The opinion
[ECF No. 52]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
M.L., et al., individually and on behalf of
J.N.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 22-7244 (CPO/EAP)
v.
HADDONFIELD BOROUGH BOARD OPINION
OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration, ECF
No. 52,1 of this Court’s October 11, 2023 Letter Order, ECF No. 51 (“Ltr. Order”), denying
Plaintiffs’ application to consolidate this matter with two newly filed matters. The Court has
received Defendant’s letter in opposition to the Motion, ECF No. 55, and having considered the
parties’ submissions, decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78(b). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
On October 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a letter with the Court requesting consolidation of this
matter with two newly filed matters: Haddonfield Borough Board of Education v. M.L. and T.N.
1 Although docketed as a “Motion for Consolidation,” Plaintiffs’ Motion is more properly
categorized as a Motion for Reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7(i). First, Plaintiffs’ brief in
support of the Motion begins, “Plaintiffs respectfully seek to have this Court reconsider its
10/11/23 Order.” ECF No. 52-4 (“Pls.’ Br.”) at 1. Second, Plaintiffs cite Local Civil Rule 7.1(i)
along with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50, 52, and 59 in support of their argument. See id.
n.1. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that this Court “overlooked or did not address a number of factors
favoring consolidation of all cases.” Id. at 5. Because this Motion requests relief already denied
in this Court’s prior Order, ECF No. 51, and because Plaintiffs explicitly request reconsideration
of that Order, the present Motion is most appropriately considered a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court treats it as such.
o/b/o J.N., No. 23-20676 (CPO)(EAP) (filed on Sept. 26, 2023), and M.L. and T.N., individually
and o/b/o J.N. v. Haddonfield Borough Board of Education, No. 23-20732 (CPO)(EAP) (filed on
Sept. 27, 2023). ECF No. 49. Plaintiffs argued that consolidation of all three matters is appropriate
because they are all based on the December 7, 2022 Final Order of Administrative Law Judge
Tricia M. Caliguire (“ALJ”). See ECF No. 1-1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiffs asserted that although the
two newly filed cases relate to the ALJ’s June 29, 2023 Final Order regarding J.N.’s educational
placement, consolidation is appropriate because the ALJ “made further ultra vires findings and
orders regarding the 12/7/22 Final Order’s evaluation findings and orders of JN.” ECF No. 49.
Finally, Plaintiffs asserted that consolidation “would be in furtherance of [the] legislature’s intent
to minimiz[e] the litigation burden to families of disabled children.” Id.
Defendant opposed Plaintiffs’ application for consolidation. First, Defendant argued that
the cases are in completely different states of litigation and consolidation would delay resolution
of this matter. ECF No. 50 at 2. Second, Defendant argued that consolidation was inappropriate
because this matter stems from the ALJ’s December 7, 2022 Final Order denying Plaintiffs’
request for an independent evaluation (“IEE”) of J.N., whereas the newly filed cases relate to J.N.’s
educational placement. Id. As such, the newly filed cases and this matter present distinct legal
issues and are supported by “vastly different administrative records.” Id.
On October 11, 2023, this Court, after considering the parties’ submissions and the
standard for consolidation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), denied Plaintiffs’
application for consolidation. See Ltr. Order. The Court explained that consolidation of all three
matters would be inappropriate because, “[a]lthough some commonality exists, the ALJ’s Final
Orders dispose of two separate due process petitions that raise distinct issues.” Id. at 3. The Court
further explained that consolidation would “impede the efficient resolution of this case,” which
has an impending dispositive motion filing deadline of November 22, 2023. Id. at 3; ECF No. 48
(“Am. Scheduling Order”) ¶ 1. The Court recognized the particular importance of this matter
being resolved “sooner rather than later” because “almost ten months ago, the ALJ recognized that
J.N. needs a re-evaluation in order for Defendant to determine an appropriate educational
placement.” Ltr. Order at 3. Finally, the Court noted that “the two newly filed matters have greater
commonality of fact and law than the three cases together.” Id. Although the Court rejected
Plaintiffs’ request to consolidate all three cases, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a motion
to consolidate only the two newly filed matters by October 20, 2023. Id.
Plaintiffs did not file a motion to consolidate the two newly filed matters. Instead, on
October 25, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the present Motion seeking reconsideration of the Court’s Order.
ECF No. 52. In support, Plaintiffs rehash the arguments they already made in support of
consolidation under Rule 42(a): namely, (1) that all three cases arise from the ALJ’s December 7,
2022 Final Order; (2) that consolidation of all three matters is appropriate because the ALJ’s June
29, 2023 Final Order “made ultra vires findings and orders regarding the claims at stake in the
12/7/22 Final Order”; and (3) that no delay would result from consolidation because “virtually no
substantive proceedings have occurred in [this matter].” Pls.’ Br. at 5, 9-10. Plaintiffs, however,
failed to cite the standard for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) or any cases explaining
what is required for reconsideration.
On November 6, 2023, Defendant filed a letter opposing the Motion for Reconsideration.
ECF No. 55 (“Def.’s Opp.”). Defendant argues that “reconsideration is likely to cause unnecessary
delay in the resolution of the IEE Cases and has the potential to cause unnecessary confusion and
prejudice in the resolution of all these matters.” Id. at 1. Defendant notes that the dispositive
motion deadline in this case is fast approaching, while the two new matters were just filed in
September 2023. Id. Furthermore, Defendant argues against consolidation because the ALJ did
not “re-evaluate or modify her December 7, 2023 Order when issuing the decision in the [newly
filed] Placement Cases.” Id. at 2.
In the District of New Jersey, a motion for reconsideration is governed by Local Civil Rule
7.1(i). In re Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 13-3306, 2016 WL 1628879, at *2 (D.N.J.
Apr. 25, 2016). The rule provides in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule . . . , a motion for reconsideration shall
be served and filed within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the
original motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge. A brief setting forth concisely
the matter or controlling decision which the party believed the Judge or Magistrate
has overlooked shall be filed with the Notice of Motion.
L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) permits a party to seek reconsideration of matters that the Court has
overlooked when it first ruled. Champion Laby’s, Inc. v. Metex Corp., 677 F. Supp. 2d 748, 750
(D.N.J. 2010). “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration . . . is to correct manifest errors of
law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc.
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted).
An order may be altered or amended only if the moving party demonstrates: “(1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the
court [issued the original order or judgment]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. Reconsideration will be granted only where the Court has
overlooked a controlling factual or legal issue which, if considered now, might reasonably alter
the result of the previous determination. White v. City of Trenton, 848 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (D.N.J.
2012) (citing Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (D.N.J. 2001)).
“Relief by way of a motion for reconsideration is ‘an extraordinary remedy’ that is to be
granted ‘very sparingly.’” White, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (quoting Interfaith Cmty. Org. v.
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 482, 507 (D.N.J. 2002)); Niblack v. Albino, No. 09-428
(RBK), 2010 WL 1253919, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2010) (citing United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D.
309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994)) (noting the standard for reconsideration, formerly re-argument, is “high”
and is to be granted “only sparingly”). Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration is not a means
by which a party disappointed by the previous determination may simply reargue his position,
express his disagreement with the court’s conclusion, or merely ask the court to rethink its
conclusion. See Fittipaldi v. Monmouth Univ., No. 20-5526, 2021 WL 6137513, at *4 (D.N.J.
Dec. 29, 2021) (quoting Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (alteration in original))
(observing that a motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to “ask the court to rethink what
it ha[s] already thought through.”); see also In re Metformin Mkt. & Sales Pracs. Litig., No. 20-
2324, 2020 WL 9397553, at *2 & n.4 (Sept. 30, 2020).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i).
Aside from Plaintiffs’ assertion that this Court “overlooked or did not address a number of factors
favoring consolidation of all cases,” Pls.’ Br. at 5, Plaintiffs have failed to address any of the Max’s
Seafood considerations. To be sure, Plaintiffs have not presented an intervening change in the
controlling law, newly discovered evidence, factual issues that were overlooked, or clear errors of
law or fact that would warrant a different ruling to prevent manifest injustice. Instead, Plaintiffs
rely on the same facts and law considered and rejected by this Court in its original Order. At
bottom, Plaintiffs simply disagree with the Court’s Order, which does not constitute “manifest
injustice.” See, e.g., In re Metformin Mkt. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 2020 WL 9397553, at *2 & n.4
(citing Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of Am., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 834, 859 n.8 (D.N.J. 1992), aff’d
mem., 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994)) (denying a motion for consideration because the movant
“failed to identify” one of the Max’s Seafood considerations and noting that “[d]isagreement with
the Court’s ruling, by itself, is not a valid basis for reconsideration”); Blount v. TD Bank, N.A., No.
20-18805, 2023 WL 7403603, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2023) (“Plaintiff appears now to contend that
her . . . allegations were adequately pled, and that dismissal of any kind was inappropriate. This
disagreement is insufficient to support a motion for reconsideration.”) (internal citation omitted);
see also G-69 v. Degnan., 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990) (quoting Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A.
v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989)) (“A party seeking reconsideration must show
more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and ‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments
considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s
burden.’”). For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED.
One final note: the dispositive motion due date of November 22, 2023 stands. The Court
will not countenance any further delay in this case. The issue of J.N.’s IEE must be resolved. That
aside, the Court will grant Plaintiffs one last opportunity to file a motion to consolidate only the
two newly filed matters, No. 23-20676 and No. 23-20732, if they so choose, no later than
November 30, 2023. An appropriate order follows.
s/ Elizabeth A. Pascal
ELIZABETH A. PASCAL
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Hon. Christine P. O’Hearn, U.S.D.J.