GAYLES v. HILLSIDE BOARD OF EDUCATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DR. ANTOINE GAYLES,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 20-13051 (JXN) (LDW)

v.

OPINION

HILLSIDE BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants.

NEALS, District Judge:

Before this Court is Defendants’—Hillside Board of Education (“the Board”), Juan Allende

(“Allende”), Laquana Best (“Best”), Joel Chapman (“Chapman”), Pinchas Shapiro (“Shapiro”),

and Kim Cook (“Cook,” and collectively, “Defendants”)1—Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Dr.

Antoine Gayles’ (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).2 (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff opposed the Motion (ECF No. 25) and Defendants replied (ECF

No. 26). Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court decides this matter without oral

argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons stated herein,

the Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, the former Superintendent of Schools for the Hillside, New Jersey, brings this suit

against Defendants alleging various constitutional violations in addition to claims of conspiracy

and political retaliation. (Am. Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 17.) He asserts that during his tenure, he was

1 Defendant Anthony Salters (“Salters”) appears pro se and has joined in the other Defendants’ Motion. (ECF No. 24.)

2 All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

subject to subterfuge and harassment motivated by personal and political agenda led by Salters—

the former Hillside Democratic Committee Chairman—culminating in his ouster in early 2019.

(Id. ¶¶ 2, 11, 17.)

Plaintiff was hired on July 1, 2016, on a four-year contract. (Id. ¶ 18.) On November 7,

2018—the day after the election in which Defendants Allende, Best, Chapman, Shapiro, and Cook

won seats to the Board—Plaintiff negotiated an extension with the then-Board president to extend

Plaintiff’s term from June 30, 2020, to June 30, 2023. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49; Defs.’ Moving Br. ¶ 23, ECF

No 22-3.) In one of its last official actions, the lame duck Board voted to rescind Plaintiff’s initial

contract and approve the new contract—a unilateral act by the outgoing president taken without

notice and approval from the entire Board. (Am. Compl. ¶ 55; Am. Compl., Ex. B, ALJ Decision

12, ECF No. 17-2.)

On January 3, 2019, its first day of office, the new Board passed a motion to issue Plaintiff

a Rice notice3—a notification to the public of the Board’s intent to discuss Plaintiff’s employment.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 57a.) The Rice notice was issued to Plaintiff on January 23, 2019. (Id. ¶ 57c.) The

next day, without listing the matter of Plaintiff’s employment on the public agenda, the Board

passed another motion to suspend Plaintiff with pay to inquire as to the legality of the new contract.

(Id. ¶ 57d-e.)

On February 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause with the Office of

Administrative Law (“OAL”) requesting reinstatement, which was denied. (Id. ¶ 57h.) After filing

Exceptions to this decision with the Commissioner of Education, the matter was remanded to the

3 Rice notice refers to the right of a public employee to receive notice of the intention of the board of education to

consider personnel matters related to them. Rice v. Union Cnty. Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 155 N.J. Super. 64, 74

(App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, denied, 76 N.J. 238 (1978).

OAL. (Id.) Separately, the Board filed a Petition for Declaratory Decision with the OAL to deem

the new contract invalid. (Id. ¶ 57i.)

On May 1, 2019, the Board passed a Resolution declaring the new contract null and void

and retroactively rescinding Plaintiff’s initial contract, effectively terminating him. (Id. ¶ 57k.) The

Board sought reimbursement for payment made after the retroactive date of November 30, 2018.

(Id.) In response, Plaintiff filed another Order to Show Cause with the OAL. (Id. ¶ 57l.) The

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) then issued an order compelling the Board to reinstate

Plaintiff’s salary and benefits under the terms of the initial contract until an initial decision was

made as to the full proceeding. (Id.)

On June 17, 2020, the ALJ issued his initial decision. (See generally Am. Compl., Ex. B,

ALJ Decision.) The ALJ held that both the new contract and the later recission of the initial contract

were void. (Am. Compl., Ex. B, ALJ Decision 24-25.) Specifically, the ALJ concluded that while

“the circumstances surrounding the suspension were suspect, the same conclusion applies to the

circumstances surrounding the preparation of a new contract sent without full Board authority.”

(Id. 25.) The ALJ’s decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Education on August 3, 2020,

which Plaintiff did not appeal. (Defs.’ Moving Br. ¶ 43.)

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on September 22, 2020. (See generally Compl., ECF

No. 1.) In response, Defendants moved to dismiss (ECF No. 8), prompting Plaintiff to withdraw

his Complaint and file a six-count Amended Complaint. Plaintiff asserts the following counts: (I)

“[42 U.S.C. §] 1983 violation – 1st Amendment; (II) “[42 U.S.C. §] 1983 – 14th Amendment –

‘Procedural Due Process’”; (III) “Conspiracy” in violation of “42 U.S.C. 1983 and the First,

Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”; (IV) “Individual Liability” in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (V) “Tortious Interference with Contractual

Relations”; and (VI) “Tortious Interference with Economic Gain.” (ECF No. 17.) Defendants filed

the instant Motion in response. (ECF No. 22.)

Among the allegations in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff cites the following as instances

of harassment, conspiracy, and retaliation:

• In or around August 2016, Salters told Plaintiff to come to him if he wanted to

discipline someone because “he could say things to people that maybe, legally

[P]laintiff could not.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Salters also requested weekly

meeting with Plaintiff and that Plaintiff hire Hillside residents. (Id.) Plaintiff

declined the weekly meetings and responded that he would hire the best

candidates. (Id. ¶ 22.)

• In November 2016, Plaintiff became aware of a petition organized by Salters to

replace Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 24.)

• In December 2016, Salters announced a procurement of $1 million in county

funding to renovate the district’s athletic field. (Id. ¶ 27.)

• In January 2017, after speaking with several county administrators, Plaintiff

reported at a Board meeting that “there was no funding . . . but rather the

Township owed the County money which it refused to repay.” (Id. ¶ 29.) This

apparently “enraged” and “embarrassed” Salters, who “demanded a public

apology.” (Id.)

• In May 2017, Plaintiff met with then-Board President Daliah Vertreese and

Board member George Cook.4 (Id. ¶ 33.) At the meeting, Vertreese “stated that

the Board met and had enough votes to buy out [P]laintiff’s contract if [he]

could not get along with [Salters].” (Id.)

• On October 9, 2017, Plaintiff met with Salters “to resolve lingering issues.” (Id.

¶ 35.) Salters tried to persuade Plaintiff to rework the athletic field deal. (Id. ¶

36.) Plaintiff did not recommend the deal to the Board at the October meeting.

(Id. ¶ 40.)

• In February 2018, Salters had the following text message exchange with a

Board member who is not a named defendant:

Board member: “It looks as if my role is to go with everyone else and

fall in line. I was told it would be political suicide if I vote the way I

want. I don’t have political aspirations. I just want to do right by the

4 Neither are named defendants in this case. Defendants assert there is no relation between George Cook and Defendant

Kim Cook. (Defs.’ Moving Br. ¶ 6 n. 1.) Plaintiff maintains George and Kim are siblings. (Pl. Opp’n Br. 26, ECF No.

25.)

students. This hurts so much because I want our kids to succeed. I don’t

care about being the mayor. I don’t care about advancing my political

agenda because I don’t have one. My heart hurts so much.”

Salters: “We all do. We just have a supt. [sic] who is a great bs artist

who needs to go. We have a community that is hurting economically.

They have 1 request of us. [Another Board member] and I have our

differences but I love her passion. She is starting to see what I have been

saying about [Plaintiff].” (Id. ¶ 41.)

• Sometime between 2017 and 2018, Defendants Chapman, Cook, Shapiro,

Allende, and Best ran for Board seats on the Democratic ticket. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that they received “financial support and endorsement” from Salters and

that “a condition of winning a seat on the Board was their fealty to Salters and

oust [Plaintiff] due to his refusal to concede to political pressure as he was not

politically aligned.” (Id.)

• As part of their election campaign, the Defendants running for Board seats

appeared in newsletter picture alongside “disparaging comments about

[P]laintiff’s professional background and performance as Superintendent, with

a caption saying money is not the problem leadership is the problem.” (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all the facts in

the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Phillips v. County of

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). Moreover, dismissal is inappropriate even where “it

appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits.”

Id.

While this standard places a considerable burden on the defendant seeking dismissal, the

facts alleged must be “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Put

differently, the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Id. Accordingly, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it provides a

sufficient factual basis to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009). In order to determine whether a complaint is sufficient under these standards, the Third

Circuit requires a three-part inquiry: (1) the court must first recite the elements that must be pled

in order to state a claim; (2) the court must then determine which allegations in the complaint are

merely conclusory and therefore need not be given an assumption of truth; and (3) the court must

assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations and ascertain whether they plausibly give

rise to a right to relief. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants advance two primary arguments in support of their Motion. Preliminarily,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is precluded by collateral estoppel to relitigate any due process

claims. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 20-23.) Next, Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to plead facts

sufficient to support his claims of (1) First Amendment discrimination based on political affiliation,

(id. 16-20); (2) civil conspiracy, (id. 23-27); (3) individual or municipal liability, (id. 27-34); and

(4) tortious interference with contractual relations or economic gain, (id. 34-37). The Court

addresses each argument in turn.

A. Collateral Estoppel

In Count II of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process because he “was not given proper notice or hearing

before being deprived of his significant property interest in his tenure, position and career.” (Am.

Compl. ¶ 78.) Defendants counter, and this Court agrees, that all procedural due process concerns

were already adjudicated by the ALJ in his June 2020 decision. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 20.)

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a

particular issue already adjudicated in a prior proceeding if: (1) the issue sought to be precluded is

the identical to that from the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue

was determined by final judgment on the merits; and (4) the determination was essential to the

prior judgment. Pasqua v. County of Hunterdon, No. 15-3501, 2017 WL 5667999, at *14 (D.N.J.

Nov. 27, 2017) (quoting Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the

parties focus their dispute on the first prong of the collateral estoppel analysis.

Plaintiff submits that the ALJ “ruled on the contractual issues solely and made no rulings

regarding Sections 1983 or [P]laintiff’s constitutional rights being violated” and that the prior

ruling “is clearly outside the scope of the [ALJ’s] decision as it contains different facts, standards

and damages.” (Pl. Opp’n Br. 27-28, ECF No. 25.) However, the Court finds that the issues now

presented by Plaintiff’s federal claims are identical to those state claims asserted with the OAL

and resolved by the ALJ’s decision.

In his decision, later affirmed by the Commissioner of Education, the ALJ found that the

Resolution suspending Plaintiff in January 2019, followed by the Resolution to stop his salary in

May 2019—wherein he was ordered to remove his belongings and was barred from his office—

effectively “amounted to a termination, disguised as a suspension, without the right to be properly

heard under the involuntary-termination section[s] of N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20 and N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-

3.2, which involves notice of charges and evidence to a superintendent, with a right to reply.” (Am.

Compl., Ex. B, ALJ Decision 24.)

Likewise, here, Plaintiff advances claims requiring the Court to make the same inquiry

under the same factual basis—specifically, whether Plaintiff was improperly denied notice and a

hearing. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155-62 (1979) (applying collateral estoppel

where the issue sought to be litigated was identical to the issue already litigated in a prior

proceeding and there was no change in controlling facts). The Court thus holds that the defense of

collateral estoppel is appropriate and Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s procedural due process

claim is granted.

Accordingly, Count Two of the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

B. Political Patronage Retaliation

The Court next considers Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under

Section 1983 for retaliation for political affiliation (or non-affiliation) and speech in violation of

the First Amendment. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 1617-20.) To state a prima facie case, Plaintiff must

show: (1) employment at a public agency in a position that does not require political affiliation,

(2) engagement in constitutionally protected conduct, and (3) that this conduct was a substantial

or motivating factor in the public agency’s employment decision. Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands

Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2007). As Defendants do not dispute the first two elements

(see Defs.’ Moving Br. 18), the Court centers its inquiry on the third prong.

The Third Circuit has elaborated that there is an implicit requirement in the third prong that

the plaintiff “produce sufficient evidence to show the defendant knew of plaintiff’s political

persuasion.” Goodman v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 2002). Sufficient

evidence “requires proof of both knowledge and causation.” Galli, 490 F.3d at 275. On this point,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient factual support to demonstrate that

they “were even aware of Plaintiff’s own political proclivities,” or that Plaintiff’s failure to align

with Salters or with a particular party was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the Board’s

employment decisions. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 19.) The Court disagrees in part.

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court draws a reasonable

inference that the Board was both aware of his political non-affiliation and that it was a motivating

factor in his suspensions. Plaintiff has provided ample evidence of his failure to align with Salters,

the former Hillside Democratic Committee Chairman. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22, 27-32.) Further,

the May 2017 meeting with two non-defendant Board members—during which the then-Board

president purportedly told Plaintiff that the Board met and had enough votes to buy out his contract

if he could not get along with Salters—suggests that the Board was not only aware of Plaintiff’s

discord with Salters, but also that failure to resolve the discord would be the motivating factor in

his removal. (Am. Compl. ¶ 333.) As to the individually named defendants on the Board, however,

the Amended Complaint provides no evidence indicating a possible First Amendment violation

other than the conclusory allegation that “[a] condition of winning a seat on the Board was their

fealty to Salters and oust [Plaintiff] due to his refusal to concede to political pressure as he was not

politically aligned.” (Id. ¶ 41.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is granted as to the individually named defendants and

denied as to the Board itself. Count One is dismissed as to the individually named defendants

without prejudice.

C. Civil Conspiracy

To state a claim for civil conspiracy, Plaintiff must show: “(1) a combination of two or

more persons; (2) a real agreement or confederation with a common design; (3) the existence of

an unlawful purpose, or of a lawful purpose to be achieved by unlawful means; and (4) proof of

special damages.” Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 331 F.3d 406, 414

(3d Cir. 2003).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, allegations of a conspiracy must provide

“some factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and

concerted action.” Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff

has not presented facts sufficient to show the existence of an agreement between Defendants.

In support, Plaintiff relies on the broad and unsubstantiated claim that the individually

named defendants ousted him in exchange for electoral support. (Pl. Opp’n Br. 30.) Yet “[t]he

factual allegations supporting the conspiracy claim may not be generalized or conclusory.” Ivan v.

County. of Middlesex, 595 F. Supp. 2d 425, 484 (D.N.J. 2009). Likewise, “mere conclusory

allegations that a conspiracy exists will not survive a motion to dismiss.” Sherrill v. City of

Hoboken, No. 16-3092, 2020 WL 64617, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2020). Plaintiff has presented no

further evidence in support of this claim.

Plaintiff’s insistence that Chapman’s recruitment of a new Board attorney to issue Plaintiff

a Rice notice “clearly speaks to . . . a meeting of the minds between [the attorney], Chapman,

Shapiro, Best, Cook, and Allende” is also unconvincing. (Am. Compl. ¶ 57a.) Plaintiff has not

alleged other facts from which the Court can infer a connection between this act and a greater

agreement between the individually named defendants.

As for the Board itself, the May 2017 meeting in which the then-Board president told

Plaintiff that the Board had met and had enough votes to buy out Plaintiff’s contract suggests an

agreement existed. (Am. Compl. ¶ 34.) However, officers of governmental entities cannot conspire

with the entity itself to establish a civil conspiracy claim. Sunkett v. Misci, 183 F. Supp. 2d 691,

722 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 118 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1988)). Defendants’

Motion is thusly granted as to Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim.

Accordingly, Count Three is dismissed without prejudice.

D. Individual Liability

In Count IV, Plaintiff asserts an individual liability claim wherein the individually named

defendants were responsible for the “instruction, supervision, control and discipline of the

members of the Board.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 86.) From their acts and omissions, Plaintiff avers a

deprivation of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments and Section 1983. (Id. ¶ 93.) Defendants’ two-fold response posits insufficient

factual support to maintain a claim against both the individually named defendants and the Board

itself. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 27-34.) The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to

support a claim against any defendant.

To state a claim for individual liability under Section 1983, Plaintiff must show that the

individual defendants “personally participated in violating [his] rights, or that they directed others

to violate, or that they had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.” Ivan,

595 F. Supp. 2d 425, 479-80 (D.N.J. 2009) (quoting Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-

91 (3d Cir. 1995). Again, other than the sweeping declaration that the individually named

defendants “participated in and were informed of the unlawful and continued harassment,”

Plaintiff has established no facts demonstrating personal participation in or knowledge of the

individually named defendants in a broader scheme to violate his rights. (Am. Compl. ¶ 86.)

Plaintiff’s claim of personal liability against Allende, Cook, Shapiro, and Best rests entirely on the

fact that they were simply members of the Board who ran with Salters’ endorsement. With respect

to Chapman, Plaintiff has not pled facts demonstrating how the recruitment of a new Board

attorney personally violated his rights.

As for the Board itself, a school board can be liable under Section 1983 for a constitutional

violation “if it occurred as a result of a policy or custom established or approved by that entity.”

L.S. v. Mount Olive Bd. of Educ., 765 F. Supp. 2d 648, 658 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)).

A school board may also be liable “if they fail to supervise or train their employees or

personnel, and such failure exhibits a ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons’ with which

they come into contact.” Id., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 658-59 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 388 (1989)). To show how a board’s failure to train or supervise exhibits deliberate

indifference to his rights, a plaintiff must “(1) identify a specific supervisory practice that the entity

failed to employ; (2) establish contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or a prior

pattern of similar incidents; and (3) show circumstances under which the supervisor's action or

inaction could have been found to have communicated a message of approval.” Id., 765 F. Supp.

2d at 660.

Lastly, a plaintiff may allege specific acts or decisions by a policymaker on the school

board that promulgated or was deliberately indifferent to a custom or policy that violated the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 847 F.2d 1042, 1060-62 (3d Cir.

1991). Here, Plaintiff has not identified any Board custom or policy that contributed or was

deliberately indifferent to his alleged constitutional violations. Nor has Plaintiff identified a

particular policymaker decision that promulgated or was deliberately indifferent to his rights. Nor

has he put forth any specific evidence illustrating how the Board’s failure to train or supervise its

employees exhibited a deliberate indifference to his rights. Plaintiff has only advanced the wholly

conclusory allegations that the Defendants “created, authorized, maintained, permitted, and

enforced a policy, practice, custom or usage of failing to property instruct, supervise, control and

discipline members of the Board” and that “Plaintiff’s rights were clearly established at the time

of such illicit actions and were violated by Defendants.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 90.)

Accordingly, Count Four is dismissed without prejudice.

E. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations and Economic Gain

As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for tortious interference with

contractual relations and economic gain should be dismissed for failing to comply with the New

Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”). (Defs.’ Moving Br. 34-35.) The NJTCA establishes strict

circumstances under which a plaintiff may bring a tort claim against public entities and public

employees. See N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. Before filing a complaint, a plaintiff must submit a notice

of claim to the public entity within ninety days of the claim’s accrual. N.J.S.A. 59:8–8(a–b).

Notice is a necessary condition to filing a complaint against a public entity. Doe v. Bd. of

Educ. Of Vocational-Tech. Sch. Dist., No. 17-13793, 2019 WL 2183860, at *3, (D.N.J. May 21,

2019). Consequently, a plaintiff who fails to timely provide notice of a claim to a public entity or

public employee within 90 days of accrual “shall be forever barred from recovering.” N.J.S.A.

59:8–8. The notice provisions of the NJTCA apply to intentional tort claims against public

employees, as here in Counts V and VI. Evans v. Gloucester Tp., 124 F. Supp. 3d 340, 354 (D.N.J.

2015) (citing Velez v. City of Jersey City, 850 A.2d 1238, 1244-45 (N.J. 2004)).

Because the Amended Complaint provides no indication that Plaintiff satisfied the notice

requirements under the NJTCA Plaintiff's tort claims against Defendants are barred by N.J.S.A.

59:8–8 and Counts Five and Count Six are and dismissed without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) is granted in part

and denied in part. An appropriate form of Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATED: April 11, 2022 ri iN A IER NEALS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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