The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
SHAVON LOATMAN,
appearing pro se,
Plaintiff, Civil No. 23-1672 (RMB/MJS)
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
EXPERIAN INFORMATION AND CONSOLIDATION ORDER
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendant
SHAVON LOATMAN,
appearing pro se,
Plaintiff, Civil No. 23-1756 (RMB/MJS)
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
EQUIFAX INFORMATION AND CONSOLIDATION ORDER
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendant.
SHAVON LOATMAN,
appearing pro se,
Plaintiff, Civil No. 23-1758 (RMB/MJS)
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND CONSOLIDATION ORDER
TRANSUNION LLC,
Defendant.
BUMB, Chief District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of three separate complaints, each
of which was also filed with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), by
Plaintiff Shavon Loatman (hereafter, “Plaintiff”), who is appearing pro se in each of these
matters. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s IFP application and
consolidate her complaints into a single action.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed three complaints with this Court, initiating
separate actions against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”), Equifax
Information Solutions, Inc. (“Equifax”), and Transunion LLC (“Transunion”). Plaintiff’s
complaints are almost entirely identical other than which defendant is named.1 Plaintiff
alleges that Experian, Equifax, and Transunion each relied upon inaccurate or incomplete
information in furnishing her credit report. Plaintiff asserts that she alerted each of these
credit reporting agencies of erroneous information in her file, including verification as to the
accuracy of her account by third party vendor LexisNexis Risk Data Management Inc.
(hereafter, “LexisNexis”).2 [See, e.g., Civil Action No. 23-1756, Docket No. 1, at 5.]
According to Plaintiff, LexisNexis has no record of any prior bankruptcies by
Plaintiff, but the credit reporting agencies failed to verify this information and update
Plaintiff’s credit report. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that defendants “violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act by failing to legitimately verify data provided by a furnisher after receiving
consumer disputes.” [Id.] She also alleges that defendants “violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act by falsely representing the amount of Plaintiff’s debt and making false and
deceptive representations in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e (2) (A) and e (10).” [Id.] As a
1 The only factual difference in Plaintiff’s complaints is the allegation against Transunion
(only) that it also refused to remove fraudulent inquiries from her credit files. [See Civil No.
23-1758, Docket No. 1, at 5.]
2 In the complaint against Experian (only), Plaintiff refers to the vendor merely as
“LexisNexis.” [Civil Action No. 23-1672, Docket No. 1, at 3.]
result, Plaintiff claims the injury she suffered includes loss of credit, increased interest rates,
humiliation, invasion of privacy, emotional distress, and embarrassment. [Id.]
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. IFP Application
When a non-prisoner seeks permission to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the
applicant must submit an affidavit that includes a complete list of the applicant’s assets and
establishes that the applicant is unable to pay the requisite fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Roy
v. Penn. Nat’l Ins. Co., Civ. No. 14-4277, 2014 WL 4104979, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2014)
(internal citations omitted). The decision to grant or deny an IFP application is based solely
upon the economic eligibility of the applicant. See Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir.
1976).
B. Consolidation Pursuant to Rule 42(a)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) allows a District Court to consolidate actions
before it if the actions involve a common question of law or fact. It is also well established
that Rule 42(a) “confers upon a district court broad power, whether at the request of a party
or upon its own initiative, to consolidate causes for trial as may facilitate the administration
of justice.” Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 339 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir. 1964).
C. Sua Sponte Dismissal
Once an application to proceed IFP has been granted, the Court is required to screen
the Complaint and dismiss the action sua sponte “if, among other things, the action is
frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to comply with the proper pleading standards.” Ball v.
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). In fact, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the Court to dismiss any claim, prior to service,
that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
and/or dismiss any defendant who is immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-
(iii).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) sets forth the pleading standards and
requirements that the Complaint must satisfy:
(1) [A] short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless
the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support;
(2) [A] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief; and
(3) [A] demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Thus, to survive a sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the
Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is factually
plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair
Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In screening the Complaint to verify whether it meets these
standards, however, this Court is mindful of the requirement that pro se pleadings must be
construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
III. ANALYSIS
A. IFP Application
Plaintiff qualifies for permission to proceed IFP. In each of the affidavits attached to
Plaintiff’s three complaints, Plaintiff indicates that she is unemployed (but is currently seeking
work), has no assets, and has no source of monthly income. [See Docket No. 1-1.] Upon
review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that she lacks the financial ability to pay
the filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s IFP Application.
B. Plaintiff’s Complaints Involve Common Questions of Law and Fact
By copying and pasting the same “statement of claim” in each of her complaints,
Plaintiff appears to concede that her claims against Experian, Equifax, and Transunion
involve common questions of fact. In any event, the Court finds that consolidation pursuant
to Rule 42(a) is warranted. Here, Plaintiff’s claims all stem from the respective credit
reporting agency’s failure to incorporate certain information from the same vendor
regarding Plaintiff’s bankruptcy history. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff’s factually
overlapping claims will also implicate common questions of law as the litigation proceeds,
including the legal defenses likely to be raised by the defendants.
C. Plaintiff’s Complaints State A Plausible Claim for Relief
The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has met the pleading requirements of Rule 8 and
that her claims are not frivolous or malicious. In each of the complaints, Plaintiff
erroneously states the federal statutory basis upon which the Court’s federal question
jurisdiction rests for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. The provisions she cites — 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(d), 1681p; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 –
are mere jurisdictional provisions that clarify the Court’s federal subject matter jurisdiction
for violations of the relevant subchapter of the statute at issue. However, in her statement of
claims, Plaintiff relies upon additional provisions of these statutes. For example, Plaintiff
relies on 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e (2) (A) and e (10) in describing her claims under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, which prohibit false or misleading representations by a debt
collector, including the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any
debt,” and using “any false representation or deceptive means” to collect a debt or obtain
consumer information, respectively.
Regarding her claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Plaintiff cites generally to
15 U.S.C. § 1681. Although Plaintiff does not cite the part of the statute that pertains to the
procedure in case of a disputed accuracies in a credit report, the Court finds that the
complaints still sufficiently put the defendants on notice as to the alleged deceptive practices
Plaintiff challenges under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as well. This is also consistent with
the Third Circuit’s instruction to liberally construe pro se complaints and resolve any doubts
in favor of Plaintiff.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS on this 11th day of April 2023, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP Application [Docket No. 1-1] is GRANTED; and it
is further
ORDERED that the Clerk file Plaintiff’s complaints; and it is further
ORDERED that Civ. Nos. 23-1672, 23-1756, and 23-1758 shall be
CONSOLIDATED and Civ. No. 23-1672 shall be designated as the lead case pursuant to
Local Rule 42.1; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court issue a summons and the U.S. Marshal serve a
copy of the complaints, summons and this order upon the defendant(s) as directed by the
plaintiff(s). All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
Renée Marie Bumb
Chief District Judge