HOWARD v. CINNAMINSON TWP. BOARD OF EDUCATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Z.H., WILLIAM HOWARD, and No. 1:22-cv-01700-NLH-SAK

LISA HOWARD,

OPINION

Plaintiffs,

V.

CINNAMINSON TOWNSHIP BOARD

OF EDUCATION and Y.A.L.E.

SCHOOL NJ,

Defendants.

RONALD DESIMONE

P.O. BOX 8379

TURNERSVILLE, NJ 08012-8379

Counsel for Plaintiffs.

ANNE ROBBINS MYERS

COMEGNO LAW GROUP, P.C.

521 PLEASANT VALLEY AVE

MOORESTOWN, NJ 08057

Counsel for Y.A.L.E. School NJ

ALYSSA K. WEINSTEIN

THE BUSCH LAW GROUP

450 MAIN STREET

THIRD FLOOR

METUCHEN, NJ 08840

Counsel for Cinnaminson Township Board of Education.

HILLMAN, District Judge

Currently before the Court are the Y.A.L.E. School, NJ’s

(“YALE”) and Cinnaminson Township Board of Education’s

(“Cinnaminson”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motions to Dismiss

Z.H., William Howard, and Lisa Howards’ (“Plaintiffs”) Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (ECF 17, 19). For the reasons that

follow, the Court will dismiss the SAC.

BACKGROUND

I. The IDEA

Though Plaintiffs assert claims under laws other than the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400,

et seq. (the “IDEA”), the thrust of their complaint is an appeal

of a decision by a state Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

denying them relief under that statute. Congress enacted the

IDEA to, among other things, ensure “the rights of children with

disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” 20

U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B).

The IDEA requires that every child with a disability

receive a free appropriate public education (a “FAPE”) from

their public school if that school receives federal funding

under the IDEA. Id. at § 1412(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a).

The term “free appropriate public education” means the provision

of “special education and related services” that meet certain

criteria. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). The IDEA also guarantees

parents of disabled children a right to participate in the

educational programming offered to their children.

To ensure that public schools adequately provide a FAPE and

that the rights of disabled students and their parents are not

infringed, Congress enacted various “procedural safeguards” that

participating public schools must comply with. Id. at §

1412(6)(A); id. at § 1415(a). One such procedural safeguard

provides standards for adjudicating disputes about whether a

school has adequately provided a FAPE. Per Congress’

requirements, these disputes begin with the filing of a “due

process petition” or “due process complaint.” Either the public

school or the child may file a due process complaint, and that

complaint may seek relief with respect to “any matter relating

to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of

the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public

education to such child.” Id. at § 1415(b)(6).

The IDEA contemplates that it is the State Educational

Agency that is responsible for making sure that there are fair

and impartial procedures in place to handle any due process

petition. Id. at §1415 (f)(1)(A) (“Whenever a complaint has

been received under subsection (b)(6) or (k), the parents or the

local educational agency involved in such complaint shall have

an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which shall

be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local

educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State

educational agency.”); id. at § 1415(e)(1) (“Any State

educational agency or local educational agency that receives

assistance under this subchapter shall ensure that procedures

are established and implemented to allow parties to disputes

involving any matter.”).

Once a due process complaint has been filed, Congress has

set strict deadlines by which certain events must occur. See

Id. at § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) (referencing timelines “applicable

[to] a due process hearing”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (setting

forth a strict timeframe for due process petition resolution);

N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(j) (same). In New Jersey, “[a] due process

hearing is an administrative hearing conducted by an

administrative law judge” (an “ALJ”) in the Office of

Administrative Law (the “OAL”). N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(a).

JURISDICTION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction because

Plaintiffs assert a claim under a federal statute, the IDEA.1

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It has supplemental jurisdiction over

1 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint asserts federal question

jurisdiction under “20 U.S.C.S. § 1415 (2)” (ECF 16 at 2) as

well as the IDEA as a whole. Id. However, this appears to be a

typographical error as no such provision exists. Rather,

Plaintiffs appear to assert a cause of action under 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(2) which allows for a party aggrieved by findings or a

decision under the IDEA’s administrative procedures to file a

civil action “in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in

a district court of the United States, without regard to the

amount in controversy.” Id. While the Court ultimately

concludes that Plaintiffs do not have a cognizable federal claim

based on the IDEA this does not deprive the court of

jurisdiction as the Court always retains jurisdiction to

determine its jurisdiction. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.

622, 628 (2002) (“it is familiar law that a federal court always

has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”).

Plaintiffs’ common-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For purposes of this motion to dismiss, the Court takes the

facts alleged in the complaint as true and will only recount

those salient to the instant motion. Z.H. was a child who was

receiving special education services from YALE. (ECF 16 at 3-

4). In 2017, Z.H.’s parents filed a due process petition

against Cinnaminson with the New Jersey Department of Education

(“NJDOE”) and unilaterally placed Z.H. at YALE where he attended

school from 9th through 12th grade. (ECF 16-1 at 4).

The due process petition was resolved by way of a

settlement agreement (the “2017 Agreement”) in which Z.H.’s

parents agreed to pay the first $10,000 of Z.H.’s annual tuition

at YALE and that Cinnaminson would reimburse them for the base

tuition expended in excess of the first $10,000. (Id.) The

2017 Agreement was approved by an ALJ and memorialized on an

administrative docket in December 2017 as a “Final Decision

Approving Settlement.” (Id.). The 2017 Agreement provided

that Cinnaminson’s reimbursement obligation would continue after

June 2021 “if and only if Z.H. is not eligible to, and does not,

graduate high school by June 30, 2021.” (ECF 16-5 at ¶ 4).

In addition, in the 2017 Agreement, Plaintiffs waived their

right to a FAPE and to hold Cinnaminson accountable for a FAPE

while Z.H. was a student at YALE. (See ECF 16-5 at ¶ 8 (“[I]t

is agreed and acknowledged that the Petitioners may challenge

the appropriateness of only the related services offered by the

District[.]”); see also id. at ¶¶ 16-17 (agreeing to indemnify

and hold harmless Cinnaminson related to any services that Z.H.

might receive from YALE); id. at ¶ 17 (“Under no circumstances

shall Z.H.’s attendance at [YALE]. . . be deemed an

acknowledgment that [Cinnaminson]. . . is required to provide

Z.H. with a FAPE.”)).

In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States

and YALE modified its teaching procedures between March 2020 and

June 2021 such that it was impossible for Z.H. to complete his

Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) goals and thereby receive

a FAPE. (ECF 16 at 3-4). Specifically, Z.H.’s IEP contemplated

that he would receive “social skills training, community-based

instruction, transitional program training, mobility program

training, vocational program training, health and wellness

training, student-to-student contact, contact with non-disabled

peers or situational environmental learning.” (Id. at 6).

Instead, because of the pandemic, YALE switched to virtual and

semi-virtual instruction through June 2021 and Z.H. was

therefore unable to achieve many of his IEP goals. (Id. at 6-

12).

On June 2, 2021, Z.H. filed a due process petition and a

request for emergent relief with NJDOE. (See ECF 16-1 at 3).

Z.H. sought to have an ALJ at the OAL set aside the 2017

Agreement so that he could continue his placement at YALE with

reimbursement from Cinnaminson. (Id.) The emergent portion of

the application was addressed on June 11, 2021 and the remaining

due process portion of the matter proceeded onward. (Id.) In

connection with the merits of the due process proceedings, the

ALJ entertained motion practice.

Relevant to the case at bar, Cinnaminson moved to dismiss

the petition with prejudice and argued that the 2017 Agreement

was controlling in this matter and that there had been no

finding by YALE that Z.H. was ineligible to graduate in June

2021. (Id. at 10-11). Cinnaminson argued that it fulfilled its

responsibilities under the agreement and that the OAL was not

the appropriate tribunal to entertain voiding the 2017

Agreement. (Id. at 11).

The ALJ agreed with Cinnaminson and concluded that barring

an affirmative statement from YALE that Z.H. was not eligible to

graduate he was eligible to graduate for the purposes of

construing the 2017 Agreement. (Id. at 15). The ALJ also

concluded that the OAL did not have the jurisdiction to enforce

or set aside the 2017 Agreement. (Id. at 17). Finally, the ALJ

concluded that Z.H. had not met his burden to show that

Cinnaminson should be responsible for payment of extended

learning beyond June 30, 2021. (Id. at 19).

Following that decision by the ALJ, Plaintiffs filed the

instant matter in federal court. (ECF 1). The instant matter

contains seven counts. Count One is styled as an appeal of the

ALJ’s decision under the IDEA. (ECF 16 at 3–16). The next

three counts are against Cinnaminson for alleged violation of

the 2017 Agreement: breach of contract (Count Two), breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count

Three), and unjust enrichment (Count Four). (Id. at 14-21).

Counts Five through Seven are against YALE, not for breach of

the 2017 Agreement to which it was not a party, but for breach

of its separate contracts with the Plaintiff parents to provide

educational services to Z.H. in the 2019-2020 and the 2020-2021

school years: breach of contract (Count Five), breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Six), and

unjust enrichment (Count Seven). (Id. at 21-29).

The Court will begin with Count One. As explained below,

this Court, as did the ALJ below, lacks the authority to

adjudicate the contractual dispute between the parties under the

IDEA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the

IDEA and the SAC will be dismissed. Consistent with the

reasoning behind that decision, the Court will decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court

must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as

true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well

settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)

(citations omitted) (first citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc.,

40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); and then citing Papasan v.

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must

take three steps: (1) the court must take note of the elements a

plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) the court should

identify allegations that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and

(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Malleus v.

George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 675, 679 (2009) (alterations,

quotations, and other citations omitted).

A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks

“not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416

U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (“Our

decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all

civil actions’ . . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d

203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail in

the coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to

federal complaints before Twombly.”). “A motion to dismiss

should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead ‘enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570).

A court in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must only

consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, the documents

attached thereto as exhibits, and matters of judicial notice.

S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd.,

181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999). A court may consider,

however, “an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant

attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s

claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.

1993). If any other matters outside the pleadings are presented

to the court, and the court does not exclude those matters, a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be treated as a summary judgment

motion pursuant to Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

I. Analysis

a. Plaintiffs’ Appeal of the ALJ’s Opinion

At the outset, the appeal of the ALJ’s decision is clearly

a contractual dispute cloaked in IDEA terms. This joins the

issue of the appropriate standard to apply to Cinnaminson’s

motion to dismiss the appeal of the ALJ’s decision. Although

Cinnaminson styles this portion of its motion as a motion under

Rule 12(b)(6), the body of its motion makes clear that it is

asking the Court decide the merits of the appeal by applying the

“modified de novo” review standard as defined by the Third

Circuit. (ECF 19 at 11).

A review of that standard bears repeating here. District

“Courts are to give due weight to the factual findings of the

ALJ in IDEA cases.” S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City

of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2003). This is conceived

of as a “modified de novo review” in which “[f]actual findings

from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima

facie correct.” Id. at 270. In practice, “this means that a

District Court must accept the state agency’s credibility

determinations unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in

the record would justify a contrary conclusion. In this context

the word ‘justify’ demands essentially the same standard of

review given to a trial court’s findings of fact by a federal

appellate court.” Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. ex

rel. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Questions

of law, however, are reviewed de novo. N. Highlands Reg’l High

Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. C.E. on behalf of C.E., No. 18-08999, 2019

WL 5975548, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2019) (“For questions of law,

a district court applies a de novo standard to the review of

administrative decisions in IDEA cases.”).

One salient difference between district court review in

IDEA cases versus other agency appeals is the fact that the

district court is empowered to hear additional evidence at the

request of either party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) (stating

that the district court “shall hear additional evidence at the

request of a party”). The Third Circuit has stated that a

district court could properly exclude inappropriate proffered

evidence such as evidence that was “cumulative and an improper

embellishment of testimony previously given at an administrative

hearing” but that it “must evaluate a party’s proffered evidence

before deciding to exclude it.” Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist.,

70 F.3d 751, 759 (3d Cir. 1995).

The Third Circuit has declined to devise a bright line rule

regarding what kind of evidence may be excluded but has advised

that a district court may approach the inquiry in a similar

manner to how to would decide to include or exclude evidence in

a civil proceeding. Id. “While a district court appropriately

may exclude additional evidence, a court must exercise

particularized discretion in its rulings so that it will

consider evidence relevant, non-cumulative and useful in

determining whether Congress’ goal has been reached for the

child involved.” Id. It is this framework that the Court

ordinarily uses in adjudicating an appeal from an ALJ’s

decision. In the mine-run IDEA case, such appeals most often

concern an ALJ’s decision on the scope of a FAPE owed by a

school district to a disabled child.

However, this matter is decidedly different. As previously

stated, though technically an appeal of a decision by an ALJ

adjudicating a due process petition, this matter is at its core

a contract dispute. While both parties frame this case as such

an appeal, Plaintiffs are not, through their denied due process

petition and appeal, seeking a renewed evaluation of the scope

of a FAPE determined by an ALJ. Rather, whether through the

procedural mechanism of a due process petition or, barring that,

a common law contract claim, the relief they truly seek is a

setting aside of the 2017 Agreement in which they waived the

right to challenge Cinnaminson on the basis that Z.H. did not

receive a FAPE. (See ECF 16-5 at ¶ 8).

The law is clear that parties in a due process proceeding

may resolve the dispute in a way that waives a claimant’s right

to a FAPE or other protections under the IDEA. Ballard ex rel.

Ballard v. Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 273 F. App’x 184, 188 (3d

Cir. 2008) (“A parent can waive her child’s right to a FAPE.”);

I.K. ex rel. B.K. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 961 F. Supp.

2d 674, 688 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d sub nom. I.K. ex rel. B.K. v.

Haverford Sch. Dist., 567 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[H]ad

the hearing officer concluded that a valid settlement agreement

existed, this determination would have substituted for a

FAPE.”). Given this waiver, Plaintiffs filed the due process

petition in order to have the OAL void the 2017 Agreement.2 (See

2 To be clear, the ALJ notes in his decision that the Plaintiffs

argued in the alternative that the 2017 Agreement did not

obviate Cinnaminson’s requirement to provide a FAPE. (ECF 16-1

at 8-9). This argument, though, is an argument regarding

ECF 16-1 at 8).

Having been denied that relief below, the Plaintiff now

seeks this Court’s de novo review of the ALJ’s legal

determinations related to the 2017 Agreement. (See ECF 16 at 3-

4 (“The plaintiff now comes before this court for a de novo

review of that decision[.]”). Consistent with that position,

Plaintiffs make a general request that the Court hear

“additional testimony to determine whether the COVID-19

Governmental shutdowns created a substantial change of

circumstances as to negate the agreement[’]s termination of

benefits to the plaintiff as of June 30, 2021 and to provide

that which was not provide[d] to the plaintiff during the

pandemic.” (Id. at 12). As noted above, taking additional

evidence is a procedural remedy available under the IDEA for a

plaintiff asserting a viable IDEA claim.

In his decision, the ALJ made two principal determinations.

First, the ALJ determined that Plaintiffs’ argument that their

previous settlement agreement should be set aside was not

properly before him and that “the OAL does not have the

jurisdiction to either enforce or set aside an enforceable

contract.” (ECF 16-1 at 17). He concluded that the issue of

the enforceability of the settlement agreement could only be

contract interpretation that, as explained below, is not

properly before this Court.

addressed outside the administrative context in a court of

competent jurisdiction. (Id. at 19).

Despite that holding, the ALJ continued on to make factual

determinations and then applied those findings in a process that

can only be described as interpreting the rights and obligations

of the parties under the contract between the two. In his

second principal determination, the ALJ held that “barring an

affirmative statement from YALE that Z.H. is not eligible to

graduate, he is eligible to graduate from the high-school

program anticipated in the 2017 Agreement.” (Id. at 15).

Because Z.H. was eligible to graduate, the ALJ reasoned,

Cinnaminson was not required to continue paying for Z.H.’s

education per the 2017 Agreement. (Id.) Despite the ALJ’s two-

step process, it is this Court’s view that the only question

properly before it on this appeal pursuant to the IDEA is the

ALJ’s determination as to whether he had the power to set aside

the 2017 Agreement. That is a question of law, and the Court

considers it de novo. N. Highlands Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of

Educ., 2019 WL 5975548 at *4.

One ALJ of New Jersey’s OAL has previously held that it is

“without authority or jurisdiction to either enforce or set

aside an enforceable contract. Such enforcement (or set aside)

is within the purview and jurisdiction of our State’s Superior

Court or the United States District Court, not the OAL.” A.P.

v. Dennis Township Board of Education, 1998 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 346,

*14-15. This interpretation of the IDEA is consistent with the

statutory language. By the very terms of the IDEA, a settlement

agreement that is entered into to resolve a due process

proceeding is “enforceable in any State court of competent

jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.” 20

U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(3).

It is also consistent with the law in this Circuit. The

Third Circuit has noted that a settlement agreement dealing with

rights under the IDEA is a binding contract just as any other

contract and where voluntarily entered, it should be enforced as

written. D.R. by M.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d

896, 898 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he settlement agreement was

voluntarily and willingly entered by the parties. It is

therefore a binding contract between the parties and should have

been enforced as written.”). Thus the Court finds no error in

the ALJ’s determination that the OAL simply did not have the

power to void, enforce or otherwise interpret the 2017

Agreement.

Accordingly, the Court declines to hear the additional

evidence that Plaintiffs propose to proffer because it is not

relevant to the purely legal issue of whether the ALJ had the

power to adjudicate the parties contractual dispute. Plaintiffs

state that they want to offer testimony “to determine whether

the COVID-19 Governmental shutdowns created a substantial change

of circumstances as to negate the agreement[’]s termination of

benefits to the plaintiff as of June 30, 2021 and to provide

that which was not provide[d] to the plaintiff during the

pandemic.” (ECF 16 at 12). By the very terms of the request,

Plaintiffs seek to introduce evidence for an improper purpose,

to negate the terms of the 2017 Agreement by engrafting a force

majeure provision. This proposed evidence simply would not be

useful to the Court in determining the issue before it — whether

the ALJ erred in determining that he did not have the power to

set aside the 2017 Agreement. Susan N., 70 F.3d at 759. The

Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in making that

determination. The ALJ correctly determined that it lacked the

authority under the IDEA to adjudicate the parties purely

contractual dispute.

Unlike the ALJ, however, this Court will not opine on

whether the conditions of the 2017 Agreement were satisfied in

connection with Z.H.’s eligibility for graduation in June 2021.

Once the ALJ determined that he did not have jurisdiction over

the contractual dispute under the IDEA, it is the view of this

Court that he should not have proceeded to construe the terms of

the 2017 Agreement. See G. W. v. Ringwood Bd. of Educ., 28

F.4th 465, 473 (3d Cir. 2022) (“To the extent that the remainder

of Appellants’ claims address the validity of the settlement

agreement on the basis of New Jersey contract law, we leave it

to the District Court in the exercise of its discretion to

consider in the first instance whether supplemental jurisdiction

is appropriately taken to resolve that matter pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367.”).

The ALJ’s factual determination as to whether a condition

precedent had been satisfied which would have triggered

additional payments by Cinnaminson amounted to an advisory

opinion which, for its part, this Court may not issue. This

Court will not compound the ALJ’s error by expressing an opinion

about the scope and enforceability of an agreement over which it

has no jurisdiction. Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 337 (3d

Cir. 2017) (“Since we lack Article III jurisdiction over this

case, we cannot resolve whether [] abstention is appropriate

because a judicial decision rendered in the absence of a case or

controversy is advisory, and federal courts lack power to render

advisory opinions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Further, the Court notes that the Third Circuit clarified

in G.W. v. Ringwood Board of Education, 28 F.4th 465 (3d. Cir.

2022) that a district court has jurisdiction over an appeal of a

Decision Approving Settlement entered by an ALJ even where the

settlement terms were negotiated outside of the OAL’s mediation

process. The key distinction between G.W. and the instant case

is that Plaintiffs are not seeking to appeal a Decision

Approving Settlement, rather they have filed a new due process

petition seeking to set aside their previous settlement that had

been in place for approximately four years. (ECF 16-1 at 3).

The ALJ determined that the settlement agreement controls, and

the question of whether petitioner has been provided with FAPE

“is a false premise” where the real question presented in the

petition is “who will pay for this additional year at YALE?”

(ECF 16-1 at 14). The ALJ explained that this question “was

dealt with in the Settlement Agreement from 2017.” (Id.).

As discussed above, this Court may review the ALJ’s

determination under the IDEA. This Court has done so, and

determines that the ALJ did not err in finding that the

settlement agreement controls, and the real issue is one of

contract interpretation. (See ECF 16-1 at 15). To the extent

Plaintiffs seek this Court’s substantive review of the

settlement agreement, the appropriate mechanism would have been

an appeal of the ALJ’s Decision Approving Settlement back in

2017. An appeal of such decision at this time would be time-

barred by the ninety-day statute of limitations. K.S. v.

Hackensack Bd. of Educ., No. 16-2155, 2017 WL 788207, at *4

(D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2017) (“The aggrieved party ‘shall have 90 days

from the date of the decision of the hearing officer to bring

such an action, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation

... in such time as the State law allows.’ 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(2)(B). New Jersey’s time limit is also ninety days. See

N.J.A.C. 6A:14–2.7(v)”).

Thus, this Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision that the

prior settlement agreement governs and “the OAL does not have

jurisdiction to either enforce or set aside an enforceable

contract.” (ECF 16-1 at 17). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim

must be dismissed.

b. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

Having resolved the appeal of the ALJ’s decision, the Court

will decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

state law claims.3 Robert W. Mauthe, M.D., P.C. v. Optum Inc.,

925 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] court does not err if it

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims

after it dismisses a federal claim on which its jurisdiction is

based in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.”); G. W.,

28 F.4th at 473 (“To the extent that the remainder of

Appellants’ claims address the validity of the settlement

agreement on the basis of New Jersey contract law, we leave it

to the District Court in the exercise of its discretion to

3 In light of this Court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs’ IDEA

claim for failure to state a claim and to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims, it

need not reach Defendants’ contentions for dismissal of those

claims on the basis of Rule 12(b)(1), the New Jersey Emergency

Health Powers Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:13-1, et seq., Beukas v.

Bd. of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 605 A.2d 776 (N.J.

Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991), or any other related arguments.

consider in the first instance whether supplemental jurisdiction

is appropriately taken to resolve that matter pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367.”).

CONCLUSION

As stated above, the essence of this matter is a

contractual dispute. If Plaintiffs wish to void the 2017

Agreement, they may go to state court to seek that relief in the

absence of diversity jurisdiction. G.W., 28 F.4th at 473

(holding that it is up to “the District Court in the exercise of

its discretion to consider in the first instance whether

supplemental jurisdiction is appropriately taken to resolve that

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.”). Therefore, Defendants’

Motions to Dismiss the SAC (ECF 17, 19) will be granted.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: July 5, 2023 s/ Noel L. Hillman

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.