“A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
THOMAS I. GAGE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 21-10763 (MAS) (LHG)
© MEMORANDUM ORDER
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION et
al.,
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Thomas I. Gage’s (“Gage”) Motion
for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 19.) Defendants New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (the “Department”) and John K. Ruschke (“Ruschke,” and together with the
Department, “Defendants”) separately opposed (ECF Nos. 21, 22), and Gage did not reply. The
Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the motion without oral
argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, the Court denies Gage’s Motion.
As the parties are no doubt familiar with the facts, the Court begins with the applicable
legal standard. Reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7.1 is “an extraordinary remedy” that is
rarely granted. Interfaith Cmty. Org v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 482, 507 (D.N.J.
2002) (citations omitted). It requires the moving party to set forth the factual matters or controlling
legal authorities it believes the Court overlooked when rendering its decision. See L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).
To succeed on a motion for reconsideration, a movant must show at least one of three factors:
“(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not
available when the court granted the motion [at issue]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of
law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros,
176 F.3d 669, 677 (Gd Cir. 1999) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
1218 Gd Cir. 1995)). Significantly, a motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to raise new
matters or arguments that could have been raised before the court decided the original decision.
See Bowers v. NCAA, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612-13 (D.N.J. 2001). Nor is a motion for
reconsideration an opportunity to “ask the court to rethink what it ha[s] already thought through.”
Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (alteration in original) (quoting Oritani Sav. & Loan
Ass’nv. Fid. & Deposit Co., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990)). “Rather, the rule permits a
reconsideration only when ‘dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law’ were
presented to the court but were overlooked.” Jd. (quoting Khair v. Campbell Soup Co., 893 F.
Supp. 316, 337 (D.N.J. 1995)).
Gage’s Motion identifies none of the three factors required for reconsideration. For
example, it does not identify any new controlling law or any injustice in ruling that the Department
enjoyed sovereign immunity. Nor does it identify any clearly established law that the Court
overlooked when ruling that Ruschke was entitled to qualified immunity. Instead, Gage’s Motion
relitigates his factual position that he was not developing improvements on protected wetlands.
But see Dunkley v. Mellon Invs. Servs., 378 F. App’x 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A motion for
reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that
could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). None of Gage’s arguments persuade the Court that its immunity rulings—which rested
on /egal grounds—were in error. And, in all events, Gage has not met his high burden to merit the
“extraordinary remedy” of reconsideration,!
IT IS THEREFORE, on this 27th day of September 2022, ORDERED as follows:
1. Gage’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 19) is DENIED.
+
MICHAEL A. Seu
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
' Ruschke also moves for sanctions. (ECF No. 22.) Although the Court agrees that it may impose
sanctions on pro se plaintiffs who use the judiciary as their “personal playground,” it declines to
exercise that discretion here. See Smith v. Cont’l Ins. Corp., 747 F. Supp. 275, 285 (D.N.J. 1990).
It does, however, warn Gage that any future frivolous filings may be met with sua sponte sanctions,
including payment of opposing counsels’ fees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).