The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RAHSHAD RONEY,
Plaintitt, Civil Action No. 24-835 (KMW) (MIS)
OPINION
SOUTH WOODS STATE PRISON, et al.,
Defendants.
WILLIAMS, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sua sponte screening of Plaintiff's
complaint (ECF No, 1) and the Court’s review of Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF No. 1-5.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff's motion seeking appointed counsel.
(ECF No. 1-7.) Having reviewed the application, this Court finds that leave to proceed in forma
pauperis is warranted in this matter, and Plaintiff's application will be granted. Because Plaintiff
will be granted in forma pauperis status in this matter, this Court is required to screen his complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim which is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiffs complaint shall be dismissed in its entirety, and Plaintiff's motion denied without
prejudice in light of the dismissal of his complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a state prisoner confined to South Woods State Prison, (ECF No. 1 at 2.) In his
complaint, Plaintiff contends that he was transferred within the prison on November 4, 2022, and
in the process some of his property went missing which he has not recovered. (ad. at 7-8.) As he
did not have his property, Plaintiff requested cleaning supplies so that he could have a shower, but
ultimately was unable to shower for eight days. (/d.) As a result, Plaintiff developed a rash and
infection which Plaintiff does not believe were properly treated by medical staff. Gad.) Plaintiff
further alleges that he was “harassed” by multiple officers, was assaulted off camera by unspecified
officers, and was the subject of rumors which have gotten him into fights and nearly stabbed. (dd.
at 8.) Despite the inflammatory nature of these allegations, Plaintiff makes no effort to provide
context or detail, he does not specifically allege how any given named Defendant was actually
involved in any of these incidents, nor does he explain what the alleged assault was, nor what sort
of harassment he was made to undergo. (Jd) Although Plaintiff attaches to his complaint several
documents that appear to have been meant to provide a little context to his claims, these documents
are self-censored and likewise fail to identify what Defendant was involved in which incident, nor
do these documents clearly explain the alleged assault, or exactly what medical care Plaintiff
believes was lacking in the treatment of his rash. (See ECF No. 1-3; 1-4.)
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff will be granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen
his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sea
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. “The
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir, 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ, P. 12(b)(6), a district court is
required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations. Papasan vy. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed
factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S, 662, 678 (2009). A
complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “’naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” Jd. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jd. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts
“merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). id. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at
557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se
litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 3d Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
In this matter, Plaintiff seeks to raise the following civil rights claims against a number of
prison staff, the State of New Jersey, its Department of Corrections, and South Woods State Prison:
a conditions of confinement claim related to lack of showers for eight days, an excessive force
claim related to an unspecified assault, a denial of medical care claim related to his rash, and a
harassment related claim. Each of these claims, however, suffers from the same key failing —
Plaintiff fails in any way to clearly identify how each of the named individual Defendants was
actually involved in the alleged wrongs. A defendant in a civil rights action, however, may not be
held liable for the actions of its employees or subordinates on a respondeat superior basis, and
must instead have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be held liable. Chavarriaga v.
N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-
08 (3d Cir. 1988). Personal involvement requires allegations of a defendant’s specific involvement
in the incidents alleged, or allegations which would show that the events could be imputed to the
defendant based on his directing others to perform the deeds in question, his actual knowledge and
acquiescence in the alleged wrong, or facts indicating that the defendant created a policy or practice
which was the moving force behind the violation. Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222. As Plaintiff's
complaint provides no more than conclusory allegations of wrongdoing and fails to identify how
any of the individual named Defendants were involved in the alleged wrongs — i.e., the complaint
does not specify what actions they took, what occurred, or how those actions were violative of
Plaintiff's rights, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted as to any of
the named individual Defendants. Plaintiffs claims against the individual named Defendants are
therefore dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim at this time.
Plaintiff's claims against the state, prison, and Department of Corrections fare no better.
States, their departments of corrections, and their prisons are not proper Defendants in a civil rights
matter, as state entities are both not persons and are in any event entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See, e.g., Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
730 F.3d 291, 318 (Gd Cir. 2013); Walker v. Beard, 244 F. App’x 439, 440-41 Gd Cir. 2007);
Grabow v. S. State Corr. Facility, 726 F, Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J, 1989). Plaintiff's claims
against the State of New Jersey, the N.J. Department of Corrections, and South Woods State Prison
must therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
Finally, Plaintiff has filed in this matter a request for appointed counsel. (ECF No. 1-7.)
Although civil plaintiffs have no right to the appointment of counsel in civil rights matters, this
Court has wide discretion to appoint counsel where the Court finds that the appointment of counsel
is warranted, Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 Gd Cir, 2002); see also Tabron y, Grace,
6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). In determining whether the appointment of counsel is warranted,
this Court must first determine whether the plaintiff is indigent and whether his claims have merit.
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57; Cuevas v. United States, 422 F. App’x 142, 144-45 Gd Ci. 2011).
Where an indigent plaintiff presents meritorious claims, the Court then must weigh various factors
to determine whether the appointment of counsel is warranted. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57; Cuevas,
422 App’x at 144-45. Although Plaintiff has established his indigence in this matter, his claims
cutrently before the Court fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted for the reasons set
forth above, and Plaintiff's current claims are thus not of sufficient merit to warrant the
appointment of counsel. Plaintiff's motion seeking appointment of counsel is therefore denied
without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF
No. 1-5) shall be GRANTED, Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) shall be DISMISSED in its
entirety, Plaintiff shall be granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days, and
Plaintiff's motion seeking appointed counsel (ECF No. 1-7) is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
“ ms
Raa Vets
Ion, Karen M, Williams,
United States District Judge
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