MILLER v. RIVAS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

EZELL MILLER,

Plamutl, Civil Action No. 20-37 (MAS) (TJB)

* MEMORANDUM OPINION

HONORABLE ALBERTO RIVAS et al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the in forma pauperis application (“IFP

Application”) of Plaintiff Ezell Miller (“Plaintiff”) to proceed with his action without prepayment

of fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 1-2.) Based on Plaintiff’s affidavit of indigence and

prison account statement, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP application, and orders the Clerk of the

Court to file the Complaint. Having reviewed the Complaint, however, the Court will dismiss the

Complaint because Plaintiff fails to state a claim and seeks relief from immune defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in Middlesex County Correctional Facility. (See Compl.

q{ 1, ECF No. 1.) Defendant Judge Alberto Rivas (“Judge Rivas”) is a member of the New Jersey

state judiciary and a Superior Court Judge in Middlesex County, New Jersey. Ud. J 2.) Defendant

Vincent Vitale (“Vitale”) is an Assistant Prosecutor with the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s

Office. Ud. J 3.) Plaintiff claims that Middlesex County law enforcement: personnel filed an

application for a search warrant before Judge Rivas, alleging that Plaintiff, along with others,

distributed controlled dangerous substances in a New Brunswick apartment. (/d. J 5.) Plaintiff

alleges that he was erroneously identified in the search warrant because at all times mentioned in

the warrant, he was in the custody of the Middlesex County Correctional Facility. (Ud. 6.) Plaintiff

ultimately filed a motion to suppress evidence before Judge Rivas. (Ud. 7.) Judge Rivas conducted

an evidentiary hearing on that motion, which he ultimately denied. (/d. [ 8.) Plaintiff now brings

this action, alleging causes of action for violations of Plaintiff's procedural and substantive due

process rights. Ud. Jf 9-10.)

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (““PLRA”), district courts are required to review

civil actions in which a prisoner proceeds in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When

reviewing such actions, the PLRA instructs courts to dismiss cases that are frivolous or malicious,

fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from suit. /d. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122

(3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). Because Plaintiff is

proceeding in forma pauperis, the applicable provisions of the PLRA apply to the screening of his

Complaint. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A pleading that

offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do,’” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.)

To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege “sufficient

factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d

ry

203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A plaintiff must be able to

demonstrate that “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” /d. at 676. Furthermore, while pro se pleadings are liberally

construed, they “still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v.

Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

Il. DISCUSSION

The Court considers Plaintiffs claims as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. § 1983 provides

in relevant part,

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State... , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...

To recover under this provision, two elements must be shown. First, a plaintiff “must

establish that the defendant acted under color of state law,” and second, that the plaintiff has been

deprived of “a right secured by the Constitution.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.

2011) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “The color of state law element is a threshold

issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color of law.” Groman v.

Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Versarge v. Township of Clinton,

984 F.2d 1359, 1363 (3d Cir. 1993)). Plaintiff seeks both monetary damages and declaratory relief

in this matter.

A. The Claims Against Judge Rivas Are Dismissed.

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims for procedural and substantive due process

violations are not actionable under § 1983. It is established that, generally, a judge is immune from

liability for all actions taken in his judicial capacity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57

(1978). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was

done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” fd. Judicial immunity, however, does not

apply under two circumstances. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial

actions, 7.é., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11

(1991) (citation omitted). “Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature,

taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” /d. at 12 (citation omitted). To determine whether

an act qualifies as a judicial act, courts look to “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a

function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they

dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Plaintiff’s allegations against

Judge Rivas relate only to judicial acts taken in his capacity as a New Jersey state court judge.

Plaintiff does not plead any facts that would indicate that Judge Rivas’s actions in denying his

motion to suppress was taken in the absence of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for

monetary damages and declaratory relief against Judge Rivas are dismissed.

B. The Claims Against Prosecutor Vitale Are Also Dismissed.

Plaintiff’s claims against Vitale are similarly not actionable under § 1983. A prosecutor is

entitled to absolute immunity against suits concerning work “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process.” Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 164 (d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (citation omitted)). Although prosecutorial immunity is

an affirmative defense, a district court may dismiss a claim upon a § 1915(e)(2) screening if the

plaintiff’s complaint plainly shows that the defendant is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. See,

e.g., Fallin v. Mueller, No. 15-248, 2015 WL 4951280, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2015). To

determine whether prosecutorial immunity exists, courts look at “the functional nature of the

activities rather than [the prosecutor’s| status.” Fogle, 957 F.3d at 159 (quoting Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).

Plaintiff's Complaint offers limited facts concerning Vitale’s actions as they relate to

Plaintiffs claims. (See generally Compl.) The Complaint discloses that Vitale “was responsible

for enforcing and prosecuting criminal cases originating in Middlesex County, New Jersey.”

(Compl. ¥ 3.) Moving to the claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ “collective actions operated

to deny [P]laintiff procedural and substantive due process protections.” (Compl. J 10.) Plaintiff

offers no additional facts to support his claims against Vitale specifically for constitutional

violations. Because Plaintiff is pro se, however, the Court construes the Complaint liberally. The

crux of the Complaint is that a search warrant erroneously identified Plaintiff. (id. 7.) Liberally

construed, Plaintiff appears to allege that Vitale, as prosecutor, violated Plaintiff’s rights by

applying for the erroneous search warrant and pursuing the underlying charges against Plaintiff.

But with respect to this claim, Vitale is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Gatson v. New Jersey,

No, 09-1658, 2009 WL 3667066, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2009) (Thus, a prosecutor’s appearance

in court as an advocate in support of an application for a search warrant and the presentation of

evidence at such a hearing are protected by absolute immunity.” (citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 486)),

aff'd, 457 F. App’x 85 Gd Cir. 2012). To be sure, the Complaint does not allege any facts regarding

Vitale that occurred outside of the criminal process. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193,

219 (3d Cir. 2017) (Prosecutors are ordinarily shielded by absolute immunity for their

prosecutorial acts .. .”) The Court, accordingly, finds that Vitale is entitled to immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs Complaint. An appropriate order

will follow.

/s/ Michael A. Shipp

MICHAEL A. SHIPP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE