O'BRYANT v. THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANANCY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KINDRA O’BRYANT, BRIAN 1:17-cv-7752-NLH-AMD

FLANDERS, and ARTIE PEOPLES,

OPINION

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

KINDRA O’BRYANT

1320 CHASE STREET

CAMDEN, NJ 08104

BRIAN FLANDERS

1320 CHASE STREET

CAMDEN, NJ 08104

ARTIE PEOPLES

1214 N. 33RD STREET

CAMDEN, NJ 08105

Plaintiffs appearing pro se1

1 As previously noted in the Court’s February 22, 2021 Opinion

[Dkt. No. 68], it has been represented to the Court that even

though O’Bryant and Flanders resided together when this matter

was filed, they no longer live in the same home. Thus, based on

the certificate of service filed by Camden County Sheriff

Defendants, it appears that O’Bryant now resides with her

father, her co-Plaintiff Peoples, and that Flanders now resides

in Wildwood, New Jersey. See Certificate of Service [Dkt. No.

70-3]. As was the case in the Court’s prior opinion, it appears

that O’Bryant and Flanders have failed to update the Court with

their correct address. See L. Civ. R. 10.1(a) (directing that

HOWARD LANE GOLDBERG

KRISTA SCHMID

OFFICE OF CAMDEN COUNTY COUNSEL

520 MARKET STREET

COURTHOUSE, 14TH FLOOR

CAMDEN, NJ 08102

On behalf of Defendants Camden County Sheriff Gilbert

“Whip” Wilson, Sheriff Deputy T. Nichols, and Sheriff

Deputy Gurkin

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Camden County

Sheriff Gilbert “Whip” Wilson, Sheriff Deputy T. Nichols, and

Sheriff Deputy Gurkin’s (collectively the “Camden County Sheriff

Defendants” or “Defendants”) renewed motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Docket Number 70], pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs Kindra O’Bryant, Brian Flanders,

and Artie Peoples (collectively “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion.

The Court has considered the parties’ submissions and

decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 78.1.

For the reasons expressed below, Defendants’ motion will be

granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Court provided a detailed outline of the factual and

litigants have an affirmative duty to inform the Court of their

current address and to inform the Court of any changes within

seven days, and if a litigant fails to do so, the complaint is

subject to being stuck by the Clerk).

procedural history of this case in its September 5, 2018

Memorandum Opinion and Order [Dkt. Nos. 44 and 45 respectively],

originally dismissing the case with prejudice, and its February

22, 2021 Opinion and Order [Dkt. Nos. 68 and 67 respectively],

dismissing with prejudice Defendants (1) the New Jersey Division

of Child Protection & Permanency (“DCPP”), (2) Allison Blake,

the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families

(“DCF”), (3) Lisa Von Pier, the Assistant Commissioner of DCPP,

(4) Lisa Capone, a DCPP Supervisor, (5) Conchita Varga, a DCPP

employee, (6) Bryant Rolls, a DCPP employee, (7) Alicia Ash, a

DCPP employee, and (8) Jonathan Garrett, a DCPP employee

(collectively the “State Defendants”). The Court assumes the

parties’ familiarity with these opinions and the relevant

history; accordingly, the Court will restate only the salient

facts relevant to the instant motion for dismissal.

This case concerns claims by Plaintiffs arising from a

state court child welfare case and the temporary removal of two

of O’Bryant’s children from her custody. O’Bryant is the mother

of three children, Flanders is the father of the youngest of

O’Bryant’s children, and Peoples is O’Bryant’s father and the

grandfather of all three children. Plaintiffs allege that, on

June 6, 2017, DCPP received a call that Flanders seemed upset

and agitated when he dropped off two of O’Bryant’s children at

school. DCPP later learned that Flanders had an “endangering

the welfare of [a] child charge, [a] weapons charge, [an]

aggravated assault on a police officer charge, [and] warrants

out for his arrest.” Complaint [Dkt. No. 1.], at ¶132. That

same day, at a time when she was pregnant with Flanders’ child,

O’Bryant was hospitalized for injuries sustained during an

attempted suicide by self-mutilation (cutting herself). Prior

to being discharged from the hospital, O’Bryant signed a Family

Agreement (the “Family Agreement”), in which she agreed that

Flanders would only be permitted around the children after

completing a twelve-week parenting and domestic violence

program.

On August 15, 2017, O’Bryant gave birth to Flanders’ child

at Cooper Hospital in Camden, New Jersey. The next day, DCPP

caseworkers arrived at the hospital to discuss the Family

Agreement with O’Bryant. Also present at the hospital were

Peoples, Flanders, and the two older children. While at the

hospital, one of the caseworkers asked to interview O’Bryant’s

two older children. Peoples refused to permit the interview and

attempted to leave the hospital with the two older children.

A DCPP caseworker then summoned hospital security and

Defendant Nichols, a Camden County Deputy Sheriff. The

caseworker informed Nichols of the situation, including the fact

there were charges against Flanders and warrants for his arrest.

Id. at ¶¶131-132. Peoples affirmed that the caseworker wanted

to speak with the two children and that he was refusing to

cooperate without a warrant. Id. at ¶134. Plaintiffs then

allege that Nichols called over to another deputy (presumably

Defendant Gurkin), asking for a warrant check on Flanders, which

supposedly came up negative, as a result of which Nichols told

Flanders there were no outstanding warrants for his arrest. Id.

at ¶133.

Peoples eventually relented and agreed to allow the

caseworker to speak with the children on the condition that a

Cooper Hospital security officer and Nichols would be present

for the interview. Id. at ¶¶136-37. The caseworker then showed

Nichols Dodd removal papers,2 which, according to the Complaint,

Nicholas showed to Peoples, informing Peoples that DCPP had the

right to speak with the children and that DCPP would speak with

the children across the street at the DCPP building. Nichols,

Peoples, Flanders, and the caseworkers then walked the children

to the DCPP building. Id. at ¶142. While the children are

escorted into the DCPP building by Nichols and the caseworkers,

Peoples and Flanders waited outside. Id. at ¶143. Flanders was

2 As described by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, “[a] ‘Dodd

removal’ refers to the emergency removal of a child from the

home [or custody of a parent] without a court order, pursuant to

the Dodd Act, which, as amended, is found at N.J.S.A. 9:6-88.21

to -8.82. The Act was authored by former Senate President Frank

J. ‘Pat’ Dodd in 1974.” N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

P.W.R., 11 A.3d 844, 849 n.11, 205 N.J. 17, 26 n.11 (2011)

(citation omitted).

later arrested by Nichols, who emerged from the building with a

warrant for Flanders’ arrest. Id. at ¶145.

After waiting several hours, Peoples was told by a DCPP

employee that the children would not be released to him as the

children were being kept in DCPP custody. Id. at ¶147.

Plaintiffs aver this DCPP employee or security guard told

Peoples that paperwork regarding the children was left with

O’Bryant back at the hospital. Id. at ¶148. Peoples returned

to O’Bryant’s hospital room where she said there was no

paperwork regarding DCPP’s seizure of the children. Id. at

¶149.

Peoples then returned to the DCPP building to again ask

about paperwork regarding the children. Id. at ¶150. Failing

to obtain paperwork or a satisfactory response, Peoples called

the Camden County Police Department to report that his

grandchildren were seized by DCPP without any documentation for

the seizure. Id. at ¶¶150-51. The responding officers entered

the DCPP building and spoke with DCPP’s security staff. Id. at

¶¶151-53. The unnamed officers (again, possibly Gurkin, as he

is otherwise not mentioned in the Complaint) informed Peoples

that “there is nothing they can do” and provided him with an

incident report number.

On August 18, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the instinct action

seeking $10,000,000 in compensatory damages, $50,000,000 in

punitive damages, and an injunction requiring explicit

instruction and policy be enacted requiring the Camden County

Sheriff Defendants to refrain from abuse of process. While the

Complaint asserts six counts, the first five counts expressly

concern claims against Defendants who were previously dismissed

from the case. Thus, only the sixth count is relevant here.

Specifically, the sixth count alleges the Camden County

Sheriff Defendants are liable for violations of Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As concerns

Nichols, the Complaint appears to center on whether his decision

to escort the children from the hospital to the DCPP building

(based on the information provided by the DCPP caseworker and

the Dodd removal papers) violated the Plaintiffs’ right to be

free from “unlawful investigations” in connection with the

temporary removal of the children.

Plaintiffs also claim Wilson failed to promulgate adequate

rules and regulations regarding the seizure of children and

further failed to instruct, discipline, and train deputies in

the appropriate methods for handling and investigating

allegations of child abuse in cases of exigent circumstances

resulting in threats and abuse of power. Id. at ¶224.

Plaintiffs seek to hold the Defendants liable in their official

and individual capacities.

On September 6, 2018, the Court dismissed the case with

prejudice for lack of jurisdiction under the domestic relations

exception and alternatively due to abstention under Younger.

The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims for

monetary damages against DCPP and the other individual State

Defendants in their official capacities on the grounds of

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. On November 4, 2020, the

case was reinstated for the remaining claims. On February 22,

2021, the Court issued an Opinion and Order dismissing the State

Defendants with prejudice, finding them entitled to qualified

immunity. On June 12, 2021, the Camden County Sheriff

Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

As Plaintiffs’ claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, the Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over

this matter because it arises under the laws of the United

States, raising a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

B. Legal Standard

It is well settled that a pleading must be “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule

“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

In addition, when considering a motion to dismiss a

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as

true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well

settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of

Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994);

and then citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must

take three steps: (1) the court must take note of the elements a

plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) the court should

identify allegations that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and

(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Malleus v.

George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 675, 679 (2009) (alterations,

quotations, and other citations omitted)).

“[W]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not

be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the

plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his

allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the

factfinder.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v.

Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). Thus, a court asks “not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.”

Id. (quoting Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236).

“A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is

unable to plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,

578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal . . . provide[d] the

final nail in the coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard that

applied to federal complaints before Twombly.”). “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that

a [party] has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). It is

ultimately the defendant, however, that bears the burden of

showing that no claim has been presented. Hedges v. United

States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages,

Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

In addition, the Court must be mindful towards pro se

pleadings. In particular, pro se complaints must be construed

liberally, and all reasonable latitude must be afforded to the

pro se litigant, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), but

pro se litigants “must still plead the essential elements of

[their] claim and [are] not excused from conforming to the

standard rules of civil procedure.” McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that

procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be

interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed

without counsel.”); see also Sykes v. Blockbuster Video, 205 F.

App’x 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that pro se plaintiffs

are expected to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure).

C. Analysis

As noted above, Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is against

the Camden County Sheriff Defendants, asserting a cause of

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for assisting the DCPP caseworkers

in removing the children to the DCPP building for interviews.

Defendants claim the Complaint fails to state a claim as they

are entitled to qualified immunity, just as the Court previously

found for the State Defendants.

Not surprisingly, the Court’s analysis of this last

remaining claim largely turns on the same reasoning as the

Court’s February 22, 2021 Opinion, which dismissed Plaintiff’s

claims against the State Defendants after finding qualified

immunity barred most of Plaintiffs’ claims. Substantially, for

the reasons expressed in that Opinion, which the Court

incorporates here, the Court finds that the Camden County

Sheriff Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the

claims against them in their individual capacities must be

dismissed.

Section 1983 provides in pertinent part, “[e]very person

who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

“By its terms, of course, [§ 1983] creates no substantive

rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights

established elsewhere.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 816 (1985).

“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff]

must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color

9 of state law.” Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir.

1993). For claims asserted against persons acting under the

color of state law, such as the Defendants here, the qualified

immunity doctrine governs the analysis. “Qualified immunity

shields government officials from civil damages liability unless

the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that

was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). “When properly

applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 735 (2011) (quoting , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). To

overcome a defendant’s qualified immunity shield, a plaintiff

must plead facts showing (1) that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was

“clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735 (citation omitted). Lower courts have

discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified

immunity analysis to tackle first. Id. (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).

“The dispositive point in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether a reasonable officer in the same

situation clearly would understand that his actions were

unlawful.” Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 118, 117 A.3d 1206,

1214 (2015); Reiche v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)

(holding that a right is clearly established when the law is

“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he [or she] is doing violates that

right.”). “In other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed

the statutory or constitutional question’ confronted by the

official ‘beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,

741 (2011)); see also White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 137 S. Ct.

548, 551 (2017) (“While this Court's case law do[es] not require

a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established,

existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.”) (internal quotations

omitted) (citation omitted).

Qualified immunity “shields an officer from suit when [he

or she] makes a decision that, even if constitutionally

deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances [he or she] confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543

U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206

(2001) (stating that qualified immunity operates “to protect

officers from the sometimes ‘hazy border between excessive and

acceptable force’”)). There is a “longstanding principle that

‘clearly established law’ should not be defined “‘at a high

level of generality.’” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (quoting al–

Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). Rather, “the clearly established law

must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” Id. (citing

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “Otherwise,

[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified

immunity ... into a rule of virtually unqualified liability

simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.” Id.

(alterations in original) (citation omitted). One final caveat

regarding qualified immunity is that the defense only protects

against claims against officers and other public officials in

their individual capacities and not their official capacities.

Stanziale v. Cnty. of Monmouth, 884 F. Supp. 140, 144-45 (D.N.J.

1995).

Here, Defendants argue the temporary removal of the

children under the circumstances alleged in the Complaint

entitles Defendants to qualified immunity. Defendants present

two bases for their argument. First, Defendants contend that

Plaintiffs’ allegations do not state a case for violations of a

“clearly established” right. And second, Defendants claim there

are no allegations to show that any constitutional or statutory

right was violated. As for the arguments presented, the Court

need only address the first line of reasoning, as it alone

sufficiently supports dismissal under qualified immunity.

In evaluating the same allegations that give rise to count

six, the Court’s February 22, 2021 Opinion plainly found

Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate a “clearly established”

right was violated. The Court’s prior ruling centered on the

Third Circuit’s analysis in Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child

Protection and Permancy, 814 F.3d 164, 166-71 (3d Cir. 2016),

which found that, although “the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents

to make decisions concerning the case, custody, and control of

their children,” and from this fundamental right flows certain

procedural due process rights for parents when a government

entity seeks to deprive them permanently of custody, “no Supreme

Court precedent clearly establishes that [the child]’s temporary

removal from her mother’s custody violated substantive due

process.” Id. at 170.

As this Court noted, “the allegations in Mammaro and those

asserted by Plaintiffs in this case are analogous,” thus the

Complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established

right and the Camden County Sheriff Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity just as were the State Defendants. February

22, 2021 Opinion [Dkt. No. 68] at 18 (“The DCPP defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity for their actions alleged by

Plaintiffs. As the Third Circuit found in Mammaro, there is no

Supreme Court precedent that clearly establishes O’Bryant’s

children’s temporary removal from her custody violates

substantive due process. Moreover, as directly evidenced by the

facts in Mammaro, there is no consensus in the case law that

temporarily removing O’Bryant’s children was an unconstitutional

interference with the parent-child relationship under the

circumstances alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint.”).

Plaintiffs argue that children cannot be removed from their

parents absent exigent circumstances. However, the record

demonstrates such circumstances were present to justify the

Defendants’ actions. As set forth in the Court’s prior Opinion,

the record shows that: (1) Flanders was upset and agitated when

dropping O’Bryant’s children off at school; (2) DCPP discovered

that Flanders, who lived with O’Bryant and her two children, had

a documented history of child abuse and a violent criminal

record, which included endangering the welfare of a child,

weapons, and aggravated assault on a police officer; (3) DCPP

discovered O’Bryant had attempted suicide while pregnant; (4)

O’Bryant willingly entered into a contract, the Family

Agreement, whereby she agreed that in order to keep custody of

her children, Flanders would not live with her children until

after he completed parenting and domestic violence programs; (5)

DCPP learned that O’Bryant’s children were living with her and

Flanders, and the two Plaintiffs were at the hospital together

with the children when O’Bryant gave birth to Flanders’ child;

and (6) the DCPP caseworkers provided Nichols with a Dodd report

concerning such details and discussed the situation with Nichols

informing him of DCPP’s entitlement to interview and protect the

children.

Thus, in consideration of all these facts and

circumstances, it is evident that Nichols’ actions (and the

other Camden County Sheriff Defendants) did not constitute “an

arbitrary abuse of government power that shocks the conscience.”

Mammaro, 814 F.3d 170-71. There is nothing suggested by

Plaintiffs that Nichols, Wilson, or Gurkin had any reason to be

put on notice that their conduct and policies violated

substantive due process. Accordingly, the Court finds that

qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants in

their individual capacities.

In addition to qualified immunity, the Court also finds

that dismissal is appropriate for Plaintiffs’ claims against

Gurkin, Nichols, and Wilson in their official capacities because

the Complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8 and ultimately fails to state a claim against them.

As noted above, Rule 8 requires Plaintiffs’ Complaint to

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Even liberally construing the Complaint, Plaintiffs fail to

provide fair notice of the grounds on which they intend to rest

their claims against Gurkin, who, beyond the case caption, is

not even mentioned or identified in the Complaint. Although the

Complaint provides an overview of events that occurred on August

16, 2017, it contains no factual allegations specific to Gurkin.

As a result, the Court and Gurkin are unable to discern which

allegations apply to him individually.

Similarly and perhaps relatedly, the Complaint notes that

Nichols called a deputy and that Camden County Police responded

to Peoples’ call, but the Complaint does not define who these

individuals are. This is a form of impermissible group

pleading. Szemple v. Rutgers Univ., No. 19-13300, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 32899, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2021) (“This group

pleading is prohibited”) (citing Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14-

169, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84365, at *8 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015)).

It is a basic pleading requirement that “[a] plaintiff must

allege facts that ‘establish each individual [d]efendant’s

liability for misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Galicki, 2015

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32899, at *8.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any policy

to support their Monell claims against Defendants in their

official capacities. Claims against officers in their official

capacities are the functional equivalent of a claim against the

municipality or public entity that employs them, as the claim is

truly against the city or municipality. See Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). Government entities or municipalities

may be liable for their agents’ actions upon a demonstration

that a policy or custom of the municipality caused, or was a

“moving force” behind, the alleged violation of the Plaintiffs’

rights. Id. at 166 (citation omitted. To demonstrate a Monell

claim, “[a] plaintiff must identify the challenged policy,

attributed to the city itself, and show a causal link between

execution of the policy and the injury suffered.” Losch v.

Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984).

Therefore, under the present circumstances, Plaintiffs may

sue the Camden County Sheriff Defendants in their official

capacities under § 1983 theory of liability only for acts

implementing an official policy, practice, or

custom. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-

94 (1978). Again, to plausibly plead Monell liability, a

plaintiff must identify the challenged policy or custom,

attribute it to the municipality itself, or in this case, a

policy established or implemented by Wilson, and show a causal

link between execution of the policy and the injury

suffered. Harley v. City of New Jersey City, No. 16-5135, 2017

WL 2774966, at *7–8 (D.N.J. June 27, 2017).

In addition, where the identified “policy concerns a

failure to train or supervise municipal employees,” as is

alleged in the instant case, “liability under § 1983 requires a

showing that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to

the rights of persons with whom those employees will come into

contact.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d

Cir. 2014). Deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard of

fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a

known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. at 223.

Ordinarily, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees” is necessary “to demonstrate deliberate

indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id.

“Additionally, ‘the identified deficiency in a city's training

program must be closely related to the ultimate injury;’ or in

other words, ‘the deficiency in training [must have] actually

caused’ the constitutional violation.” Id. at 222 (quoting City

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989)).

Here, the Complaint identifies Wilson and the Camden County

Sheriff’s Department (which is not named as a Defendant) as

responsible for promulgating and enforcing rules, policies, and

regulations regarding child abuse investigations, but the

Complaint fails to note any specific policy, procedure, or rule

that undergirds the action as a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights.

The Complaint vaguely claims the existence of a policy or custom

allowing deputies to commit “abuse of process,” yet there is

nothing further plead to substantiate this bald assertion.

Accordingly, a thorough review of the Complaint shows Count Six

is merely a collection of bare conclusions against Wilson and

the Camden County Sheriff’s Department (and by extension Gurkin

and Nichols for supposedly following this unnamed policy), which

is insufficient to state a claim for relief. Id. (citing Kaplan

v. Holder, No. 14-1740, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33376, 2015 WL

1268203, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678)).

More particularly, beyond these blank averments, there is

nothing tying Defendants, and particularly Wilson and Gurkin to

the action. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir.

2005) (holding that dismissal was appropriate because pro se

plaintiff’s Complaint failed to allege the individual defendant

was personally involved in the alleged unlawful act, nor did the

Complaint include “even a remote suggestion that [the individual

defendant] had contemporaneous, personal knowledge of the

[alleged unlawful act] and acquiesced in it.”). Thus,

Plaintiffs provide no reasonable basis to support a finding that

a Camden County Sheriff’s Department policy, practice, or custom

led to a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The

Complaint is absent of facts establishing the existence of an

unconstitutional policy; the execution of that policy caused

Plaintiffs’ deprivation of rights; and a connection between that

conduct and the deputies’ actions in aiding the DCPP

caseworkers’ removal of O’Bryant’s children.

For these reasons, the Complaint in its current form “would

not provide any meaningful opportunity to [Defendants] to

decipher or answer the vague allegations levied against them.”

Johnson v. Koehler, No. 18-807, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42006, at

*8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2019); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Consequently, even if the Court were not to grant dismissal

under qualified immunity, the Court is compelled to disregard

the Complaint’s “naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and dismiss the Complaint

against the Defendants for failure to state a claim and for

failure to comply with Rule 8. See Szemple, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 32899, at *9 (dismissing pro se Plaintiff’s complaint for

failure to comply with Rule 8 and failure to state a claim where

Plaintiff failed to refer to Defendants individually and provide

them fair notice of the grounds on which he intends to rest his

claims).

In sum, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants in their

individual capacities will be dismissed with prejudice.

Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants in their

official capacities will be without prejudice. Plaintiff will

be granted leave to file an Amended Complaint within thirty (30)

days of this Opinion and accompanying Order that cures the

aforementioned pleading deficiencies if they are able to do

consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992) (holding that a pro se

plaintiff should receive leave to amend to address the

inadequacies of his/her complaint unless such amendment would be

futile or inequitable); see also LaGuardia v. Ross Twp., 705 F.

App’x 130, 132 n.6 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that “leave to amend

pleadings should be freely granted unless the curative amendment

would be ‘inequitable, futile, or untimely’”) (quoting Alston v.

Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that “even

when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, if a complaint is

vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a District Court must permit a

curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or

futile”)).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Rule 12(b)(6) motion

will be granted. An appropriate Order will follow.

Date: August 11, 2022 s/ Noel L. Hillman

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.