K.N. v. GLOUCESTER CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

K.N. and J.N., on behalf of 17-7976-NLH-SAK

J.N.,

Plaintiffs, OPINION

v.

GLOUCESTER CITY BOARD OF

EDUCATION,

Defendant.

Appearances:

CATHERINE MERINO REISMAN

REISMAN CAROLLA GRAN & ZUBA LLP

19 CHESTNUT STREET

HADDONFIELD, NJ 08033-1810

Counsel for Plaintiffs

BRETT E. J. GORMAN

PARKER MCCAY PA

9000 MIDLANTIC DRIVE

SUITE 300

MT. LAUREL, NJ 08054

Counsel for Defendant

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on motion of Plaintiffs

seeking attorneys’ fees from Defendant Gloucester City Board of

Education (“Board”). (Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Docket Number

44). The relevant factual and procedural history of this matter

is set forth in this Court’s prior Opinions1 and need not be

repeated at length here. For the reasons expressed below,

Plaintiffs’ motion will be granted, and Defendant will be

ordered to reimburse Plaintiffs in the amount of $100,849.78.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed actions against the Board alleging a

series of violations under federal and state antidiscrimination

laws related to the school district’s (“District”) provision of

services for an autistic child, J.N., in an after-school program

(“ASP”). Specifically, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Due

Process with the New Jersey Office of Special Education

Programs, alleging violations of the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), and the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). K.N. v. Gloucester City Bd. Of Educ.,

379 F. Supp. 3d 334, 343 (D.N.J. 2019). An Administrative Law

1 On March 29, 2019, the Court issued an Opinion and Order [Dkt.

Nos. 18 and 19 respectively] granting in part Plaintiffs’ motion

for summary judgment. The Court there found that Defendant

violated Section 504, the ADA, and the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination (“NJLAD”). On August 27, 2019, the Court issued

an Opinion and Order [Dkt. Nos. 28 and 29 respectively] denying

Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and request that the

Court certify its Opinion to allow for interlocutory appeal. On

March 25, 2021, the Court issued an Opinion and Order [Dkt. Nos.

39 and 40 respectively] granting Plaintiffs’ request to

establish a compensatory special needs trust in the amount of

$26,017.20 and finding that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties

entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in favor of Defendant, finding that

Plaintiff was provided with a free and appropriate public

education (“FAPE”) as well as proper ASP with supports in place.

Plaintiffs thereafter initiated the instant action, requesting

that the Court review the ALJ’s decision, but only on issues

concerning anti-discrimination laws — specifically Section 504,

the ADA, and the NJLAD.

This Court found that Defendant “violated Section 504, the

ADA, and the NJLAD by (1) failing to provide J.N. meaningful

access to the after-school program []; and (2) subjecting J.N.

to unnecessary social isolation.” K.N. v. Gloucester City Bd.

Of Educ., No. 17-09776-NLH-AMD, 2021 WL 1138136, at *1 (D.N.J.

Mar. 24, 2021). This Court further held that Plaintiffs are

“prevailing parties” entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and

thus instructed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on

the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees Plaintiffs are owed.

Id. at **4-5. As of May 10, 2021, the parties had filed the

instant motion, opposition, and reply papers2 on the issue of

2 The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ reply brief is not properly

formatted as it appears to be single-spaced in Times New Roman

12-point font. Local Civil Rule 7.2(d) requires that “[e]ach

page of a brief shall contain double-spaced text and/or single-

spaced footnotes or inserts. Typeface shall be in 12-point non-

proportional font (such as Courier New 12) or an equivalent 14-

point proportional font (such as Times New Roman 14).” The

Court will not on this occasion reject Plaintiffs’ reply papers.

However, as this is the second time Plaintiffs’ counsel

submitted an improperly formatted brief, see Reply Brief at Dkt.

attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs’ motion is therefore ripe for

adjudication.

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.

II. Analysis

Plaintiffs are seeking to recover $98,934.74 in attorneys’

fees and $1,915.04 in related costs that they claim they are

entitled to under both the ADA and Section 504. Plaintiffs are

correct that the Court has the discretion to award attorneys’

fees and costs to the “prevailing party” under both Section 504,

29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow

the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of

the costs”), and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (“[T]he court ...,

in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a

reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and

costs”). Defendant’s opposition brief argues the amount of fees

awarded should be dramatically reduced from the amount

requested.

A. Plaintiffs Are Prevailing Parties

No. 35, Plaintiffs’ counsel is hereafter on notice that failure

to adhere to our Local Civil Rules may result in the rejection

of a deficient submission.

As the ADA and Section 504 provisions both make clear, to

obtain an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, Plaintiffs must

first demonstrate that they were prevailing parties in this

action. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Based on

the Court’s prior ruling, it is both accepted by the parties and

established in the record that Plaintiffs are prevailing

parties, leaving only the issue of determining what constitutes

an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to be reimbursed by

Defendant.

B. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Reasonable Fees and Costs

The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ fee request. Overall, the

Court finds the request is reasonable under the circumstances.

When calculating an attorney's fee award under the ADA and

similar statutes, the “lodestar” method provides the starting

point for determining reasonable attorney's fees. Lanni v. New

Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2001); see also McKenna v.

City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 455 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The

starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is

the lodestar approach.”) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 433 (1983)). Under the lodestar approach, “court[s]

determine[] an attorney's lodestar award by multiplying the

number of hours he or she reasonably worked on a client's case

by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services given the

geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the

experience of the lawyer.” S.S. Body Armor I., Inc. v. Carter

Ledyard & Milburn LLP, 927 F.3d 763, 773 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting

Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir.

2000)).

A district court may discount any hours that it deems

unreasonable, including those considered to be “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at

433. Although the Court has substantial discretion to determine

what constitutes a reasonable rate and reasonable hours, once

the lodestar is determined, it represents the presumptive

reasonable fee. Lanni, 259 F.3d at 149. “The prevailing party

bears the burden of establishing by way of satisfactory

evidence, in addition to [the] attorney's own affidavits ...

that the requested hourly rates meet this standard.” School

District of Philadelphia v. Kirsch, 722 F. App’x. 215, 229 (3d

Cir. 2018) (quoting Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d

Cir. 2001)). “The party normally satisfies this burden by

submitting the affidavits of other attorneys in the relevant

community, attesting to the range of prevailing rates charged by

attorneys with similar skill and experience. P.G. v. Brick Twp.

Bd. of Educ., 142 F. Supp. 2d 251, 261 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing

S.D. v. Manville Bd. Of Educ., 989 F. Supp. 649, 656 (D.N.J.

1998)).

“[O]nce the fee petitioner ‘submit[s] evidence supporting

the hours worked and rates claimed,’ the party opposing the fee

application has the burden to challenge the reasonableness of

the requested fee.” J.L. v. Harrison Township Bd. of Educ., No.

14-2666 (RMB/JS), 2017 WL 1954535, at *2 (D.N.J. May 11, 2017)

(quoting McKenna, 582 F.3d at 459). If sufficiently specific

objections to the requested fees are raised, “a district court

‘has a great deal of discretion to adjust the fee award in light

of those objections.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. USF-Red Star

Exp., Inc., 212 F. App’x. 101, 111 (3d Cir. 2006)).

1. Counsels’ Hourly Rates Are Reasonable

To calculate Plaintiffs’ lodestar, the Court must first

evaluate the hourly rates claimed for Plaintiffs’ counsel. At

this stage, “a reasonable hourly rate is calculated according to

the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.”

Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). In determining a

reasonable hourly rate, courts will “assess the experience and

skill of the prevailing party’s attorneys and compare their

rates to the rates prevailing in the community3 for similar

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience,

3 The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm is Reisman

Carolla Gran Zuba LLP. The firm is located in Haddonfield, New

Jersey — a South Jersey Borough in the Philadelphia Metropolitan

Area. Thus, the Court finds that the relevant legal market is

the Philadelphia Metropolitan Area.

and reputation.”

Plaintiffs have put forth the following hourly rates used

in their lodestar calculations: $545 per hour for Catherine

Merino Reisman, a partner; $500 per hour for Amelia Carolla, a

partner, and $100 per hour for Connie Tracey and Tina Tilton,

both paralegals.4 The Board only disputes Carolla and Reisman’s

hourly rates.

Plaintiffs first direct the Court to consider the rates

published by Community Legal Services, which demonstrate that

Plaintiffs’ requested rates are either average or well below

average for attorneys with the numbers of years of experience

they each have.5 (Motion Brief at 7-9). The Court finds this

argument compelling as “[t]he fee schedule established by

Community Legal Services, Inc. (“CLS”) ‘has been approvingly

4 Carolla worked 0.5 hours, and paralegals Connie Tracey and Tina

Tilton worked 2.5 and 1.8 hours respectively. Thus, the

majority of time billed is attributed to Reisman, who worked at

least 190 hours.

5 Reisman has practiced law for at least 32 years and has

specialized in special education law for approximately 23 years.

The Community Legal Services’ Attorneys Fess Schedule for the

Philadelphia legal market sets forth a range of: (1) $550-640

per hour for an attorney with 21-25 years’ experience, and (2)

$650-700 per hour for an attorney with more than 25 years’

experience. Therefore, Reisman’s requested rate of $545 not

only falls within the fee schedule, but the rate is also below

the minimum range regardless of how her years of experience are

calculated. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ requested rate of $500 for

Carolla, who has practiced law for approximately 26 years and

specialized in education law for at least 21 years, is well

within (and again below) the range of Community Legal Services’

Attorney Fee Schedule.

cited by the Third Circuit as being well developed and has been

found ... to be a fair reflection of the prevailing market

rates.’” Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir.

2001) (quoting Rainey v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 832 F.

Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1993)); see also Rhodes v. Marix

Servicing, LLC, No. CV121636MASDEA, 2020 WL 5760455, at *5

(D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2020) (approving hourly rates based on CLS fee

schedule). Accordingly, the CLS fee schedule supports Reisman’s

$545 rate and Carolla’s $500 rate as reasonable hourly rates in

the relevant legal market.

In further support of the requested rates, Plaintiffs also

emphasize Reisman and Carolla’s experience in special education

law.6 (Motion Br. at 6-9). There is no doubting this

experience, which is reflected in the record as decades of

service as counsel in numerous special education matters,

published articles, lectures, and other activities in the realm

6 Upon graduation from Yale Law School in 1989, Reisman was

admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1989,

bar of the State of New Jersey in 2001, and the bar of the State

of New York in 2018. (Reisman Certification (“Reisman Cert.”)

[Dkt. No. 44-2], at ¶¶ 1-4). Therefore, Reisman practiced law

for approximately 32 years, and she has specialized in special

education law since 1999 (approximately 23 years). (Id. at ¶¶

1-6). Carolla graduated from Rutgers School of Law—Camden in

1995 and was admitted to the bars of the State of New Jersey and

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that same year. (Id. at ¶ 13).

Carolla therefore practiced law for approximately 26 years.

Moreover, Carolla began specializing in special education law in

2001 and thus possesses approximately 21 years of experience

special education law. (Id. at ¶ 15).

of special education law. (See Reisman Cert.). Reisman and

Carolla are founding partners of Reisman Carolla Gran & Zuba

LLP, which they started in 2008. (Id. at ¶ 7). The firm

currently bills Reisman and Carolla’s services at rates of $545

per hour and $500 per hour respectively. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 17).

In line with the requested rate of $545, Reisman has

previously received hourly rates of $525 per hour and $475 per

hour by courts in 2020 and 2017 respectively. See E.H. v.

Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 2020 WL 6286709, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Oct.

27, 2020); see also Sch. Dist. Of Phila. v. Kirsch, 2017 WL

13180, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2017), aff’d in relevant part,

722 F. App’x 215, 230 (3d Cir. 2018). The Court in E.H. also

approved a $480 per hour rate for Carolla. E.H., 2020 WL

6286709, at *12.

In addition, Plaintiffs not only base the requested rates

on the prior rates awarded in E.H., but they also seek to add an

approximately 4-5% rate increase since that decision was issued

in 2020. (Motion Br. at 9). In support of this rate increase,

Plaintiffs cite to two unpublished opinions from another

district. See, e.g. Earley v. JMK Assocs., 2020 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 66176, at **3-4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2020) (awarding

attorneys’ fees including an annual rate increase of 5%); Jada

H. v. Rivera, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94679, at **6-7 (E.D. Pa.

June 6, 2019)(awarding attorneys’ fees including a 4% increase,

finding such “an increase . . . is reasonable”). Plaintiffs

note the rate increase is justified as their requested rates are

below the CLS fee schedule and because said schedule has not

been updated since July 1, 2018. (Motion Br. at 8-9). The

Court does not disagree and, having not been presented with any

authority to the contrary, finds that, even with a minor 4-5%

adjustment, which is appropriate given the significant and

current inflationary pressures facing the U.S. economy, the

requested rates fall within and below the CLS fee schedule and

are supported by counsels’ lengthy, specialized experience.

While there is already a sufficient basis for the requested

rates based on the CLS fee schedule, Plaintiffs’ counsels’

significant experience in the niche field of special education

law, and the fact that courts have awarded counsel similar,

albeit lesser, fees in prior cases, the Court further finds that

Plaintiffs’ have met their burden of demonstrating the

reasonableness of the requested rates based on the

certifications and declarations of Reisman and three, local,

established attorneys7 who specialize in the area of civil rights

and special education. For example, in support of their motion,

Plaintiffs submit the Declaration of David J. Berney, Esq. a

7 Plaintiffs submitted the Declaration of David J. Berney

(“Berney Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 44-3], the Certification of John D.

Rue (“Rue Cert.”) [Dkt. No. 44-4], and the Certification of

Staci J. Greenwald (“Greenwald Cert.”) [Dkt. No. 44-5].

special education practitioner who has worked in this

specialized area of law since 1996. (Berney Decl. ¶ 3). Berney

notes that he bills his services at $540 per hour, and, in

connection with his practice, he has extensively researched the

customary billing rates for special education attorneys in the

greater Philadelphia metropolitan area. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-32).

After reviewing the experience and qualifications of Plaintiffs’

counsel, the most recent CLS fee schedule, his own experience,

and taking into account recent court decisions regarding fee

awards in these types of cases, Berney concludes that Reisman’s

requested hourly rate of $545 “is reasonable given her

reputation, skill, and expertise and what other special

education and/or civil rights attorneys of comparable reputation

and expertise charge.” (Id. at ¶¶ 26-39).

Plaintiffs also submitted the Certifications of Staci J.

Greenwald, Esq. and John D. Rue, Esq. Greenwald is a partner at

Sussan Greenwald & Wesler with approximately 29 years'

experience specializing in special education law. (Greenwald

Cert. at ¶¶ 1-3). Greenwald’s hourly rate is $465. (Id. at ¶

4). Greenwald states her familiarity with Reisman, and

certifies that “Ms. Reisman’s fee [of $545 per hour] is a

customary fee charged by other attorneys who specialize in this

area and who practice in the community in which this matter

arose, and, is reasonable in light of Ms. Reisman’s level of

expertise and years in practice.” (Id.).

Likewise, Rue, the founder of John Rue & Associates, who

possess over a decade of experience in special education

litigation and charges an hourly rate of $400, also agrees as to

the reasonableness of Reisman’s requested rate. (Rue Cert. at

¶¶ 2-13). Rue knows Reisman “through her work as an attorney in

the fields of special education and civil rights law [and is]

aware of her excellent reputation in these areas.” (Id. at ¶

14). Rue further certifies that, “[a]s an attorney practicing

in this field, as a former attorney at a large firm and having

personal knowledge of the quality of her legal work, I can state

that Ms. Reisman’s reduced rate of $545 per hour is more than

reasonable, and lower than, the rates of attorneys in our region

with similar levels of legal experience.” (Id. at ¶ 18).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented

several bases to satisfy their burden of establishing the

reasonableness of the requested rates, particularly as concerns

Reisman. See P.G., 142 F. Supp. 2d at 261.

In contrast, the Court holds that Defendant has not met its

burden to challenge the reasonableness of the requested rates.

Defendant quibbles over the requested rates noting that

Reisman’s rate is $80 more than Greenwald’s rate, even though

Reisman possesses only three more years of practice experience

than Greenwald. Defendant likewise takes offense that Carolla’s

rate is $35 more than Greenwald’s rate, despite Greenwald

possessing three years more experience than Carolla. However,

what these distinctions miss is the fact that Greenwald, Rue,

and Berney all attested that Reisman’s rate of $545 is

reasonable based on the above criteria and in the target legal

market.

Moreover, Defendant has not presented any rebuttal

declarations, certifications, affidavits, or other sworn

statements to challenge Plaintiffs’ supporting authorities.8 Nor

has Defendant attempted to diminish or distinguish Plaintiffs’

arguments regarding the intrinsic value of Reisman and Carolla’s

experience or consideration of the requested rates against the

CLS fee schedule.

The sole authority Defendant cites is an unpublished

8 Defendant submitted an outdated Certification, dated January

26, 2016, from Brett E.J. Gorman, Esq. that purportedly lists

other attorneys’ hourly rates, including Greenwald. However,

this certification is of de minimis value as it is over six

years out-of-date and therefore fails to demonstrate current

“prevailing rates charged by attorneys with similar skill and

experience” in the relevant community. P.G., 142 F. Supp. 2d at

261. Defendant likely submitted the certification to state that

Greenwald’s hour rate has risen from $395 to $465 over five

years and to show that Reisman’s requested rate, representing an

$80 premium over Greenwald’s, must somehow be excessive by

comparison. The Court rejects this argument, as stated above,

Greenwald explicitly endorses Reisman’s requested rate as within

the range of “prevailing rates charged by attorneys with similar

skill and experience.” Id. If Defendant wanted to rebut

Reisman’s requested rate or Greenwald’s sworn statement, then

Defendant should have proffered at least one rebuttal

certification.

opinion from another court in this District that awarded fees in

a special education matter for hourly rates of $400 and $375.

E.I.H. v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 2021 WL 1153139, at **4-6

(D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2021). However, that case supports Plaintiffs’

arguments here, as the court in E.I.H. considered the CLS fee

schedule, the fee petitioning attorneys’ years of experience,

and supporting certifications (including from Greenwald) in

reaching the conclusion that the requested rates of $400 and

$375 were reasonable. Defendant mistakenly fixates on the fact

that the court in E.I.H. awarded fees of $400 per hour as some

sort of cap. However, this misses the point that $400 was in

fact the requested rate. Nothing in that matter suggests the

Court would not have awarded $500 per hour if it had been

requested and likewise supported by the record. The E.I.H.

court did not find that attorneys possessing 37 years of

practice should only be awarded $400 rates. Moreover, the skill

differential between Reisman, who has specialized for decades in

special education law, and the attorney in E.I.H., who did not

specialize for decades in special education law, diminishes the

value of this comparison.

Defendant’s final arguments are that the requested rates

are unreasonable because: (1) Defendant’s counsel charges a rate

of $175 per hour; and (2) the COVID-19 global pandemic has

caused great financial hardship, making Plaintiffs’ request for

a 4-5% rate increase distasteful. Lacking any cited authority,

the court rejects these arguments as bald assertions that have

no bearing on the instant inquiry as to reasonableness.

The Court, therefore, is satisfied that Plaintiffs’ hourly

rates are reasonable here.

2. Plaintiffs Billed Reasonable Hours

“After a court ascertains a reasonable hourly rate, it must

then determine whether the hours that the attorney expended are

reasonable.” Machado v. Law Offices of Jeffrey H. Ward, No. 14-

7401, 2017 WL 2838458, at *2 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017) (citing

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433–34). The Court must “review the time

charged, decide whether the hours set out were reasonably

expended for each of the particular purposes described and then

exclude those that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary.’” Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 184. The Court will

exclude any hours that “were not reasonably expended” from the

fee calculation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citation omitted).

“Hours are not reasonably expended if they are excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Rode v. Dellarciprete,

892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). To determine whether the

hours expended in this matter are reasonable, “it is necessary

that the Court ‘go line, by line, by line’ through the billing

records supporting the fee request.” Evans v. Port Auth. of

N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 362 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis in

original).

“The party seeking attorney[s’] fees has the burden to

prove that its request for attorney[s’] fees is reasonable.”

Rode, 892 F.3d at 1183. “When the fee petitioner has produced

satisfactory evidence for a fee award, the burden shifts to ‘the

party opposing the fee to contest the reasonableness of the

hourly rate requested or the reasonableness of the hours

expended.’” Rhodes, 2020 WL 5760455, at *3 (quoting Apple

Corps. Ltd. v. Int'l Collectors Soc'y, 25 F. Supp. 2d 480, 485

(D.N.J. 1998)). “If the party opposing the fee petition meets

its burden of proving that an adjustment is necessary, the

[C]ourt has wide discretion to adjust the attorneys’ fee ....”

Apple Corps. Ltd., 25 F. Supp. at 480 (citation omitted); see

also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (noting that determining

reasonableness of fees is within the trial court's discretion).

In cases such as this, the Court “has wide discretion to

adjust the attorneys’ fee for a variety of reasons such as

inadequate documentation of hours spent, reasonableness of hours

expended or duplication of efforts.” Apple Corps. Ltd., 25 F.

Supp. 2d at 485 (citing Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670,

677 (3d Cir. 1983)). “The Court, however, must be prompted by

the opposing party to review specific charges and cannot make

any adjustments sua sponte.” Machado, 2017 WL 2838458, at *2

(citing Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d

694, 711 (3d Cir. 2005)). “The lodestar calculation is presumed

reasonable, but the ‘[C]ourt can adjust the lodestar downward if

the lodestar is not reasonable in light of the results

obtained.’” Id. (quoting Washington v. Phila. Cty. Court of

Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996)).

As mentioned above, Plaintiffs here are seeking attorneys’

fees in the amount of $100,849.78 for hours billed by two

attorneys and two paralegals. Reisman billed at least 190

hours, Carolla billed 0.5 hours, and paralegals Tracey and

Tilton billed 2.5 and 1.8 hours respectively. Plaintiffs have

submitted full billing records for each proceeding, which

include time entries accounting for the entire time requested.9

Plaintiffs claim “[t]he work done at the administrative

level, including work related to the IDEA claims, was

appropriate, reasonable, and necessary for proper advocacy and

the successful prosecution of J.N.’s 504/ADA claims regarding

denial of access to the ASP.” (Motion Br. at 12). Likewise,

Plaintiffs claim “[t]he work done at the federal court level,

with the exception of the supplemental briefing on remedies

excluded from this motion for attorney’s fees, was appropriate,

9 Plaintiffs have already pared down and reduced the requested

award as they are not seeking fees for: (1) work related to the

supplemental briefing on remedy ($4,064.50); (2) time spent

regarding Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) meetings

($6,104.00); and (3) duplicative entries ($381.50).

reasonable, and necessary for proper advocacy and the successful

prosecution of J.N.’s discrimination claims.” (Id.). And, as

set forth above, Berney, Rue, and Greenwald all attested that

the total number of hours expended are reasonable. (See, e.g.,

Berney Decl. at ¶ 39 (“It is my opinion, based on the special

education hearings and federal IDEA cases that I have either

litigated or supervised, that the total number of hours accrued

by Ms. Reisman and her co-counsel are reasonable and may even be

on the low side given the complexity of this type of

litigation”); Rue Cert. at ¶ 19 (“Based on my review of the

records, the time expended by the family’s attorneys in the

administrative hearing and in the pending litigation to date was

reasonable and necessary for a vigorous and capable

representation of J.N.”); Greenwald Cert. at ¶ 5 (“I believe the

fees and expenses charged by Ms. Reisman are very reasonable

given the complexity of the matter and the issues addressed”)).

The Court has engaged in a searching and detailed review of

the billing records submitted by Plaintiffs. There is nothing

in the record to suggest the time spent was anything but fair

and reasonable.

In opposition, Defendant argues the time spent should be

reduced because Plaintiffs achieved only limited success on

their claims, taking issue with the hours billed for work prior

to the instant federal litigation before this Court. The Court

will address Defendant’s argument in another section, as

Defendant’s argument does not contest the hours billed as

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Accordingly,

there are no specific challenges to the billing records. As the

Court does not make adjustments sua sponte, the Court finds

Plaintiffs expended reasonable hours that are entitled to

reimbursement by Defendant. Machado, 2017 WL 2838458, at *2

(citing Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d

694, 711 (3d Cir. 2005)).

In sum as to the lodestar calclulation, Plaintiffs here

submitted fee requests for $100,849.78 for approximately 194.8

hours of work billed (190 hours for Reisman, 0.5 hours for

Carolla, and 4.3 hours for Tracey and Tilton) and expenses. The

Court has analyzed Plaintiffs’ billing entries on a line-by-line

basis, and Defendant does not present any specific challenges to

the hours billed. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs’

counsel reasonably expended approximately 194.8 hours on this

litigation and, based on the respective hourly rates for each

attorney and paralegal and expenses, calculates Plaintiffs’

lodestar as $100,849.78.

3. Plaintiffs’ Fee Award Will Not Be Reduced

Reaching a reasonable fee award as set forth above is not

the end of the Court’s analysis here. Throughout its opposition

brief, Defendant has repeatedly pushed for another, substantial

reduction of Plaintiffs’ fees award: Defendant claims that

Plaintiffs achieved only a limited degree of success in this

action, and therefore requests that the Court reduce its

lodestar calculation for fees associated with the administrative

proceeding regarding the IDEA claims. Plaintiffs disagree,

arguing the requested rates and billed hours reflect a

reasonable fee that should not be reduced beyond Plaintiffs’

own, self-imposed cuts.

Although the lodestar calculation “produces a presumptively

reasonable fee, that ‘does not end the inquiry. There remain

other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust

the fee upward or downward.’” United Auto. Workers Local 259

Social Sec. Dept. v. Metro Auto Center, 501 F.3d 283, 292 (3d

Cir. 2007) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). Instead, the

Supreme Court has explained that when ‘a plaintiff has achieved

only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly

rate [i.e., the ‘lodestar’ amount] may be an excessive amount.”

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. “In such cases, a reduction in the

fee award is warranted, and ‘[t]he district court may attempt to

identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may

simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.’”

A.S. ex rel. V.S. v. Colts Neck Bd. of Educ., 190 F. App’x. 140,

143 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).

In other words, a district court “may adjust a requested

legal fee downward based upon the results obtained by counsel

for the prevailing party, particularly ‘where a plaintiff is

deemed “prevailing” even though he succeeded on only some of his

claims for relief.’” School District of Philadelphia v. Kirsch,

722 F. App’x. 215, 230 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 434). “Indeed, ‘the most critical factor’ in determining the

reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree of success

obtained.’” D.O., on Behalf of M.O. v. Jackson Twp. Bd. of Ed.,

No. 17-1581 (TJB), 2019 WL 1923388, at *2 (D.N.J. April 30,

2019) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114). Importantly,

“[d]istrict courts have wide discretion to determine whether,

and by how much, fees should be reduced for lack of success.”

D’Orazio v. Washington Twp., 501 F. App’x. 185, 188 (3d Cir.

2012). But as the Supreme Court explained in Hensley, “[w]here

a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should

recover a fully compensatory fee ... [and] the fee award should

not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on

every contention raised in the lawsuit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at

435.

Defendant, obviously seeking the largest possible

reduction, frames Plaintiffs’ lawsuit as a half-win, since

“Plaintiffs’ success in this matter is limited to the claims

raised in this appeal only.” (Opposition Br. at 9). Defendant

admits Plaintiffs succeeded on their ADA, NJLAD, and Section 504

claims but argues these issues were tangential and instead

emphasizes that the majority of the underlying administrative

proceeding centered on Plaintiffs’ challenge to the proposed

IEPs and whether the school provided J.N. with a FAPE under the

IDEA. (Opposition Br. at 9-10). As if to prove this point,

Defendant cites to the number of pages of various witnesses’

transcripts from the administrative proceeding to demonstrate

that the ASP was not the central matter, noting: of the Williams

transcript, a mere 96 pages concerned the ASP, while a whopping

71 pages are unrelated; and of the Brennan transcript, only 28

pages concerned the ASP and the remaining 59 pages do not. (Id.

at 11-12). Defendant emphasizes that it prevailed on the IDEA

claim, proving J.N. was afforded proper FAPE and as Plaintiffs

did not seek appellate review from this Court, Plaintiffs should

not be awarded attorney’s fees for the significant amounts of

time spent pursuing the IDEA claims when they were ultimately

unsuccessful. (Id. at 10-13). The Court disagrees.

Here, Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim, ADA claim, Section 504 claim,

and NJLAD claim all arose from Defendant denying J.N. access to

an appropriate ASP. The ALJ’s opinion plainly spells out how

the ASP is the central issue: “Indeed, there is not much dispute

as to what occurred here, but whether the evidence, taken as a

whole, is sufficient to establish that J.N. received FAPE or

whether he was denied due process by the District not

incorporating the ASP into his IEP.” (ALJ Opinion [Dkt. No. 1-

1] at 15). Plaintiffs sought relief in the form of ASP for J.N.

as part of his IEP. The ALJ found that J.N. was provided with

FAPE and that there were no violations of the ADA and Section

504. Plaintiffs appealed and this Court found clear violations

of J.N.’s rights. Specifically, the Court held Defendant

violated the ADA, Section 504, and NJLAD by failing to provide

J.N. with meaningful access to the ASP and by unnecessarily

subjecting J.N. to social isolation.

The Court awarded J.N. compensatory education in the form

of a special needs trust in the amount of $26,017.20 and found

that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties entitled to attorney’s

fees.10 While the original IDEA, ADA, and Section 504 claims

were all discrete issues, they all derived from the same, one

claim, J.N.’s access to ASP — a claim Plaintiffs unequivocally

succeeded on. There is no parsing out the IDEA claim work from

10 Plaintiffs direct the Court to consider that the amount

awarded in compensatory education far exceeds Plaintiffs’ last

settlement demand of $12,300 (plus attorney’s fees and costs),

thus further demonstrating the degree of success achieved by

Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Reply Brief [Dkt. No. 47] at 9). While

the amount of relief awarded compared to the amount of relief

sought is a factor courts consider in evaluating counsel’s

success, such an analysis is unnecessary here where the record

plainly demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ counsel succeeded across

the board in achieving the relief sought and thus achieved

“excellent results” warranting full attorney’s fees.

the other claims as they all relate to the relief sought: proper

ASP for J.N.

Tellingly, as Plaintiffs correctly point out, the IDEA

claims, though unsuccessful at the administrative proceeding

level, were intertwined with the discrimination claims as an

alternative theory of relief, and the entire process of

presenting the IDEA claims was a necessary, prerequisite step to

enable Plaintiffs to pursue their discrimination claims at both

the administrative level and successfully here. See S.D. v.

Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 722 F. App’x 119, 121-25 (3d Cir.

2018). Defendant does not deny this.11 Just as important, this

issue and Defendant’s argument are not new; the Court has

11 Rather, Defendant misdirects the Court to consider a case

outside of this district and circuit, K.M. ex rel. Bright v.

Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1306 (C.D. Cal.

2015), where the court reduced a fee award by 50% because

although “the administrative proceeding was related to and

involved overlapping facts with the ADA claim, leading to a

development of the factual record, Plaintiff was unsuccessful in

achieving relief under the IDEA . . . [which] Plaintiff did not

challenge . . . on appeal[, thus, m]uch of Plaintiff’s counsel’s

time expended on the IDEA administrative proceedings was not

reasonably necessary to achieve success on the ADA claim,

meriting a proportional reduction in fees.” While facially,

this case may appear informative, the Third Circuit’s holding in

Rena C. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 840 F. App’x 676, 682 (3d Cir.

2020)(discussed infra), and partially in S.D., compel this Court

to rule otherwise. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs correctly point

out, K.M. is not analogous to the present proceedings. For

example, the plaintiff in K.M. did not assert the discrimination

claims at the administrative hearing and instead first raised

them at her appeal to the district court. 78 F. Supp. 3d at

1293-94.

previously ruled on this issue:

[T]he District argues Plaintiffs’ status as

a prevailing party is limited to the claims

raised in its appeal only. The District

focuses on the fact that the District

prevailed on “a vast majority of the

underlying matter” between Plaintiffs and

the District. The District argues “[t]he

504 issue present here was, in comparison, a

tangential issue that was not the focus of

the hearing” and that Plaintiffs’ demand on

the 504 issue likely exceeds what will

actually be ordered by the Court and thus

should impact the prevailing party award.

. . .

This Court agrees that Plaintiffs are

“prevailing parties” and thus may be awarded

a certain amount of attorney’s fees for

succeeding on Plaintiffs’ claims in this

Court. Moreover, this Court agrees with

Plaintiffs that where, as here, a federal

statute requires exhaustion, the plaintiff

is entitled to fees for administrative

proceedings.

. . .

The District does not argue that exhaustion

was not required for Plaintiffs’ claims and

instead argues fees related the

administrative hearing should not be awarded

because the District prevailed on a the

I.D.E.A. portion of the appeal and

Plaintiffs never appealed this decision.

The District does not direct this Court’s

attention to any case law to support this

proposition. The Court finds persuasive the

case law that awards attorney’s fees

connected to administrative proceedings that

are a prerequisite to filing suit because

such hearings are a necessary precursor to

Plaintiffs’ ultimate success on their

federal claims. Plaintiffs had to exhaust

administrative remedies on the IDEA claims

in order to be able to pursue their ADA and

Section 504 claims in this Court.

K.N., 2021 WL 1138136, at *4 (citations omitted). Therefore,

the Court does not find that Plaintiffs’ loss of the IDEA claims

at the administrative level and choice to forego the same in

this forum should impact the award of attorney’s fees. Again,

the IDEA claims were merely an alternative ground for relief,

and more importantly, a necessary vehicle to exhaust the

administrative process. Plaintiffs were ultimately successful

in obtaining the very relief requested, namely relief from the

District’s exclusion of J.N. from ASP. Since Plaintiffs

prevailed on every claim raised in this action, counsels’ work

below, which was a necessary, prerequisite to reach this court,

is part and parcel to this successful outcome. In short,

excellent results warrant attorneys’ fees in full. Hensley, 461

U.S. at 435.

Moreover, as Plaintiffs adroitly point out, Defendant’s

request to isolate issues and their successes in a vacuum (e.g.

claims for IDEA, ADA, and Section 504, which are all independent

but alternative bases to achieve the same results) for

attorneys’ fees purposes is expressly rejected by the Third

Circuit. See Rena C. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 840 F. App’x 676,

682 (3d Cir. 2020) (“When determining a fee award, an important

factor that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward

or downward is the prevailing party’s degree of success.

[Importantly, w]hen a party . . . prevails in an action

involving either ‘only a single claim’ or multiple ‘claims for

relief’ that have ‘a common core of facts or . . . based on

related legal theories,’ the ‘lawsuit cannot be viewed as a

series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should

focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the

plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the

litigation.’ In doing so, ‘the fee award should not be reduced

simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every

contention raised in the lawsuit. Litigants in good faith may

raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the

court’s rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not

a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. The result is what

matters.’” (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-37)).

Accordingly, the Court here finds that Plaintiffs’ framing

of the outcome in this litigation is entirely accurate.

Plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining excellent results, thus there

is no basis to reduce the lodestar award.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs’ motion for

attorneys’ fees [Dkt. No. 44) shall be granted, and Defendant

will be ordered to reimburse Plaintiffs in the amount of

$100,849.78.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: March 1, 2022 s/ Noel L. Hillman

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.