IDUMONYI v. BERGEN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WINIFRED IDUMONYI, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 20-9891

v.

OPINION & ORDER

BERGEN COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

Presently before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by (1) the Bergen County Sheriff

(“BCS”), improperly pled as Bergen County Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff’s Officer Young

Kim, D.E. 23; and (2) Defendant Fort Lee Police Officer Matthew Lyle, D.E. 45. Plaintiffs filed

letters opposing both motions, D.E. 25, 54, and BCS and Kim filed a reply, D.E. 30.1 The Court

reviewed the submissions and decides the motions without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

1 For purposes of this Opinion, the Court refers to BCS and Kim’s brief in support of their motion

to dismiss (D.E. 23-4) as “BCS Br.”; Lyle’s brief in support of his motion to dismiss (D.E. 45-2)

as “Lyle Br.”; Plaintiffs’ letter opposing BCS and Kim’s motion (D.E. 25) as “Plfs. BCS Opp.”;

Plaintiffs’ letter opposing Lyle’s motion (D.E. 54) as “Plfs. Lyle Opp.”; and BCS and Kim’s reply

(D.E. 30) as “BCS Reply.”

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs Winifred Idumonyi (“Winifred”), Keilan Scott, and Shirley Idumonyi (“Shirley”)

bring claims against multiple individual Fort Lee police officers and a Bergen County Sheriff’s

Officer who were allegedly involved in an altercation on August 2, 2018 at Shirley Idumonyi’s

home.2 Plaintiffs also assert claims against the Fort Lee Police Department and the Bergen County

Sheriff. Plaintiffs allege that during the altercation, certain Defendants assaulted Winifred and

threatened her with arrest. Supp. Compl. ¶¶ 24-25, 27-28. Multiple Defendants also allegedly

assaulted Scott. Id. ¶ 26.

Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the Complaint on August 2, 2020, asserting Section 1983, New

Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), and tort claims. D.E. 1. On March 22, 2021, this

Court dismissed the case because Plaintiffs failed to effect service, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(m). D.E. 4. Plaintiffs, acting pro se, subsequently filed a motion to reopen the

case and terminate their attorney. D.E. 5. This Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen on April

26, 2022, directed the Clerk’s Office to reissue summons in the matter, and provided Plaintiffs

with an extension of time to effect service. D.E. 9. The Court then granted Plaintiffs’ attorney’s

request to withdraw as counsel and permitted Plaintiffs to proceed in the matter pro se. D.E. 13.

On June 15, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Supplemental Complaint. The supplemental pleading

asserts the same claims, “includes revisions to the description of the incident,” removes two

Plaintiffs, and appears to assert claims against additional Fort Lee officer Defendants. D.E. 15.

As relevant here, however, the Supplemental Complaint does not contain new allegations as to

2 The factual background is taken from Plaintiffs’ Complaint, D.E. 1, and the Supplemental

Complaint, D.E. 15. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded

facts in the complaint. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).

BCS, Kim or Lyle. The moving Defendants then filed the instant motions to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), seeking to dismiss the Complaint and Supplemental

Complaint. D.E. 23, 45. Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court treats the

Supplemental Complaint as an amended complaint.3

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint that fails

“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to

survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that

is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Constr.

Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district

courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,

210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and

therefore, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212,

224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however, “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.

3 It also appears that Plaintiffs filed the Supplemental Complaint before any Defendant was served

with the initial Complaint and it does not appear that any of the Moving Defendants were served

with Supplemental Complaint. Kapusinski Decl. ¶ 3, Doris Decl. ¶ 3; see also D.E. 19. Because

the moving Defendants are aware of the Supplemental Complaint, which contains the same

allegations as to the Moving Defendants as the initial Complaint, and Plaintiffs could have filed

the Supplemental Complaint (as an amended complaint) as a matter of course pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(A) or (B), the Court considers the Supplement Complaint as filed.

Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court construes the Complaint liberally and

holds it to a less stringent standard than papers filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972). The Court, however, need not “credit a pro se plaintiff's ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal

conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse v. Lower

Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Claim (Count One)

In Count One, Plaintiffs assert a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983, in

relevant part, provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights; rather, Section 1983 provides

a vehicle for vindicating violations of other federal rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-

94 (1989). To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) a person deprived

him of a federal right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state

or territorial law.” Burt v. CFG Health Sys., No. 15-2279, 2015 WL 1646849, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr.

14, 2015).

1. Defendant Fort Lee Police Officer Matthew Lyle

Lyle maintains that the claims must be dismissed as to him because Plaintiffs fail to allege

that he was personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing. Lyle Br. at 2. Plaintiffs counter that

there is no way to include each encounter with every Defendant without making the Complaint too

lengthy. Plaintiffs further maintain that as the case progresses, the details about their interaction

with each Defendant will emerge. Plfs. Lyle Opp. at 1.

When asserting any claim, including a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead facts

setting forth each defendant’s involvement in the alleged violations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;

see also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of First

Amendment retaliation claim where the plaintiff failed to allege personal direction of or knowledge

and acquiescence in retaliatory actions by individual defendants). Similarly, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure require that plaintiffs set forth plausible allegations as to each defendant. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that Rule 8 requires more than “naked asserts devoid of further factual

enhancement”). Here, Lyle is not named as a Defendant in the initial Complaint, nor do Plaintiffs

allege that he was engaged in any wrongful conduct. Although Lyle is named as a Defendant in

the caption of the Supplemental Complaint, Supp. Compl. at 2, Plaintiffs still do not make any

factual allegations that involve Lyle in the pleading. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to allege personal

wrongdoing as to Lyle. Plaintiffs cannot proceed with their claims against Lyle without making

specific and plausible factual allegations as to his individual wrongful conduct. Because Plaintiffs

fail to do so, Lyle’s motion is granted.

2. Defendant Bergen County Sheriff

BCS seeks to dismiss Count I because Plaintiffs fail to plead a policy or custom that

resulted in the alleged wrongdoing.4 BCS Br. at 14. Plaintiffs do not address this argument for

4 It also appears that BCS may not be the appropriate party as it is merely an arm of the county.

Hernandez v. Borough of Palisades Park Police Dep’t, 58 F. App’x 909, 912 (3d Cir. 2003)

(“Police departments cannot be sued alongside municipalities because a police department is

merely an administrative arm of the municipality itself.”); Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township,

132 F.3d 20, 29 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (“As in past cases, we treat the municipality and its police

department as a single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability.”). However, BCS does not

raise this argument, and the Court declines to do so sua sponte.

dismissal. A county or municipality may be liable under Section 1983 only “if the plaintiff

identifies a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury.” Jewell

v. Ridley Township, 497 F. App’x 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); see also Meleika v. Bayonne Police Dep’t, No. 21-19793,

2022 WL 522810, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2022) (explaining that for the City to be liable under §

1983, the law “would require facts suggesting an unconstitutional municipal policy, practice, or

custom”). A plaintiff may show the existence of a policy when a decision-maker with final

authority issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict. Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850

(3d Cir. 1990). Custom may be established by showing that a given course of conduct, “although

not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to

constitute law.” Id.; see also Watson, 478 F.3d at 155-56; Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Fac., 318

F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (defining “custom” as “‘an act that has not been formally approved

by an appropriate decisionmaker,’ but that is ‘so widespread as to have the force of law.’” (quoting

Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997))).

Plaintiffs fail to mention any policy or custom that led to the alleged constitutional

violation. Plaintiffs, therefore, fail to state a Section 1983 claim against BCS.

3. Defendant Sheriff’s Officer Young Kim

Kim first maintains that to the extent Plaintiffs Shirley or Scott are asserting claims against

him, the claims must be dismissed for lack of personal involvement. BCS Br. at 10-11. The Court

agrees. As discussed, Plaintiffs must allege facts demonstrating the personal involvement of each

Defendant to state a Section 1983 claim. Plaintiffs’ allegations as to Kim only involve his

interaction with Plaintiff Winifred. See Supp. Compl. ¶ 27.

Turning to these specific allegations, Plaintiffs allege that after Defendant Hernandez

placed handcuffs on Winifred, Kim grabbed Winifred. Id. Winifred then asked Kim “Are you

arresting me?” and Kim allegedly answered in the affirmative. Id. Winifred was later pulled down

the stairs of the apartment and placed into a police car. While not entirely clear, it appears that

Winifred was let out of the police car at some point because Plaintiffs further indicate that Winifred

was ultimately confined to the front porch and told she could not go anywhere else. Id. ¶ 28.

Plaintiffs do not allege that Kim was involved in any of the conduct after he answered Winifred’s

question about being placed under arrest.

Kim argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to plead a false arrest claim against

him because he did not actually arrest Winifred. BCS Br. at 11-12. Kim relies on Lozano v. New

Jersey, 9 F. 4th 239 (3d Cir. 2021) to make this argument. BCS Br. at 11-12. To establish a

Section 1983 false arrest claim, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating “(1) that there was an

arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” Lozano, 9 F. 4th at 245 (internal

quotation omitted). In Lozano, one police officer was present while a second officer questioned

and ultimately placed handcuffs on Lozano. Id. at 242. The Third Circuit determined that

“[m]erely being present at the scene” of an arrest is not part of the arrest. Id. The Circuit continued

that the arrest “was conducted entirely” by the second and the first officer who was merely present

did not violate Lozano’s constitutional rights. Id. Here, viewing the Complaint in a light most

favorable to Plaintiffs, Kim’s interaction with Winifred could be construed as more than merely

being present at the scene, or as Kim maintains, “a bystander to the acts of other law enforcement.”

BCS Br. at 13. Plaintiffs plead that after Defendant Hernandez placed a cuff on Winifred, Kim

became physically involved and answered that he was arresting Winifred. Supp. Compl. ¶ 27.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations suggest that Kim was more than a mere bystander; he was

directly involved in the alleged arrest. BCS and Kim’s motion, therefore, is denied on these

grounds.

Kim also maintains that he is entitled to qualified immunity because, as in Lozano, he was

merely a bystander such that no constitutional violation occurred. BCS Br. at 13. Qualified

immunity can protect a state actor from liability in a Section 1983 case. Wright v. City of

Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005). “Qualified immunity shields government officials

from personal liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Paszkowski v. Roxbury Twp. Police Dep’t, No. 13-7088, 2014 WL 346548, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 30,

2014). A court must engage in the following two-part inquiry to determine whether qualified

immunity applies: (1) whether the allegations, taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, show that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2)

whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). “If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong, the

defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d

675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding defendant police officers were entitled to qualified immunity at

the motion to dismiss stage) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). As explained, Winifred sufficiently

alleges that Kim was actually involved in her false arrest. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude

that Kim is entitled to qualified immunity at this time.

In sum, BCS and Kim’s motion is denied to the extent they seek to dismiss Count One as

to Kim vis-à-vis Winifred.

B. New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Claim (Count Two)

Next, BCS and Kim seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ NJLAD claim. BCS Br. at 15. The NJLAD

is an anti-discrimination statute that generally applies in the workplace. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-

12(a). To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that she (1) is a member of a designated protected class; (2) was qualified for and

performing the essential functions of the job; (3) suffered termination or an adverse employment

action; and (4) the adverse employment action gives rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination. Toutelotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App’x 831, 842 (3d Cir. 2016). In this

instance, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not relate to their employment. Consequently, Plaintiffs fail to

state a NJLAD claim and Count Two is dismissed.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Counts Three and Four)

In Count Three, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants committed the tort of outrage. Supp.

Compl. ¶ 31. In Count Four, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants committed the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶ 32. BCS and Kim contend that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim

in either count. BCS Br. at 17-18. Under New Jersey law, a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress requires a plaintiff to show that (1) the defendant acted intentionally or

recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was outrageous and extreme; (3) the defendant's actions

were the proximate cause of the emotional distress; and (4) severe emotional distress. See Smith

v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 374 F. Supp. 2d 406, 422 (D.N.J. 2005) (quoting Wigginton v. Servidio, 734

A.2d 798, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)). The tort of outrage “is also known as intentional

infliction of emotional distress.” Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F. Supp. 2d 512, 568 (D.N.J.

2000). Consequently, the Court considers Counts Three and Four together.

BCS and Kim argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim in Counts Three and Four because

Plaintiffs do not plead any outrageous or extreme conduct. BCS Br. at 16-17. The Court agrees.

For conduct to be extreme and outrageous under New Jersey law, it must be “so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be

regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Lankford v. City of Clifton

Police Dep’t, 546 F. Supp. 3d 296, 323 (D.N.J. 2021) (quoting Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football

Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir. 1979)). Plaintiffs’ allegation that Kim grabbed Winifred and

answered that he was arresting her does not amount extreme or outrageous conduct; the Court is

not aware of any authority finding similar conduct sufficient to establish the tort. Plaintiffs argue

that their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should not be dismissed because Kim

“inflict[ed] further emotional distress to an already distressed individual.” Plfs. BCS Opp. at 1.

But Plaintiffs’ factual allegations still fall short of alleging outrageous conduct. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim in Counts Three and Four against Kim and BCS.

D. Leave to Amend

When dismissing claims brought by a pro se plaintiff, a court must decide whether the

dismissal will be with prejudice or without prejudice, the latter of which affords a plaintiff with

leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2002). The

district court may deny leave to amend only if (a) the moving party's delay in seeking amendment

is undue, motivated by bad faith, or prejudicial to the non-moving party or (b) the amendment

would be futile. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984). At this point, the Court

cannot conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims are futile. As a result, Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed

without prejudice and Plaintiffs are granted leave to file an amended pleading. If Plaintiffs intend

to file an amended complaint, they must file a single amended pleading (entitled the “Second

Amended Complaint”) that addresses the claims asserted against every named Defendant in the

Complaint and Supplemental Complaint. Any such pleading will replace both the Initial and

Supplemental Complaints and will be the operative pleading.

E. Letters of Support

Finally, since this matter was reopened, numerous non-parties have filed letters in support

of Plaintiffs on the docket. See D.E. 26, 31, 32, 40, 36, 37, 41, 43, 50, 57, 60, 63, 64, 67. The

Moving Defendants object to these letters and request that the Court strike them from the record.

See D.E. 33, 35, 65. Plaintiffs counter that these non-parties are expressing their freedom of

speech, and the letters are meant to humanize Plaintiffs and provide further insight into the matter.

D.E. 53.

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court ordinarily considers only the

factual allegations in the pleading, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record.

A court may also rely on “a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” U.S.

Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) (citation

omitted). None of the non-party letters fall into any of the categories that would permit the Court

to consider their contents in deciding a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court did not consider

any of the letters to decide the instant motions.

Further, although the relevance of these letters is not readily apparent, if anything, they

might be relevant as to potential discovery in this matter. But documents produced in discovery

are not ordinarily filed on the docket. In fact, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) provides that

parties’ initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) and responses to discovery requests “must not be

filed until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1). In

addition, the Court is unaware of any constitutional right permitting non-parties to submit

documents in support of civil litigants. Here, the Court has not ordered that Plaintiffs provide the

Court with any letters of support, nor did the Court need such documents to decide the motions to

dismiss. As a result, the Court will strike each letter from the docket. Moreover, the Court instructs

the Clerk’s Office to stop filing letters of support from non-parties on the docket in this matter.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and for good cause shown,

IT IS on this 16th day of November, 2022

ORDERED that Defendant Police Officer Matthew Lyle’s motion to dismiss, D.E. 45, is

GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Complaint and Supplemental Complaint are dismissed as to

Defendant Lyle without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the Bergen County Sheriff and Sheriff’s Officer Young Kim’s motion to

dismiss, D.E. 23, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and it is further

ORDERED that the Complaint and Supplemental Complaint are dismissed as to the

Bergen County Sheriff without prejudice and Counts Two through Four are dismissed without

prejudice as to Defendant Kim; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs are afforded thirty (30) days to file a single amended complaint

(entitled the “Second Amended Complaint”) that cures the deficiencies set forth above. If

Plaintiffs fail to file an amended complaint within this time, the claims dismissed herein will be

dismissed with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that D.E. 26, 31, 32, 40, 36, 37, 41, 43, 50, 57, 60, 63, 64 and 67 are stricken

from the docket; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office shall refrain from filing any non-party letters of support

on the docket in this matter; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office is directed to mail a copy of this Opinion & Order to

Plaintiffs via regular mail and certified mail return receipt.

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John\Michael Vazquez, U.S.D,F. °

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