finding challenge to parole revocation unexhausted because Petitioner did not appeal the decision in the state court, as permitted under state law
How later courts described this case
- finding challenge to parole revocation unexhausted because Petitioner did not appeal the decision in the state court, as permitted under state law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
AARON HANDY, Jr.,
Plaintiff
Civil No. 23-2390 (RMB/MJS)
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE OPINION
BOARD, et al.,
Defendants
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 1) filed pro se by Plaintiff Aaron Handy, Jr., a pretrial
detainee confined in Cumberland County Correctional Facility in Bridgeton, New
Jersey at the time he filed the complaint. Plaintiff has since been released from
pretrial confinement. (Dkt. No. 4.) Plaintiff submitted an application under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Docket No. 3), which establishes his financial eligibility to proceed
in forma pauperis, and the application will be granted. Plaintiff, however, will not be
required to submit the filing fee in installment payments from his prisoner trust
account pursuant to § 1915(a)(2), because he is no longer confined.1 For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
I. Sua Sponte Dismissal
When a person is granted IFP status, courts must review the complaint and
sua sponte dismiss any claims that are: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “The legal standard for
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). Thus, [“t]o survive dismissal, ‘a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Id. at 122-23 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Moreover, “courts have an
independent obligation to satisfy themselves of jurisdiction if it is in doubt.” Nesbit v.
Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 76–77 (3d Cir. 2003).
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Complaint
The defendants named in the complaint are Michael Schreiber, Esq. and the
New Jersey State Parole Board. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 12.) Plaintiff asserts
1 Plaintiff also submitted a $5 filing fee, which is the fee required for filing a petition for writ
of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 3.) The relief Plaintiff seeks is to be “removed
from Megan’s law” and for an unspecified injunction. (Id. at 13.) For his claim
against New Jersey State Parole Board, Plaintiff alleges:
I was in South Woods State Prison, as I recall, in 2003. I
was brought into a room, and they told me I had to sign
these new conditions or I wouldn’t be released back into
society. I felt coerced into doing so. My alternative the
lady stated I would be civilly committed and would never
go home.
(Id. at 12.) For his claim against Michael Schreiber, Esq., Plaintiff alleges:
Defendant Michael Schreiber, assigned pool attorney at
that time, never went over my discovery packet with me. I
was never asked if I was innocent, and treated like
criminal upon encountering my representation. I also
never spoke to him until my sentencing time of only of
what I should take. I was under the false premise that I
would be serving a life sentence.
B. Whether the Court Has Jurisdiction under § 1983 to Grant the Relief
Requested
The proper means of seeking immediate or earlier release from confinement,
is through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489,
93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); see also Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 890 (9th
Cir.1994) (like criminal incarceration, involuntary commitment satisfies section
2254's “in custody” requirement); see also Buxton v. Pennsylvania, 398 F. App'x 704,
707 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding challenge to parole revocation unexhausted because
Petitioner did not appeal the decision in the state court, as permitted under state
law). “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that--
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State” See
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). Based on Preiser and its progeny, this Court lacks jurisdiction under
§ 1983 because the relief sought by Petitioner is immediate or earlier release from
confinement.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint for lack of jurisdiction. If
Plaintiff has exhausted his state court remedies, he may reopen this matter by filing a
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on this Court’s form,
which will be supplied to him.
An appropriate Order follows.
DATE: November 3, 2023 s/Renée Marie Bumb
Renée Marie Bumb
Chief United States District Judge