The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WENDELL JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 22-2530 (ZNQ) (TJB)
v.
OPINION
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
et al.
D efendants.
QURAISHI, District Judge
Plaintiff Wendell Johnson, an inmate at Northern State Prison in Newark, New Jersey, is
proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., ECF No.
1.) The Court has screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine
whether the Court should dismiss it as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon
which the Court may grant relief, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from suit. As set forth below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the New
Jersey Parole Board with prejudice and the remainder of the Complaint without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that:
On [April 11, 2018], parole officer Brett Bertoni filed a complaint
with the Trenton Police Department against the plaintiff on Mercer-
18-001435 that was dismissed on [March 4, 2022]. On [September
7, 2018], parole officer Michael Traendly filed a criminal complaint
with the Trenton Police Department against the plaintiff on Mercer-
18-003469 that was dismissed on [March 4, 2022], by the Mercer
County Superior Court of New Jersey due to the fact that the State
had no evidence to prosecute.
Defendants Samuel L. Plumeri Jr., chairman of New Jersey State
Parole[,] and counter-parts Tania Larkin and Barry Volkert
approved and gave permission on the above dates to those officers
to file [the] criminal charges. Also[,] Trenton Police Department
approved the criminal charges of Defendant Craig Kirk and
processed all the above charges that had the Plaintiff detained
illegally under the new Bail Reform [Act] knowing[] each
Defendant would not go forth with those criminal charges even after
each indictment was returned and amounted to a miscarriage of
Justice.
(Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff further alleges that:
[Samuel J. Plumeri, Jr.,] allowed its [sic] members to file frivolous
criminal charges against the plaintiff that was [sic] dismissed in
full[, and] Tania Larkin gave an order to the co-defendants to file
frivolous criminal charges that was dismissed on March 4, 2022 . . .
.
(Id. ¶ 3(b), (c).)
Plaintiff names the New Jersey State Parole Board; Parole Board members Samuel J.
Plumeri, Jr. and Tania Larkin; parole officers Barry Volkent, Michael Tradendly, and Brett
Bertoni; the Trenton Police Department and Detective Craig Kirk as defendants in this matter.
(See id. ¶ 3.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
District courts must review complaints in civil actions in which a prisoner or pretrial
detainee is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). District courts may sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which the court
may grant relief, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
id.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Section
1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012);
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp.
2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). A court properly grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) if, “accepting all well pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted).
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the [alleged] misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts
liberally construe pro se pleadings, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl. ¶ 1(a).) To succeed
on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed
by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federally
secured right. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993). The court liberally construes
the Complaint as asserting Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claims
against each of the Defendants. However, for the following reasons, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint.
A. Persons Amenable to Suit
As an initial matter, Plaintiff names the New Jersey State Parole Board (the “Board”) as a
defendant. The Court will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against the Board because it is
not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 action.
Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State… subjects…any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights…secured by the
Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). To be liable under Section 1983,
therefore, a defendant must be a “person” within the meaning of the statute. See id. The Supreme
Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’
under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, a cause of action
under Section 1983 “cannot be asserted against the state, its agencies, or its officials acting in their
official capacities.” Landi v. Borough of Seaside Park, No. 07-5319, 2009 WL 606141, at *6
(D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2009).
Here, the Complaint asserts Section 1983 claims against the Board. As the Board
constitutes a state agency, it is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. See Will, 491
U.S. at 71; Landi, 2009 WL 606141, at *6. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against the Board with prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.
B. Malicious Prosecution Claims
To make out a claim for malicious prosecution under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) without probable cause; (3) the criminal
proceeding ended in his favor; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent
with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d
75, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, the Complaint lacks sufficient facts from which the Court could reasonably infer that
the Defendants lacked probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings against him. For example,
Plaintiff fails to plead any facts regarding the nature of the charges brought against him or the
circumstances leading to the charges and his detainment. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that the
charges were “frivolous,” which is conclusory and which the Court need not accept as true. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the remainder of the Complaint
without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the New
Jersey Parole Board with prejudice and the remainder of the Complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff
may file an amended complaint within thirty days. An appropriate Order follows.
Date: February 6, 2024
s/ Zahid N. Quraishi
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE