GREENFIELD v. TRENTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TALAY GREENFIELD, Administratrix ad

prosequendum, individually and on behalf of the

ESTATE OF JAMER J. GREENFIELD,

Civil Action No. 16-04366 (FLW)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

TRENTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; THE CITY

OF TRENTON; TRENTON POLICE DIRECTOR

ERNEST PARREY, individually and in his official

capacity; THE COUNTY OF MERCER; THE

MERCER COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE

JOHN/JANE DOES (#1-20),

Defendants.

WOLFSON, Chief Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff, Talay Greenfield, Administratrix ad prosequendum, individually and on

behalf of the Estate of Jamer J. Greenfield (“Plaintiff”), brought this civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, the Trenton Police Department (“Police Department”), the City

of Trenton (“City”), and Trenton Police Director Ernest Parrey (“Director Parrey”) (collectively,

the “Trenton Defendants”), in connection with the fatal death of her son, Jamer J. Greenfield

(“Greenfield”). Presently before the Court is the Trenton Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful death and survivorship (Count One),

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1, et seq., related

to the police’s use of handcuffs on Greenfield (Count Two), deliberate indifference to the medical

needs of Greenfield under § 1983 and the NJCRA1 (Count Three), Monell claim under § 1983

based on the City and the Police Department’s purported mishandling of murder investigations

involving African American male victims (Count Four), and violation of the New Jersey Law

Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., as it relates to the Trenton

Defendants’ investigation of Greenfield’s death (Count Five).

For the reasons set forth below, the Trenton Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.2 On July 19, 2014, two officers

from the Trenton Police Department were patrolling in the 100 block of Rosemont Avenue, in

Trenton, New Jersey, when they heard approximately four to five gunshots nearby. (Trenton

Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Summary Judgment (“Def.

SUMF”), at ¶ 1.) The officers then observed eight to ten black males running in various directions

from the area in front of 209 Rosemont Avenue. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.) Several individuals ran up Hoffman

Avenue towards Stuyvesant Avenue, and the officers pursued them while also announcing the

“shots fired incident” over their police radios. (Id. at ¶ 3.) As the officers turned onto Hoffman

1 Courts in New Jersey view the NJCRA as analogous to § 1983, see, e.g., Hedges v. Musco, 204

F.3d 109, 121 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000); Van Tassel v. Ocean Cty., No. 16–4761, 2017 WL 5565208, at *6 (D.N.J.

Nov. 17, 2017); Velez v. Fuentes, No. 15–6939, 2016 WL 4107689, at *5 (D.N.J. July 29, 2016);

Hottenstein v. City of Sea Isle City, 977 F. Supp. 2d 353, 365 (D.N.J. 2013); Trafton v. City of Woodbury,

799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. 2011). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s NJCRA claims will be interpreted

analogously to her § 1983 claims. Trafton, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 443–44; see Hedges, 204 F.3d at 121 n.12

(concluding New Jersey’s constitutional provisions concerning search and seizures are interpreted

analogously to the Fourth Amendment).

2 Plaintiff did not submit a responsive statement of undisputed material facts that comports with

Local Civil Rule 56.1. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, “any material fact not disputed shall be deemed

undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion.” However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro

se, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s submissions to determine which facts, if any, she contests.

Avenue, at approximately 5:01:23 a.m., they observed a black male, later identified as Greenfield,

laying in the street, facedown, next to a black Acura. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

The officers exited their police vehicle to assess Greenfield, who they observed as having

a large amount of blood covering the front of his shirt. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 9.) Identifying Greenfield as

unresponsive, one of the officers, Officer Runyon, provided medical aid to Greenfield, while his

partner, Officer Schiaretti, requested an ambulance at 5:01:47 a.m. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.) While awaiting

the ambulance, the officers placed Greenfield in handcuffs. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

Greenfield was transported to Fuld Hospital at approximately 5:22:48 p.m.; however, he

was pronounced dead at 5:30 a.m. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 16.)

B. Procedural History3

On July 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, which asserts various federal and state law

claims related to the police officers’ treatment of Greenfield and the Trenton Defendants’

subsequent investigation of his death. (ECF No. 1.)

Several months later, in October 2016, the parties stipulated and agreed that all claims

against the County of Mercer were dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 7.) In June 2017, the Hon.

Michael A. Shipp, U.S.D.J. also dismissed all claims asserted against the Mercer County

Prosecutor’s Office with prejudice. (ECF No. 14.)

Two years later, in April 2019, this case was stayed “in order to permit Plaintiff’s counsel

time to conclude communications with the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office.” (ECF No. 40.) In

October 2019, the case was restored, and discovery was later closed. (ECF Nos. 50 and 80.) At a

status conference conducted on October 27, 2021, the Magistrate Judge instructed the parties to

3 Three different judges have presided over this case, with the most recent reassignment occurring in

April 2022, when the case was reassigned to me. (ECF No. 94.)

file dispositive motions by December 10, 2021, and on November 12, 2021, the Trenton

Defendants filed the instant motion. (ECF No. 84.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine only if there is “a sufficient evidentiary

basis on which a reasonable [factfinder] could find for the non-moving party,” and it is material

only if it has the ability to “affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. Cty.

of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of

summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “In considering a motion for summary judgment,

a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;

instead, the non-moving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn in his favor.’” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587, (1986); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002).

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its

motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “If the moving party will bear the

burden of persuasion at trial, that party must support its motion with credible evidence ... that

would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Id. at 331. On the other hand, if

the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, the party moving for summary

judgment may satisfy Rule 56’s burden of production by either (1) “submit[ting] affirmative

evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim” or (2) demonstrating

“that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the

nonmoving party's claim.” Id. Once the movant adequately supports its motion pursuant to Rule

56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324; see also Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586; Ridgewood Bd. of Ed. v. Stokley, 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999). In deciding the

merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence

and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder. Big

Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). There can be “no

genuine issue as to any material fact,” however, if a party fails “to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. at 323; Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992).

III. DISCUSSION

The Trenton Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate on all claims brought

against them because (1) the force exercised by Officers Runyon and Schiaretti, namely their use

of handcuffs on Greenfield, was reasonable under the circumstances; (2) the Trenton Defendants

responded promptly and diligently to administer medical treatment upon discovering Greenfield’s

condition; and (3) the NJLAD does not provide a cause of action for family members who believe

they have not received adequate information about a murder investigation. Further, as it relates to

Plaintiff’s Monell and wrongful death and survivorship claims, the Trenton Defendants argue that

those claims must be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s inability to prove an underlying constitutional

violation and a failure to file a Tort Claims Notice in connection with the New Jersey Tort Claims

Act.

A. Excessive Force

First, the Trenton Defendants challenge Count Two of the Complaint, which asserts a claim

for excessive force in violation of Greenfield’s Fourth Amendment rights under § 1983. In Count

II, Plaintiff claims that the Trenton Defendants engaged in the use of force that was excessive and

objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, Compl., ¶¶ 49-56, because Greenfield had

already been the victim of gunshot wounds. (Id. at ¶ 51.) The Trenton Defendants move for

summary judgment, arguing that although Greenfield appeared incapacitated when the officers

discovered him, the decision to place him in handcuffs did not cause him any physical pain or

result in any injury or discomfort to Greenfield. (Def. Mov. Br., 11.) Rather, the Trenton

Defendants argue that the decision to place Greenfield in handcuffs was made out of an abundance

of caution for the safety of the officers and any potential bystanders nearby. (Id.)

I begin my analysis of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim with a discussion of qualified

immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When properly

applied, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Medley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). To overcome qualified immunity, a

plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that: (1) the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right; and (2) “the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s

alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232; Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2016). A right is clearly established if it is “sufficiently

clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

burden of proving the affirmative defense of qualified immunity rests on the party seeking to

invoke it. See Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2006).

1. Deprivation of a Constitutional Right

The Court begins by considering whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the

Trenton Defendants deprived Plaintiff of a constitutional right. Plaintiff has alleged that officers

of the Trenton Police Department used excessive force against Greenfield, namely in their decision

to handcuff him. (See Compl., ¶ 51.) A police officer who uses excessive force in the course of his

or her duties violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.

Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006). In determining whether the amount of force

used is excessive, the relevant inquiry is whether the officers’ actions were “objectively reasonable

in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent

or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). Courts

engaging in this analysis must be sensitive to the fact that “police officers are often forced to make

split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about

the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396. In analyzing the conduct

alleged, the Court looks at several factors, including

the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to

the safety of the officers or others, ... whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight[,] ... the duration of the [officer’s] action,

whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility

that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police

officers must contend at one time.

Couden, 446 F.3d at 496–97 (citations omitted).

While the Court acknowledges the severity of the circumstances surrounding the alleged

shooting, including the fear and safety concerns of the responding police officers, none of the facts

relied on by the Trenton Defendants suggest that Greenfield was a suspect or a direct threat to the

safety of the officers or the community. Indeed, according to the Trenton Defendants’ own facts,

when the officers arrived at the scene, they immediately identified Greenfield, who was laying

facedown in the street, as unresponsive. The officers observed Greenfield’s gunshot wounds and

requested an ambulance for further medical assistance. It was after requesting an ambulance for

the unresponsive Greenfield that the officers then placed Greenfield in handcuffs. But, clearly by

the time the officers decided to handcuff Greenfield, the facts indicate that Greenfield was neither

a threat to escape, nor was he capable of harm given his physical condition. Had the officers been

concerned that Greenfield was armed, they could have quickly patted him down for any weapons,

without the need for handcuffs, after assessing his physical condition. Further, to the extent the

Trenton Defendants argue that the approximately eight to ten other individuals seen fleeing the

scene posed an external threat to the safety of the officers, those individuals, according to the

officers’ own account, had already dispersed when they handcuffed Greenfield. Hence, although

a shooting had occurred in the area moments before the officers’ arrival, no evidence exists in the

record of any ongoing threat—and especially not one posed by Greenfield. Based on this record,

it does not appear that Greenfield posed an immediate threat of serious harm to the police officers

or anyone else.

Lastly, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s failure to provide any proof of injury to Greenfield

based on the police officers’ use of handcuffs does not change the calculus. Indeed, the Third

Circuit has noted that “the absence of injury does not legitimize otherwise excessive force.”

Graham-Smith v. Wilkes-Barre Police Dep’t, 739 Fed. Appx. 727, 731 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing

Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997) (“We do not agree that the absence of physical

injury necessarily signifies that the force has not been excessive, although the fact that physical

force was of such an extent as to lead to injury is indeed a relevant factor to be considered as part

of the totality.”), abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 209–11 (3d Cir.

2007); cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (“There is, of course, a de minimis level

of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.”). Accordingly, viewing the evidence

presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is sufficient evidence from which a trier of

fact could reasonably conclude that the police officers’ handcuffing of Greenfield was excessive.

2. Clearly Established Right

Because the Court has determined that a reasonable jury could find that a constitutional

violation occurred, I must consider whether Greenfield’s rights were “clearly established” at the

time. See Green v. N.J. State Police, 246 F. App’x 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2007). A right is “clearly

established” when, “at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [the] right [are]

sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing

violates that right.’ ” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). There need not be a case that is “directly on point,” Al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, but “ ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question’ confronted by the official ‘beyond debate.’ ” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779

(2014). “[T]he legal principle” must also “clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular

circumstances before him,” which “requires a high ‘degree of specificity.’ ” Dist. of Columbia v.

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 13). In that regard, the “clearly

established” inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a general

proposition.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). The

Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the right at issue should not be defined “at a high

level of generality.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742. “The dispositive question is whether the violative

nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11 (internal quotations

omitted). Factual specificity is particularly important in the Fourth Amendment context because it

may be “difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force,

will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Id. at 308 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at

205). In light of these directions from the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit, the Court identifies

the right at issue as follows: the right of an unresponsive individual, who posed no threat to law

enforcement, to be free from being placed in handcuffs, when those handcuffs caused no injury or

harm.

For qualified-immunity purposes, “clearly established rights are derived either from

binding Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent or from a ‘robust consensus of cases of

persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals.’ ” Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir.

2018) (citation omitted); see Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589–90 (“To be clearly established, a legal

principle must ... [be] dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive

authority[.]” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, the Court’s independent review did not find any binding Supreme Court or Third

Circuit precedent, or a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals”

to support the notion that the right at issue was clearly established at the time the police officers

handcuffed Greenfield. Rather, the only body of case law that comes close to addressing the right

at issue, involves excessive physical force against an already handcuffed incapacitated or

unresponsive individual. See Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 903 (6th Cir.

2004) (finding that that driving heavy pressure into a prone, handcuffed, incapacitated detainee’s

back was constitutionally impermissible because it posed a serious risk of asphyxiation to the

arrestee and was unnecessary to protect the officers); McCoy v. Meyers, 887 F.3d 1034, 1038 (10th

Cir. 2018) (denying qualified immunity where officers brought the plaintiff to the ground, struck

him, and rendered him unconscious with a carotid restraint maneuver, before then handcuffing the

plaintiff and striking him again once he regained consciousness); Waiters v. City of Scranton, No.

07-1722, 2009 WL 10718511, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2009) (denying qualified immunity where

officers dragged an unconscious, handcuffed, and shackled person, on their stomach, down an

alley). While the ‘clearly established’ standard does “not require a case directly on point,” the

cases highlighted here, fall well short of “a robust consensus of persuasive authority.” Ashcroft,

563 U.S. at 741-42 (internal quotation marks omitted). To be clear, no case decided by the Supreme

Court, the Third Circuit, or any other federal courts of appeal, involve a sufficiently analogous

situation to this one such that “every reasonable official would interpret [them] to establish the

particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (emphasis added). Thus,

because existing precedent has not placed the constitutional question at issue “beyond debate,”

Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741, I find that the Trenton Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as

to Plaintiff’s state and federal excessive force claims on the basis of qualified immunity.4

4 As mentioned above, supra, because the NJCRA is a state law corollary to § 1983 and Plaintiff’s

NJCRA claims are interpreted analogously to her § 1983 claims, her claim for excessive force under the

NJCRA is dismissed based on qualified immunity. See Shuman v. Raritan Twp., 14-3658, 2016 WL

7013465, at *17 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2016) (dismissing a plaintiff’s excessive force claim asserted under the

NJCRA based on qualified immunity); Roberson v. Borough of Glassboro, 20-02765, 2021 WL 5154000,

at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2021) (same).

B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that the Trenton Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to Greenfield’s medical needs in violation of § 1983 and the NJCRA based on the

Trenton police officers’ purportedly slow and/or delayed response upon encountering the

unresponsive Greenfield. (Compl., ¶¶ 23, 58-59.) The Trenton Defendants move for summary

judgment, arguing that the record “establishes that the Trenton Police Officers were nothing but

prompt and diligent in getting Mr. Greenfield medical treatment.” (Def. Mov. Br., 1-2.) Given that

the record lacks any evidence of a delayed response by the Trenton Defendants, or any medical

personnel for that matter, I agree that no reasonable juror could find the Trenton Defendants acted

with deliberate indifference to Greenfield’s medical needs.

Failure to provide medical care to a person in custody may amount to a constitutional

violation under § 1983 “only if that failure rises to the level of deliberate indifference to that

person’s serious medical needs.” Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir.

1995); see also Easterling v. City of Newark, 778 F. App’x 80 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(applying deliberate indifference standard to delay of medical care claim where the plaintiff was

shot by police at the scene of a robbery). Such a claim requires that plaintiff demonstrate that (1)

defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs; and (2) the medical needs were

objectively serious. Rouse v. Plaintier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

As an example, in Easterling, the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the

plaintiff could not show that a police officer was deliberately indifferent to his need for medical

care for the plaintiff’s gunshot wound. 778 Fed. Appx. at 83. As the Third Circuit reasoned, the

facts demonstrated that upon learning that the plaintiff had been shot, the police officer

immediately decided to drive the plaintiff to the hospital. Id. Indeed, the Third Circuit set forth a

detailed timeline starting with the police officer began driving at 3:10 p.m., which was, at most,

only ten minutes after the plaintiff had been shot. Id. At 3:13 p.m., the police officer flagged down

an ambulance, at which point the plaintiff was transferred to the ambulance and began receiving

medical care. Id. The ambulance arrived at the hospital at 3:28 p.m., and the plaintiff was

discharged less than four hours later. Id. Thus, because the undisputed facts in the record showed

that the police officer “responded promptly and appropriately upon learning that [the plaintiff] was

shot,” the Third Circuit found that the district court correctly granted summary judgment against

the plaintiff on his delay-of-medical-care claim. Id.; see also Gunter v. Township of Lumberton,

2012 WL 2522883, at *14 (D.N.J. 2012) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant

officers when “the total time span of the incidents in question—from Larry Gunter’s 9–1–1 call at

1:29 a.m. to the arrival of the second ambulance at 2:05 a.m. – constitutes a period of only thirty-

six minutes”; and “[d]uring that time, the officers responded to Mr. Gunter’s medical needs as they

arose—first for the head laceration with the call for medical assistance at approximately 1:43

a.m.—and second for advanced life support medical assistance when Mr. Gunter became

unresponsive at the conclusion of the twelve minute struggled where he resisted arrest”); Hinton

v. White, 2012 WL 6089476, at *6 (D.N.J. 2012) (finding defendant police officers did not act

with deliberate indifference where their police car struck the plaintiff, the defendant officers

handcuffed the plaintiff, secured bundles of heroin that the plaintiff tossed away from his body,

attempted to search the plaintiff's body, and then when the plaintiff began screaming in pain, the

officers ceased their search and called for an ambulance).

Here, the evidence in the record resoundingly demonstrates that no reasonable juror could

find the Trenton Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Greenfield’s medical needs, and

as such, Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law. Specifically, Plaintiff provides no evidence to

dispute the Trenton Defendants’ timeline of events, which shows that the police officers first

encountered Greenfield, lying in the street, at 5:01:23 a.m. Having immediately identified

Greenfield as a gunshot victim, Officer Schiaretti requested an ambulance at 5:01:47 a.m. -- less

than thirty seconds after discovering Greenfield. From there, Greenfield was transported by

ambulance to the hospital at approximately 5:22:48 p,m., and he was pronounced dead at 5:30 a.m.

Based on these facts, which are supported by the Investigative Report and Computer Aided

Dispatch Report following the incident, I find nothing in the record to demonstrate that any of the

Trenton Defendants intentionally delayed medical treatment or otherwise acted with deliberate

indifference to Greenfield’s serious medical needs. Indeed, Plaintiff does not provide a scintilla of

evidence to support an alternate timeline which could possibly suggest any delay on the part of the

Trenton police officers in providing Greenfield with medical care.

Moreover, the record also lacks any evidence which suggests that any of Greenfield’s

injuries were the result of the police officers’ alleged delay in providing medical care, or that

Greenfield’s condition worsened because of that unsubstantiated delay. Indeed, like the excessive

force claim, Plaintiff provides no medical reports, medical expert opinion, or any other evidence

related to Greenfield’s injuries. This lack of medical evidence provides additional support for the

Court to award summary judgment in favor of the Trenton Defendants. See Bocchino v. City of

Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp. 3d 387, 406 (D.N.J. 2016) (finding that the fact that “[p]laintiff has

provided no evidence that any delay or denial of medical care ‘exacerbated his medical condition,

caused infection, or otherwise subjected him to an increased risk of harm’ ” supported summary

judgment on plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim) (citations omitted); see also Horvath v. City

of New York, No. 12-6005, 2015 WL 1757759, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2015) (granting summary

judgment on plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim where plaintiff “offer[ed] evidence of a

number of injuries resulting from [an] alleged assault[,]” but made “no attempt to connect [those

injuries] to the alleged delay in medical attention”).

Put simply, no evidence exists in the record to suggest that any of the Trenton Defendants

intentionally delayed medical treatment to Greenfield or otherwise acted with deliberate

indifference to Greenfield’s medical needs in a manner giving rise to § 1983 liability. Rather, the

undisputed facts of record show that the Trenton police officers responded promptly and

appropriately upon learning that Greenfield had been seriously injured. Accordingly, summary

judgment is granted in favor of the Trenton Defendants on Plaintiff’s medical care claim under §

1983 and the NJCRA.

C. Monell Claim

In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that the Trenton Defendants “authorized, condoned,

acquiesced in and/or were aware of a pattern of misconduct and unconstitutional acts engaged in

by its Officers and staff by which the violent crimes and murders of African American men in the

City of Trenton are mishandled and/or given low priority treatment.” (Compl., ¶ 61.) Further,

Plaintiff alleges that “the families of [murder] victims, in particular the [m]others of these

tragically killed African American males, are ignored, lied to, given misrepresentations and false

promises, and otherwise obstructed from finding out the truth as to what happened to their sons[.]”

(Id. at ¶ 63.) On this motion, the Trenton Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that

Plaintiff cannot maintain any cause of action for constitutional violations against either the Police

Department or the City.

Under Monell, a municipality can only be liable for a constitutional violation pursuant to

an action based on section 1983 when “the alleged constitutional transgression implements a

policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by

custom.” Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “a local

government’s policy or custom inflicted the injury in question.” Est. of Roman v. City of Newark,

914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) (internal brackets and quotation

marks omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff’s claim against the City of Trenton and the Police Department in Count Four

must fail for the simple reason that she has not established, let alone alleged, an underlying

violation of Greenfield’s constitutional rights as it relates to the subsequent murder investigation

conducted by the Trenton Defendants. See Blair v. City of Pittsburgh, 711 F. App’x 98, 103 (3d

Cir. 2017) (citing Mulholland v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is

well-settled that, if there is no violation in the first place, there can be no derivative municipal

claim” based on Monell)). Rather, as discussed in detail above, supra, the only potential

constitutional violation that this Court has found is rooted in the police officers’ use of excessive

force, not the ensuing investigation into Greenfield’s murder. Importantly, Plaintiff has not raised

a § 1983 claim of her own constitutional right regarding the investigation. Moreover, even if a

constitutional violation could be found as to the investigation, Plaintiff provides no proof of any

policy, custom, or procedure existing within the City of Trenton or the Police Department that

treats murder investigations involving African American male victims differently than the same

crime committed against other races or genders. For these reasons, the City of Trenton and the

Police Department are entitled to summary judgment on the Monell claim.

D. New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

In Count Five, Plaintiff asserts a claim under the NJLAD, alleging that the Trenton

Defendants “discriminated against Plaintiff, and other African American crime victims and crime

victim family members similarly situated, due to her and her son’s race and/or color.” (Compl., ¶

67.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she was discriminated against with respect to her “access to

the services, facilities, and benefits of local law enforcement agencies[.]” (Id. at ¶ 68.) As to the

Police Department, Plaintiff alleges that it “refused to cooperate or share information with

[Greenfield’s] family,” including Plaintiff in particular. (Id. at ¶ 26.) On this motion, the Trenton

Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that the NJLAD does not provide a cause of

action for family members of a crime victim who believe that they have not received adequate

information or communication from a police department regarding an ongoing investigation.

The NJLAD prohibits unlawful discrimination in employment, housing, places of public

accommodation, and certain business transactions. See N.J.S.A. §§ 10:5–4, 10:5–12; Jackson v.

Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 122 (1969); Rubin v. Forest S. Chilton, 3rd, Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 359

N.J. Super. 105, 109–10 (App. Div. 2003). As discussed above, Plaintiff, here, appears to base her

claim on a theory of race-based discrimination in a place of public accommodation, i.e., the police

station. The NJLAD provides that “[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity ... to obtain all the

accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation”

without discrimination on the basis of race. N.J.S.A. § 10:5–4. In this connection, this District has

held that police stations are places of public accommodation. Jobes v. Moorestown Twp., No. 03–

4016, 2006 WL 3000444, at * 11 (D.N.J. Oct.19, 2006) (“an [NJ]LAD claim against the police

department may proceed beyond the dismissal stage because the police department is considered

a place of public accommodation”) (citing Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, 371 N.J. Super. 333, 337 (App.

Div. 2004)).

“New Jersey courts generally interpret the [NJ]LAD by reliance upon [the construction of]

analogous federal antidiscrimination statutes” Chisolm v. Manimon, 97 F.Supp.2d 615, 621

(D.N.J. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 275 F.3d 315 (3d Cir.2001). Indeed, this Court has analyzed

NJLAD claims based on racial discrimination using the same standard governing Equal Protection

claims. Clark v. Bd. of Educ. of the Franklin Twp. Pub. Sch., No. 06–2736, 2009 WL 1586940, at

*6–11 (D.N.J. June 4, 2009) (analyzing a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim of Equal Protection violation

and his NJLAD claims together); Rojas v. City of New Brunswick, No. 04–3195, 2008 WL

2355535, at *31 (D.N.J. June 4, 2008) (using Equal Protection standard to analyze NJLAD claim

regarding an allegedly racially discriminatory arrest). To show a violation of Equal Protection, a

plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions had a “disproportionate impact” and were

motivated by “discriminatory intent.” Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.

252, 264–66 (1977). Further, courts have held that NJLAD racial discrimination claims require

proof of intent to discriminate. Parker v. Dornbiere, 140 N.J. Super. 185, 189 (App. Div. 1976)

(intent to discriminate is required for a NJLAD racial discrimination claim); Rojas, 2008 WL

2355535, at *31 (“[t]he crucial element is the intent to discriminate”).

Here, regardless of whether the NJLAD provides Plaintiff the recourse she seeks, Plaintiff

provides absolutely no evidence of discriminatory intent by the Police Department or any other

Trenton Defendant in connection with her son’s murder investigation. In opposition to the Trenton

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff relies solely on the fact that she “[d]id not

receive adequate information or personal belongings, such as jewelry.” (Pl. Opp., 3.) Plaintiff

states that instead of the jewelry being returned to her, she was “instructed to sign [her] son’s

jewelry over to the mothers of his children but they refused to sign the papers.” (Id.) In support of

this claim, Plaintiff provides only a letter from Paul R. Adezio, Esq., the Mercer County Counsel,

on behalf of the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office. (See Pl. Opp., Ex. C.) Mr. Adezio states that

he is in receipt of Plaintiff’s July 21, 2020 letter requesting certain property belonging to

Greenfield, and that he has “not received any signed release forms from the identified mothers of

[Greenfield’s] children[.]” (Id.) According to Adezio, “[w]ithout those releases, pursuant to prior

discussions with the Court, the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office has not released any personalty,

including jewelry.” (Id.) (emphasis added). Not only does this solitary and benign letter not suggest

any discriminatory intent, but it involves the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office—an entity

dismissed from this case, with prejudice, more than five years ago. (See ECF No. 15.) Put simply,

looking at the totality of the record on summary judgment, Plaintiff has provided no evidence of

discrimination on the part of the Trenton Defendants to support her unsubstantiated allegations.

Accordingly, summary judgment on Count Five in favor of the Trenton Defendants is appropriate.

E. Wrongful Death and Survivorship

Finally, in Count One, Plaintiff asserts a claim against the Trenton Defendants for wrongful

death and survivorship. To assert a cause of action for wrongful death, Plaintiff must assert “(1)

that [Greenfield’s] death was caused by a wrongful act, and (2) that [Greenfield] would have been

able to maintain an action for damages had he survived.” Davis v. Twp. of Paulsboro, 2005 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 9881, at *57 (D.N.J. May 24, 2005) (citing Miller v. Estate of Sperling, 766 A.2d

738, 741 (N.J. 2001)). Given that Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the Trenton

Defendants either directly caused or contributed to Greenfield’s death, I find that the Trenton

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s wrongful death and survivorship

claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Trenton Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

is GRANTED.

Dated: June 28, 2022 /s/ Freda L. Wolfson

Freda L. Wolfson

U.S. Chief District Judge