PRASS v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY- DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DONALD PRASS,

Plaintiff,

18cv17389 (EP) (AME)

v.

OPINION

STATE OF NEW JERSEY – NEW JERSEY

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant.

PADIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Donald Prass is a Guyanese-born employee of Defendant State of New Jersey –

New Jersey Department of Corrections’ (“DOC”). He claims that he is the victim of national

origin discrimination because he is paid less than his American-born colleagues. Presently before

the Court is DOC’s motion for summary judgment. D.E. 54. Prass opposes the motion. D.E. 59.

The Court has considered the motion without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.Civ.R.

78.1(b). For the following reasons, DOC’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Prass is a Guyanese-born American citizen. D.E. 55-1, Def.’s Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts ¶ 1. He has been employed by DOC in various titles since 2000. Id. Prass was

promoted to his current Accountant II title in January 2016. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2. Prass alleges that he, on

an unspecified date, “discovered that his American-born comparators [at DOC] are paid a salary

between $6,500 and $19,000 more than [he receives].” D.E. 1, Compl. ¶ 28. He further claims

that “[i]n or around early 2017, [he] filed a grievance1 with [DOC’s] Equal Employment Division

(‘EED’) regarding the substantial pay differential between [Prass] and his American-born

coworkers.” Id. ¶ 32. He alleges that on May 24, 2017, EED referred Prass’s grievance to human

resources because “it was not a discrimination matter, but a personnel issue.” D.E. 1 ¶ 33. Prass

further avers that human resources never contacted him, and that “[DOC] has still not addressed

[Prass’s] significant pay differential.” Id. ¶¶ 34, 35.

On December 19, 2018, Prass filed a two-count complaint alleging pay discrimination

based on his national origin in violation of: (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Count I); and (2) the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

(“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1, et seq. (Count II). D.E. 1.

On June 15, 2022, DOC filed its motion for summary judgment. D.E. 54. DOC requests

that this Court enter summary judgment on Count I, see D.E. 54-1 at 5-10, and that it summarily

dismiss Count II based on Eleventh Amendment-immunity principles, see id. at 13-14. The limited

evidentiary materials DOC has submitted in support of its motion include the following: (1) Prass’s

October 28, 2020 deposition transcript, D.E. 54-3; (2) the New Jersey Civil Service Commission-

promogulated job specifications for the titles of Accountant I and Storekeeper 3, D.E.s 54-5, 54-

6; and (3) the July 21, 2021 deposition transcript of Elizabeth Whitlock, who at the time of her

testimony, was DOC’s director of human resources, D.E. 54-7.

Prass opposed the motion on July 6, 2022. D.E. 59. Prass’s opposition includes the

following additional evidentiary materials: (1) the New Jersey Civil Service Commission-

promogulated job specifications for the title of Accountant II; (2) a proposed DOC organizational

chart that shows the reporting hierarchy associated with various civil service titles, including

1 Neither Prass nor DOC has provided a copy of this grievance to the Court.

Accountant I, II, and III; and (3) Prass’s resume. D.E. 59-3. DOC submitted its reply on July 12,

2022. D.E. 61.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact in dispute is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law” and is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude granting a motion for summary

judgment. Id. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make

credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving

party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”

Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255)). In other words, a court’s role in deciding a motion for summary judgment is not to evaluate

the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but rather “to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its

motion and must demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After the moving party adequately supports its motion,

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits,

or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). To

withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify

specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250. “[I]f the non-movant’s evidence is merely ‘colorable’ or is ‘not significantly probative,’ the

court may grant summary judgment.” Messa v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d

523, 528 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50)).

Ultimately, there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” if a party “fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,”

however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim is Granted

Count I of Prass’s complaint alleges that because he is Guyanese-born, he was paid $6,500

to $19,000 less than other DOC employees who did comparable accounting work, in violation of

Title VII. This claim is subject to the burden-shifting analysis created by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To prevail on a Title VII claim, a

plaintiff initially bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima

facie case of national origin discrimination. Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d

Cir. 2003). To meet his initial burden, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) [he] belongs to a

protected class; (2) [he] was qualified for the position; (3) [he] was subject to an adverse

employment action despite being qualified; and (4) under circumstances that raise an inference of

discriminatory action.” Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Under the McDonnell

Douglas framework, if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts

to the defendant employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

employee’s rejection.” Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 797 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).

The employer may satisfy this burden by introducing evidence which, taken as true, would allow

the factfinder to conclude that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable

employment decision. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Burton v.

Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013). The employer need not prove, however, that the

tendered reason actually motivated the decision. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.

248, 253 (1981). In fact, the burden on the defendant at this second stage of the analysis has been

described as “relatively light.” Burton, 707 F.3d at 426. The burden remains on the plaintiff to

demonstrate that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

Thus, if the defendant proffers evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to

the plaintiff to “provide evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably infer that the

employer’s proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Burton, 707 F.3d at 426-

27. To show pretext, the plaintiff must point to evidence that would reasonably permit the

factfinder to either “(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated reasons or (2) believe that an

invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of

the employer’s action.” Id. at 427 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.1994)).

Applying this three-part framework to Prass’s Title VII discrimination claim, the Court

concludes that the record lacks evidence which would permit a reasonable factfinder to decide in

favor of Prass at trial. Prass, to reiterate, claims that he was paid less than his American-born

“comparators” because he was born in Guyana. He, however, has failed to present any evidence

to the Court detailing his own salary,2 much less provide any evidence or other concrete

2 That Court notes that during his deposition, Prass testified that his salary upon being promoted

to the Accountant II title in January 2016 was $53,910.34, and that his salary in that role was

$69,840.54 as of October 28, 2020. D.E. 54-3 at p. 28-29. This fact, however, has not been

independently introduced by either Prass or DOC in their summary judgment papers.

information about the nationalities and/or actual salaries received by other DOC employees with

the title of Accountant II. Prass, in other words, has failed to establish, through evidentiary proofs,

that he was paid a lower salary than other American-born individuals employed by DOC as

Accountant IIs. Prass likewise proffers no evidence which demonstrates that he was paid less than

his American-born “comparators” because he is Guyanese-born. Indeed, he testified that no one

at DOC ever said, texted, or emailed anything negative to him about his national origin. See D.E.

55-1 ¶¶ 9, 10. Prass’s assertion that there is a causal nexus between his alleged pay disparity and

his national origin is, in short, purely conclusory. Prass has accordingly failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination. See Freeman v. Harris, 716 F. App’x 132, 134 (3d Cir. 2018)

(affirming prejudicial dismissal of plaintiff’s Title VII complaint where plaintiff, “[a]t no point in

the District Court or on appeal . . . explained why she believes her employer’s 2008 or 2011

decisions occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,

as she must to state a prima facie [Title VII] case.”).

Moreover, even assuming Prass could point to circumstances that raise an inference of a

discriminatory motivation for DOC’s purported failure to pay Prass as much as his American-born

colleagues, DOC has come forward with evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could

conclude that Prass’s salary was calculated based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. In

particular, DOC’s then-director of human resources, Elizabeth Whitlock, testified during her

deposition about the manner in which the salary for civil service titles, like Accountant II, are

calculated. She explained that the calculation is driven by the New Jersey Civil Service

Commission and the New Jersey Administrative Code. See D.E. 54-7 at 12 (“What determines

the salaries of employees? . . . [E]ssentially, it’s administrative code, Civil Service Commission,

it’s 4A. We can’t go against their policy and their rulings on how salaries are determined.”). Ms.

Whitlock further testified that “[a] lot of variables can go into the determination of salary. It would

be education, it could be experience, it could be . . . lack of the ability to get a viable candidate

pool.” Id. at 21-22. “[I]t could be a fiscal issue.” Id. at 28. It could be that the “promotional

advancement pay adjustment” factors in, and “then your new salary is determined based on your

current salary.” Id. at 32; accord id. at 64 (“when salaries are determined, it’s based upon that

specific person’s former State history, former State titles, and applying the administrative code

rules to those titles and salaries, amount of time in those salaries to determine the new salary in

their current title or the title they’re going into.”). Employment decisions guided by the State’s

civil service rules and regulations have been found to be legitimate and non-discriminatory. See,

e.g., Scutchins v. New Jersey, Civil Action No. 12-5855 (SRC), 2014 WL 6991908, at *8 (D.N.J.

Dec. 10, 2014) (non-selection of plaintiff for civil service position based on her low ranking on

the employment opportunity eligibility list constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason);

Williams v. New Jersey Trenton Psychiatric Hosp., Civil Action No. 04-06041(FLW), 2007 WL

2893378, at *5-8 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007) (employer had legitimate reason for not offering position

to plaintiff pursuant to the provisions within the New Jersey Administrative Code governing civil

service titles).

Furthermore, Prass points to no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer

that DOC’s explanation for the manner in which it calculated Prass’s salary is pretextual. See

Jones v. Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 403, 414 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming entry of summary judgment on

plaintiff’s Title VII claim where plaintiff “presented no evidence from which a jury could conclude

that the [employers] articulated reasons for its adverse employment actions were a pretext for

discrimination.”); Shah v. New Jersey Off. of Homeland Sec. & Preparedness, No. CV 15-

3233(FLW), 2018 WL 1535282, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2018). (“outside of his own, subjective

beliefs, Plaintiff fails to adduce evidence that Defendant’s decision to deny Plaintiff a promotion

was motivated by race, rather than a determination that Plaintiff was unqualified . . . . Plaintiff

thus lacks the requisite evidence of pretext to defeat summary judgment.”). For these reasons, the

Court will grant DOC’s motion for summary judgment on Prass’s Title VII claim.

B. Prass’s NJLAD Claim is Dismissed

DOC, in its summary judgment motion, also seeks dismissal of Prass’s NJLAD claim,

asserting that this Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim based on Eleventh Amendment

immunity. See D.E. 61 at 5-7. The Court agrees.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, “[t]he Judicial

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced

or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.” As a general proposition, a suit by private parties seeking to

impose liability which must be paid from public funds in a state treasury is barred from federal

court by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Eleventh Amendment immunity is waived by the State

itself or by federal statute. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Absent an

explicit waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, a State may not be sued in the federal courts.

Id. at 673. Moreover, Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to litigation against departments

and agencies of the State. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280

(1977); Laskaris v. Thomburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir.1981).

Importantly, the text of NJLAD does not contain language that waives the State’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity in federal court. See Garcia v. Richard Stockton Coll. of New Jersey, 210

F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (D.N.J. 2002) (“Although the NJLAD clearly identifies the State as a potential

defendant, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5(e), and authorizes private suits “in Superior Court,” id. §

10:5-13, it makes no mention of federal court. I must conclude, therefore, that New Jersey has not

stated ‘by the most express language’ that it is open to private suits under the NJLAD in federal

court.”) (quoting College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527

U.S. 666, 678 (1999)); accord Rudolph v. Adamar of New Jersey, 153 F. Supp. 2d 528, 542 (D.N.J.

2001).

Here, it is undisputed that DOC is an agency of the State of New Jersey, and thus, Eleventh

Amendment immunity applies to Prass’s NJLAD claim against it. See Garcia, 210 F. Supp. 2d at

550 (“a plaintiff may not sue the State of New Jersey, or its alter egos, under the NJLAD in federal

court.”). Prass’s NJLAD claim against DOC must accordingly be dismissed. See Pennhurst State

School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Chee-Wah v. Maurer, 663 F. App’x

194, 198 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming District Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s NJLAD claim “on the

basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, DOC’s motion for summary judgment, D.E. 54, is granted.

Prass’s complaint is dismissed. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: January 19, 2023

/s/ Evelyn Padin

Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.