def. Mem. 17-19.) Defendants cite cases that are 19

and 25 years old, arguing that damages should be reduced to

$20,000 from $50,000, where plaintiff’s doctors relied on

plaintiff’s own “representation regarding her condition and the

source of her distress” and offered “little evidence of her

mental anguish.” As discussed above, a medical diagnosis,

medical treatment, or third-party corroboration is not required

to sustain garden variety emotional distress damages. Further,

more recent cases typically uphold damages of $30,000 to

$125,000 for garden variety emotional distress claims.

10 The court notes that Diaz’s emotional distress damages award is comprised

of $40,000 in compensator y damages and $10,000 in punitive damages. (ECF No.

224, Memorandum and Order dated 12/28/18 at 56.)

There was ample trial evidence that Diaz suffered

garden variety emotional distress damages as a result of the

hostile work environment. Diaz worked at CCG from July 2010

until December 2012 – approximately two and a half years. (Tr.

1206.) When Diaz interviewed with CCG, Diaz observed various

Onionhead paraphernalia, signs, and practices, including the

Onionhead building façade (Tr. 1203); Onionhead books and

literature (Tr. 1203); “very dim” lighting from desk lamps and

overhead lighting was off (Tr. 1204); and incense, candles,

Buddha, and a lot of spiritual paraphernalia (Tr. 1204). Diaz

testified that she understood that she was terminated by

defendants because “they found out [she] was speaking about the

company . . . . [She was] warning new hires when they were

coming in, be aware that this is a cult, there are certain

things that you are going to have to agree to, otherwise, you’re

not going to be able to stay here.” (Tr. 1207.)

Diaz testified that, when she commenced training as a

customer service representative at CCG, she was given Onionhead

books, Onionhead universal truth cards, an Onionhead journal,

and an Onionhead dictionary. (Tr. 1208-09.) Diaz further

testified that she, like the other employees, was instructed by

her supervisor that “every day [] we should go into the deck [of

Onionhead universal truth cards] and pick out a card, and [the

cards] were to remain at the desk with us,” and all the customer

service representatives kept their Onionhead cards at their

desks, as they were instructed to do. (Tr. 1211-12.) Diaz

testified that she was instructed to use the Onionhead

dictionary, which described “different emotions,” but that she

“didn’t read the whole thing or try to go too in depth with it”

because it made her “very uncomfortable,” and she would only

“look at it because we were told we had to, but [she] really

didn’t want to take any of it in.” (Tr. 1213-14.) Diaz

testified that Onionhead was “like a cult,” “very spiritual,”

and “it wasn’t something that [she was] used to[,] being a

Catholic.” (Tr. 1215.) She also testified that Onionhead

“grab[bed] from all different religions . . . [t]here were

things that would have angel wings.” (Id.) Diaz testified that

Onionhead “was just very confusing to me and right from the bat

it made me feel uncomfortable that I knew it was something I had

to deal with working there.” (Id.)

Diaz testified that Denali frequently changed the

Onionhead posters and banners pinned around defendants’

workplace. (Tr. 1217.) Diaz testified that she encountered

Denali “about every three weeks” at defendants’ workplace, and

when Denali visited, Denali “would go to every employee and . .

. you would have to stand up. Everyone would give her a hug and

a kiss, praise her . . . people [would be] following her

around[.]” (Tr. 1218.) Diaz testified that she felt like

hugging and kissing Denali, and telling Denali “I love you,”

were things she felt like she “had to do.” (Id.) Further,

Denali “talked a lot about . . . different religions . . .

Buddhism . . . planets aligning.” (Tr. 1219.) “[E]very time

[Denali] came down, it was always something about God. Again,

she would mash a lot of religions together, so it would be God,

it would be Buddha, it would be all different things together.”

(Id.) Diaz testified that she was exposed to Onionhead “[e]very

day that [she] was in the office,” which made her feel

“uncomfortable” because she “felt this was being forced on

[her].” (Tr. 1227-28.) Even when Denali wasn’t in the office,

she, or other supervisors, including April Levine and COO

Bourandas, would send emails that “forced” Onionhead on the

employees. (Tr. 1228.)

Denali also vocalized the existence of spirits or

demons in defendants’ workplace, frequently moving employees

around the office because she felt that “the right spirit wasn’t

there or there [were] demons in a certain area.” (Tr. 1219-20.)

Diaz was moved “four or five times, maybe six, through the

customer service pit and then into another area and then back

into customer service [due to] whatever spirits [Denali] was

feeling at the time or if there [were] demons in a certain area,

she didn’t like [me] sitting there so [I] must move here.”

(Id.) Diaz testified that Denali called people “angels” and

said that there were “angels on the Harnessing Happiness book

list.” (Tr. 1220.)

Diaz testified that the office was filled with

spiritual and religious paraphernalia, “lots of fountains,

“candles and incense,” and that candles would be on in Denali’s

office all the time, even when she was not at defendants’

workplace, because Denali had advised that “her spirit was still

with us even if she wasn’t physically present.” (Tr. 1221-22.)

Candles were used in defendants’ workplace until March 2012,

when Denali emailed the employees that the candles were a fire

hazard. (Tr. 1222-23.) CEO Hodes and COO Bourandas allowed

Denali free rein to implement any religious practices she

desired, depending on Denali’s feelings about demons and spirits

in defendants’ office. (Tr. 1251.) When Denali was in the

office, she regularly held private and group meetings with

employees about religious and spiritual subjects, while

“Buddhist-type chanting” music was being played. (Tr. 1255-57.)

Meetings would begin with all employees hugging and kissing

Denali, and then Denali would lead the employees through prayer

while holding hands. (Tr. 1257-58.)

Like other employees, Diaz attended Onionhead

workshops, which she understood to be mandatory. Diaz was added

to the workshops by COO Bourandas. (Tr. 1235.) Diaz further

testified that she felt the workshops were “forced upon” her,

despite having never believed in the Onionhead teachings. (Tr.

1237.) The workshops were “always spiritually involved,” and

employees were instructed to utilize the Onionhead materials,

including the Onionhead dictionary. (Tr. 1238.) The Onionhead

workshops made Diaz “very uncomfortable,” like a forced “therapy

session” at which a number of employees, including Diaz, cried.

(Tr. 1242-43.) Diaz “despised” going to the weekly Onionhead

workshops and “dread[ed]” emails from Bourandas instructing her

to attend. (Tr. 1244-45.)

All of the discomfort caused by the coercive religious

and spiritual practices were heightened during a “spa weekend”

in March 2012, which Denali planned for the female employees

working in the customer service department. (Tr. 1266.)

Employees carpooled in a caravan to a retreat located in

Connecticut. Unbeknownst to Diaz, Denali had planned “spiritual

events” for the weekend. For example, Denali commanded

employees to “pull[] angel cards,” which were “like the

Universal Truth cards” and depicted various angels on them (Tr.

1268.); hold hands in prayer (Tr. 1270); and Denali announced

her intention that the spa weekend be a “spiritual kind of

awakening” for the employees. (Tr. 1269.) One night, during

the spa weekend, Denali gathered the employees around 10 p.m.

and screamed at them for several hours for not participating in

the spiritual activities as she had planned; no one was

permitted to leave during Denali’s angry tirade. (Tr. 1280-83.)

Diaz testified that, eventually “[e]very single person in the

circle had to say sorry to [Denali] and then it ended with us

all having to gather hands together and [at] Denali’s request .

. . chant ‘Love, love, love.’” (Tr. 1283.) The spa weekend

left Diaz feeling “duped,” “in a daze,” “emotionally spent” and

“violated.” (Tr. 1271, 1284, 1289.) After witnessing Denali

fire Faith Pabon after the spa weekend, Diaz testified that she

felt “wrecked” and not “emotionally okay,” and that she “broke

down emotionally.” (Tr. 1291-92.) Diaz “dreaded” coming to

work, and witnessing Pabon’s termination made her feel as though

she was on “shaky ground,” and at the same time, she felt

increasingly “repulsed” by the Onionhead practices she

encountered every day. (Tr. 1296-97.) Diaz testified that she

saw multiple doctors between March 2012 and December 2012 for

rashes and was told that the rashes were stress-induced; she

also suffered from headaches and abdominal pain. (Tr. 1298-99.)

Due to ample trial evidence of Diaz’s emotional

distress, and because the $40,000 compensatory damages award –

which has already been greatly reduced from $190,000 - for

claimant Diaz does not shock the judicial conscience, the court

upholds her reduced compensatory damages award of $40,000.

d. Honohan

The jury awarded claimant Honohan $570,000 in

compensatory damages, which the court later reduced to $50,000.

(ECF No. 224, Memorandum and Order dated 12/28/18 at 56.)

Citing cases that are over 20 years old, defendants have

asserted that Honohan’s emotional distress damages award of

$50,000 should be further reduced to $20,000. (Def. Mem. 20.)

Honohan worked for defendants for almost 20 years,

beginning in 1992, as an HR manager, accountant, and in a data

entry role. (Tr. 164.) She testified that, until Denali

arrived at defendants’ workplace in 2007, Honohan loved her job,

got along well with her coworkers, including COO Bourandos and

CEO Hodes, and believed that she would retire from UHP. (Tr.

180-84, 210-11, 346.) Honohan understood Denali’s role at

defendants’ workplace to be “spiritual advisor.” (Tr. 186.)

During one of Honohan’s first one-on-one interactions with

Denali, Denali asked Honohan about her mother, whom she

correctly guessed had passed away, and Denali acted like a

spiritual medium, moving her hands back and forth in front of

her body as though “she could feel . . . vibrations” and “speak

with those who have passed on.” (Tr. 190-91.)

Honohan testified at length regarding the “unwelcome”

worsening changes to her workplace environment after Denali

joined, and how those changes made her “very unhappy.” (Tr.

201, 228-29.) According to Honohan, “It was just completely

different [after Denali’s changes] from the way things were

before. It was a happy environment before and I feel like it

turned not happy after she came.” (Tr. 228.) Honohan testified

that she understood Onionhead to be “a belief system that uses

religious and spiritual references while talking about feelings

and emotions.” (Tr. 231.) Like other employees, Honohan was

instructed by Denali to wear Onionhead pins (Tr. 233); Honohan

was instructed by Denali and COO Bourandas to use Onionhead

universal truth and feeling cards (Tr. 234-37); Honohan “felt

pressured” to use the Onionhead cards at workplace meetings,

even though she otherwise would not have (Tr. 235-36). As of

2010, Onionhead was a “daily” presence at defendants’ workplace.

(Tr. 248.) Honohan observed a conspicuous Onionhead logo

displayed on defendants’ building’s façade, which communicated

“[w]hat a big presence Onionhead had at the office” (Tr. 250);

Onionhead pins, Onionhead “pictures on the wall,” Onionhead

cards, and Onionhead literature (Tr. 250); Onionhead posters

depicting angel wings coming out of the side of the character

(Tr. 251); and Onionhead incorporated in employees’ signature

blocks (Tr. 251).

Additionally, the smell of incense at defendants’

workplace was “overpowering” to Honohan (Tr. 204); the dim

lighting strained Honohan’s eyes and exacerbated her headaches

(Tr. 333-34); Honohan felt that the Onionhead workshops were

“very forced and intrusive” (Tr. 278); and the forced human

“prayer chains,” where employees held hands from the entrance of

the office to the back, made Honohan “cringe” (Tr. 227). Prior

to Denali’s arrival, Honohan had never heard references to God,

demons, angels, or participated in prayer, while at work. (Id.)

When Denali visited defendants’ workplace, approximately every

four to six weeks, Denali had lots of interaction with

employees: Denali would “go around to each and every person and

say good morning and hug them and kiss them,” say “I love you,”

and constantly talk about the “[u]niverse, paradigms, . . . God,

different religions, Buddha,” “spirits,” “demons,” “angels,”

“positive energy,” and “negative energy.” (Tr. 224-25.)

In July 2009, Denali emailed defendants’ employees to

say she would be coming to defendants’ workplace to do an

Onionhead workshop, and if anybody wanted to sign up, they could

do so on a strictly optional basis. (Tr. 239.) Because Honohan

did not wish to participate, she did not sign up. (Tr. 239-41.)

COO Bourandas, whose office shared a door with Honohan’s office,

mentioned to Honohan that she had not responded to Denali’s

email. Honohan testified that Bourandas had said that Denali’s

email was “a test. Everything is a test,” i.e. “the workshop

was not voluntary, [Denali] was trying to see who would

participate and who wouldn’t.” (Tr. 240-41.)

Although turnover at the company had historically been

“[v]ery low” before Denali’s arrival, (Tr. 229-30), after Denali

was hired by her nephew, CEO Hodes, there was a “big turnover”:

Honohan recalled that she was aware of seven employees leaving

the company. (Id.) Honohan was aware that multiple employees

had left because they had been “uncomfortable with the direction

the company was going and all the changes that Denali had made”

and because “the environment just got so miserable” after Denali

joined defendants’ workplace. (Id.) Honohan testified that she

believed “nobody was safe,” as anyone who opposed Denali’s

religious and spiritual practices “could lose their job at any

time.” (Tr. 231, 280.) Particularly after the termination of

her longtime coworkers, plaintiff-intervenors Pennisi and

Ontaneda, Honohan testified that she felt “[d]efeated,”

“[d]isappointed,” and “[s]ad.” (Tr. 265.) Honohan began

experiencing work-related nightmares as a result of the

workplace stress. (Tr. 304.)

Due to ample trial evidence of Honohan’s emotional

distress, and because the $50,000 compensatory damages award –

which has already been significantly reduced from $570,000 - for

claimant Honohan does not shock the judicial conscience, the

court upholds her reduced compensatory damages award of $50,000.

e. Maldari

The jury awarded claimant Maldari $308,000 in

compensatory damages, which the court later reduced to $50,000.

(ECF No. 224, Memorandum and Order dated 12/28/18 at 56.)

Again, citing cases that are over 20 years old, defendants

assert that Maldari’s emotional distress damages award of

$50,000 should be further reduced to $15,000. (Def. Mem. 22.)

Maldari worked at defendants’ workplace for

approximately three years and eight months, from October 2004,

until she was terminated in May 2008. (Tr. 1438.) Maldari

worked as a customer service representative from 2004 to 2007, a

licensed insurance agent, and a licensed sales agent. (Tr.

1440-42.) Prior to late 2007, when Hodes hired Denali, Maldari

was “happy” to be working at defendants’ workplace and “enjoyed”

what she was doing. (Tr. 1444.) Maldari “saw opportunities,”

potential career advancements, and envisioned that she “could

retire from someplace like [UHP].” (Id.) Maldari received

numerous awards, positive performance reviews, and raises during

her employment by defendants. (Tr. 1445-57.)

Maldari testified that her sanguine outlook toward her

employment changed in the fall of 2007, when Denali arrived and

began “rolling out her religious practices.” (Tr. 1459.)

Denali’s arrival brought about the creation of a “sanctuary”

that featured candles, incense, dim lights, rosary beads,

pictures of angels, and religious texts (Tr. 1471); the

discontinuance of the use of overhead lights due to “demons

coming out of the [light] fixtures” (Tr. 1472-73); and

suboptimal work conditions, where employees were given lamps and

forced to work under “[v]ery dark” conditions, which caused

Maldari to strain her eyes while working at her computer and

which caused her to suffer headaches (Tr. 1472-73).

Maldari testified that she “felt like it was becoming

a hostile environment” because the religious practices were

interfering with her ability to get work done, and she felt

“very uncomfortable” with defendants’ requests, including that

Maldari bring “an overnight bag to keep in the office,” and

participate in a human prayer chain “to rid the negative energy

and the demons out of the building.” (Tr. 1474-75.) As Maldari

testified, Denali was “always saying strange things . . . in the

office, religious comments, spewing out comments” regarding how

the employees “were all her angels” and “the angels were flying

or the demons were flying when she was upset.” (Id.) Denali

also spoke of God and other religious subjects “[j]ust about

every time [Maldari] saw her,” declaring that God loves and/or

forgives the employees, and told the employees to “cleanse”

their “souls.” (Tr. 1459-60.) Maldari also testified that

Denali called her “one of her three Marys,” which Maldari

understood to be a religious reference to “Mary, Jesus’s mother”

and “Mary Magdalene.” (Tr. 1460.)

Denali’s religious proclamations, her practice of

kissing and hugging the employees, instructing them to do the

same, and telling employees “I love you,” made Maldari so

uncomfortable that she strived to avoid interactions with

Denali. (Tr. 1462-64.) Maldari testified that she felt

Denali’s religious practices were being “forced on [her] and it

was just bizarre.” (Tr. 1463.) Further, Maldari testified that

Denali “would put her hand on my head and she would pray” at

scheduled work meetings, or at impromptu meetings; such meetings

featured “angelic music” (Tr. 1479) and “always ended with

[employees] holding hands and [Denali] would put her hand on my

head and say a prayer and we’d have to say I love you to each

other.” (Tr. 1463-64.)

Maldari further testified that she made it clear that

she was not receptive to Denali’s religious practices, through

her words, body language, and actions. (Tr. 1464-65.) Maldari

complained to her supervisors and managers, as well as Denali,

about Denali’s religious practices, which made her “upset,”

“uncomfortable,” and “scared.” (Tr. 1464-70.) Maldari

testified: “Because I was not receptive to Denali and the

practices that she was putting in place in the office,” she was

warned by an office manager that she “better get on board . . .

attend the meetings [with Denali]” or she would “be terminated

next.” (Tr. 1504-05.) As a result of this warning, Maldari was

“out of [her] mind scared,” “had a lot of anxiety,” “wasn’t

sleeping well,” suffered nightmares, and was worried. (Tr.

1506-08.)

Due to ample trial evidence of Maldari’s emotional

distress, and because the $50,000 compensatory damages award –

which has already been markedly reduced from $308,000 - for

claimant Maldari does not shock the judicial conscience, the

court upholds her reduced compensatory damages award of $50,000.

f. Pegullo

The jury awarded claimant Pegullo $180,000 in

compensatory damages and $160,000 in punitive damages, which the

court later reduced to $40,000 in compensatory damages and

$10,000 in punitive damages. (ECF No. 224, Memorandum and Order

dated 12/28/18 at 56.) Defendants have asserted that Pegullo’s

emotional distress damages award of $40,000 should be further

reduced to $10,000 because they allege that Pegullo’s testimony

is “conclusory” and “uncorroborated.” (Def. Mem. 23-24.) The

court disagrees with defendants’ characterization and notes that

there is substantial evidence in the trial record as to the

detrimental impact of defendants’ hostile work environment on

Pegullo.

Pegullo worked at defendants’ workplace from April

2004 until 2007, when she briefly left and later rejoined the

company in April 2008, before being terminated in April 2011.

(Tr. 680-84, 719, 736.) During her first stint at defendants’

workplace, Pegullo worked in customer service and provider

relations, and during the second stint, Pegullo resumed her

employment as a receptionist. (Tr. 680-82.) From her first

encounter with Denali in 2008, Pegullo was awestruck by the

“wizard type, kind of Gandolf-looking” figure that was Denali;

Pegullo described Denali as “very charismatic” with a “strong

personality,” and Pegullo initially was “drawn” to Denali. (Tr.

686-87.) Pegullo understood that Denali’s role at defendants’

company was that of a “spiritual advisor.” (Tr. 687.) Pegullo

testified that Denali would visit defendants’ workplace “very

often,” and that each time Denali came, Pegullo would converse

“the whole day” with her, discussing both personal and

professional matters. (Tr. 688.)

Pegullo testified that Denali implemented various

changes in the workplace by “br[inging] Onionhead into the

business [with] dim lights and fountains, candles.” (Tr. 690.)

Pegullo’s job responsibilities also changed, as Pegullo was

tasked with lighting candles in Denali’s office, even when

Denali was not physically present, “to keep the bad spirits away

. . . to keep the place pure [of evil]” and of incorporating

“fountains and meditation music” in Denali’s office and in CEO

Hodes’ office. (Id.) In addition, whenever an employee was

fired or left, Pegullo was tasked by Denali with “spiritual[ly]

cleansing” the office, eliminating any “bad energy” in that

particular office. (Tr. 697-98.) Moreover, whenever Denali or

CEO Hodes would visit New York, Pegullo was instructed to “clean

up their house and cleanse it,” which entailed “go[ing] to each

room [of Hodes’s home] and . . . light[ing] up candles and . . .

do[ing] some chanting [and] praying[.]” (Tr. 699-701.)

As a sign of Denali’s trust in Pegullo, Denali

requested that Pegullo “be [Denali’s] eyes and ears” at

defendants’ workplace and report to Denali if she “saw something

that wasn’t right.” (Tr. 702.) As defendants’ receptionist,

Pegullo sat at the front desk with Onionhead pins, and, if

someone wasn’t wearing their Onionhead pins, Pegullo was to

report back to Denali regarding the employees’ noncompliance.

(Tr. 702-03, 708.) Pegullo also observed Onionhead universal

truth cards at employees’ desks (Tr. 708-09) and attended

Onionhead meetings and workshops, which she testified were

mandatory (Tr. 710, 713). Unlike the other claimants whose

damages are at issue, Pegullo was highly influenced by Denali,

to the point that she “became a different person” and “became

like [Denali.]” (Tr. 717.) Pegullo testified that the emails

she sent, while under Denali’s influence, were clearly

“different,” as Pegullo had begun “following [Denali’s] ways,

the way she was thinking . . . [and] becoming more like her[.]”

(Tr. 720-22.) Pegullo was so influenced by Denali that she gave

Denali another name, “Eden.” Denali, in turn, renamed Pegullo,

“Leah.” Both names were Biblical references. (Tr. 722.)

Pegullo testified that, in December 2010, Pegullo

received an email from Denali stating that “Rob was not able to

control his business, his company, and he was, it was something

about being demonic and . . . they were going to take over his

business[.]” (Tr. 724-75.) It was around December 2010 that

Pegullo began to recognize that she was being “brainwashed,”

“controlled” and manipulated at work. (Tr. 743, 778-79, 819,

854.) Pegullo felt that the workplace is not supposed to be

“totally God this and God that, God bless you, I love you.”

(Tr. 744.)

In April 2011, with a group of other employees,

Pegullo complained to CEO Hodes about Denali that “when [Denali]

brought Onion[head] into the business, everything just became so

psychotic . . . . It wasn’t a normal workplace.” (Tr. 729-30.)

At the meeting, Pegullo also showed Hodes Denali’s email, and

later that day, Pegullo was fired. (Tr. 730.) Pegullo further

testified that, as of the date of trial, she was “still mentally

disturbed [by] what happened to me. I became, like, an

instrument to [Denali, who] manipulated me.” (Tr. 743.)

Defendants’ contention, that Pegullo “only experienced

emotional distress from the work environment for a total of four

months,” unfairly minimizes the “profound effect” that Denali

had on Pegullo’s life, which caused her to feel manipulated,

controlled, and brainwashed. (Def. Mem. 23; Pl. Mem. 35.)

Further, as plaintiff’s memorandum noted, claimant Diaz’s

testimony corroborates Pegullo’s testimony regarding Pegullo’s

unhappiness with Denali’s religious practices. As Diaz

testified, Pegullo warned Diaz “to be careful” about Denali

because Pegullo was terminated by defendants after trying to get

Denali out of the office. (Tr. 1253-55.)

Based on ample trial evidence of Pegullo’s emotional

distress, and because the $40,000 compensatory damages award –

which has already been significantly reduced from $180,000 – for

claimant Pegullo does not shock the judicial conscience, the

court upholds her reduced compensatory damages award of $40,000.

g. Safara

The jury awarded claimant Safara $80,000 in

compensatory damages, which the court later reduced to $50,000

in compensatory damages. (ECF No. 224, Memorandum and Order

dated 12/28/18 at 56.) Defendants have asserted that Safara’s

emotional distress damages award of $50,000 should be further

reduced to $10,000. (Def. Mem. 25.)

Defendants apparently argue that Safara’s damages

award should be reduced because her exposure to defendants’

office and Denali was allegedly limited. (Def. Mem. 24-25

(Safara spent approximately four hours per workday at

defendants’ office and did not always overlap with Denali’s

presence at the office).) Further, defendants have asserted

that Safara’s testimony “does not detail the duration,

magnitude, or physical manifestation of her alleged emotional

distress.” (Dem. Mem. 25.) Defendants have also asserted that

“Safara admitted that the work environment was ‘fantastic’ from

when she started until right before she left in August 2008.”

(Def. Mem. 24.)

As plaintiff’s memorandum correctly notes, defendants’

last assertion mischaracterizes the trial record. Safara

testified: “Initially, UHP was a fantastic place to work . . . .

Everyone got along.” (Tr. 1133.) Safara had “every intention

[of] staying there for as long as [she] could.” (Tr. 1134.)

This changed in “late 2007 into ’08,” after Denali joined

defendants’ company, bringing Onionhead with her, and causing

defendants’ workplace to become “very uncomfortable to work in

and there [were] a lot of things going on that [Safara] did not

agree with or . . . felt were not right.” (Tr. 1134.)

For instance, Safara noticed that defendants’

workplace was suddenly populated with Buddha statues, burning

candles, and burning incense. (Tr. 1136-40.) Safara testified

that these changes were “distracting,” particularly because the

overhead lights were “shut off [because] softer lighting was

more of a positive spiritually.” (Tr. 1140.) As Safara

testified, her “understanding was that [the overhead lights were

moved and lamps were introduced] to bring the good vibes and the

positive spirits,” and to push away “demons and negative

spirits.” (Tr. 1142.) Further, Safara testified that “soft,

almost church-like music . . . would play softly in the

background throughout the office.” (Tr. 1143.)

Safara testified that the changes she observed after

Denali’s arrival disturbed her: “[T]hey were not welcoming

changes. I almost felt like it was being pushed on us to be or

to think a certain way . . . I thought it was pretty

bothersome.” (Tr. 1144-45.) Safara felt “very uncomfortable”

in defendants’ workplace. She testified that all of the

religious symbols were reminiscent of “being in a church” and it

was “bringing religion into [the workplace] and pushing that

specifically on you.” (Tr. 1145.) “Any time” one had a

conversation with Denali, spiritual subjects came up, including

discussion of “angels or spirits or positive . . . light or

negative energy or demons [or] God.” (Tr. 1155.)

As Safara testified, the changes that came about after

Denali’s arrival “had a negative impact on our workplace and on

the people that worked there because you could see how things

started to decline internally once all of that started, and it

wasn’t the same as it was.” (Id.) Safara perceived Denali’s

religious and spiritual discussion as “very cult-like, in the

sense that she always was pushing her beliefs onto us.” (tr.

1155-56.) Safara testified that she tried to ignore Denali’s

emails about spirituality because “everyone can have their own

religious opinions . . . and their own beliefs, but to push

yours on someone else I don’t agree with that.” (Tr. 1156.)

Safara also testified that Denali routinely instructed employees

to engage in hand-holding prayer, in both individual and group

meetings. (Tr. 1156-57.) When such workplace prayers occurred,

Safara testified that she “would sit there and not participate”

because it made her “very uncomfortable and it almost made the

workplace feel hostile[.]” (Tr. 1157-58.)

Safara further testified that she attended three or

four individual meetings with Denali, which she was instructed

to do by COO Bourandas. (Tr. 1160-61.) Denali’s references to

God at the workplace made Safara “very angry.” (Tr. 1167.)

Safara testified that Denali conducted herself “like a pastor or

a priest of a church,” except “she was like that for the

company.” (Tr. 1177.) Safara testified: “[E]verything in the

office turned into almost like a mosque or a church[] . . . in

the way how you have the incense burning away, like you would

smell if you walked into a religious building, or the way you

have that music, that organ soft music, with the religious

statues and the candles and the dim lighting, and then the way

she overall looked herself.” (Id.) Additionally, “every time

[one] did talk to [Denali], there was talk of God or love or

spirits, and then there was the prayer.” (Id.)

In August 2008, Safara quit her employment because she

“couldn’t do it anymore” because she “hate[d]” her job and felt

“miserable,” causing her to be “cranky” when she got home at

night. (Tr. 1177-78.) Like Pegullo, Safara testified that her

work experience at defendants’ workplace affected her

emotionally, causing her to lose trust in people and not

interact with coworkers outside of work anymore. (Tr. 1180.)

In addition, she has “closed [her]self off . . . from getting to

know [her new] coworkers,” turning down invitations to social

events, such as holiday parties, because she felt “it’s not

worth getting emotionally involved in things anymore.” (Id.)

Due to ample trial evidence of Safara’s emotional

distress, and because the $50,000 compensatory damages award –

which has already been reduced from $80,000 – for claimant

Safara does not shock the judicial conscience, the court upholds

her reduced compensatory damages award of $50,000.

III. The Trial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Award of Punitive

Damages for Diaz and Pegullo.

The jury awarded claimant Diaz $400,000 in punitive

damages and awarded claimant Pegullo $160,000 in punitive

damages. On December 28, 2018, the court reduced their

respective punitive damages awards to $10,000 each, in

accordance with the statutory maximums prescribed under Title

VII. (ECF No. 224, Memorandum and Order dated 12/28/18 at 56;

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A).)

a. Legal Standard

Title VII provides for the recovery of punitive

damages “if the complaining party demonstrates that the

respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or

discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless

indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved

individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). “The terms ‘malice’ or

‘reckless indifference’ pertain to the employer’s knowledge that

it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness

that it is engaging in discrimination.” Kolstad v. ADA, 527

U.S. 526, 535 (1999). A Title VII plaintiff may prevail by

showing that the employer discriminated in the face of a

“perceived risk” that its actions may violate federal law.

Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 539. Punitive damages are not

justified if “the employer is unaware of the relevant federal

prohibition or discriminates with the distinct belief that its

discrimination is lawful, where the underlying theory of

discrimination is novel or otherwise poorly recognized, or where

the employer reasonably believes that its discrimination

satisfies a bona fide occupational qualification defense or

other statutory exception to liability.” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at

427.

Defendants incorrectly assert that “[p]unitive damages

are reserved for egregious cases.” (Def. Mem. 26.) As the

United States Supreme Court has held, “[A]n employer’s conduct

need not be independently ‘egregious’ to satisfy § 1981a’s

requirements for a punitive damages award, although evidence of

egregious misconduct may be used to meet the plaintiff’s burden

of proof.” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 546; see also Luciano v. Olsten

Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We find nothing in

the language of [42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)] to support the Company’s

argument that there must also be a finding that the defendants’

conduct was ‘extraordinarily egregious.’”)

As the Second Circuit has further held, Title VII’s

statutory damages cap is not reserved for “the most egregious

cases of employment discrimination.” Luciano, 110 F.3d 219-22.

Rather, the jury is to determine the amount of punitive damages

“without being influenced by the statutory caps,” and only after

the jury has made its determination will the district court

“reduce[] the award to ensure that it conforms with subsection

(b)(3),” as necessary. Id.

b. Diaz and Pegullo Are Entitled to Punitive Damages

In arguing for remittitur of the punitive damage

awards of $10,000 for Diaz and Pegullo, respectively, defendants

point to the existence of “an anti-harassment policy . . . which

was periodically updated,” and further assert that “neither

[Diaz nor Pegullo] complained about being required to

participate in . . . any alleged religious activity to any

supervisor.” (Def. Mem. 27-29.)

The Supreme Court has noted that an employer’s

“written policy instituted in good faith” could “go[] a long way

towards dispelling any claim about the employer’s ‘reckless’ or

‘malicious’ state of mind.” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544 (1999)

(internal citation omitted); see also Cioffi v. New York Cmty.

Bank, 465 F. Supp. 2d 202, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (affirmative

defense to punitive damages under Title VII may be established

if employer shows it has made “good faith efforts to enforce an

anti-discrimination policy”). Here, defendants have not

presented evidence that they engaged in good-faith efforts to

enforce their anti-discrimination policy in the workplace.

Cioffi v. New York Cmty. Bank, 465 F. Supp. 2d 202, 213

(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“An employer’s written anti-discrimination

policy, by itself, is not enough . . . [A]n employer must show

good faith efforts to enforce its anti-discrimination policy”).

As the court summarized in its December 28, 2018

Memorandum and Order, defendants’ anti-discrimination practices

and policies were “lackluster”: defendants’ “dissemination of

those policies was inconsistent”; “defendants never conducted

employee trainings regarding those policies or advis[ed]

employees about what they should do if they believed they were

being discriminated against or harassed”; and those policies

“fail[ed] to address harassment in the workplace.” (ECF No.

224, at 21-22; Tr. 2016.) In addition, the employee handbooks

from 2007, 2011, and 2012 did not “discuss workplace harassment

in any form nor d[id] they provide a clear and effective avenue

for reporting discrimination.” (ECF No. 224, at 34.)

At trial, several claimants testified that they were

either unaware of defendants’ anti-discrimination policy, or

that they believed that it would have been futile to report

discrimination to management because “the people that were

exposing me to Onionhead and Denali’s practices were [the]

managers: [COO] Tracy [Bourandas], [CEO] Rob [Hodes],

[supervisor] April [Levine], [and the CEO’s aunt] Denali

[Jordan].” (Tr. 676, 1173-74, 1313, 1424.) There is also trial

evidence showing that, when claimants did complain to

management, their complaints were ignored. For instance, when

certain claimants complained to COO Bourandas of certain

religious practices implemented by Denali, including the burning

of incense and the use of Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness

materials, she allowed the complained-about practices to

continue and continued to engage Denali’s services and enforce

Denali’s authority and practices. (ECF No. 224, at 23; Tr.

1956-57, 1960, 1974.) As the court previously noted, CEO Hodes

and COO Bourandas “were both made aware of employees’ complaints

and concerns regarding Denali and the practices she implemented,

and they failed to take responsive or corrective action,” and

they “again failed to take action in the wake of receiving

letters from [plaintiff-intervenors’ counsel] and the EEOC on

behalf of claimants raising issues pertaining to religious

discrimination and hostile work environment. (ECF No. 224, at

22-23.) To the extent that defendants took remedial action in

response to complaints of religious discrimination, it was

“minimal and ineffective.” (Id.) Defendants’ own policies and

inaction demonstrate their knowledge of the unlawfully

discriminatory hostile work environment that they created and

implemented in the face of a perceived legal risk.

Defendants have also asserted that punitive damages

are not warranted because “management did not view any of their

actions as discriminatory or in potential violation of federal

law,” and because “the theory of discrimination is novel” or

“poorly recognized.” (Def. Mem. 28.) In response, plaintiff

contends that, “[w]hile Onionhead may be ‘novel,’ the underlying

theory of discrimination in this case –that employees cannot be

forced to participate in religious activities as a condition of

their employment- is not.” (Pl. Mem. 38.) Plaintiff also cites

a Ninth Circuit decision, EEOC v. Townley Engineering and

Manufacturing Company, which noted that “[p]rotecting an

employee’s right to be free from forced observance of the

religion of his employer is at the heart of Title VII’s

prohibition against religious discrimination.” 859 F.2d 610,

620-21 (9th Cir. 1988). The court agrees with plaintiff that a

reverse religious discrimination case, while somewhat less

commonplace than a typical religious discrimination case

involving an employee’s religious practice, cannot be

characterized as a “novel” theory. Moreover, the court has

previously found that Onionhead’s teachings and practices were

religious for purposes of Title VII. Onionhead I, 213 F. Supp.

3d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).

As ample trial evidence demonstrated, employees were

subjected to religious practices associated with Onionhead and

Harnessing Happiness: they were “preached at; [] forced to work

by lamp lighting because of demons allegedly coming out of the

overhead light fixtures; [] required to participate in meetings

that were personal and spiritual in nature and where employees

engaged in prayer; [] described as angels; [] moved to different

offices to get rid of bad energy and demons; [and were]

subjected to discussions of religion in the workplace.” (Id. at

18-19; Tr. 1219-20, 1462-64, 1469-73, 1476.)

As summarized above, there is sufficient trial

evidence that “defendants’ highest-ranking officials, Bourandas

and Hodes, as well as individuals with supervisory authority,

Levine and Denali, were aware of and perpetrated practices that

created, contributed to, and maintained a hostile work

environment.” (ECF No. 224, at 17.) As the court previously

noted in its December 28, 2018 Memorandum and Order, in addition

“to hiring and giving Denali authority within defendants’

company, members of defendants’ management team directly

encouraged, contributed to, and engaged in the Title VII

violations by participating in and authorizing the enforcement

of religious practices in the workplace.” (Id. at 15.) For

example, Bourandas enforced employee participation in Onionhead

workshops, conducted workshops herself, and distributed

Onionhead materials to employees. (Id. at 15-16.) Denali, too,

enforced employee participation in Onionhead by requiring that

employees wear Onionhead pins and use universal truth and

feeling cards (Tr. 233-37.), and non-compliance with Onionhead

practices was reported back to Denali by trusted subordinates

like Pegullo (Tr. 702-03, 708).

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable

to Diaz and Pegullo, a reasonable jury would not have been

compelled to find in defendants’ favor regarding punitive

damages. Even weighing the evidence under Rule 59, the court

cannot conclude that the jury’s verdict was seriously erroneous

or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court upholds the

punitive damages award of $10,000 each to Diaz and Pegullo.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court respectfully (i)

denies defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law or

for a new trial with respect to Benedict’s and Josey’s hostile

work environment claims; (ii) denies defendants’ motion for a

new trial or for remittitur with respect to the compensatory

damages awards for Benedict, Diaz, Honohan, Josey, Maldari,

Pegullo, and Safara; and (iii) denies defendants’ motions for

judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, or for remittitur,

with respect to Diaz’s and Pegullo’s punitive damages awards.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2020

Brooklyn, New York

_________/s/_________________

HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO

United States District Judge

Eastern District of New York