“judges .. . are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly”
How later courts described this case
- “judges .. . are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LEON GREEN-BEY,
Plaintiff Civil Action No, 21-20143 (KMW) (AMD)
OPINION
ATLANTIC COUNTY, et al,
Defendants.
WILLIAMS, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sua sponte screening of Plaintiffs
complaint (ECF No. 1) and the Court’s review of Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF No. 1-2.) Having reviewed the application, this Court finds that leave to proceed
in forma pauperis is warranted in this matter, and Plaintiff's application will be granted. Because
Plaintiff will be granted in forma pauperis status in this matter, this Court is required to screen his
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's complaint shali be dismissed without prejudice.
L BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a state pre-trial detainee, who is currently detained in the Mercer County
Correction Center. (See ECF Nos. 1; 14). On June 16, 2021, while already a pre-trial detainee,
Plaintiff was transported into Atlantic County by two Atlantic County Sheriffs officers. (ECF
No. | at 8.) It is not clear from the complaint why Plaintiff was taken into Atlantic County on that
date, but it does not appear to have been the date on which he was arrested as Plaintiff was detained
in the Cape May County jail for at least several weeks prior to that date and continued to be
detained there until at least November 2021, (See ECF No. 1-2 at 4.) Plaintiff contends that being
transported to Atlantic County caused him mental anguish because he had previously suffered an
unspecified excessive force incident in Atlantic County in June 2019.! (ECF No. 1 at 8.) While
being transported by the Sheriff’s officers, Plaintiff noticed that they had with them a document
which contained his photograph and identified his race as black or African American, both of
which he finds offensive because he identifies himself as being of Moorish descent. Ud.) Taking
offense to being transported into Atlantic County and being so identified on this document,
Plaintiff attempted to file tort claim notices with Atlantic County and several related agencies,
including the Atlantic County Prosecutor and the claim adjuster for the County, all of whom
declined to grant him relief. Vd.) Plaintiff also sought relief from the state courts, but received
none. Ud.), Plaintiff now believes that these actions amount to a grand conspiracy to violate his
rights and harm him which includes within its ranks several state court judges, officers,
prosecutors, Atlantic County itself, and several other figures.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff will be granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen
his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
' Plaintiff also feels compelled to note that he did not “consent” to being transported and that he
did not appreciate being transported in “chains” and under guard by two officers armed with pistols
which put him at a disadvantage. (ECF No. | at 8.) Considering Plaintiff was clearly already a
state criminal detainee and was most likely being transported for reasons related to his criminal
prosecution, none of these facts are in any way surprising or indicative of any wrongdoing —
criminal detainees are as a matter of course transported by armed police while handcuffed or
otherwise restrained.
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Jd. “The
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 3d Cir. 2000)),
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court is
required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 228 3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations. Papasan y. Allain, 478 U.S, 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed
factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A
complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “’naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Jd. (quoting Bell Ailantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” /d. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570), “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts
“merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). /d. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at
557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se
litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim,” Mala v. Crown
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
ill, DISCUSSION
In this matter, Plaintiff seeks to raise claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C, § 1983 alleging that he
was denied his right to Due Process and Equal Protection because he was transported into Atlantic
County for unknown reasons and noticed that two Sheriff's officers transporting him possessed
documents which referred to him as black of African American, two terms with which he does not
associate himself, “To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a
violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States that was committed
by a person acting under color of state law.” Nicini vy. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000).
“The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to ‘identify the exact contours of the underlying
right said to have been violated’ and to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation
ofa constitutional right at all.’” Jd. at 806 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 US. 833,
841 n.5 (1998)).
Although Plaintiff contends that his rights were violated when he was transported into
Atlantic County, he provides no context for that claim other than the fact that he suffered some
emotional pain upon being brought into Atlantic County because, two years earlier, he had suffered
some incident of excessive force in that county. He provides no facts to suggest that his being so
transported — presumably for purposes related to his criminal proceedings given the Defendants he
names in his complaint — was in any way wrong or improper, or that he had some right to Due
Process before being so transported. Given that he was already a state prisoner being held on
criminal charges on the date of his transport, this Court perceives no clear constitutional violation
from Plaintiff's being taken from the jail in which he was housed to another county, nor does this
Court recognize any Constitutional right of criminal prisoners to be completely free of ever
entering a given county merely because they were previously accosted in that county. This Court
thus finds no basis for a § 1983 claim arising out of being Plaintiff's transport to Atlantic County
and dismisses any claims based on that allegation as such,
In his remaining claims, Plaintiff takes issue with his being identified in state paperwork
as “black” or “African American,” racial terms which he personally finds offensive and does not
identify. Plaintiff does not provide any context regarding this document — it is not clear what the
document was, what purpose the document served, or how its identification of Plaintiff's perceived
race had any actual effect upon Plaintiff. Indeed, from Plaintiffs allegations, it seems Plaintiff
only incidentally noticed the document, and he fails to indicate that it had any effects upon him
beyond his own distaste for the racial identification noted on the form. As this Court is aware of
no casclaw finding a constitutional violation arising out of a plaintiff being identified by general
racial terms with which he does not identify, and Plaintiff has provided no basis for such a
violation, this Court finds that this, too, fails to state a plausible claim for relief. Likewise, given
the fact that the two incidents Plaintiff identifies do not appear to have actually involved any
wrongdoing on the parts of the Defendants, Plaintiff's contention that he was improperly denied
relief likewise fails to state a plausible claim for relief. As all of Plaintiff's claims fail to state a
plausible claim for which relief may be granted, his complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice
at this time.
This Court notes several other deficiencies, however. First, Plaintiff makes little effort to
connect most of the Defendants to the alleged wrongs — he does not explain why he was being
transported, where he was being taken, or who actually produced the document which he believes
incorrectly labeled his race. A defendant may only be held liable in a federal civil rights matter
where he had personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. See, e.g., Rode y. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). In this matter, Plaintiff doesn’t clearly identify what parties truly
had any part in the alleged “wrongs.” Instead, he relies on a blanket allegation that all those he
believes involved were parts of a poorly defined conspiracy against him.
The basic element of a conspiracy, be it a conspiracy to violate § 1983 or otherwise, is a
“meeting of the minds” of the alleged conspirators, Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 205
(3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A plaintiff seeking to raise a claim that the defendants conspired
to deprive him of his rights must therefore “provide some factual basis to support the existence of
the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.” Capogrosso vy. The Supreme Court
of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 Gd Cir, 2009) (quoting Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1481
(10th Cir, 1990)). Because a plaintiff must plead facts showing his claim to be plausible rather
than merely possible to survive screening, “the bare allegation of an agreement is insufficient to
sustain a conspiracy claim.” Brown v. Deparlos, 492 F, App’x 211, 215 Gd Cir, 2012), Likewise,
is insufficient to allege that ‘the end result of the parties’ independent conduct caused plaintiff
harm or even that alleged perpetrators of the harm acted in conscious parallelism.’” Desposito vy.
New Jersey, No. 14-1641, 2015 WL 2131073, at *14 (D.N.J. May 5, 2015) (quoting Novelfino vy,
NJ. Dep’t of Corr, Mountanview Youth, No. 10-4542, 2011 WL 3418201, at *15 (D.N.J. Aug. 3,
2011). As Plaintiff only provides a conclusory allegation that any conspiracy exists, he has failed
to clearly connect most, if not all, of the Defendants to any of the alleged wrongs, and his claims
are deficient for this reason as well.
Finally, the Court notes that several of the named Defendants may also be entitled to
immunity in this matter. The state judge and court Defendants, for example, are almost certainly
immune from suit. See Figueroa vy. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440-41 (3d Cir, 2000) (“judges .. .
are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly”). The Atlantic County
Prosecutor’s office is likewise most likely immune. See /mbler y. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410
ry
(1976); see also LeBlanc v. Stedman, 483 F. App’x 666, 669 (3d Cir, 2012). Should Plaintiff
choose to file an amended complaint in this matter, and to reraise these likely immune Defendants,
he should address why his claims should not be barred.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF
No, 1-2) shall be GRANTED, and Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) shall be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered,
Jn
4 \Wnhe————
n, Karen M. Williams,
United States District Judge
~