OLEXSAK v. JONES

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANDREW PETER OLEXSAK AND JENNIFER

LYNN OLEXSAK,

Civil Action No. 21-20026 (SDW)(ESK)

Plaintiffs,

v.

OPINION

OFFICER STEPHEN JONES, BOONTON

POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND TOWN OF

BOONTON,

July 28, 2022

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court is Defendants Officer Stephen Jones (“Officer Jones”), Boonton Police

Department (“Boonton PD”), and Town of Boonton’s (“Boonton”) (collectively, “Defendants”)

Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 4) Plaintiffs Andrew Peter Olexsak (“Plaintiff” or “Andrew O.”) and

Jennifer Lynn Olexsak’s1 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Complaint (D.E. 1 (“Compl.”)) pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1332. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1445(a). This opinion is issued

1 Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Olexsak has pled no claims in the Complaint. (See generally D.E. 1.) The Complaint has set

forth no factual allegations or causes of action as to Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Olexsak. The only mention of Plaintiff

Jennifer Lynn Olexsak is in Plaintiffs’ Opposition Brief, which alleges that “Plaintiff was a witness and testified in

the court hearing on December 18, 2012”; Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Olexsak was a “witness in the 2021 firearms appeal

hearing” and “witness to new false statements made [. . . ] in the New Jersey Superior Court in November 2021”; and

Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Olexsak suffered undue emotional distress and trauma. (D.E. 7.) Even a generous reading of

the Complaint does not reveal facts sufficient to sustain any causes of action by Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Olexsak and

thus her claims are dismissed. This opinion will refer only to Plaintiff, Andrew O. going forward.

without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion is

GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL HISTORY2

A. Plaintiff’s May 2012 Arrest

On May 5, 2012, Plaintiff Andrew O. was involved in a dispute with his neighbors in

front of his home in Boonton, New Jersey that resulted in Boonton PD being called. (D.E. 5 at

25–26.) At the scene of the May 5, 2012 incident, Andrew O. was asked by police officers

repeatedly to remove his hands from his pockets. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to remove his hands from

his pockets, ridiculed the police officers, and then proclaimed in front of several citizens and

children that he had a weapon. (Id.) Plaintiff was then placed under arrest for disorderly conduct.

(Id.) As a result of his actions, Plaintiff was charged with Obstructing the Administration of Law

or Government Function, N.J.S.A. § 2C:29-1(a) and Disorderly Conduct, N.J.S.A. § 2 C:33-2.

(D.E. 5 at 25–26, 42–44, 47, 52.)

In connection with the May 5, 2012 incident, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Jones unlawfully

searched, seized, and arrested him. (Compl. at 4, 10.) Following the arrest, Officer Jones

purportedly “created a fictitious police report to shield himself from the misconduct.” (Id. at 10.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a misconduct complaint against Officer Jones with the

Morris County Prosecutor’s office after the “false arrest.”3 (Id.) Without providing further factual

2 The factual information provided in this opinion was obtained from the Complaint, as well as the exhibits attached

to Defendants’ motion that were explicitly referenced and relied upon in the Complaint by Plaintiff.

3Andrew O. has provided no further factual detail regarding the alleged misconduct complaint filed against Officer

Jones. (See generally Compl.) The specifics and the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct

complaint are not provided. (Id.) It is unclear whether the alleged misconduct complaint was substantiated or

dismissed. (Id.)

detail, Plaintiff asserts that “when [Officer Jones] found out about the misconduct complaint,

[Officer Jones] retaliated by maliciously prosecuting the plaintiff.”4 (Id.)

On or about December 18, 2012, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to Obstructing the Administration

of Law or Government Function, N.J.S.A. § 2C:29-1(a) in connection with his May 5, 2012 arrest

and was sentenced to complete community service. (D.E. 5 at 42–44, 57, 52.) On that same date,

the Disorderly Conduct, N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-2 charge against Plaintiff was dismissed. (Id. at 52.)

Court records indicate that Plaintiff filed an appeal of his entered guilty plea of Obstructing the

Administration of Law or Government Function, N.J.S.A. § 2C:29-1(a) on or about January 16,

2013. (Id. at 47.) No further factual information is provided on the appeal. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that from 2013 through 2016 “[f]ictitious police reports” were filed

against him. (Compl. at 10.) Specifically, Plaintiff made “several attempts to notify the Chief of

Police and other police officers of the misconduct” from 2013 to 2016. (Compl. at 10.)

Purportedly, “[e]ach attempt was met with police reports that contained material omissions and or

falsifications to create a narrative that protected the defendant.” (Id.) However, during this period,

the police reports filed documented incidents where Plaintiff harassed and intimidated Boonton

police officers and their respective family members at their homes; Boonton personnel; and other

persons. (D.E. 5 at 25–32.)

B. The Firearms Purchaser Identification Card and Firearms Permit Application

On November 15, 2020, Plaintiff Andrew O. applied for a New Jersey Firearms Purchaser

Identification Card (FID) and Firearms Permit. (Compl. at 10.) In the application, Plaintiff

4 A generous liberal reading of Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to allege that Officer Jones retaliated against Plaintiff

after the misconduct complaint was filed against Officer Jones regarding the May 5, 2012 arrest. (Compl. at 10.)

Plaintiff has not pled facts detailing what Officer Jones did after he purportedly found out about the misconduct

Complaint.

certified that he had never been “convicted of a disorderly persons offense in New Jersey or any

criminal offense in another jurisdiction where you could have been sentenced up to six months in

jail that has not been expunged or sealed[.]” (D.E. 5 at 19–20.) He did not report on the application

that he was found guilty of Obstructing the Administration of Law or Government Function in

connection with his May 5, 2012 arrest. (Id.)

After consideration, the application was denied by way of letter dated, April 20, 2021.

(Compl. 10, D.E. 5 at 65.) The letter advised that Plaintiff’s application was denied because no

permit to purchase a handgun or FID shall be issued to any person, inter alia, “who knowingly

falsifies any information on the application for a handgun purchaser permit or firearms

identification card” or “where the issuance would not be in the interest of the public, health, safety,

and welfare.” (D.E. 5 at 65.)

Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County regarding

the denial of his application for an FID and Firearms Permit to purchase a handgun.5 (D.E. 5 at

69.) The appeal proceeded with testimony on September 20, 2021 and November 17, 2021. (Id.)

On November 22, 2021, Plaintiff voluntarily asked to withdraw his appeal with the Morris County

Superior Court. (Id.) On December 1, 2021, Judge Thomas J. Critchley, J.S.C. of the Superior

Court of New Jersey, Morris County entered an order withdrawing Plaintiff’s appeal of the denial

of his application. (Id.)

5 A search of public records has not yielded information documenting that Plaintiff filed an appeal in the Superior

Court of New Jersey, Morris County. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants provided a copy of the filed appeal. Defendants

did attach a copy of an Order from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County withdrawing the appeal. (D.E.

5 at 69.) Notwithstanding, this Court will consider the appeal as filed.

C. Federal Court Complaint

Plaintiff filed the instant suit on November 15, 2021, alleging three Counts, including

violations of various constitutional rights.6 (See generally Compl.) In Count One, Plaintiff alleges

that he was unlawfully searched, seized, and arrested on May 5, 2012. (Compl. at 10.) In Count

Two, Plaintiff alleges that fictitious police reports were filed from 2013 through 2016 in

connection with his May 5, 2012 arrest and other incidents. (Id.) In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges,

inter alia, that he was denied his FID and Firearms Permit in retaliation for exercising his First

Amendment rights; that the denial of his FID and Firearms Permit violated his Second Amendment

rights; and that he was harassed, discriminated against, and intimidated from entering the “public

building to vote or conduct other normal business.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that he was

intimidated because of Officer Jones’ testimony during the Superior Court hearing on his appeal.7

(Id.) Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (D.E. 4.) All timely briefing was

filed. (D.E. 7 (“Opp. Br.”), D.E. 9.)8

6 This Court interprets the “Claim #1”, “Claim #2”, and “Claim #3” listed in the Complaint as causes of action

(“Counts”) for the purposes of this opinion. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Courts are to

construe complaints so ‘as to do substantial justice,’ . . . keeping in mind that pro se complaints in particular should

be construed liberally.” (citations omitted)). These Counts are for violations of: “Perjury/False Statements, Unlawful

Search, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Retaliation, Fictitious Reports, 4th Amendment,

14th Amendment Violations” (Count One); “Fictitious police reports” (Count Two); and “Perjury/False Statement,

Discrimination, Intimidation, Harassment, Retaliation, Fictitious Police Reports, 1st Amendment, 2nd

Amendment, 14th Amendment Violations” (Count Three). The Complaint is generally unclear as to which factual

allegations support each Count and against which specific Defendant(s) each Count is alleged.

7 Plaintiff alleges that Officer Jones’ testimony that he is “setting up undisclosed security in the town hall specifically

directed at the plaintiff” has intimidated him from entering the public building and voting. (Compl. at 10.)

8 On February 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply, which the Court advised “has been submitted without permission

and will not be considered.” (D.E. 10, D.E. 11.) Subsequently, on February 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amendment

to his opposition. (D.E. 12.) Plaintiff’s filed amendment (D.E. 12) has been submitted without permission and will

not be considered.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

An adequate complaint must be “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a)(2). This Rule “requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515

F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket

assertion, of an entitlement to relief”).

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept all factual

allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine

whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”

Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009)

(discussing the Iqbal standard). Determining whether the allegations in a complaint are

“plausible” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the “well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint should be dismissed

for failing to “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id.

While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim . . . [and] they cannot flout procedural rules—

they must abide by the same rules that apply to other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,

704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Importantly, beyond the complaint, the Court can consider documents attached to the

complaint or those “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770

F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). Here, Defendants attached, inter alia,

the police reports filed from 2012 to 2016; the FID and Firearms Permit application; the Court

Order withdrawing Plaintiff’s appeal; and other Court documents to their motion. (D.E. 5.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully searched, seized, and arrested in May 2012; the police

reports filed from 2012 to 2016 were “fictitious”; he was unlawfully denied his FID and Firearms

Permit; and Officer Jones falsely testified and introduced false police reports during the Superior

Court hearing on his appeal. (Compl. at 10.) By calling into question, inter alia, the police reports

and the FID and Firearms Permit application’s accuracy and lawfulness, Plaintiff has “invited [the

Court’s] consideration” of said documents. See Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C. v. Fishman, 666

F.App’x 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2016). Because the referenced documents and the information

contained therein are “integral to” and “explicitly relied upon in the complaint,” the Court will

consider and refer to said documents in resolving the present motion. See In re Burlington Coat

Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Counts One and Two

A (generous liberal) reading of Counts One and Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests that

Plaintiff intended to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.9 (Compl. at 10.) In Count One, Plaintiff

9 As the basis for federal question jurisdiction in this matter, Plaintiff cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for

deprivation of rights); 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (Cause of action under police pattern or practice); 18 U.S.C. § 242

(Deprivation of rights under color of law); 18 U.S.C. § 245 (federally protected activities); 42 U.S.C. § 14141

(Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute); 18 U.S.C. § 594 (Intimidation of voters); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (Perjury

generally); 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (False declarations before grand jury or court); and 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (Unsworn

alleges “perjury/false statements, unlawful search, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious

prosecution, retaliation, fictitious reports, 4th Amendment, 14th Amendment violations” in

connection with Plaintiff’s May 5, 2012 arrest. (Id.) In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that “fictitious

police reports” were filed from 2013 through 2016 in violation of his constitutional rights. (Id.)

The statute of limitations for actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in New Jersey is two

years. See Backof v. N.J. State Police, 92 F. App’x 852, 855 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2A:14-2). “[A] cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the

plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based. The

determination of the time at which a claim accrues is an objective inquiry; we ask not what the

plaintiff actually knew but what a reasonable person should have known.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d

626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims (Counts One and Two) are barred by the two-year statute

of limitations. (Compl. at 10.) Count One stems from the arrest of Plaintiff on May 5, 2012. (Id.)

As Plaintiff was aware of his alleged injury at the time of his arrest, the two-year limitations period

began to run on May 5, 2012, and expired in May 2014. Count Two stems from alleged “fictious

police reports” filed from 2013 to 2016 containing “material omissions and or falsifications[.]”

(Compl. at 10.) The two-year limitations period on those claims has also expired under any liberal

reading. Plaintiff provides no basis for a later accrual date or equitable tolling here, arguing only

that his claims are not time-barred because the “unlawful actions by the defendant in 2012 were

used as evidence in the 2021 Superior Court Proceedings to deprive [Plaintiff of his Second]

declarations under penalty of perjury), as federal statutes that are at issue in this matter. (D.E. 1 at 3, 9.) The

above-cited statutes do not provide Plaintiff with a private cause of action, except for Plaintiff’s claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. As such, Plaintiff’s claims under 34 U.S.C. § 12601, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 245, 42 U.S.C.

§ 14141, 18 U.S.C. § 594, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, and 28 U.S.C. § 1746 are dismissed with

prejudice. Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will be analyzed only.

Amendment rights.” (D.E. 7 at 2); see also Brown v. Elmwood Park Police Dep’t, Civ. No. 19-

9565, 2019 WL 2142768, at *2 (D.N.J. May 16, 2019) (citing Kach, 589 F.3d at 634). Counts

One and Two against Defendants are therefore dismissed with prejudice.

B. Count Three

Count Three, when liberally construed, appears to assert: that Plaintiff’s First and Second

Amendment rights were violated because he was denied his FID card and Firearms Permit due to

retaliation for exercising his free speech; Officer Jones “engaged in acts of intimidation,

discrimination[,] and harassment by testifying to the court on 9/21/21 that he is setting up

undisclosed security in the town hall specifically directed at the plaintiff”; and Officer Jones’

testimony intimidated him from voting and accessing the services at Boonton Town Hall.

(Compl. at 10.)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s claims under Count Three (Compl. at 10), fall far short of

adequately specifying what cognizable causes of action are actually being asserted because he fails

to provide a clear narrative of either the factual or legal basis for his claims. See Eisenstein v.

Ebsworth, 148 F. App’x 75, 77 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of a complaint that “failed to

succinctly set forth . . . the legal cause(s) of action on which the claims were based”). For example,

Plaintiff’s assertions that his First Amendment and Second Amendment rights were violated

because he was denied his FID card and Firearms Permit due to retaliation for exercising his free

speech are bald unsupported assertions that cannot survive a motion to dismiss. (Compl. at 10.)

Noticeably absent from the Complaint are pertinent facts demonstrating that Plaintiff was actually

denied an FID card and Firearms Permit as a result of exercising his free speech. (Id.)

Even a generous reading of the Complaint does not reveal facts sufficient to sustain any

cause of action under Count Three. (Compl. at 10.) Therefore, the facts alleged in the Complaint

are insufficient to support a claim entitling Plaintiff to relief. Pro se complaints, although “[held]

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520–21 (1972), must still “‘state a plausible claim for relief.’” Yoder v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 566 F. App’x. 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.

2013)). Count Three against Defendants is therefore dismissed.

i. Claims against Defendants Boonton and Boonton PD

Count Three also fails to state a claim for relief because it falls far short of adequately

specifying what cognizable causes of action, if any, are specifically attributable to Defendants

Boonton and Boonton PD. The body of the Complaint fails to note against which Defendant the

claims are specifically being made, which specific alleged facts relate to the purported claims, and

how they are so related. See Ingris v. Borough of Caldwell, Civ. No. 14-855, 2015 WL 3613499,

at *5 (D.N.J. June 9, 2015) (“[T]o the extent Plaintiff seeks to lump several defendants together

without setting forth what each particular defendant is alleged to have done, he has engaged in

impermissibly vague group pleading.”). Instead, Plaintiff’s Complaint “presents a dense thicket

of incomprehensible assertions” absent of “any arguable factual or legal basis.” James v. Walls,

Civ. No. 07-842, 2007 WL 1582660, at *2–3 (D.N.J. May 31, 2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (citing Eisenstein v. Ebsworth, 148 F. App’x. at 77). The Complaint fails to provide fair

notice to Boonton and Boonton PD of the factual basis of the claims against them and

impermissibly requires them to speculate on the legal grounds for relief sought by Plaintiff. (See

generally Compl.)

Nonetheless, consistent with Plaintiff’s pro se status, this Court will consider the

Complaint in detail with generous inferences and presumptions made below. See, e.g., Higgs v.

Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro

se litigant’s pleadings is well-established.”). “However, even under this relaxed standard there is

nothing in . . . the complaint to indicate a reasonable basis” for the relief sought. Tunnell v. Wiley,

369 F. Supp. 1260, 1264 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff’d, 514 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1975). Count Three, when

liberally construed, is presumably intended to assert 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Boonton and

Boonton PD in connection with the denial of Plaintiff’s FID card and Firearms Permit. (Compl.

at 10); Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e will apply the applicable law,

irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” (internal quotation omitted)).

However, government entities are generally not liable under § 1983 unless injury results from the

“execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy[.]” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In other words, a municipally-enacted policy, practice, or custom

must be the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378, 389 (1989).

Here, Plaintiff provides no reasonable basis to support a finding that a municipally-enacted

policy, practice, or custom led to a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In fact, neither

Boonton nor Boonton PD are mentioned in the allegations of the Complaint. The Complaint is

absent of facts establishing the existence of an unconstitutional policy; the execution of that policy

caused Plaintiff’s injury; and a connection between that conduct and Boonton itself. Therefore, to

the extent Plaintiff intended to assert § 1983 claims against Boonton and Boonton PD, Plaintiff’s

claims are dismissed.10

10 Boonton PD serves as “an executive and enforcement function of municipal government,” rather than as an

independent entity. See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118. “[T]he proper [§ 1983] defendant is therefore the municipality itself,

not the police department.” Brown v. Elmwood Park Police Dep’t, Civ. No. 19-9565, 2019 WL 1745984, at *2 (D.N.J.

Apr. 18, 2019) (citing Jackson v. City of Erie Police Dep’t, 570 F. App’x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2014)).

Lastly, while municipality officers can, under certain circumstances, be held personally

liable under § 1983 based on actions performed in their official capacities, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21, 30–31 (1991), Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Jones fail for the reasons set forth below.

ii. Claims Against Defendant Officer Jones

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability so long

as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 417

(3d Cir. 2015) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also Brown v. State of New Jersey, 165 A.3d 735, 743 (N.J. 2017) (explaining that

New Jersey’s qualified immunity doctrine tracks the federal standard). To determine whether a

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must “decide whether the facts that a plaintiff

has . . . shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 232 (2009). In addition, the court must “decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. If the answer to either question

is “no,” the analysis may end and immunity applies. Gardner v. N.J. State Police, No. 15-08982,

2018 WL 5342715, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2018) (citing Pitman v. Ottehberg, No. 10-2538, 2015

WL 6445872, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2015)).

“Generally, the applicability of qualified immunity is a question of law.” Hill v. Algor, 85

F. Supp. 2d 391, 401 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 n.4 (3d Cir.

1997)). “However, where factual issues relevant to the determination of qualified immunity are

in dispute, the Court cannot resolve the matter as a question of law.” Id. (citing Karnes v. Skrutski,

62 F.3d 485, 491 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Santini, 795 F.3d at 420; Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271,

278 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Just as the granting of summary judgment is inappropriate when a genuine

issue exists as to any material fact, a decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there

are unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges causes of action against Officer Jones in connection with the denial

of his FID card and Firearms Permit. (Compl. at 10.) However, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently

allege that Officer Jones violated a statutory or constitutional right that was “clearly established”

at the time of the alleged conduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 232. Without more, Plaintiff

merely asserts that Officer Jones denied him FID card and Firearms Permit and requested

additional security in the town hall due to his past conduct. As pled, Plaintiff’s claims against

Officer Jones in Count Three would be barred under qualified immunity.

iii. The Younger Abstention Doctrine

The Younger abstention doctrine discourages federal interference with pending state

proceedings. (D.E. 4-5 at 28.) In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court

affirmed the longstanding policy discouraging federal court interference with state proceedings in

the interests of equity, comity and federalism. Id. at 43–45. Younger applies to criminal, civil,

and administrative state proceedings. See Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian

Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986). Federal courts invoke the Younger doctrine and abstain

where: (1) there is a pending state proceeding11 that is judicial in nature; (2) the state proceeding

implicates important state interests; and (3) the state proceeding affords the complainant an

adequate opportunity to raise constitutional issues. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.

Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785,

11 At the time Plaintiff filed the instant matter, Plaintiff’s appeal of the denial of his FID card and Firearms Permit was

still pending in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Plaintiff voluntary withdrew his appeal in the Superior Court of

New Jersey on November 22, 2021, which was days after Plaintiff filed the instant matter on November 15, 2021.

789 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1015 (1995). Here, Plaintiff’s claims under Count Three

are also barred by the Younger abstention doctrine for the reasons discussed below.

The first element of Younger requires there to be a pending state proceeding that is judicial

in nature. A “pending proceeding” is one that has already commenced rather than one that is

“merely incipient or threatened.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975). The Third

Circuit in O’Neill held that a state proceeding is “pending” within the meaning of Younger

abstention where:

[A]dequate state-court judicial review of the administrative

determination is available to the federal claimants, and where the

claimants have chosen not to pursue their state-court judicial

remedies, but have instead sought to invalidate the State's judgment

by filing a federal action.

O’Neill, 32 F.3d 791.

Here, Plaintiff was denied an FID card and Firearms Permit in an administrative

determination. (Compl. at 10; D.E. 5 at 65.) As appropriate, he appealed the denial to Superior

Court of New Jersey. After days of a hearing, Plaintiff abruptly withdrew his appeal before a

decision was rendered by the Court. (D.E. 5 at 69.) Prior to withdrawing his appeal in the Superior

Court of New Jersey, Plaintiff filed the instant matter before this Court, again challenging the

denial of his application and asserting various other claims, as addressed herein.

The second element of Younger requires that the state proceeding implicate important state

interests. This element rests on the vital consideration of comity, which necessarily includes “a

proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a

Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government

will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in

their separate ways.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. In making this inquiry, the Court must examine

the “importance of the generic proceedings to the State,” rather than the state’s narrow interest in

the outcome of the particular case. O'Neill, 32 F.3d at 791–92 (citing New Orleans Public Service,

Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364–65 (1989)). That New Jersey has the most

substantial interest in protecting the health, welfare, and safety of the public when determining

whether individuals are fit to acquire firearms pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2C:58-3 is irrefutable. While

there is certainly a federal interest, it is substantially outweighed by New Jersey’s overriding

interest. Further, New Jersey has established a comprehensive statutory framework under N.J.S.A.

§ 2C:58-3 to govern the acquisition of firearms in the state. Thus, the second factor under Younger

is met.

The third element of Younger requires that the state proceeding afford the complainant an

adequate opportunity to raise constitutional issues. In the context of a state administrative

proceeding, this element is satisfied “when the federal claimant can assert his constitutional claims

during state-court judicial review of the administrative determination.” O'Neill, 32 F.3d at

792; accord Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 477 U.S. at 629; Middlesex County Ethics Committee

v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 436 (1982). Plaintiff has the exclusive burden to

establish that “state procedural law barred presentation of its claims” in an administrative action

or before the state courts. Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Pennzoil Co.

v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987). Furthermore, when a claimant fails to present its federal

claims in a “related state-court proceeding[ ], a federal court should assume that state procedures

will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary” and

abstain. O'Neill, 32 F.3d at 792 (quoting Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15).

Here, Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his appeal of the denial of his FID card and Firearms

Permit (D.E. 5 at 69), when the state proceeding would have afforded him an adequate remedy.

(D.E. 4-5 at 27.) There is no plenary “right of access to a federal forum for the disposition of all

issues,” and considerations underlying Younger specifically militate against the availability of a

“federal forum . . . prior to the completion of the state proceedings in which the federal issue

arises.” Huffman, 420 U.S. at 606. Any argument that Plaintiff did not have an adequate

opportunity to present his constitutional claims in the state proceedings is untenable. A plaintiff

cannot impermissibly seek to “bypass the state system and to seek relief in federal court” where

he had ample opportunity to raise his federal claims in the state-court proceedings, where he had

the right to appeal any adverse decision to higher courts, and where there exists no extraordinary

circumstance12 that would make abstention inappropriate. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435

(“[s]o long as the constitutional claims of respondents can be determined in the state proceedings

and so long as there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary

circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate, the federal courts should abstain”).

Accordingly, the third element of Younger has been satisfied.

In sum, the Younger abstention doctrine relieves this Court of jurisdiction and Plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate its inapplicability. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed.13

12 In the present case, no such extraordinary circumstances, bad faith, or harassment exist.

13 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint may also be barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine (“ECD”). The

ECD “embodies the notion that the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court;

accordingly, all parties involved in a litigation should at the very least present in that proceeding all of their claims

and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy.” Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883,

886 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (1995));

see also Mori v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., 472 A.2d 150, 155 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (“[T]he entire

controversy doctrine applies not only to matters actually litigated, but to all aspects of a controversy that might have

been thus litigated and determined.”) This Court need not reach a discussion on the ECD because the Younger

Abstention Doctrine applies.

V. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED. An appropriate order

follows.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: Parties

Edward S. Kiel, U.S.M.J.