Opinion

ECKERT v. ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FACILITY

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
Jan 23, 2024
Cited by
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More cited than 25.6%

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The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JAMES ECKERT,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No, 21-5244 (KMW) (MJS)

. OPINION

ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FACILITY,

et al.,

Defendants.

WILLIAMS, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF

No. 74.) Plaintiff filed a response to the motion (ECF No. 81), to which Defendants replied. (ECF

No. 84.) For the following reasons Defendants motion for summary judgment shall be denied.

L BACKGROUND

At the time that the incidents which gave rise to Plaintiff's complaint, he was detained in

the Atlantic County Justice Facility for, inter alia, failing to appear for Drug Court. (ECF No. 74

at 10; ECF No. 81-1 at 1.) On July 31, 2020, while incarcerated in the jail, Plaintiff was moved to

the admissions area of the jail for medical observation for suspected seizures. (ECF No. 74 at 11;

ECF No. 81-1 at 3.) While on the phone in the admissions area of the jail that day, Plaintiff saw

his then girlfriend, Tara Lynn Wilson, enter the jail to be booked on unrelated charges, (ECF No.

74-4 at 9.) Plaintiff saw her, but was not permitted by staff to speak with her. Ud. at 10.) While

being admitted into the jail, Wilson used the restroom. (ECF No, 74-5 at 5.) Sometime later, while

in the admissions area, Plaintiff also used the restroom. (/d,) Officer Dear reported seeing Plaintiff

in the restroom acting strangely and seeming to place something in his clothes. (4) Dear

suspected Plaintiff had contraband and told him he needed to be strip searched. (/d.; ECF No. 74-

4 at 10.) It is undisputed that, during that search, money was found in Plaintiffs sock during the

strip search. (ECF No, 74-4 at 10; ECF No. 74-5 at 5,) Plaintiff contends that the money had been

in his possession the entire time he was in the jail, while Defendants contend it was Jeft for him in

the bathroom by Wilson. (ECF No. 74-4 at 10; ECF No. 74-5 at 5.)

Dear and Plaintiff dispute exactly what occurred at the end of the search, with Dear

asserting that Plaintiff was attempting to dispose of or hide the money while removing his socks,

while Plaintiff instead asserts that the money merely fell out while removing his sock, (ECF No.

74-4 at 10; ECF No. 74-5 at 5.) During the resulting scuffle over the money, Dear contends that

Plaintiff struck him in the chest with his elbow. (ECF No. 74-5 at 5.) Eckert then struck Plaintiff

in the face with a closed fist, and Plaintiff fell to the ground. (/d.) Plaintiff testified at his

deposition that Dear thereafter punched and kicked him multiple times, rendering him

unconscious. (ECF No. 74-4 at 10-12.) Dear instead testified that he struck Plaintiff only once,

that Plaintiff fell but was not unconscious, and that was the end of the incident. (ECF No. 74-6 at

12.) Dear then cailed for help, and Plaintiff was taken to a secure area and seen by medical staff.

(id.) Plaintiff was charged with multiple disciplinary infractions, including assaulting Dear,

possession of contraband, refusing to obey a staff order, and disruptive conduct. (ECF No, 74-5

at 5.) Plaintiff was ultimately adjudicated guilty of those infractions. (ECF No, 74-8.) Plaintiffs

medical examination indicated that the blow had caused a “complex continued left maxillofacial

fracture involving the anterior maxillary sinus wall, posterior maxillary sinus wall, orbital floor,

and lateral orbital wall and zygomatic arch,” which required surgery and the implanting of titanium

plates to repair, (ECF No. 74-11 at 5-6; ECF No. 74-12 at 1.)

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment where the record

“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of

“identifying those portions of the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is

material “if it bears on an essential element of the plaintiff's claim,” and is genuine if “a reasonable

jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist,, 767 F.3d

247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014), In deciding a motion for summary judgment a district court must “view

the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion,” id., but must not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing

of the evidence, See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,

(however, ] there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Once the moving party has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving

party who must provide evidence sufficient to establish that a reasonable jury could find in the

non-moving party’s favor to warrant the denial of a summary judgment motion. Lawrence v. Nat'l

Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); Serodio v. Rutgers, 27 F, Supp. 3d

546, 550 (D.N.J. 2014).

“A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if

it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor

at trial. However, the party opposing the motion for summary

judgment cannot rest on mere allegations, instead it must present

actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for

trial.”

Serodio, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 550.

ll. DISCUSSION

Defendants first argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's excessive

force claims as the force used was “de minimis” and not in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment excessive force standard, however, applies only to uses of force against

convicted prisoners, see, e.g., Jacobs vy. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 Gd Cir. 2021),

a point Defendants realized in their reply, wherein they instead argue that the use of force was

reasonable and thus not violative of Plaintiffs rights under the Fourth Amendment, which

Defendants contend applies because the in-jail strip search Plaintiff underwent was akin to an

atvest. The Fourth Amendment’s objective standard, however, applies only to uses of force in the

context of arrests, investigatory stops, or other seizures against non-prisoners. /d. As the Supreme

Court has clearly established, the use of force against a pre-trial detainee or other non-convict

detained prisoner is instead evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections. Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015); Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 194, As Plaintiff clearly fel! into this

category at the time of the incidents at question as he had been placed in jail for a drug court

violation but was not serving a sentence for a conviction or violation of probation or parole at the

time in question, Plaintiff's excessive force claim arises out of the Fourteenth Amendment, and

Defendants’ arguments must be evaluated under that rubric.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the central question is whether the force which the

defendant applied to the plaintiff purposely or knowingly was “objectively unreasonable.”

Kingsley, 576 U.S, at 396-97. Courts “cannot apply this standard mechanically” and the

determination of objective reasonableness must turn on the “facts and circumstances of each

particular case,” with reasonableness being determined from the perspective of a reasonable officer

on the scene taking into account what was known to the defendants at the time rather than what

may be apparent in hindsight. /d. at 397; see also Jacobs, 8 F Ath at 194-95, A determination as

to reasonableness will therefore require consideration of “the relationship between the need for the

use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by

the officer to temper or limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the

threat reasonably perceived by the officer, and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.”

Jacobs, 8 F Ath at 194-95 (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).

While it is certainly true that not every push or shove of an inmate will warrant

consideration by a court of law and truly de minimis uses of force will not give rise to liability, see

Jacobs, 8 F 4th at 195 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)), the force used in this

instance can hardly be characterized as de minimis. Even if a Jury were to credit the officer’s

version of events in this matter over that of Plaintiff, the record is still clear that the officer struck

Plaintiff with a closed fist in the eye with sufficient force to cause a significant fracture of the

bones of Plaintiff's eye socket, requiring surgery and titanium implants to repair. That is no minor

contact and Defendants’ contention that such was de minimis is not a reasonable interpretation of

the facts of this matter, Indeed, were a jury instead to credit Plaintiff's version of events and find

that Dear struck Plaintiff a number of times even after he hit the ground and was in and out of

consciousness, clearly the jury could find the force used was objectively unreasonable and

therefore excessive. As this Court must look at the facts of this matter in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff for the purposes of this motion, this Court must conclude that, giving the Plaintiff the

benefit of reasonable inferences, a jury could find that Dear’s actions involved a use of force

beyond that which was reasonable under the circumstances, especially in light of Plaintiff's

testimony that multiple blows were used even after he was incapacitated. While a reasonable

officer at the scene who was either purposefully or accidentally struck in the chest, as Dear testified

he was, could well have concluded that a single blow was warranted to secure Plaintiffand prevent

him from using the potentially dangerous contraband against the officer. Even considering just

the single blow which indisputably occurred, however, if one were to consider the facts in a light

favorable to Plaintiff, it is still possible to conclude that the degree of force used in that single

sttike — sufficient not only to knock Plaintiff down but significantly injure his eye socket to the

extent of requiring surgery — may exceed the amount of force reasonably necessary to secure the

situation, especially where it appeared to the officer that the Plaintiff was attempting to dispose

rather than make use of the contraband as Officer Dear’s testimony and report suggests. Thus,

even considering only that single blow, a reasonable jury could find that the force used was

objectively unreasonable, and find in favor of Plaintiff, and summary judgment is therefore not

warranted.

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff should be constrained from basing his claims on any

facts that are contrary to his disciplinary adjudications for striking an officer, refusing to obey an

order, and possessing contraband. Defendants base this argument on the doctrine first announced

by the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphries, 512 U.S. 477 (1994.) Under Heck, a federal civil

rights action “will not lie when a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement,”

seeks the shortening of his term of imprisonment, or raises a claim the success of which would

undermine the validity of his imprisonment or its length. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79

(2005). Thus, absent the prior invalidation of a jail disciplinary proceeding affecting the length of

a prisoner’s term of imprisonment, a state prisoner’s civil rights suit “is barred (absent prior

invalidation) — no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the

prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) — if success in

that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [his} confinement or its duration.” /d.

at 81-82. Here, Plaintiff asserts that the force against him was excessive, a finding which a

reasonable juror could make for the reasons expressed above even assuming that Plaintiff did have

contraband, did resist Dear’s orders, and did strike Dear with his elbow during the scuffle at the

end of the strip search. Thus, Heck in no way bars Plaintiff's claim.’ Heck likewise does not serve

as a basis to preclude or limit Plaintiff's testimony as the “Heck doctrine . . . has never clearly been

held to provide a basis for issue preclusion.” Altagracia v. Viola, No, 21-13017, 2022 WL

17417112, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2022).

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's

excessive fore claims. “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials who

perform discretionary functions ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.’” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 417 Gd Cir. 2015) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)), “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects ail but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.,

800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, (2011)). In

determining whether immunity applies, courts use a two-pronged test: “a court must decide

“whether the facts that a plaintiff has... shown make out a violation of a constitutional right’[,

second, the Court must determine ‘whether the right at issue was clearly established at the

Although part of the punishment related to these infractions involved a loss of jail credits,

Plaintiff was not serving a sentence, and it does not appear that one arose from this incident to

which any such credits could or did apply. It thus doesn’t appear that the credits actually did affect

the fact or length of Plaintiff's term of imprisonment, and Heck may well also be inapplicable for

that reason,

time of [the] defendants alleged misconduct.’”” Jd. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S, 223,

232 (2009)).

As this Court explained above, a reasonable juror could conclude from the facts at hand

that the force used against Plaintiff was unreasonable, and that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment

rights had been violated, The remaining question, then, is whether Plaintiff's claim was “clearly

established” as of late July 2020. For a claim to be clearly established, “existing precedent [must

have] placed the . . . constitutional [right in] question beyond debate.” Id. at 638. With the

exception of cases involving “obvious violations” of prior Supreme Court rulings, a plaintiff's

claim will only be “clearly established” where “the violative nature of the particular conduct [was]

clearly established.” James y. New Jersey State Pol., 957 F.3d 165, 169 3d Cir. 2020). The

conduct in question must therefore be defined at an “appropriate level of specificity,” Spady, 800

F.3d at 638, and, when so defined, the plaintiff must identify “a case where an officer acting under

similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated” the constitutional provision in question,

James, 957 F.3d at 169-70, For the purposes of this analysis, “clearly established rights are derived

either from binding Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent or from a robust consensus of

cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals” in effect at the time of the conduct in

question. Jd. at 170.

That an officer may not use force against inmates which is divorced from legitimate

penological purposes has long been clearly established. Jacobs, 8 F. 4th at 197; see also Kingsley,

576 U.S. at 396-97; Hope y. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002); Rhodes v, Chapman, 452 US. 337,

346 (1981). It has likewise long been clear from a wide array of caselaw that an officer may not

use force against a prisoner who has been incapacitated. Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 197 (collecting cases

predating this incident). Looking at the events of this matter in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

a juty which credited Plaintiff could find that he was struck by Defendant Dear while attempting

to cooperate with a strip search for contraband, and was then struck after being incapacitated and

knocked to the ground, resulting in severe injuries to his eye. As the Third Circuit made clear in

Jacobs, that such an incident was contrary to the law had been clearly established prior to February

2015, and thus well before the events at issue in this matter. 8 F.4th at 191, 197. Plaintiff's claim

was thus clearly established, and Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's

excessive force claims.

In their final argument, Defendants contend that Plaintiff should be prohibited from

obtaining non-economic damages for his state law claims as such damages are prohibited under

the N.J. Tort Claims Act in the absence of permanent injuries where medical treatment expenses

exceed $3600. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-2(d). Under that statute, a plaintiff seeking to recover

under state law for pain and suffering must show “an objective permanent injury” and “a

permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial.” Nieves v. Office af the Public Defender, 241

N.J, 567, 581 (2020); Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395, 406 (1997), The New Jersey Supreme Court

has held that, where an injury results in serious injury that requires the implanting of medical

devices such as pins, wires, or plates to restore relatively normal functioning, such an injury still

qualifies both as permanent and having caused a permanent loss of bodily function which is

substantial, notwithstanding that the medical implants may have restored the injured party to

relatively normal functioning. Gilhooley v. Cnty. Of Union, 164 .N.J. 533, 541-42 (2000). In this

case, the repair of Plaintiff's eye required the implantation of titanium plates to hold his eye socket

together and restore relatively normal functioning. Without those plates, Plaintiff's eye socket

would likely not have healed properly and he would have had a permanent loss of proper

functioning. His injuries thus clearly fall within the four walls of Gilhooley, and he is not barred

from recovery under the statute for non-economic damages. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 74) is denied. An

appropriate order follows.

F oh, Karen M. Williams,

‘United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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