Opinion

ROBINSON v. JACKSON HEWITT, INC.

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
Jun 24, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.7%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Jessica Robinson, et al., on

behalf of herself and all others

Civil Action No. 19-9066

similarly situated,

(MEF)(JRA)

Plaintiffs,

OPINION

v.

Jackson Hewitt, Inc., et al.,

Defendants.

* * *

For the purposes of this brief Opinion, the Court assumes full

familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

* * *

The Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of a proposed

settlement and preliminary certification of a settlement class.

See Motion (April 5, 2024) (“Motion”).

Soon after the motion was made, the Court posed certain

questions, at a status conference. See Text Order (May 6, 2024)

(setting conference).

Following the status conference, the Plaintiffs submitted

revised materials. See Brief (May 29, 2024) (“Brief”). These

address the Court’s main questions in a satisfactory manner.

The motion is therefore likely to be granted, pending the

Plaintiffs addressing a loose end.

* * *

The Court’s first question related to the Plaintiffs’ obligation

to support the factual assertions they aim to rely on with

appropriate evidentiary materials. See generally Hacker v.

Elec. Last Mile Sols. Inc., 2024 WL 1231257, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar.

21, 2024).

But that is no longer an issue. The Plaintiffs have now filed

ample sworn materials. See e.g., Joint Declaration of Richard

M. Paul III, Jason Hartley, and Joseph Saveri in Support of

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Unopposed

Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement and Certification

of Settlement Class (May 29, 2024) (“Joint Declaration”).

* * *

The second set of questions related to the dollar value of the

proposed settlement. What percentage of the Plaintiffs’ total

damages does the proposed settlement cover? Must the settlement

account for the possibility of treble damages? And how does the

proposed settlement compare to settlements in comparable class

actions?

Each of these questions has been answered.

The settlement represents 54% of the total damages that are

potentially in play here, at least as those total damages have

been calculated by the Plaintiffs’ expert. See id. at 22.

The settlement need not account for the possibility of treble

damages. See Brief at 29 (citing In re Am. Family Enters., 256

B.R. 377, 425 (D.N.J. 2000); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,

495 F.2d 448, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds

by Goldberger v. Integrated Res., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000)).

And a 54% settlement compares favorably to settlements in

comparable class actions. See Brief at 22 (referring to

settlements of less than 5%, 25%, and 16.7%).

The Court has itself independently scrutinized these answers and

concludes that they make sense.

* * *

The Court’s third question related to the various factors that

must be assessed before a district court in the Third Circuit

may finally approve a settlement, under Girsh v. Jepson, 521

F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975), and its progeny.

The Plaintiffs’ newly built-out analysis of these factors is

persuasive. See Brief at 24-32. Among other things, the

Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success here is not 100%. Even

putting wholly to one side the arguable novelty of some of the

key legal theories, see id. at 26-27, there would be factual

questions here that could break in any number of different ways.

As to liability, for example, a number of franchise owners have

sworn that they were unaware of any “no-poach agreements” ---

and would prove it, in part, by showing that they had in fact

hired employees that would have been off-limits under such no-

poach agreements. See Joint Declaration ¶ 47; Brief at 30-31

(citing Exhibit R (Declarations JH-095707; JH-095701; JH-095690;

JH-05713; JH-095710); Defendant’s Class Certification Opposition

Exhibits 13-17).

As to damages, those are proposed to be calculated here based on

battling experts. These experts offer complex (and competing)

judgments as to how to estimate any declines in wages --- and it

is not crystal clear which expert’s views might prevail, and to

what extent.

Especially in light of these risks, a settlement that amounts to

54% of the Plaintiffs’ expert’s total damage calculation is, in

the Court’s judgment, a sufficient one. And all the more so by

comparison with the markedly lower settlements (5% to 25%) that

have been obtained in reasonably comparable cases.

* * *

The Court’s fourth question related to whether the Plaintiffs’

lawyers were properly incentivized not only to negotiate a

robust settlement --- but also to ensure that settlement money

actually makes its way into the pockets of individual class

members. See generally Hacker, 2024 WL 1231257 at *18-*20

(discussing this concern).

The Plaintiffs have adequately addressed this issue. They have

explained that they “have sufficient information for each of the

class members” for the claims administrator to make automatic

payments to them. See Brief at 13. This information includes

names, addresses, and email addresses, see Declaration of Carla

Peak ¶ 10, and this should allow for class members to be readily

located and promptly paid.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs’ lawyers have proposed that the Court

hold back 10% of their fee award until the process of

distributing all settlement funds to the class members is

completed. See Brief at 13 n.4. This creates a useful

incentive, that will help to encourage the Plaintiffs’ lawyers

to use their best efforts to make sure that class members

actually receive the payments to which any final settlement

would entitle them.

k tk *

Fifth and finaliy, the Court asked about whether objections to

the proposed settlement might be made by email, as opposed to by

traditional paper-and-stamp letters. This is, in part, to

ensure that there are low barriers to entry for anyone who might

wish to object to the proposed settlement. See Hacker 2024 WL

1231257 at *17. The Plaintiffs’ papers suggest that they will

allow for email notice. See Joint Declaration § 42. But the

proposed notice materials they have submitted to the Court do

not reference the possibility of email objections being made.

See Motion Exhibit 6 at 2, 8.

* * *

The motion at Docket Entry 309 is likely to be granted, upon

submission of revised notice materials that address the

referenced email issue.

DATE: June 24, 2024 Michael E. Farbiarz, U.S.D.J.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.