The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
FREDDIE RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 20-679 (MAS) (LHG)
° OPINION
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sua sponte screening of Plaintiff Freddie
Richardson’s (“Plaintiff”) civil complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pursuant to the statute, the Court must review Plaintiff's complaint and dismiss any claim which
is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court permits Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims to
proceed against Defendant Connolly and the John Doe and Jane Roe Defendants. In addition, the
Court permits Plaintiffs negligence claims to proceed against Rutgers UCHC, Defendant
Connolly, and the John Doe and Jane Roe Defendants. The Court dismisses Plaintiffs remaining
claims.
1. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner incarcerated in Northern State Prison in Newark, New
Jersey. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that, prior to his incarceration, he suffered from epilepsy
and had a history of severe back pain stemming from a car injury in which Plaintiff fractured parts
of his spine. (/d. at 3-4.) During his time in Northern State Prison, Plaintiff frequently complained
of back pain but was refused pain management or other treatment “for at least a year and a half.”
(id. at 4.) After the prison eventually obtained Plaintiff's medical records, Defendant Dr. Connolly
“told Plaintiff his x-rays showed that his bones were never broken and that his pain was just the
result of arthritis.” Ud.) Plaintiff contends that this “was a deliberate lie, used to justify” the
previous denial of treatment. (/d.) Plaintiff continued to complain about his pain, following which
Plaintiff received an MRI confirming that he suffered from “severe canal stenosis with ancillary
osteophytes” causing spinal compression, lumbar radiculopathy, and “‘cauda equina syndrome.”
(d.)
The prison subsequently moved Plaintiff's bed assignment from a bottom bunk to a top
bunk, which Plaintiff contends was in “retaliation for his grievances and complaints.” (/d.)
Although Plaintiff asserts that this was retaliatory action, he does not identify which named
Defendant was responsible for the placement or possessed the alleged retaliatory motive. Plaintiff
complained to an officer assigned to his unit, who told Plaintiff he would need to speak with the
medical department. (/d. at 5.) Plaintiff also complained to a nurse who suggested that he should
speak to prison officials. (/d. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that entering the bed caused him significant
pain. (/d@.) On one occasion when Plaintiff attempted to exit the bed, he had an epileptic seizure
then fell and injured himself. (U/d.)
IL. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court is required to screen Plaintiff's complaint
and must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Id. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir, 2012) (citing Allah vy.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)),
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips
v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A
complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must
contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it
provides only “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Jd. (quoting Bel/
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” /d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556), A
complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). □□□
(quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in
conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints
to support a claim.” Mala vy. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
Il. DISCUSSION
In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks to raise claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate
indifference to medical needs against the following parties: the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (“DOC”); Rutgers UCHC, the medical provider for Northern State Prison; Doctor
Connolly; the nurse to whom Plaintiff raised the bunk issue; and several John Doe prison staff
Defendants. (Ud. at 5-7.) Plaintiff also seeks to raise a § 1983 claim asserting First Amendment
retaliation, although he does not clearly assert which Defendant actually engaged in this alleged
retaliation. (/d at 7.) Plaintiff also asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”)! against both the DOC and Rutgers UCHC, both of whom he asserts are public entities.
(/d. at 7-8.) Finally, Plaintiff seeks to assert state law claims for negligence and violations of New
Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) related to the alleged improper assignment of a
top bunk. at 8-9.)
Turning first to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, it is clear that the DOC is not subject to suit under
the statute. As a suit against a state department “is no different from a suit against the state itself,”
and as states are immune from suit for money damages in federal court, the DOC is immune from
suit for damages in this Court. See Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 280 (D.N.J. 2013).
Likewise, a state department like the DOC is not a “person” subject to suit under the statute.
see also Grabow vy. S. State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989). The DOC is
therefore clearly immune from any suit for damages in this Court and is in any event not subject
' Although Plaintiff does not specify which type of ADA claim he wishes to pursue, the Court
presumes that he is attempting to set forth a claim under Title IT of the ADA. Title II provides that
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
to suit under § 1983. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and Plaintiffs state law claims that appear to seek
only damages against the DOC are, therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Rutgers UCHC fare no better. To plead a plausible claim
for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts which would show that the named defendants
had personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d
210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir, 1988)). Where
the named defendant is a third-party entity that contracts with the state to provide services, a
plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the contractor had personal involvement in a violation must plead
facts which show that the alleged constitutional violation is the result of a policy or custom put
into effect by the contractor. See Natale y. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84
(3d Cir. 2003), A formal policy or custom will be the cause of an alleged violation where it is the
“moving force” behind the violation. City ef Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989): see also
Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35-36 (2010). To plead a formal policy, a plaintiff
must allege facts indicating that a decisionmaker with final authority established an applicable
formal proclamation, policy, edict, or rule. Natale, 318 F.3d at 584. A corporate custom instead
exists where a given action has not been formally approved by the decisionmaker, but is “so
widespread as to have the force of law.” Jd. To plead a plausible claim against a contracting
entity, a plaintiff must therefore plead either that a formally instituted policy caused the alleged
violation, a policy maker violated the plaintiff's rights directly, or the policy maker at the entity
failed to take affirmative action to address known inadequate existing practices such that the
policymaker can be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm posed by the
practices. Id.
Plaintiff's complaint raises conclusory allegations that Rutgers UCHC had a “policy,
practice, or custom” of taking various actions including failing to obtain medical records,
understaffing prisons, ignoring grievances, and “instructing staff to not review or lie” about
medical records. Plaintiff, however, provides no factual allegations to support these conclusions.
Plaintiff neither identified any formal policy enacted or announced by Rutgers UCHC that resulted
in his mistreatment nor alleged any history of similar issues at Northern State Prison sufficient to
indicate that policymakers at Rutgers UCHC should have known that there were issues with
staffing, obtaining medical charts, or doctors “lying” to inmate patients. As conclusory allegations
are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief, and as Plaintiff has failed to plead facts which
would show that Rutgers UCHC has adopted a policy or custom which resulted in the alleged harm
in this matter, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Rutgers UCHC are dismissed without prejudice.
As to the remaining Defendants—Connolly, the John Doe officers, and the Jane Roe
nurse—Plaintiff seeks to plead § 1983 claims for deliberate indifference to medical needs and for
first amendment retaliation. The complaint fails to connect Plaintiffs retaliation claim to any
specific Defendant and instead asserts claims generally. As Plaintiff has failed to plead that
Connolly, the John Does, and Jane Roe nurse had any personal involvement in the alleged
retaliation, that claim is dismissed without prejudice as to those Defendants. Chavarriaga, 806
F.3d at 222.
Having reviewed Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims against Defendant Connolly, the
John Doe Defendants, and Jane Roe Nurse, however, the Court will permit those claims to proceed.
Likewise, the Court will permit Plaintiffs state law negligence claims to proceed against
Defendants Rutgers UCHC, Connolly, the John Doe Defendants, and the Jane Roe Nurse.
Turning to Plaintiffs ADA and NJLAD claims raised against the DOC and Rutgers UCHC,
to state a claim under the ADA or LAD,’ Plaintiff must allege that he is “a qualified individual
with a disability, who was precluded from participating in a program, service, or activity, or
otherwise was subject to discrimination, by reason of his disability.” Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
933 F.3d 285, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2019). Because Plaintiff appears to seek damages, and not
injunctive relief, he must also plead intentional discrimination.? S.H. ex rel, Durrell v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2013). Intentional discrimination will exist only
where the defendants were at least deliberately indifferent — that is, where the defendant knew that
harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely and failed to act upon that likelihood.
Id. at 262-63. In his complaint, Plaintiff does not specify who transferred him to a top bunk
assignment or allege that the person who made that assignment was aware of his epilepsy or back
pain issues. Although Plaintiff alleges that he told some officers and at least one nurse about his
concerns with the top bunk assignment, he has not alleged that any of these individuals had the
ability to change his assignment or had any hand in making the top bunk assignment. Plaintiff has
therefore failed to allege that the decision maker who assigned him a top bunk knew of his
disabilities. Plaintiff, consequently, has failed to plead deliberate indifference sufficient to qualify
* In evaluating claims brought pursuant to the NJLAD, courts “typically look to federal anti-
discrimination law in construing [the] NJLAD,” and apply the law applicable to the federal
equivalent in determining whether the plaintiff states a viable claim for relief. See, e.g, Chisolm
v. MeManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 324 n.9 (3d Cir. 2001). The Court must therefore evaluate
Plaintiff's LAD claim using the standards applicable to Plaintiffs federal ADA claim. Jd.
> The complaint is not clear as to the relief sought, but Plaintiff makes no explicit mention of any
form of injunctive relief. As Plaintiff appears to have been released from prison (see ECF No. 5),
it is doubtful that any form of injunctive relief would be applicable to Plaintiff's claims as he is no
longer subject to the “services” of either the DOC or Rutgers UCHC. If Plaintiff does seek some
relief other than damages via his ADA claim, he is free to file an amended complaint that clearly
sets forth the non-damages relief he seeks,
as intentional discrimination and the Court dismisses Plaintiff's ADA and NJLAD claims without
prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs deliberate indifference claims shall proceed
against Defendant Connolly and the John Doe and Jane Roe Defendants, Plaintiff's negligence
claims shall proceed against Rutgers UCHC, Connolly, the John Doe and Jane Roe Defendants,
and Plaintiffs remaining claims shall be dismissed. An order consistent with this Opinion will be
entered.
s/ Michael A. Shipp
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE