VALENTINE v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MILTON VALENTINE,

Petitioner,

Civil Action No, 20-7910 (KMW)

OPINION

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, et

Respondents.

WILLIAMS, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Milton Valentine’s Petition for a writ of

habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 2254, (ECF No, | as reconstrued by ECF No. 4.)

Following an order to answer, Respondents filed a response to the Petition. (ECF No. 5.) Petitioner

did not file a reply, For the following reasons, this Court will dismiss the Petition, and will deny

Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

In September 2019, Petitioner was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment following a guilty

plea to compelling another to engage in prostitution. (ECF No. 6 at 30.) Based on the nearly six

hundred days of jail credits Petitioner received, he became eligible for parole shortly after the onset

of his sentence, resulting in a parole hearing in November 2019. (/d. at 4.) Following that hearing,

a panel of the New Jersey State Parole Board denied Petitioner parole in December 2019. □□□□

Petitioner was given a twenty-month future parole eligibility term. (U/d. at 3.) Petitioner filed an

administrative appeal of that decision, and the denial of parole was affirmed in March 2020. Gd.

at 13-16.) Following the adoption of the state’s COVID-19 protocols related to parole decisions,

that decision was automatically reconsidered by the parole board panel on May 6, 2020, and

Petitioner was once again denied parole. (/d. at 3.) Petitioner did not appeal this reconsideration

to the entire board, nor did he appeal either parole decision to the state appellate division or

supreme court. (ECF No. 1 at 3, ECF No, 5-1 at 2-3.)

In June 2020, Petitioner was also considered for, and denied transfer to emergency medical

home confinement under the State’s COVID-19 protocols, (Ud. at 77.) Although a public defender

filed a dispute as to that decision on Petitioner’s behalf, the Department of Correction issued a

final administrative decision denying furlough or release to home confinement on July 22, 2020.

(Ud. at 140.) Petitioner did not appeal that decision to the state appellate division or supreme court.

(ECF No. 1 at 3, ECF No, 5-1 at 2-3.) Instead, Petitioner filed his habeas petition in this matter

on June 29, 2020, (ECF No. 1.) In that petition, he challenges the parole board’s denial of release

on parole based on Petitioner’s COVID-19 related concerns. (d.)

IL. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the district court “shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” A habeas petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief for each claim

presented in his petition based upon the record that was before the state court. See Eley v. Erickson,

712 F.3d 837, 846-47 (3d Cir. 2013). Under the statute, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (““AEDPA”), district courts are required to give

great deference to the determinations of the state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 559

U.S. 766, 772-73 (2010).

Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, the district court shall

not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court adjudication

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Federal law is clearly established for these purposes where it is clearly

expressed in “only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta[,]” of the opinions of the United States

Supreme Court. See Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 2015). “When reviewing state criminal

convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by

overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.”

Id. Where a petitioner challenges an allegedly erroneous factual determination of the state courts,

“a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and the]

applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

I, DISCUSSION

In their response to the habeas petition, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s claims must

be dismissed as Petitioner did not fully exhaust his claims through appeals to the state courts

following the entry of administrative decisions denying Petitioner release. A habeas petition

“cannot proceed unless all meritorious claims have been exhausted in state court.” Mallory vy.

Bickell, 563 F. App’x 212, 215 Gd Cir. 2014). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, “state

prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by

invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). “The burden is on the habeas petitioner to prove exhaustion.”

DeFoy v, McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 Gd Cir. 2005). The exhaustion doctrine mandates that

the claim “must have been ‘fairly presented’ to the state courts.” Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d

700, 725 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Picard vy. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)).

Pursuant to the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Matter of Request to Modify

Prison Sentences, 242 N.J, 357, 388 (2020), a prisoner seeking release based on COVID-19 related

concerns, after being denied parole or release on that basis, must first administratively appeal the

denial. Following the entry of a final administrative decision, an unsatisfied prisoner may

thereafter appeal that denial of release to the Superior Court of New Jersey — Appellate Division.

id. at 389-90, Adverse decisions on that level can then be appealed to the New Jersey Supreme

Court. Jd. To exhaust a COVID-19 related parole or home release claim, a New Jersey prisoner

must therefore appeal the decision of the parole board or other official until a final administrative

decision is issued, and must thereafter appeal his claims to the Appellate Division, and ultimately

the state supreme court. See, e.g., McArthur v. New Jersey State Parole Board, No. 20-7316, 2020

WL 3577834, at *1 (D.N.J. July 1, 2020). A failure to complete all of these steps prior to filing a

habeas petition therefore constitutes a failure to exhaust, and will result in the dismissal of the

habeas petition without prejudice. fd. at *1-2,

In this matter, Petitioner admits in his habeas petition that he did not appeal his parole

denial beyond the administrative level, and Petitioner has not disputed Respondents contention

that he appealed neither his parole or his furlough denial to the Appellate Division or state supreme

court. It is thus clear that Petitioner failed to fully exhaust his claims. /d@ Petitioner’s habeas

petition is therefore dismissed without prejudice! as such. id.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a petitioner may not appeal from a final order in a habeas

proceeding where that petitioner’s detention arises out of his state court conviction unless he has

“made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “[A petitioner] satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution

of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude [that] the issues presented here are

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-E/ v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327

(2003). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching

the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [Certificate of Appealability] should issue when

the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states

a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack y. MdcDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000). Because jurists of reason could not disagree with this Court’s conclusion that

Petitioner’s petition is unexhausted and must be dismissed without prejudice as such, Petitioner’s

! The Court additionally notes that it appears that Petitioner may well have completed his sentence

insomuch as his maximum date was listed in the parole denial paperwork as being in April 2022.

(See ECF No. 6 at 4.) To the extent that the particular period of incarceration Petitioner sought to

challenged ended in April, he would no longer be in custody sufficient to support an exercise of

habeas jurisdiction in this matter. See, e.g., Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 716, 717 (d Cir. 2003)

(habeas jurisdiction only available where petitioner is “in custody” pursuant to the challenged

judgment). It thus appears that Petitioner’s having reached his release date may also mandate the

dismissal of this matter for want of jurisdiction. Because neither party has updated the Court as to

Petitioner’s custody status, and it is conceivable that some complication may have resulted in

Petitioner remaining in custody longer than anticipated, and because Petitioner’s habeas petition

shall be dismissed in any event, this Court need not further inquire into the custody issue at this

time.

habeas petition is inadequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further at this time, and

Petitioner is denied a certificate of appealability.

Vv. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE, and Petitioner is DENEED a certificate of appealability, An appropriate order

follows.

7!

\ Roe

on. Karen M. Williams,

United States District Judge