HARKER v. CORNELIUS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SALVATORE CLARK HARKER, No. 21-20284 (NLH) (MJS)

Plaintiff, OPINION

v.

SHANNON CORNELIUS, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCE:

Salvatore Clark Harker

1 Westbrook Dr.

#G-104

Swedesboro, NJ 08085

Plaintiff Pro se

HILLMAN, District Judge

Plaintiff Salvatore Clark Harker filed this complaint

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging “excessive abuse of judicial

authority, official oppression, false arrest, false

imprisonment, [and] unlawful extradition,” as well as denial of

medical care and “the tort[s] of kidnapping, assault and

battery, pain and suffering, mental anguish and negligence.”

ECF No. 1 at 1.

At this time, the Court must review the complaint in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it

should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will allow

Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claims to proceed. The

remainder of the claims will be dismissed for failure to state a

claim.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, “[o]n or, about November 8,

2019, the plaintiff, Salvatore Clark Harker arrived at the Logan

Township Police Department, in Bridgeport New Jersey, to post

bail for failure to appear in court for a motor vehicle

violation in New Jersey.” ECF No. 1 at 19. Plaintiff “was

informed that he could not post bail due to an outstanding no

bail fugitive warrant in Northampton County Pennsylvania.

Moreover that the Northampton County Sherriff confirmed, that

they will extradite him to Pennsylvania.” Id. Plaintiff was

“transported and remanded over to the custody of the Salem

County Correctional Facility [“SCCF”] along with a copy of the

warrant so that extradition proceedings could be scheduled in

the Gloucester County Superior Court.” Id.

The SCCF Intake Officer interviewed Plaintiff and took down

Plaintiff’s medical conditions and current medications. Id.

Plaintiff was “placed in a holding cell, in the isolation ward,

along with eleven other inmates, this holding cell was designed

to house only five inmates. It contained 1 toilet, five bunk[s]

and twelve mattresses.” Id. Over the next six days, Plaintiff

“repeatedly requested to be seen by a doctor to inform him of

the urgency of his medical needs in order to receive his

necessary medications . . . .” Id. at 20. Plaintiff was moved

to A-Block of the Intake Unit on November 14, 2019 “where he was

given Librium and told that due to protocol he would have to

wait to be seen by the nursing staff.” Id. He was moved to C-

Block of the Observation Unit on November 15, 2019. Id. His

requests to see a doctor were denied. Id.

Plaintiff was moved to B-Block in General Population on

November 18, 2019. Id. He was taken to the Medical Department

for assessment. Id. “Plaintiff described his medical condition

and medications prescribed by his primary health care provided

for COPD, emphysema, asthma, cholesterol, and anxiety. The

clinical staff stated that the County does not treat pre-trial

detainees for these types of conditions due to budget

constraints.” Id.

Plaintiff appeared in court for his motor vehicle violation

on approximately November 19, 2019. Id. at 21. “[T]he

prosecutor read the charge’s [sic] against the plaintiff wherein

the plaintiff’s counsel stated that discovery had not been

provided to the defense and was not prepared to proceed. A

court date was rescheduled for December 8, 2019. The plaintiff

was returned to the Salem County Correctional Facility.” Id.

He returned to court on November 20, 2019 for his extradition

hearing. Id. The court “explained the [process] for

extradition, informed the plaintiff of the charges in that

Chester County [Pennsylvania] wanted plaintiff to answer to the

charges of DUI related offenses as a felony.” Id. Plaintiff

informed the court that the charges were out of Northampton

County, not Chester County. Id. “The Court stated that Chester

would pick up the plaintiff and convey him to the appropriate

authorities. The plaintiff waived extradition.” Id. The court

told Plaintiff that Chester County had ten days to pick him up,

and Plaintiff returned to SCCF after signing the extradition

order. Id.

Plaintiff was taken before a different New Jersey Superior

Court judge on November 27, 2019. Id. at 22. Defendant Shannon

Cornelius, a Gloucester County Assistant Prosecutor, informed

the court that “we are here to correct some typos on the prior

extradition order in that Northampton County Pennsylvania wanted

[Plaintiff] to answer for DUI related offenses, moreover that

the charges were reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor,

furthermore that they would need until December 3, 2019 to pick

[Plaintiff] up.” Id. Plaintiff objected to the request,

stating he was due to be released on November 29, 2019. Id.

“The plaintiff explained that he already informed the court that

the warrant was from Northampton County Pennsylvania and the

judge ordered the extradition for Chester County to pick up the

plaintiff.” Id. The court did not amend the extradition order.

Id. On November 29, 2019, Plaintiff asked Defendant Michael

Hand, a SCCF correctional officer, if he was going to be

released soon. Id. Defendant Hand told Plaintiff he would have

to ask the booking sergeant, Defendant Andrew Biddle. Id.

Defendant Biddle told Plaintiff that Plaintiff “wasn’t being

released in that it wasn’t up to him.” Id. at 23.

On December 3, 2019, Plaintiff “was told to gather his

belongings in that he was being released, at which time he was

escorted to the property room and was given his cloth’s [sic]

key’s and wallet.” Id. “The plaintiff was then directed to the

sally port where he was accosted by two men who stated that they

were Northampton County PA. detective’s, wherein the plaintiff

took a defensive posture and backed away from them and informed

them that the time had expired on the warrant . . . .” Id. The

detectives “produced an order faxed from the Gloucester County

Prosecutor. The order was tampered with in that it had a

notation to P/U 12-3-19.” Id. at 24. Plaintiff objected to the

arrest and was told that if he did not assume the stop-and-frisk

position he would be charged with resisting arrest. Id.

Plaintiff complied and was taken to the Northampton County Jail

in Easton, Pennsylvania. Id.

Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a declaratory judgment

against Defendants Cornelius, SCCF Warden John Cuzzue, SCCF

Deputy Warden Hobart Riley, Biddle, Hand, Jane Doe Medical

Staff, and SCCF Corrections Officer John Doe for “official

oppression, unlawful restraint, false arrest, false

imprisonment, unlawful extradition, and kidnapping, the denial

of adequate medical care” as well as “assault and battery, pain

and suffering, mental anguish, negligence and undue hardship

under state law.” Id. at 27. He also seeks damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to

show that the Plaintiff’s claims are facially plausible. Fowler

v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Fair

Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir.

2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the

Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the

Plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972);

United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court

must “accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Denial of Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied adequate medical care

during his stay at SCCF. Claims by pretrial detainees for

failing to provide adequate medical care arise under the

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and are analyzed “under

the standard used to evaluate similar claims brought under the

Eighth Amendment[.]” Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318

F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). Plaintiff must allege facts

indicating “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or

omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.” Id. (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182

F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff alleges he requested

medical treatment for COPD, emphysema, asthma, cholesterol, and

anxiety. ECF No. 1 at 20. He alleges “[t]he clinical staff

stated that the County does not treat pre-trial detainees for

these types of conditions due to budget constraints.” Id. The

Court will permit the denial of medical care claim to proceed

against Defendants Jane Doe Medical Director, Cuzzue, Riley, and

Salem County1 this time.2

B. Extradition Proceedings

Plaintiff alleges violations in connection with the

extradition procedures. He argues that Northampton County’s

time to pick him up from SCCF expired on November 29, 2019,

making his December 3, 2019 arrest and his imprisonment between

November 29, 2019 and December 3, 2019 unlawful. He alleges

Defendants conspired to falsify the extradition order.

1 Plaintiff names SCCF as a defendant in this matter. A

correctional facility is not a “person” within the meaning of §

1983. As Plaintiff alleges it was a county policy to deny

certain medical treatments to pre-trial detainees, the Court

considers this claim to be raised against Salem County under

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

along with Plaintiff’s claims against the jail officials in

their official capacities.

2 The Court’s preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not

determine whether the allegations in the complaint would survive

a properly supported motion to dismiss filed by a defendant

after service. See Richardson v. Cascade Skating Rink, No. 19-

08935, 2020 WL 7383188, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2020) (“[T]his

Court recognizes [a] § 1915(e) screening determination is a

preliminary and interlocutory holding, subject to revision at

any time prior to entry of final judgment.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

The Extradition Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires

that “[a] person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or

other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in

another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the

State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the

State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.” U.S. Cont. art. IV, §

2, cl. 2. “The Extradition Clause was intended to enable each

state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the

state where the alleged offense was committed.” Michigan v.

Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978). “Interstate extradition was

intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding . .

. .” Id. at 288.

Congress set forth the procedures to carry out the

extradition process in the Extradition Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3182.

Under the Extradition Act, “when the executive authority of one

state demands of the executive authority of another state a

person as a fugitive from justice, and produces an indictment or

affidavit made before a magistrate which charges the person with

a crime, the executive authority of the asylum state is required

to arrest the fugitive, notify the demanding state, and confine

the fugitive for a minimum of 30 days.” Soto v. Bartkowski, No.

11-3631, 2014 WL 4854605, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2014). New

Jersey and Pennsylvania have implemented these procedures

through their adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Law,

N.J.S.A. § 2A:160-9, et seq.; 42 Pa.C.S.A., § 9121–9171. “Thus

the Uniform Act carries with it the preemptive lineage of the

United States Constitution and a Congressional enactment.”

State v. Morel, 602 A.2d 285, 287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1992). “It follows that any provision in the New Jersey

Constitution or New Jersey Rules of Court that is contrary to

the rendition process of the Uniform Act must yield to the Act.”

Id.

Under the Uniform Act, a prisoner has the right to appear

before a criminal court judge wherein he must be informed of his

right to counsel and the ability to contest the legality of his

arrest. N.J.S.A. § 2A:160-18. Petitioner waived this right:

“I, specifically state that I do not desire to contest my return

to the demanding State, and do hereby WAIVE all my rights

incidental to the extradition proceedings and agree to be

delivered to the Agent(s) of the demanding State that I may

return to that jurisdiction as provided by the Uniform Criminal

Extradition [N.J.S.A. § 2A:160-10].” ECF No. 7 at 20. Once

Plaintiff waived his right to challenge Pennsylvania’s authority

to extradite him, New Jersey officials were required to turn him

over to Pennsylvania officials. See 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (requiring

executive authority of asylum state to “cause the fugitive to be

delivered to such agent [of the demanding state] when he shall

appear”); N.J.S.A. § 2A:160-30 (“If and when such consent has

been duly executed . . . [t]he judge shall direct the officer

having such person in custody to deliver forthwith such person

to the duly accredited agent or agents of the demanding state,

and shall deliver or cause to be delivered to such agent or

agents a copy of such consent.”).

Under federal law, Pennsylvania had thirty days to retrieve

Plaintiff from New Jersey. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (“If no such agent

appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the

prisoner may be discharged.”); Soto v. Bartkowski, No. 11-3631,

2014 WL 4854605, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2014) (“[T]he executive

authority of the asylum state is required to arrest the

fugitive, notify the demanding state, and confine the fugitive

for a minimum of 30 days.”). Federal law supersedes the New

Jersey court’s instructions. As alleged by Plaintiff he was

first arrested in New Jersey on November 8, 2019 and held no

later than December 3, 2019, less than 30 days. Plaintiff has

not stated a claim for relief under § 1983 even after accepting

all the alleged facts as true.

“‘[F]ailure to comply with established procedures does not

deprive the fugitive of any protected right.’” Rivera v.

Algarin, 350 F. App’x 703, 709 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting

Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1295 (6th Cir. 1997))

(alteration in original). “[T]o establish a § 1983 claim for

monetary relief, including a showing of damages, [Plaintiff]

will have to prove that he suffered some deprivation of liberty

greater than that which he would have suffered through

extradition in full compliance with the UCEA.” Knowlin v.

Thompson, 207 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff has not

done so.

“Where a person has been charged with a crime in another

state, New Jersey law expressly authorizes arrest without a New

Jersey warrant.” Allen v. Wrightson, 800 F. Supp. 1235, 1239

(D.N.J. 1992) (citing N.J.S.A. § 2A:160–22). Pennsylvania’s

authority to arrest and extradite Plaintiff did not evaporate on

November 29, 2019. See 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (“Nothing in this

section shall be deemed to limit the rights of the accused

person to return voluntarily and without formality to the

demanding state, nor shall this waiver procedure be deemed to be

an exclusive procedure or to limit the powers, rights or duties

of the officers of the demanding state or of this state.”);

Stynchcombe v. Whitley, 242 S.E.2d 720, 721 (Ga. 1978) (“We see

no reason why the warrant should become stale or void merely

because it was not executed during the period of detention

allowed to facilitate arrest thereunder.”).

Plaintiff was still charged with a crime in Pennsylvania

and could have been lawfully rearrested and extradited from New

Jersey on those charges. See Rivera, 350 F. App’x at 709 n.10

(“[T]he Commonwealth could have cured the arguable procedural

flaw by releasing and immediately re-arresting Rivera.”).

“Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that defendants

violated the Extradition Act or the Extradition Clause, and he

has not alleged facts showing that he was injured,” McGeachy v.

Doe, No. 10-3342, 2011 WL 2182728, at *4 (D.N.J. June 2, 2011),

the Court will dismiss all claims related to the extradition

proceedings for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted.3 The Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over related state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3).

The Court will also dismiss Plaintiff’s request for

declaratory judgments. “The purpose of a declaratory judgment

is to ‘declare the rights of litigants.’ The remedy is thus by

definition prospective in nature.” CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of

Phila., 703 F.3d 612, 628 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilton v.

Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)). Declaratory

judgments “cannot be issued to address past wrongs.” Parkell v.

Senato, 704 F. App’x 122, 125 (3d Cir. 2017). The Court will

3 The Court also notes that Defendant Cornelius has absolute

prosecutorial immunity for claims arising from the extradition

proceedings. See Rivera, 350 F. App’x at 708 (holding

prosecutor’s “efforts to initiate extradition proceedings

against [plaintiff] are prosecutorial in nature and entitle her

to immunity from liability”); Burke v. MacArthur, No. 15-6093,

2015 WL 5970725, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2015) (“Absolute

immunity also attaches to a prosecutor’s activity of seeking

extradition.”).

dismiss Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory judgments as he

does not request any prospective relief.

C. Motion for Pro Bono Counsel

Plaintiff moves for the appointment of pro bono counsel.

ECF No. 2. Appointment of counsel is a privilege, not a

statutory or constitutional right, Brightwell v. Lehman, 637

F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2011), and is governed by the factors

enumerated in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993). In

determining whether to appoint counsel, “the district court must

consider as a threshold matter the merits of the plaintiff’s

claim.” Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155. The Court is proceeding

Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claims; therefore, the

complaint satisfies this threshold inquiry. The Court must now

consider: (1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her own

case; (2) the complexity of the legal issues; (3) the degree to

which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of

the plaintiff to pursue such investigation; (4) the amount a

case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; (5)

whether the case will require the testimony of expert witnesses;

and (6) whether the plaintiff can attain and afford counsel on

his own behalf. See id. at 155–56, 157 n.5; see also Cuevas v.

United States, 422 F. App’x 142, 144–45 (3d Cir. 2011)

(reiterating the Tabron factors).

Plaintiff’s motion simply recites the Tabron factors:

1. The Plaintiff is indigent and unable to afford

counsel.

2. The issues involved in this case are complex.

3. The Plaintiff has a very limited knowledge of the

law.

4. The Plaintiff is confined due to Covid-19

restrictions and has limited access to the prison law

library and research materials.

5. The interest of jurisprudence demands no less than

qualified counsel to present this matter.

ECF No. 2 at 1. The fourth reason no longer applies because

Plaintiff appears to have been released from custody. The Court

will deny the motion without prejudice, and Plaintiff may

reapply for counsel by addressing the Tabron factors by

explaining how they apply in his case rather than merely

reciting them.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will proceed

Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claims. Plaintiff’s claims

stemming from the extradition proceedings will be dismissed. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). The motion for counsel will

be denied without prejudice.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: November 21, 2022 s/ Noel L. Hillman

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.