The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JAQUAN REDDICK,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 22-6926 (ZNQ) (RLS)
v.
OPINION
MARCUS O. HICKS, et al.,
Defendants.
QURAISHI, District Judge
Plaintiff Jaquan Reddick, a former inmate of Mercer County Correctional Center
(“MCCC”) in Mercer County, New Jersey, is proceeding with a civil rights complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. §§ 10:6-1 to 10:6-2.
(Compl., ECF No. 2-1.) Before the Court is Defendants New Jersey Department of Corrections
(“NJDOC”) and Marcus O. Hicks’ (the “State Defendants”) motion to dismiss. (Mot., ECF No.
6.) Defendants County of Mercer and Charles Ellis (the “County Defendants”) join the motion in
part. (See County Defs.’ March 7, 2023 Letter, ECF No. 16; Mar. 8, 2023 Order, ECF No. 17.)
Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court decides this matter without oral argument.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons below, the Court will: (1) grant the Motion in part as to
the State Defendants’ argument that the NJDOC and Defendant Hicks in his official capacity are
not “persons” subject to liability within the meaning of Section 1983 and the NJCRA and as to the
County Defendants’ argument that the Complaint engages in improper “group pleading”; (2) deny
the Motion in part without prejudice as to Defendants’ remaining arguments; (3) dismiss with
prejudice the claims against Defendants NJDOC and Defendant Hicks in his official capacity; and
(4) dismiss without prejudice the remainder of the Complaint.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from Plaintiff’s contraction of COVID-19 while incarcerated at the MCCC
in May 2020. (Compl. ¶¶ 11–12.) Plaintiff names the County of Mercer, MCCC, Mercer County
Sheriff’s Office, New Jersey Department of Corrections, Charles Ellis, John Kemler, Marcus
Hicks, and several unspecified individuals and corporations as defendants. (Id. at 1.)
According to Plaintiff, the Defendants, collectively, failed to follow proper COVID-19
protocols and CDC guidance regarding COVID-19, failed to develop, implement, and/or enforce
policies and procedures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and failed to properly train and/or
supervise guards, staff, and/or other employees in the proper procedures to prevent the spread of
COVID-19. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16, 23, 25.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends that the Defendants failed to
provide adequate medical attention and/or treatment to Plaintiff, failed to properly train and/or
supervise guards, staff, and/or other employees to provide proper medical attention and/or
treatment to individuals infected with COVID-19, and failed to implement and/or enforce policies
and procedures to provide adequate medical attention and/or treatment to Plaintiff and other
inmates who contracted COVID-19. (Id. ¶¶ 22–24.)
Plaintiff initiated this matter in state court on April 29, 2022 by filing a complaint in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Mercer County. (See Compl.) The complaint asserts a single count
alleging that the Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights to due process, equal protection, to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment, and other rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the
Constitution of the United States, the New Jersey State Constitution, the New Jersey Civil Rights
Act, and/or the laws of the State of New Jersey. (Id. ¶¶ 38–43.) On July 22, 2022, the Superior
Court dismissed Defendants MCCC, Mercer County Sheriff’s Office, and John Kemler from the
matter. (ECF No. 2-7.)
On December 1, 2022, the Defendants removed the matter to this Court. (Notice of
Removal, ECF No. 1.) Thereafter, the State Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on
December 29, 2022. (See Mot.) On March 8, 2023, the County Defendants joined part of the
motion. (See County Defs.’ March 7, 2023 Letter.) Plaintiff submitted a brief in opposition on
May 26, 2023. (Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 28.) The State and County Defendants submitted a reply
brief on June 8th and 9th, 2023, respectively. (Defs.’ Reply Brs., ECF Nos. 29–30.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a district court is “required to accept as true all factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable
to the [plaintiff].” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). “[A]
complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . .” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the Plaintiff’s “obligation to provide
the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the
complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 560 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This “plausibility standard” requires the
complaint allege “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual
allegations” are not required, but “more than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation”
must be pled; it must include “factual enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a
recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 678. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged--but it has not ‘show[n]’--‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
III. DISCUSSION
In the Motion, the State Defendants contend that: (i) the Court should dismiss the
Complaint because it fails to plead sufficient facts to show that the State Defendants are
responsible for the MCCC or Mercer County employees; (ii) the State Defendants are not subject
to liability under Section 1983 or the NJCRA;1 (iii) the Complaint otherwise fails to plead
sufficient facts to state a claim against them; and (iv) Plaintiff’s claim for damages should be
dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. (See Mot.) The County Defendants
join the motion as to Points III and IV. (See County Defs.’ March 7, 2023 Letter; County Defs.’
Reply Br. 4, ECF No. 30.) Moreover, the County Defendants further argue that the Complaint
1 Although the title of this argument contends that Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to
establish the State Defendants’ personal involvement, the Court construes the substance of the
argument to contend that the State Defendants are not subject to liability under Section 1983 or
the NJCRA.
utilizes improper “group pleading.” (See County Defs.’ Reply Br. 4–6.)
A. Whether the State Defendants are Persons Within the Meaning of Section 1983
and the NJCRA
As an initial matter, the Court first addresses the State Defendants’ argument that they are
not subject to liability under Section 1983 or the NJCRA. Specifically, the State Defendants
contend that the NJDOC and Defendant Hicks in his official capacity are not “persons” within the
meaning of Section 1983 or the NJCRA.
Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person who, under color of [State law] . . .
subjects . . . any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis
added). To be liable under Section 1983, therefore, a defendant must be a “person” within the
meaning of the statute. See id. It is well-established that “neither a State nor its officials acting in
their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989).
Likewise, the NJCRA “premise[s] liability on the conduct of a ‘person.’” Estate of Lagano
v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 856 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lopez-Siguenza
v. Roddy, No. 13-2005, 2014 WL 1298300, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014). Accordingly, “New
Jersey district courts have interpreted the NJCRA as having incorporated the Supreme Court’s
decision in Will that, for purposes of § 1983, states and state officials acting in their official
capacity are not amenable to suit.” Id.; see Didiano v. Balicki, 488 F. App’x 634, 638 (3d Cir.
2012) (affirming district court order granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s NJCRA claims
against the State and state officials acting in their official capacity because the New Jersey Code’s
definition of “person” does not include the State or defendants which are the functional equivalent
of the State).
Here, the Complaint asserts Section 1983 and NJCRA claims against the NJDOC and
Defendant Hicks in his official capacity. As those parties are arms of the State or the functional
equivalent of the State, they are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983 or the NJCRA,
and the Court dismisses those claims against them with prejudice.
B. Whether the Complaint Utilizes Improper “Group Pleading”
Next, the Court addresses the argument that the Complaint utilizes improper “group
pleading.”
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading must contain a short
and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Travaline v. U.S. Supreme
Court, 424 F. App’x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit has explained that, in determining
whether a pleading meets Rule 8’s “plain statement” requirement, the Court should “ask whether,
liberally construed, a pleading ‘identifies discrete defendants and the actions taken by these
defendants’ in regard to the plaintiff’s claims.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
In this regard, the Court has consistently held that “a complaint may not indiscriminately
attribute wrongdoing to a group of defendants, leaving [the defendants] to guess as to who
allegedly did what[.]” Yu-Chin Chang v. Upright Fin. Corp., No. 19-18414, 2020 WL 473649, at
*3 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2020) (collecting cases). Thus, when a plaintiff names numerous defendants
in a complaint, a plaintiff cannot refer to all defendants “who occupied different positions and
presumably had distinct roles in the alleged misconduct” without specifying “which defendants
engaged in what wrongful conduct.” Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013 WL
1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013) (emphasis in original).
Here, the Complaint asserts due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual
punishment claims arising from distinct alleged acts – failure to provide adequate medical care,
failure to train, failure to implement adequate policies – against a variety of defendants without
identifying the discrete acts of each defendant. Rather, the Complaint lumps together all the
allegations against unspecified corporations, John/Jane Doe defendants, the former commissioner
of the NJDOC, the Warden of the MCCC, and Mercer County, leaving the Defendants and the
Court to “guess as to who allegedly did what.” Yu-Chin Chang, 2020 WL 473649, at *3.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice the remainder of the Complaint in its entirety
for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
C. Defendants’ Remaining Arguments
Having dismissed the entirety of the Complaint for the reasons stated above, the Court need
not address Defendants’ remaining arguments at this time. Accordingly, the Court denies the
remainder of Defendants’ motion without prejudice as moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court will: (1) grant the Motion in part as to the State
Defendants’ argument that the NJDOC and Defendant Hicks in his official capacity are not
“persons” subject to liability within the meaning of Section 1983 and the NJCRA and as to the
County Defendants’ argument that the Complaint engages in improper “group pleading”; (2) deny
the Motion in part without prejudice as to Defendants’ remaining arguments; (3) dismiss with
prejudice the claims against Defendants NJDOC and Defendant Hicks in his official capacity for
failure to state a claim for relief; and (4) dismiss without prejudice the remainder of the Complaint
for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. An appropriate order
follows.
Date: July 18, 2023
s/ Zahid N. Quraishi
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE