FREDERICK OF THE FAMILY GONORA v. RISCH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FREDERICK OF THE FAMILY

GONORA,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-893 (RK) (TJB)

v. OPINION

PATRICIA RISCH,

Defendant.

KIRSCH, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant

Patricia Risch, Director of the Office of Child Support Services (““OCSS”) for the State of New

Jersey (“Defendant”). (ECF No. 9.) The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions

and decides the motions without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b)

and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who is pro se, identifies himself as “Frederick of the Family Gonora, a Free man

defined under the [New Jersey] Constitution Article I section I as free and independent, and

hav[ing]| certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending

life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining

safety and happiness ....” (Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at *1.) Plaintiff's Complaint is

difficult to construe. It appears that he has been the subject of various child support judgment

orders from March 18, 2016 through the present, resulting in ongoing garnishment proceedings in

Monmouth County. Ud. at *7-10.) Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to ninety-six (96)

“counts” of unlawful taking pursuant to Income Withholding Orders (“IWO’s”) from the

Monmouth County Probation Unit, resulting in garnishments of $180.00 monthly from Plaintiff's

earned income, to satisfy various alleged arrears. (/d. at *7—-8.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was

forced to “pay a third party or face arrest and indefinite incarceration if 2 monthly payments are

missed,” that his economic stimulus funds were seized in April, 2020, and that his passport was

revoked in November, 2022 when the alleged arrears were reported. (/d. at *8, 11.)

Plaintiff alleges that the Monmouth County judges lacked jurisdiction to impose these

orders. Ud. at *7.) He alleges that OCSS, who is responsible for the administration of the Child

Support Program in New Jersey,' enters into “Cooperative Agreements with entities including

[t]he New Jersey Judiciary’s Administrative Office of the Courts [“AOC”] and the respective

components of the judicial districts, namely, the Family Division, the Probation Division (Child

Support)[,] and the Finance Division to carry out [its] responsibilities . . . .°* Plaintiff further states

that Article VI, Section VI, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution forbids Superior Court

Judges from holding other offices or positions of profit.’ Plaintiff appears to be alleging that the

Monmouth County judges who issued the child support judgment orders lacked jurisdiction

because, by entering into a Cooperative Agreement with OCSS, they acted as employees of OCSS

in violation of Article VI of the New Jersey Constitution. Plaintiff thus argues that the child support

orders are “invalid non judicial orders” which violate his civil rights and are therefore “null and

' 42 U.S.C. 654.3 provides requirements for the States’ plans for child and spousal support.

N.IA.C, § 10:110-2.1 provides that “[t]he Department [of Human Services] may enter into cooperative

agreements with public entities in accordance with 45 C.F.R. 302.34 and contracts with private entities for

the purpose of carrying out the responsibilities granted to the Division’s OCSS ....”

3 Article VI, Section VI, paragraph 7 provides that “the Judges of the Superior Court shall hold no other

office or position, of profit, under this State or the United States.”

void.” Ud. at *7, *12.) Plaintiff also alleges that OCCS is responsible for monitoring the activities

of the AOC included in the Cooperative Agreement.‘ (/d. at *5.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant,

as Director of OCSS, “fail[ed] to monitor violations of Constitutional rights by AOC.” (/d. at *12.)

Plaintiff brings an involuntary servitude claim under the Thirteenth Amendment and claims

under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment based on Section

1983, as well as a claim under the bill of attainder clause. Ud. at *7-11, 19.) Plaintiff asks the

Court to “remove the Alleged Arrears,” close the family court matter in Monmouth County “with

a Zero dollar amount in arrears,” order a “refund of all property unlawfully taken by [the income

withholding orders]” in the family court matter in Monmouth County “from March 18, 2016 to

Present day,” and order an “accounting for 12% interest on property taken since March 18, 2016.”

(Ud. at *18). Plaintiff also seek punitive damages and court costs. (/d.)

U. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this action on February 16, 2023. (Compl.) On March 17, 2023, Defendant

requested an extension of time to respond to the Complaint. (ECF No. 5.) That same day, Plaintiff

filed a Request for Default, which was denied by the Clerk of Court given that Defendant had

entered an appearance. (ECF No. 6.) On March 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify the

New Jersey Office of the Attorney General as defense counsel. (ECF No. 7.) This motion was

denied by the Honorable Rukhsanah Singh. (ECF No. 17.) On April 3, 2023, Defendant moved to

dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (ECF No. 9.)° On May 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

4N.J.A.C. § 10:110-3.4 provides that “OCSS shall be shall be responsible for monitoring the activities

included in the Cooperative Agreement between the [Probation] Division and AOC ....”

> Thereafter, Plaintiff also filed a “Statement of Claim” purportedly brought under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a). (ECF No. 12.) Rule 8(a) requires a “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007) (explaining the federal pleading requirements). The rule provides the standards for pleading a cause

Discovery, (ECF No. 18), and on July 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,

(ECF No. 21). On August 2, 2023, this Court administratively terminated Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment pending resolution of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 24), and on

September 5, 2023, Magistrate Judge Singh denied Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery, finding good

cause to stay discovery also pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 25).

Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss brought under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 9.) Defendant raises several arguments for dismissal.

First, because Plaintiff seeks damages from actions that occurred beginning March 18, 2016, yet

only filed his Complaint in February 2023, many of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable

two-year statute of limitations. (/d. at 1.) Second, this Court should not exercise jurisdiction over

Plaintiff's Complaint based on the Younger and Rooker-Feldman doctrines. (/d. at 1-2.) Third,

Plaintiffs Complaint sets forth no allegations that could establish a Thirteenth Amendment claim.

Fourth, any claims arising from Defendant’s compliance with a court order for garnishment fail

because Defendant is protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Fifth, Plaintiff’s claims under the

doctrine of respondeat superior fail because Plaintiff does not allege any personal involvement on

the part of Defendant. (/d. at 2-3.) Finally, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of qualified

of action in federal court; nothing in the rule provides an independent basis to submit a filing in addition to

a complaint. Thus, Plaintiff subsequent “Statement of Claim” will not be considered by the Court.

Plaintiff also filed a “Request to Take Judicial Notice” of the “the facts of his constitutional deprivations

by the Defendant”—namely, that the Cooperative Agreement between Defendant and the New Jersey

judiciary violates the Separation of Powers doctrine. (ECF No. 15.) “A court may take judicial notice of

facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are either ‘generally known within the trial

court’s territorial jurisdiction’ or ‘can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.’” Sturgeon v. Pharmerica Corp., 438 F. Supp. 3d 246, 257 (E.D. Pa.

2020) (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 201(b)(2)). Defendant’s alleged violation of Plaintiffs

Constitutional rights is subject to reasonable dispute; indeed, the issue is central to the Court’s adjudication

of this matter and thus may not be judicially noticed.

immunity. Ud. at 3.) On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition, (ECF No. 11), and on

May 8, 2023, Defendant filed a reply, (ECF No. 13).’

Tl. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (12)(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” For a complaint to survive dismissal, it

“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must accept all well-

pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the non-moving party. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008); in re

Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 336 F. Supp. 3d 395, 406 (D.N.J. 2018). “A pleading that offers labels and

conclusions or a formulistic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a

complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted). It is well established that a pro se

complaint “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 500 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The

’ Plaintiff argues in his brief in opposition that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be treated as a motion

for summary judgment. (ECF No. 11 at *8.) Plaintiff then argues that, because Defendant’s motion was

“unsupported by affidavits or depositions,” it ts somehow “[i]ncomplete.” (/d.) In reviewing a 12(b)(6)

motion, a court should generally only consider facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached thereto,

and matters of judicial notice. S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Lid., 181 F.3d 410,

426 (3d Cir. 1999). “If any other matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court, and the court does

not exclude those matters, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be treated as a summary judgment motion... .”

Miller Indus. Towing Equip. Inc. v. NRC Indus., 582 F. Supp. 3d 199, 203 (D.N.J. 2022). The only

attachments to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss are Plaintiff's Complaint, the certification of counsel and

certificate of service, and a proposed order. Such matters do not convert Defendant’s motion to a summary

judgment motion, and thus, the Court considers the motion under the standards of Rule 12(b)(6).

Court is obligated to construe pro se claims liberally and afford pro se plaintiffs the benefit of

every doubt. Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F, App’x 924, 926 (3d Cir, 2005).

IV. DISCUSSION

Because jurisdiction is the threshold issue in this case, the Court will first consider the

Court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims. A federal district court’s duty to exercise its

jurisdiction conferred by Congress is “virtually unflagging.” Colorado River Water Conservation

Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). There are limited circumstances, however, where a court

may or must abstain from exercising its jurisdiction.

a. Younger Abstention Doctrine

Abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),

is rooted in “a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial

proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State

Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982).8 Federal courts may abstain from exercising jurisdiction

under the Younger abstention doctrine in three categories of proceedings: “(1) ongoing state

criminal prosecutions; (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) pending civil proceedings

involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial

functions.” Malhan y. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 462 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Sprint

Commce’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78-79 (2013)) (quotations and additional citations

omitted). Ifa court finds that the subject proceeding fits one of the above categories, the court must

“Strictly speaking, Younger abstention is not analyzed under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).”

Yarborough v. Johnson, No. 18-2688, 2018 WL 6567701, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2018) (quoting Knox v.

Union Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 13-5875, 2015 WL 769930, at *5 n.7 (DN.J. Feb. 23, 2015)). That said,

“Tdjismissal on abstention grounds without retention of jurisdiction is in the nature of a dismissal under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1206 n.18

(3d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, “courts in this District have treated [a motion to dismiss on the basis of|

Younger abstention as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . in that matters outside of the pleadings are not

to be considered.” Yarborough, 2018 WL 6567701, at *1.

then consider the additional Middlesex factors: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are

judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state

proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.” /d. (citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at

81-82 and Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 423).

Plaintiff's claims appear to pertain to ongoing garnishment proceedings. Plaintiff alleges

that the Monmouth County Probation unit has been unlawfully withholding $180.00 monthly from

Plaintiff's earned income “starting from March 18, 2016 to Present day.” (Compl. at *7, 10

(emphasis added).) Plaintiff also alleges that the proceeding “has not ended or reached final

conclusion” and asks the Court to remove the arrears currently imposed on him and close the case.

(id. at *15, *17.)

Courts in this Circuit have overwhelmingly abstained under the Younger doctrine when

faced with challenges to ongoing child support proceedings. See, e.g., Gittens v. Kelly, 790 F.

App’x 439, 441 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“To the extent that the state court proceeding

regarding [plaintiffs] child support obligations were ongoing, the District Court properly invoked

the Younger abstention doctrine.”); Dixon In re Burrell, 626 F. App’x 33, 35 (3d Cir, 2015)

(denying petition for writ of mandamus because “[f]ederal courts usually abstain from deciding

civil actions such as [plaintiff's] where state child support proceedings implicate important state

interests, and the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise claims.”); DiPietro v.

New Jersey Fam. Support Payment Ctr., 375 F. App’x 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2010) (‘The District Court

correctly found that the requirements for abstention are met” in a case challenging ongoing child

support obligations); Dixon v. Kuhn, 257 F. App’x 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); see also

Dormevil vy. Domestic Rels. Off Delaware Cnty. Pennsylvania Child Support Agency, No. 23-

3025, 2023 WL 6144845, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2023) (abstaining under Younger in a challenge

to child support proceedings); Kastler of the Fam. Joseph v. Washington Cnty. Domestic Rels.

Unit, No. 19-00781, 2020 WL 429124, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2020) (same); Ridinger v.

Williams, No. 18-1922, 2020 WL 374837, at *1 n.1 (D. Del. Jan. 23, 2020) (“To the extent that

state court proceedings are pending or ongoing in [plaintiffs] child support matter, the Younger

abstention doctrine applies.”); Spageage Consulting Corp. v. Porrino, No. 17-6299, 2018 WL

1169133, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2018) (“The State Garnishment Order was issued as part of a

matrimonial, child custody, and child support dispute . . . that is ongoing in New Jersey state court.

Thus, this Court’s intervention ... is barred by the Younger abstention doctrine.”); Sheils vy. Bucks

Cnty. Domestic Rels. Section, 921 F. Supp. 2d 396, 410 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (abstaining under Younger

from considering claims pertaining to ongoing child support proceedings). But see Pittman v.

Grewal, No. 20-06696, 2022 WL 489459, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2022) (finding that abstention

under Younger was not appropriate in a challenge to a child support order), aff'd sub nom. LoPresti

v. Johnson, No. 22-1435, 2023 WL 6890732 (3d Cir. Oct. 19, 2023) (affirming the district court

on other grounds).

The Court finds that Plaintiff's ongoing garnishment proceeding fits into the third category

of cases wherein courts should abstain under Younger: pending civil proceedings involving certain

orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions. See

Dormevil, 2023 WL 6144845, at *4 (Child support cases fall squarely in the third category of

exceptional cases.”); see also Shallenberger v. Allegheny Cnty., No. 20-00073, 2020 WL 1465853,

at *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2020) (noting that Courts in the Third Circuit have “repeatedly held” that

child-custody cases fit squarely into the third category of cases).’ Indeed, Plaintiff appears to be

The case at bar is distinguishable from Ma/han wherein the Third Circuit held that a state agency’s

disclosure of the plaintiff's bank records and administrative levy on his bank account and a state court order

refusing to allow the plaintiff to file counterclaims and offsets to his child support debt were not orders

uniquely in furtherance of the state court’s ability to perform its judicial function under category three. 983

challenging a number of orders issued by the family court in the garnishment proceedings that

“ensure that the family courts can perform their functions,” such as the revocation of his passport

and the threat of incarceration, which are similar to the examples given in Malhan, such as civil

contempt orders, that the Court determined would uniquely further the state court’s judicial

function. 938 F.3d at 463.

Having determined that the matter falls into one of the requisite categories, the Court turns

to the Middlesex factors and finds that each factor militates in favor of abstention. Beginning with

the first factor, the Court find that there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature.

“State proceedings are pending only if they are initiated before any proceedings of substance on

the merits have taken place in federal court.” Malhan, 938 F.3d at 464. As noted above, the

Complaint alleges the existence of a state court proceeding that was initiated at least as early as

March 18, 2016 and appears to be ongoing. (See Compl. at *7, 10 (complaining of income

withholding orders that “starting from March 18, 2016 to Present day.” (emphasis added)); id. at

*15 (alleging that the proceeding “has not ended or reached final conclusion”)); see also DiPietro,

375 Fed. App’x at 204 (finding that child support proceedings are ongoing because “New Jersey

courts are charged with monitoring, enforcing, and modifying child support obligations throughout

the duration of a child support order” (citing Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2003));

Yarborough, 2018 WL 6567701, at *2 (finding that child support obligations constitute ongoing

state proceedings (citing Anthony, 316 F.3d at 420)).!°

F.3d at 463. The Malhan Court expressly declined to determine whether family court garnishment orders

fit into this third category because the state had ceased garnishing the plaintiff's wages, vacated its

garnishment order, and had not issued another—thus there were no pending garnishment proceedings, 938

F.3d at 463-65. The Malhan Court also pointed out that the plaintiff was not trying to “annul the results of

a past garnishment.” Jd. at 465. Not so here. In this case, Plaintiff undoubtedly seeks to both terminate an

ongoing garnishment proceeding and annul the results of past garnishment orders.

0 In Anthony v. Council, the Third Circuit explained that a person under a New Jersey state-court child

support obligation “is party to an open case that will not terminate until the child support order is finally

Turning to the second factor, the Third Circuit has held that “there is no question that state

child support proceedings implicate important state interests.” DiPietro, 375 Fed. App’x at 205;

see also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“[fjamily relations are a traditional area of state

concern”). Finally, with respect to the third factor, there is a presumption that state courts are

equally competent and willing to hear federal statutory and constitutional claims. Pennzoil Co. v.

Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17 (1987). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any obstacle to raising his

present grievances in state court, and thus there is no basis to conclude that Plaintiff would not be

afforded adequate opportunity to raise his claims in state court. See DiPietro, 375 Fed. App’x at

205 (finding that plaintiff challenging child support obligations was “able to raise his claims in

state court and to appeal adverse decisions through the state appellate system and to the United

States Supreme Court.”). Accordingly, Younger abstention applies,'! and the Court declines to

exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's challenges to the ongoing garnishment proceedings. !”

discharged.” 316 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2003). While the Third Circuit noted in a footnote in Ma/lhan that

Anthony was abrogated by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Spriné because Anthony only applies the

Middlesex factors without first determining whether the state court action fit into one of the three categories

recognized in Sprint, see Mathan, 938 F.3d at 462 n.4, nothing in Sprint affected Anthony's description of

state-court child support obligations. Indeed, the Third Circuit has, in a post-Malhan opinion, cited Anthony

for the proposition that “abstention was proper where persons held in civil contempt for failing to comply

with their child support orders alleged violations of their due process rights.” Giftens, 790 F. App’x at 441.

The Court also notes that Plaintiff previously filed a separate case in federal court against OCSS and

various Monmouth County defendants challenging their establishment of his paternity which he alleged

deprived him of his Constitutional rights. Gonora v. Off. of Child Support Servs., No. 18-3793, 2019 WL

13271888 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2019), aff'd sub nom. Frederick of Fam. Gonora vy. Off. of Child Support Servs.,

783 F. App’x 250 (3d Cir. 2019). The District Court dismissed Plaintiff's case with prejudice based on the

Younger abstention doctrine. /d. at *3. Plaintiff appealed, and the district court’s decision was affirmed by

the Third Circuit. Frederick of Fam. Gonora v. Off. of Child Support Servs., 783 F. App’x 250, 252-53 (3d

Cir. 2019).

'2 Defendant argues that the Court is also barred from exercising jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. (ECF No. 9 at 10-11.) In Malhan, the Third Circuit cautioned that Rooker-Feldman “does not

apply when state proceedings have neither ended nor led to orders reviewable by the United States Supreme

Court.” 938 F.3d at 460. Rather, federal courts are only barred from exercising jurisdiction when (1) the

state court of last resort has affirmed the judgment; (2) the time to appeal has expired or the parties

voluntarily terminated litigation; or (3) the state court has resolved all federal issues even when state law

or factual issues remain. id. at 459-60, see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 291 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman applies when “the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court

b. Failure to State a Claim

Even if the Court were to exercise jurisdiction over this case, the Court nonetheless finds

that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant fail for three reasons: (1) Defendant is immune from suit

based on the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity; (2) Plaintiff may not state claims under Section

1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior; and (3) Plaintiff fails to state a bill of attainder

claim.

Turning first to Defendant’s immunity from suit: the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity

“evolved out of its well-known namesake, judicial immunity,” which protects judges from liability

for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. Russell vy. Richardson, 905 F.3d

239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018). The fair administration of justice depends not only on judges, however.

Id. Thus, the immunity doctrine has been extended to “certain others who perform functions

closely associated with the judicial process,” id. (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200

(1985), including “those who serve as arms of the court, .. . fulfill[ing] a quasi-judicial role at the

court’s request,” id. (quoting Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks

omitted). The Third Circuit has explained that quasi-judicial immunity “extends to the acts

authorized by court order, i.e., to the execution of a court order,” but not to the manner in which a

court order is executed. Jd. at 250.

Plaintiff alleges vaguely that Defendant “is the master liable for the OCSS’s actions,

including failing to monitor violations of Constitutional rights by AOC.” (Compl. at *12.) To the

after the state proceedings ended”). Thus, in Malhan, the Court concluded that interlocutory orders in child

support proceedings, such as garnishment orders, were not final judgments within the meaning of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 938 F.3d at 461. It is difficult to discern from Plaintiff's Complaint whether he

is challenging final judgments in child support proceedings that have ended. A cogent argument can be

made that, by challenging a judgment for $251,387.02 from 2016 and judgments for a total of $163,494.56

from 2022, (Compl. at *7), Plaintiff is attempting to challenge final judgments from closed proceedings.

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to challenge such judgments, the Court would be barred from

exercising jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.

extent that Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant liable for OCSS’s role in executing court orders

pertaining to Plaintiff's garnishment proceedings, those claims are barred by the doctrine of quasi-

judicial immunity. See Dormevil, 2023 WL 6144845, at *6 (finding that the director and officers

of the office of domestic relations were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for their actions in

connection with child support proceedings).

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant unrelated to her

alleged execution of court orders, Plaintiffs claims still fail because liability under Section 1983

generally cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior. Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of

Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015). Rather, a plaintiff seeking to bring claims based on

constitutional violations under Section 1983 must demonstrate that the defendant had personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs. see also Murphy v. Middlesex Cnty., 361 F. Supp. 3d 376,

387 (D.N.J. 2019). Accordingly, there are two potential theories of supervisory liability for Section

1983 claims: (1) that the supervisor “participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others

to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’

violations”; or (2) that the supervisor “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established

and maintained a policy, custom, or practice which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” 4.M!.

ex rel J. MK. y. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff expressly states in his Complaint that he is bringing his claims “[u]nder the

Respondeat Superior doctrine.” (Compl. at 12.) He appears to be attempting to hold Defendant

liable for the AOC’s alleged violations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff

fails to allege that Defendant personally participated in violating his constitutional rights or, as

Director of OCSS, had supervisory authority over employees of the AOC, or established a policy,

custom, or practice that directly caused Plaintiff's alleged constitutional harms. Thus, Plaintiff's

respondeat superior liability claims against Defendant fail.

Finally, the Court briefly notes that Plaintiff's attempt to bring a claim against Defendant

based on the bill of attainder clause also clearly fails. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which

inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468

(1977). The garnishment proceeding challenged by Plaintiff does not constitute a legislative act.

See, e.g., Stanko v. Obama, 434 F. App’x 63, 66 Cir. 2011) (finding that a prisoner’s argument

that his disciplinary hearing constituted an unlawful bill of attainder was a “non-starter” because

it is not a legislative act). Having found that Plaintiff's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment and

bill of attainder claims fail, the Court finds dismissal appropriate and finds it unnecessary to

address Defendant’s remaining arguments.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’

Complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this

Opinion. Gf?

ROBERT KIRSCH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: November 30, 2023