SHAW v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

_________________________________________

:

ANTHONY SHAW, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civ. No. 21-10166 (CCC)

:

v. :

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., : OPINION

:

Defendants. :

_________________________________________ :

CECCHI, District Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Anthony Shaw (“Plaintiff”), a pretrial detainee at Essex County

Correctional Facility (“ECCF”), seeks to initiate an action against the United States, the Marshals

Service, this Court, former Chief Judge Wolfson, the Department of Justice, Governor Murphy,

Essex County, Director Ortiz, Warden Cirillo, and CFG Medical Services arising out of alleged

civil rights violations related to restrictions imposed during the Covid-19 pandemic. ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to: (1) Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); (2) the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FCTA”), 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.; (3) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d); (4) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §

2000bb et seq.; (5) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42.

U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.; (6) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986; and (7) the Administrative Procedures

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702.1 ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff also moves to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).

ECF No. 1-1. For the reasons below, this Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP application (ECF No. 1-1),

but dismisses the Complaint (ECF No. 1) after screening.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.

1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions

in which a plaintiff is proceeding IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The PLRA directs district

courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing

Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive

screening, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially

plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind

Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

1 Numerous federal detainees have filed the same form complaint which differs only in the name and docket

number assigned to the complaint. “In many cases, the district court dismissed the earlier versions of the

complaint for suing only the United States, which was immune under sovereign immunity.” Murray v.

United States, No. 21-4903, 2021 WL 4772174, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2021). In others, like this case,

plaintiffs preemptively sought to file an amended complaint, rather than face dismissal of their initial

complaints.

“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted). “A pro se plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations which are

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set

forth in a ‘short and plain’ statement of a cause of action.” Johnson v. Koehler, No. 18-00807,

2019 WL 1231679, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2019).

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of

constitutional rights. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege first, the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the

alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See

Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A plaintiff may also have an implied cause of action for constitutional violations committed

by federal actors in very limited circumstances. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. To state a claim

under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation of the right was caused by a person acting

under color of federal law. See Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2006).2

2 The Court assumes for the purpose of this Opinion that an implied remedy exists for the claims Plaintiff

asserts against federal actors. However, recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on the availability of

such relief.

In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied damages remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation

committed by federal officials, see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, and “opened the door for courts to exercise

their judicial power to fashion [] damages remed[ies] against federal officers for other types of

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s IFP Application

The PLRA, which amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915, establishes certain financial requirements

for prisoners who are attempting to bring a civil action IFP. Pursuant to the PLRA, a prisoner

bringing a civil action IFP must submit an affidavit, including a statement of all assets, which

states that the prisoner is unable to pay the fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The prisoner also must

submit a certified copy of his inmate trust fund account statement for the six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of his complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Here, Plaintiff has

complied with the PLRA’s requirements and demonstrated indigence. Accordingly, the Court will

grant IFP status and screen the Complaint.

B. Immune Defendants

1. United States

constitutional violations,” Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 318 (3d Cir. 2020). Since the Supreme Court decided

Bivens, however, it has extended the remedy to other contexts only twice: first, to a claim for gender

discrimination under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,

248–49 (1979), and second, to a claim for inadequate prison medical care under the Eighth Amendment’s

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–23 (1980).

Recently, the Supreme Court has cautioned against expanding Bivens into new contexts and described it as

a “disfavored judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017). In Abbasi, the Supreme

Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether a prospective Bivens claim may proceed. First,

courts must ascertain whether the case presents a “new context.” Id. at 1859. If the case differs “in a

meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by th[e Supreme] Court, then the context is new.” Id.

Second, if the case presents a new context, the court must then consider whether “special factors” counsel

against extending the Bivens remedy. See id. at 1860. This inquiry asks whether the Judiciary is at least

arguably less equipped than Congress to “weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to

proceed.” See id. at 1858.

In Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022), the Supreme Court clarified that the two-step process laid out

in Abbasi often resolves to a single question: whether there is any rational reason to think that Congress

might be better equipped to create a damages remedy. Id. at 1803. If there is, a plaintiff cannot recover

under Bivens. See id.

The Court need not decide whether a Bivens remedy exists in this matter in light of Abbasi and Egbert

because, as discussed below, Plaintiff’s claims against federal actors fail for other reasons. See Hernandez

v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017) (stating that disposing a Bivens claim on other grounds, while

assuming the existence of a Bivens remedy, is appropriate in many cases).

First, the Complaint seeks to assert civil rights claims against the United States. The United

States, however, is not subject to suit for constitutional torts, including the civil rights claims

Plaintiff seeks to raise, and is entitled to absolute sovereign immunity in this matter. See, e.g.,

F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476-77, 484-85 (1994) (the United States is immune from suit

for constitutional torts, and Bivens provides no cause of action against the United States or its

agencies); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687 (1949) (sovereign

immunity bars suit against the United States either for damages or for injunctive relief requiring

government action); United States v. Rural Elec. Convenience Co-op. Co., 922 F.2d 429, 434 (7th

Cir. 1991) (sovereign immunity bars suits seeking damages or coercive injunctive relief); Scott v.

Manenti, No. 15-7213, 2016 WL 80640, at *1 n.2 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2016).

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim pursuant to the FTCA, the “FTCA operates as a

limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity.” White–Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592

F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Under the FTCA, the United States is liable “in

the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28

U.S.C. § 2674. An incarcerated FTCA plaintiff may sue only the United States, may seek only

monetary damages, and may not recover for mental or emotional damages in the absence of

physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)–(2); CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 138 n.2 (3d

Cir. 2008) (“The Government is the only proper defendant in a case brought under the FTCA.”).

A plaintiff suing under the FTCA must present the offending agency with notice of the

claim, including a “sum certain” demand for monetary damages. See White–Squire, 592 F.3d at

457. “Because the requirements of presentation and a demand for a sum certain are among the

terms defining the United States’[ ] consent to be sued, they are jurisdictional.” Id. An agency’s

final denial of the tort claim is a jurisdictional requirement. Lightfoot v. United States, 564 F.3d

625, 627 (3d Cir. 2009). These requirements cannot be waived; if a plaintiff has not complied

with the FTCA’s pleading requirements, “a district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over

the claim.” Hardie v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 3d 152, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d, No. 21-106,

2021 WL 4427852 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2021).

Here, the Complaint fails to reference any notice of a tort claim, a demand for a sum certain,

or that Plaintiff has otherwise exhausted his FTCA claim. See ECF No. 1. Accordingly, the Court

will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s FTCA claim against the United States “for failure to

sufficiently allege the jurisdictional basis” for his claim. Hoffenberg v. United States, No. CIV.A.

10-2788, 2012 WL 379934, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2012).

2. Marshals Service, Department of Justice, and District of New Jersey

The other federal Defendants are immune. Federal departments and agencies, such as the

Department of Justice and the United States Marshals Service, are immune from suit in civil rights

matters. See, e.g., Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 158–59 (3d Cir. 1998) (federal governmental

entities are not “persons” subject to suit in a federal civil rights matter); see also Gary v. Gardner,

445 F. App’x 465, 466–67 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that “the United States Marshals Service is

entitled to sovereign immunity from suit” absent an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity). This

Court is likewise entitled to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States Dist. Ct. of

Rhode Island, No. 18-778, 2019 WL 1301727, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 21, 2019). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims against this Court, the United States Marshals Service, and the United States

Department of Justice are also dismissed with prejudice.

3. Chief Judge Wolfson

Plaintiff challenges Chief Judge Wolfson’s decisions to exclude time under the Speedy

Trial Act due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. However, judges are generally “immune from

a suit for money damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991). Judicial immunity stems from

“the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or

her convictions without threat of suit for damages.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440

(3d Cir. 2000). Generally, judges “are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when

such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or

corruptly.” Id. (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978)); cf. Gallas v. Supreme

Ct. of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 769–70 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that judges are not entitled to

immunity for mere “administrative acts”); see, e.g. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)

(judge was acting in an administrative capacity in terminating a subordinate court employee).

Here, Chief Judge Wolfson’s orders were “clearly issued in a judicial rather than

administrative capacity,” notwithstanding Plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, with respect to the

exclusions of time under the Speedy Trial Act. Hill v. United States, No. 21-03872, 2021 WL

3879101, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2021). “Chief Judge Wolfson addressed and adjudicated a legal

issue before her, i.e., the effect of a global pandemic on the speedy trial rights of the pretrial

detainees in this District.” Welch v. United States, No. 21-10866, 2021 WL 4772110, at *3 (D.N.J.

Oct. 13, 2021).

Chief Judge Wolfson is likewise entitled to immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s requests

for injunctive relief. In 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to state that “in any action

brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief

was unavailable.” See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (provision applies to

both state and federal judges).

Here, Plaintiff has not properly pled that Chief Judge Wolfson violated any declaratory

decree or that declaratory relief is unavailable. Plaintiff summarily concludes that “[a] decree was

violated[,] and declaratory relief was not made available.” ECF No. 1 at 2. However, Plaintiff’s

bare conclusions are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Kaplan v. Holder, No. 14-1740, 2015

WL 1268203, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Consequently, Chief

Judge Wolfson is entitled to judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief.

Plaintiff also asks this Court to “declare” that Chief Judge Wolfson violated a litany of

statutes and constitutional amendments. ECF No. 1 at 23. Declaratory judgment, however, “is

inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct.” Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84–85 (3d

Cir. 2006). “Nor is declaratory judgment meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to

another.” Id.

If Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief to prospectively protect his rights, he has not pleaded

facts to support such a claim. As discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiff—like the other

plaintiffs utilizing a virtually identical, boilerplate complaint—styled this Complaint as a class

action, offering no details specific to his own situation. This Court “concurs with other courts

throughout the District of New Jersey and finds that Chief Judge Wolfson’s standing orders, issued

in response to the COVID-19 pandemic” are “supported by detailed findings, and provide[] a

sound factual and legal basis that any delays are supported by the ends of justice, consistent with

the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Hafner, No. 19-790, 2021 WL

1873560, at *3 (D.N.J. May 10, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v.

Kaetz, No. 20-1090, 2021 WL 37925, at *8 n.8 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2021); Chu, 2021 WL 879905, at

*4).

Chief Judge Wolfson conducted an appropriate balancing test under the Speedy Trial Act

in Standing Order 21-04:

[T]he Court recognizes the trial, procedural and substantive rights

of criminal litigants and particularly, their right to a speedy and

public trial under the Sixth Amendment (and the particular

application of that right in cases involving defendants who are

detained pending trial). However, the Court also recognizes the

compelling public health and safety issues outlined in this Standing

Order, and therefore, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(A), finds

that the ends of justice served by taking such action materially

outweigh the best interests of the public and the parties in a speedy

trial. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the time period of March

16, 2020 through June 1, 2021 shall be “excluded time” under the

Speedy Trial Act. Having considered the factors outlined in 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B), the Court finds specifically, that the failure

to grant such continuance would be likely to make a continuation of

proceedings impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice. Such

exclusion is necessary to assure that in cases going to trial, there is

a full, unhindered, continuously serving jury venire and seated jury

in every case, which is central to the sound administration of justice.

Such exclusion of time is also necessary in cases not yet set for trial

in order to address the reasonably anticipated difficulties in defense

counsel communicating or visiting with clients (including those

detained in locales and facilities under a declared state of

emergency), and the inherent delay in the scheduling of further trials

as a consequence of the exclusion period herein. The Court may by

further Order or Extension extend the period of exclusion as

circumstances may warrant, and the assigned judicial officer may,

by Order, also do so in connection with any specific proceeding.

The “Chief Judge specifically acknowledged the importance of the right to a speedy and

public trial and balanced the interests of defendants and the public in that right against the

compelling public health and safety issues arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic.” Hafner, 2021

WL 1873560, at *3. That, coupled with a lack of information specific to Plaintiff’s individual

circumstances, compels a conclusion that the Complaint fails to state a claim for declaratory relief

regarding Plaintiff’s speedy trial rights.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against Chief Judge

Wolfson for monetary relief and dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against her for

injunctive and declaratory relief.

4. Governor Murphy

Plaintiff also asserts claims for monetary relief against Governor Murphy in his official

capacity. However, sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment renders “states—and, by

extension, state agencies and departments and officials when the state is the real party in interest—

generally immune from suit by private parties in federal court.” Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs,

Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, New Jersey state agencies

“established in the Executive Branch of State Government” are entitled to Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity, “regardless of the relief sought,” unless an exception applies. See Rhett v.

Evans, 576 F. App’x 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those exceptions

apply when (1) Congress abrogates the immunity; (2) a state waives immunity; or (3) when a

plaintiff sues individual state officers for prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal

law. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001).

Here, Governor Murphy is a state official sued in his official capacity. ECF No. 1 at 3.

Consequently, he is entitled to sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages.

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

99–100 (1984). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Governor Murphy

with prejudice.

C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act Claims (“RICO”)

Next, Plaintiff claims that every Defendant is liable under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d).

ECF No. 1 at 19. RICO makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any

enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct

or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of

racketeering activity.” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010).

Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful “for any person to conspire to violate § 1962(c).” Id. “To plead

a RICO claim under § 1962(c), ‘the plaintiff must allege (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through

a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’” Id. (quoting Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d

Cir. 2004)). An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or

other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal

entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). A “‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of

racketeering activity” as set forth in § 1961(a), within a ten-year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).

Here, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead the elements of a RICO claim. The Complaint

only alleges that “defendants . . . acted as a criminal enterprise that is run as a business with a

pattern of illicit conduct exceeding two predicate acts that equate[ ] to fraud, corruption, violence,

and activity in furtherance of human trafficking and slavery.” ECF No. 1 at 19. Plaintiff does not

detail the enterprise, what conduct he specifically believes violated RICO, and/or what predicate

acts he believes to have been racketeering activities. See id.

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to plead cognizable RICO losses. Plaintiffs may only use a

civil RICO claim “to recover ‘concrete financial loss’ in the form of an injury to property or

business, personal injury or emotional harm are not proper bases for a RICO claim.” Cabbagestalk

v.United States, No. 21-4902, 2021 WL 2260517, at *1–4 (D.N.J. June 3, 2021) (quoting Parness

v. Christie, No. 15-3505, 2015 WL 4997430, at *6-8 (D.N.J. August 19, 2015)); see also Maio v.

Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000). Every claim here stems from alleged constitutional

violations, which are not proper RICO losses. And even if Plaintiff had pled proper losses, his

bare conclusions are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Kaplan, 2015 WL 1268203, at *4

(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). He cannot rely on “naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement” and “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported merely by

conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s

RICO claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

D. Religious Freedom Claims

Plaintiff next asserts claims under RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., and RLUIPA, 42.

U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. RFRA “prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that

substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive

means of serving a compelling government interest.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573

U.S. 682, 690–91 (2014). RLUIPA “allows prisoners ‘to seek religious accommodations pursuant

to the same standard as set forth in RFRA.’” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 358 (2015) (quoting

Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniõ do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006)).

However, RLUIPA applies “on a more limited category of governmental actions.” Watson

v. Christo, 837 F. App’x 877, 881 n.6 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Burwell, 573 U.S. at 695). To state

a claim under either statute, “Plaintiff must allege facts that indicate that the federal government

substantially burdened a sincerely held religious belief.” See, e.g., Martinez v. United States, No.

21-4336, 2021 WL 2224268, at *4 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021) (citing Holt, 574 U.S. at 360–61);

Gambino v. Cassano, No. 17-0830, 2021 WL 1186794, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2021). A substantial

burden exists where

1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of

his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to

other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion

in order to receive a benefit; or 2) the government puts substantial

pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to

violate his beliefs.

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2007).

Here, Plaintiff does not plead any facts regarding his personal religious beliefs or tenets.

ECF No. 1 at 13, 36–39. Plaintiff alleges only that pandemic restrictions have generally hindered

certain religious practices at the facility. Id. Without specific allegations as to his personal

religious beliefs (and how they were burdened), the Complaint fails to state a claim. Consequently,

the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s RLUIPA and RFRA claims.

E. Supervisory Liability

Next, it appears that Plaintiff wishes to assert supervisory liability claims against Governor

Murphy, Director Ortiz, and Warden Cirillo. Generally, government officials are not liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a respondeat superior theory. See Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dept. Of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (finding no

vicarious liability for a municipal “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S.

507, 515–16 (1888) (“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position

wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of subagents or servants or

other persons properly employed by or under him, in discharge of his official duties.”).

There are two ways in which supervisors may be liable for the unconstitutional acts of their

subordinates. First, liability may attach if a supervisor, “with deliberate indifference to the

consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the]

constitutional harm.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586

(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)).

A policy generally involves a “statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by [the governing] body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. A custom, although

lacking the formal approval of a policy, refers to those official practices which are “so permanent

and well settled as to constitute . . . the force of law.” Id. at 691. A plaintiff “must identify a

custom or policy . . . and specify what exactly that custom or policy was” to satisfy the pleading

standard. Sheils v. Bucks Cty. Domestic Relations Section, 921 F. Supp. 2d 396, 417 (E.D. Pa.

2013) (noting that although this standard typically applies to municipal entities, it “applies with

equal force to supervisory liability claims premised on a ‘policy, practice, or custom’ theory”

(citing Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). Under the second approach,

a supervisor “may be personally liable if he participated in violating [ ] rights, directed others to

violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinates’

unconstitutional conduct.” Estate of Moore v. Cumberland Cty., No. 17-2839, 2018 WL 1203470,

at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2018).

Here, the Complaint fails to explain how Governor Murphy, Director Ortiz, and Warden

Cirillo personally violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff makes a single brief reference

to unspecified customs and policies, ECF No. 1 at 23, and summarily blames Defendants. Plaintiff

fails to describe these policies or customs, how they specifically caused or contributed to his

injuries, or the nature of any injury. As discussed below, Plaintiff alleges numerous claims against

the Defendants collectively, but fails to specifically tie individual actions to individual Defendants.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss without prejudice the supervisory liability claims

against Governor Murphy, Director Ortiz, and Warden Cirillo.

F. Remaining Claims

Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and the

Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, also fail to state a claim. The Complaint often

alleges that the Defendants acted in unison, without explaining the actions of each Defendant.

Alternatively, Plaintiff often states that someone’s rights have been violated, without specifying

which Defendant or Defendants committed the wrong, and then concludes that all of the

Defendants were somehow responsible. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 18–19.

A plaintiff must generally allege facts that “establish each individual [d]efendant’s liability

for the misconduct alleged.” Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14-169, 2015 WL 3970297, at *2 (D.N.J.

June 29, 2015). What Plaintiff has done here, however, is improper group pleading. “[C]onclusory

allegations against defendants as a group” that “fail[ ] to allege the personal involvement of any

defendant” are insufficient to state a claim. Id. A complaint that contains “impermissibly vague

group pleading” is subject to dismissal. Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013 WL

1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013).

Apart from Chief Judge Wolfson’s standing orders, Governor Murphy’s unspecified

orders, and Director Ortiz’s unspecified declarations, Plaintiff fails to plead any specific acts by

any Defendant. For example, throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff identifies general conditions

without pleading that he personally needed, and was deprived, access to those services. ECF No.

1 at 18–19. As to Governor Murphy and Director Ortiz, “Plaintiff does not identify the orders or

state how they caused the specific rights violations he wishes to challenge, or specify how any

decisions, policies, [or] practices, . . . caused him harm.” Hill, 2021 WL 3879101, at *4 (emphasis

in original). Such claims “would not provide any meaningful opportunity for the [remaining]

Defendants to decipher or answer the vague allegations levied against them.” Koehler, 2019 WL

1231679, at *3; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Likewise, CFG Medical Services is barely

mentioned except to identify it as a Defendant. At best, the Complaint alleges limited or sub-

standard care ostensibly tied to CFG; for example, lack of medical and dental visits and “healthy

teeth . . . pulled out . . . that often only needed a simple filling.” ECF No. 1 at 17. However, like

Plaintiff’s other allegations, these allegations appear to apply to a putative class, which Plaintiff is

not permitted to represent. Lewis v. City of Trenton Police Dep’t, 175 F. App’x 552, 554 (3d Cir.

2006). And Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 suffer from

similar deficiencies. Plaintiff baldly alleges that every Defendant conspired to violate his rights

without further elaboration. However, Plaintiff “must instead plead facts showing actual

agreement between the alleged conspirators and concerted action towards the object of the

conspiracy.” Cabbagestalk, 2021 WL 2260517, at *3 (citing Brown v. Deparlos, 492 F. App’x

211, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he bare allegation of an agreement is insufficient to sustain a

conspiracy claim”)).

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 5 U.S.C. § 702, for failure to state a claim.

Finally, all federal claims having been dismissed, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, including any claims under

the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) or potential state medical malpractice claims against

CFG Medical Services. See ECF No. 1 at 17 (alleging improper dental care); 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).3

G. Request for Jail Credits

In his Complaint, Plaintiff also seeks four extra jail credits for every day spent in detention

during the pandemic for unspecified detainees. ECF No. 1 at 24. Detainees may not, however,

use a civil rights complaint to “challenge the fact or length of [their] detention.” Pittman v. United

States, No. 21-10123, 2021 WL 2260518, at *2 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021). Rather, detainees must

3 The Court notes, however, that because the NJCRA is interpreted analogously to § 1983 claims, the

NJCRA claims would also likely be dismissed for the same reasons as the § 1983 claims: there are

insufficient facts alleged detailing state Defendants’ specific actions and their impact upon Plaintiff.

Szemple v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 493 F. App’x 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2012) (“NJCRA is interpreted

as analogous to § 1983.”)

raise any claim “which would impugn or otherwise overturn the fact or length of . . . detention

. . . via a criminal motion or a habeas petition.” Id. (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–

82 (2005); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643–48 (1997)). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss

Plaintiff’s request for additional jail credits. See Pittman, 2021 WL 2260518, at *2.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims

against the United States (except for Plaintiff’s FTCA claim), the United States Department of

Justice, the United States Marshals Service, the United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey, former Chief Judge Wolfson for monetary relief, and Governor Murphy in his official

capacity for monetary relief. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the remainder

of Plaintiff’s federal claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law

claims. An appropriate Order follows.

DATED: April 30, 2024

s/Claire C. Cecchi

Claire C. Cecchi, U.S.D.J