WILSON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRYANT WILSON,

Civil Action No. 21-10004 (JXN)(JBC)

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

NEALS, District Judge:

Before this Court is pro se Plaintiff Bryant Wilson’s (“Plaintiff”) civil rights complaint

(“Complaint”) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 (ECF No. 1.) Based on his affidavit of indigence

(ECF No. 2), the Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered

the Clerk of Court to file the Complaint. (ECF No. 3.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts several

causes of action, alleging violations of his speedy trial rights resulting from this Court’s

coronavirus (“COVID-19”) related Standing Orders, as well as various restrictive jail conditions

claims, against the United States, the United States Department of Justice, the United States

Marshals Service, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Chief Judge

Freda Wolfson, Governor Phil Murphy, Essex County, Director Alfaro Ortiz, Warden Guy Cirillo,

and CFG Medical Services.

1 The Complaint at ECF No. 1 is labeled “Amended Civil Action.” The Court notes that this is Plaintiff’s initial

pleading. For sake of clarity, the Court will refer to ECF No. 1 as the Complaint.

At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

and 1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Complaint

is dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he is a federal detainee, housed at the Essex County Correctional

Facility, in Newark, New Jersey. (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 1.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff lists various

federal and state law claims. 2 As best the Court can interpret, Plaintiff alleges that his right to a

speedy trial was violated by this Court’s coronavirus (“COVID-19”) Standing Orders. (ECF No.

1, at 10-11.) On March 16, 2020, the Chief Judge of this Court issued Standing Order 2020-02.3

Pursuant to Standing Order 2020-02, “[t]he time period of March 16, 2020 through April 30, 2020

shall be ‘excluded time’ under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) . . . .” (See

Standing Order 20-02 at ¶ 6.) In so ordering, the Chief Judge noted the challenges and serious

health risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the guidance of federal and state public health

officials, and the burgeoning effort to further public health, and the health and safety of Court

personnel, litigants, and other case participants. Id. at 1.

Plaintiff also asserts several claims against state government official and the United States

and its agencies. More specifically, Plaintiff claims Governor Murphy issued “Covid-19

emergency orders that were used by defendants to deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights.” (ECF

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint is nearly identical to several initial pleadings filed by pretrial detainees at

the Essex County Correctional Facility, seeking to proceed as a class action. See, e.g., McClain v. United States, No.

21-4997, 2021 WL 2224270, at *1 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021); Middlebrooks v. United States, No. 21-9225, 2021 WL

2224308, at *1 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021). In styling the complaints as a class action, the plaintiffs in these cases have

failed to include any information regarding their personal, individual circumstances.

3 The Court’s Standing Orders, which include Standing Order 2020-02, can be located on the District of New Jersey’s

website at: https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/standing-orders (last visited January 18, 2022).

No. 1, at 6.) Plaintiff asserts Director Ortiz issued the “Twenty Fifth Amended Declaration.” (Id.,

at 15.) Plaintiff alleges that this Court, and the United States employ some of the Defendants and

should be responsible based on that employment and that the Defendants conspired to deprive

Plaintiff of his rights. Plaintiff complains about various pandemic related restrictions at the jail

such as limited visitation, religious services, discovery access, legal research time, and medical

care, as well as slow mail, lockdowns, extreme quarantines, and a lack of access to attorneys. (Id.

at 11.)

Plaintiff seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. In particular, he seeks to vacate

unspecified pandemic related orders and declarations and requests four days of jail credit for every

day in detention “during the period of March 15, 2020 to present.” (Id. at 23-24.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66

to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions

in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress

against a government employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect

to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss

any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to

sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A because Plaintiff

is a prisoner who is proceeding as indigent.

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing

Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). According to the Supreme Court’s decision

in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially

plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB

Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his

constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. . . .

Therefore, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, the alleged deprivation

was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is the

federal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Walker v. Zenk, 323 Fed. App’x. 144, 145 n.1 (3d

Cir. 2009) (citing Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004)). To state a claim under

Bivens, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States; and (2) that the deprivation of the right was caused by a person acting under

color of federal law. See Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing that Bivens

created a right against federal officials parallel to Section 1983’s right to assert a claim against

state officials); see also Collins v. F.B.I., No. 10-3470, 2011 WL 1627025, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 28,

2011) (“The Third Circuit has recognized that Bivens actions are simply the federal counterpart to

§ 1983 claims brought against state officials and thus the analysis established under one type of

claim is applicable under the other.”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Immune Defendants

As an initial matter, the Court will determine whether any of the Defendants are immune

from suit.

1. The United States, the United States Department of Justice, The United States

Marshals Service, and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

“It is well-settled that the United States has sovereign immunity except where it consents

to be sued.” Brobst v. United States, 659 F. App’x 135, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing United States

v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). Stated differently, “the United States is not subject to suit

for constitutional torts, including the civil rights claims Plaintiff seeks to raise, and is entitled to

absolute sovereign immunity in this matter.” See, e.g., Edward Pittman, v. United States, No. 21-

10123, 2021 WL 2260518, at *2 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021) (footnote omitted). Sovereign immunity

constitutes a jurisdictional bar to claims against the United States and its agencies unless Congress

has specifically waived such immunity. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Larson v.

Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687 (1949) (sovereign immunity bars suit

against the United States either for damages or for injunctive relief requiring government action.)

Indeed, “[a]n action against government officials in their official capacities constitutes an action

against the United States [and is] barred by sovereign immunity, absent an explicit waiver.” Lewal

v. Ali, 289 F. App’x 515, 516 (3d Cir. 2008); Webb v. Desan, 250 F. App’x 468, 471 (3d Cir.

2007).

Here, there is no evidence that Congress waived sovereign immunity for the asserted claims

against the United States. Thus, Plaintiff claims against the United States are barred by sovereign

immunity. See Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717-18 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding sovereign

immunity bars claims against the United States and its federal agencies and officials, unless the

United States explicitly waives its immunity). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims

against the United States with prejudice.

Likewise, the United States Department of Justice, the United States Marshals Service, and

the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, are immune from suit in this matter

because they have not explicitly waived sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137

F.3d 148, 158-59 (3d Cir. 1998) (federal governmental entities are not “persons” subject to suit in

a federal civil rights matter); see also Gary v. Gardner, 445 F. App’x 466-67 (3d Cir. 2011) (“the

United States Marshals Service is entitled to sovereign immunity from suit” absent an explicit

waiver of sovereign immunity); Hill v. United States, No. 21-03872, 2021 WL 3879101, at *3

(D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2021); Gamble v. United States Dist. Ct. of Rhode Island, No. 18-778, 2019 WL

1301727, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 21, 2019) (finding that the District Court is immune from suit). These

Defendants have not explicitly waived sovereign immunity; thus, they are immune from suit and

this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against them. Richards v. United States,

176 F.3d 652, 654 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Sovereign immunity not only protects the United States from

liability, it deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction over claims against the United States.”).

Consequently, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the United States Department of

Justice, the United States Marshals Service, and the United States District Court for the District of

New Jersey with prejudice.

2. Chief Judge Wolfson

Plaintiff asserts various claims against Chief Judge Wolfson for issuing several COVID-

19 Standing Orders, which excluded time under the Speedy Trial Act.

It has long been held that members of the judiciary are entitled to absolute immunity from

suits based upon the performance of their judicial functions. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10

(1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S.

335, 347 (1872). Judicial immunity was established to permit judges to render decisions “with

independence and without fear of consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). “If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions,

the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful

incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits.” Forrester v. White,

484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988). Accordingly, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because

the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he

will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump,

435 U.S. at 356-57; see also Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351. Furthermore, “[a] judge is absolutely immune

from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of

grave procedural errors.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 359. “[Judicial] immunity is overcome in only two

sets of circumstances.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for

non-judicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Id. In determining

whether an act qualifies as a “judicial act,” courts look to “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether

it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectation of the parties, i.e., whether

they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. “Second, a judge is

not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.

Neither exception applies here. Plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest that Chief Judge

Wolfson engaged in nonjudicial acts or took any actions in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

To the contrary, Plaintiff takes issue with Chief Judge Wolfson’s judicial acts – issuing a Standing

Order to further public health, and the health and safety of court personnel, litigants, and other

court participants. Other courts in this District have similarly found that the issuance of standing

orders by Chief Judge Wolfson were judicial acts and, therefore, Chief Judge Wolfson was

absolutely immune from civil lawsuit. See Hill, 2021 WL 3879101, at *3 (“Chief Judge Wolfson

is joined based on her issuance of the standing orders Plaintiff opposes. Those orders were clearly

issued in a judicial rather than administrative capacity[.]”); Tiedeman v. United States of America,

No. 21-4326, 2021 WL 2224265, at *2 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021); Majerska v. United States of

America, No. 21-4381, 2021 WL 4739602, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2021). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claims for monetary damages against Chief Judge Wolfson are dismissed with prejudice.

Chief Judge Wolfson is also immune from suit with respect to Plaintiff’s requests for

injunctive relief. Except in very limited circumstances, judges are immune from personal-capacity

suits for injunctive relief. In 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that “injunctive

relief shall not be granted” in an action brought against a judicial official for an act or omission

taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory

relief was unavailable.” See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (abrogating in part Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42

(1984) (which held that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a

judge acting in his or her judicial capacity)).

Here, Plaintiff did not provide what decree was violated or that declaratory relief was

unavailable. Rather, Plaintiff provided conclusory remarks from which the Court cannot deduce

that a decree was violated or that relief was unavailable. See, e.g. (ECF No. 1, at 2 (“[a] decree

was violated[,] and declaratory relief was not made available.”).) Plaintiff fails to provide any

factual detail to support his conclusory allegations. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive

relief against Chief Judge Wolfson is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief, requesting a “declaration” that various statutes and

constitutional amendments were violated. (ECF No. 1, at 23.) “Declaratory judgment is

inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one

party is liable to another.” See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam);

see also Andela v. Admini. Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)

(“Declaratory judgments are meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in the

anticipation of some future conduct”). While a plaintiff may request declaratory relief, he/she

must show a likelihood of future injury, as declaratory judgment is an inappropriate remedy to

proclaim liability for past actions. Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84; Gochin v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.,

Civ. A. No. 16-6153, 2017 WL 2152177, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2017). Instead, declaratory

relief is meant to “define legal rights and obligations” for future conduct between parties. Id.;

Rutkowitz v. Turner, Civ. A. No. 17-6622, 2018 WL 3388306, at *5 (D.N.J. July 12, 2018).

Here, the non-monetary relief sought – a declaration that statutes and constitutional

amendments were violated – is improper. Although Declaratory relief is only appropriate for

future conduct, Plaintiff seeks relief for alleged harm caused by past “violations.” Plaintiff does

not seek any relief regarding future injury, nor does Plaintiff allege any facts to support such relief.

More importantly, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts regarding how the standing orders affected

him personally. Thus, Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated a claim for declaratory relief.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims declaratory relief against Chief Judge Wolfson are dismissed

without prejudice.4

3. Governor Murphy

Any claim for monetary relief that Plaintiff is attempting to raise against Governor Murphy

in his official capacity is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment

“has been interpreted to render states—and, by extension, state agencies and departments and

officials when the state is the real party in interest—generally immune from suit by private parties

in federal court.” Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, New Jersey state agencies “established in the Executive

Branch of State Government” qualify for Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, “regardless

4 Although Plaintiff has failed to properly plead a claim for declaratory relief, this Court also “concurs with other

courts throughout the District of New Jersey and finds that Chief Judge Wolfson’s standing orders, issued in response

to the COVID-19 pandemic” are “supported by detailed findings, and provide[ ] a sound factual and legal basis that

any delays are supported by the ends of justice, consistent with the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment.”

United States v. Hafner, No. 19-790, 2021 WL 1873560, at *3 (D.N.J. May 10, 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (citing United States v. Kaetz, 2021 WL 37925, at *8 n.8 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2021); United States v. Chu, No. 19-

678, 2021 WL 879905, at *4). Chief Judge Wolfson conducted an appropriate balancing test under the Speedy Trial

Act. See Standing Order 21-04. “The Chief Judge specifically acknowledged the importance of the right to a speedy

and public trial and balanced the interests of defendants and the public in that right against the compelling public

health and safety issues arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic.” Hafner, 2021 WL 1873560, at *3; Chu, 2021 WL

879905, at *3.

of the relief sought,” unless an exception to the immunity rule applies. See Rhett v. Evans, 576 F.

App’x 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). Those exceptions apply when: (1)

Congress abrogates the immunity, (2) a state waives immunity, or (3) when a plaintiff sues

individual state officers for prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law. See MCI

Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001).

Governor Murphy is a state official who is being sued in his official capacity. (ECF No.

1, at 3 ¶ 6.) Thus, Governor Murphy is entitled to sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s claim for

monetary damages. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Governor Murphy

for monetary damages with prejudice. See Kaul v. Christie, 372 F. Supp. 3d 206, 243 (D.N.J.

2019).

B. Federal Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff indicates that he is also raising a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim. (ECF

No. 1, at 19.) “The FTCA waives the federal government’s sovereign immunity with respect to

tort claims for money damages.” Baer v. United States, 722 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). “‘[T]he FTCA does not itself create a substantive cause of action against

the United States; rather, it provides a mechanism for bringing a state law tort action against the

federal government in federal court.’” Lomando v. United States, 667 F.3d 363, 372 (3d Cir. 2011)

(quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.3d 344, 362 (3d Cir. 2001)); see

also CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The cause of action in an FTCA

claim ... must come from state tort law.”). “[A]s part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act . . .

section 1346(b)(2) of the FTCA precludes inmate tort actions against the United States for ‘mental

or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the

commission of a sexual act,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2).” West v. United States, 729 F. App’x 145,

148–49 (3d Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (May 9, 2018) (per curiam).

A plaintiff suing under the FTCA must present the offending agency with notice of the

claim, including a “sum certain” demand for monetary damages. See White–Squire, 592 F.3d at

457. “Because the requirements of presentation and a demand for a sum certain are among the

terms defining the United States[’] consent to be sued, they are jurisdictional.” Id. An agency’s

final denial of the tort claim is a jurisdictional requirement. Lightfoot v. United States, 564 F.3d

625, 627 (3d Cir. 2009). These requirements cannot be waived. See, e.g., White–Squire, 592 F.3d

at 457. In other words, if a plaintiff has not complied with the FTCA’s pleading requirements, “a

district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.” Hardie v. United States, 501 F.

Supp. 3d 152, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d, No. 21-106, 2021 WL 4427852 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2021);

see also Washington v. Thomas, No. 16-0992, 2017 WL 36272, at *3 n.3 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2017);

Hoffenberg v. United States, No. 10-2788, 2012 WL 379934, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2012).

Here, the Complaint fails to make any reference to a notice of tort claim, a demand for sum

certain, or that Plaintiff has otherwise exhausted his FTCA claim. Accordingly, the Court will

dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s FTCA claim against the United States “for failure to

sufficiently allege the jurisdictional basis” for his claim. Hoffenberg, 2012 WL 379934, at *4.

C. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff appears to claim that Defendants Governor Murphy, Essex County, Director Ortiz,

Warden Cirillo, and CFG Medical Services are liable as supervisors. Plaintiff fails to plead

sufficient facts to indicate Defendants Governor Murphy, Essex County, Warden Cirillo, and CFG

Medical Services had personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. Plaintiff only alleges that

Director Ortiz issued that “Twenty Fifth Amended Declaration.”

Defendants in a § 1983 case may not be held liable solely based on a respondeat superior

theory of liability premised on their vicarious responsibility for the actions of their subordinates.

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988).

Rather, a “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Generally, a plaintiff seeking to name supervisors as

defendants must show each supervisor’s participation in the alleged wrongs by pleading either that

the supervisor’s “establishment of policies, practices or customs . . . directly caused the

constitutional violation[,] personal liability based on the supervisor participating in the violation

of [the p]laintiff’s right, [that the supervisor] direct[ed] others to violate [the p]laintiff’s rights, or

[that the supervisor had actual] knowledge of and acquiesc[ed] to a subordinate’s conduct.” Doe

v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 14-5284, 2015 WL 3448233, at *9 (D.N.J. May 29, 2015)

(quoting Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316-20 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other

grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015)); see also Tenon v. Dreibelbis, 606 Fed. App’x. 681, 688 (3d Cir.

2015) (§ 1983 Plaintiff pleading supervisory liability must establish defendant’s “participation [in

the alleged wrong], or actual knowledge and acquiescence, to be liable”).

In the case of a municipal defendant or outside contractor, such as Defendants Essex

County and CFG Medical Services, a plaintiff must plead that the municipality or contractor

adopted a policy, practice, or custom that was ultimately responsible for the alleged violation. See,

e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). A municipal or corporate

policy, practice, or custom must therefore be the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional

violation for a plaintiff to successfully plead a plausible claim for relief as to such a defendant.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); see also Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562

U.S. 29, 35-36 (2010).

In the instant matter, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a plausible claim

that Defendants Governor Murphy, Essex County, Warden Cirillo and CFG Medical Services were

personally involved in actions that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff makes a

single brief reference to unspecified policies and customs. (ECF No. 1, at 23.) Plaintiff fails to

explain what policies he is referring to or how they violated any of his personal rights. Plaintiff

also submits that Governor Murphy issued “Covid-19 emergency orders.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff,

however, fails to identify which order he is challenging, how it violated his constitutional rights,

or how Plaintiff himself, as opposed to a generalized class of persons, was harmed. Defendants

Governor Murphy, Essex County, Warden Cirillo and CFG Medical Services are not liable simply

for being superiors, as government officials are not liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff’s

unsupported conclusory allegations do not sufficiently plead a cognizable claim for relief against

these Defendants. Kaplan v. Holder, No. 14-1740, 2015 WL 1268203, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 18,

2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Governor

Murphy, Essex County, Warden Cirillo and CFG Medical Services are dismissed without

prejudice.

While Plaintiff appears to claim that Director Ortiz is liable for the issuance of the “Twenty

Fifth Amended Declaration,” Plaintiff fails to allege that this declaration personally violated his

constitutional rights, as opposed to a generalized class of persons. To have standing to sue, “a

plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct

and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Booth v. King, 346 F.Supp.2d 751 (E.D.Pa.

2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). Because a plaintiff has standing only

where he has personally experienced past or imminent “actual injury,” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 351 (1996), a prisoner cannot raise claims on behalf of others or to bring general allegations

about prison conditions. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013) (“To have standing,

a litigant must seek relief for an injury that affects him in a ‘personal and individual way.’”).

Although Plaintiff’s Complaint is extensive, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that any

unconstitutional conditions caused his injury. Plaintiff cites only generally to the conditions at the

Essex County Correctional Facility. Plaintiff does not allege he was denied access to his attorney,

that he was denied family visitation, that he received inadequate medical care, or that his own

conditions of confinement were so deplorable as to establish a constitutional violation. Because

Plaintiff has failed to allege any actual personal injury, he fails to state a claim on which relief can

be granted against Defendant Director Ortiz. Accordingly, any claims against Defendant Ortiz are

dismissed without prejudice.

C. Group Pleadings

Plaintiff raises various claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and the Administrative

Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff raises claims regarding

prison conditions, such as a lack of access to dental care, limited access to medical services, limited

access to counsel, isolation and lack of family visits. (ECF No. 1, at 14-17.) Plaintiff also alleges

that Defendants conspired to deny him of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff fails to

delineate which Defendants are responsible for which action, aside from citing to the “Twenty

Fifth Amended Declaration of Alfaro Ortiz.” However, Plaintiff asserts these claims against all

Defendants. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants in general are responsible for these wrongs.

This type of pleading against “defendants” collectively leaves defendants unable to discern

which allegations apply to any of them individually. This group pleading is prohibited. Galicki

v. New Jersey, No. 14-169, 2015 WL 3970297 at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015) (citing Aruanno v.

Main, 467 F. App’x 134, 137–38 (3d Cir.2012) (dismissal of § 1983 action was appropriate where

Defendants were collectively sued as “[government] personnel” and failed to allege the personal

involvement of the individual Defendants)). A plaintiff must allege facts that “establish each

individual [d]efendant’s liability for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When a number of defendants

are named in a complaint, plaintiff cannot refer to all defendants “who occupied different positions

and presumably had distinct roles in the alleged misconduct” without specifying “which

defendants engaged in what wrongful conduct.” Falat v. County of Hunterdon, 2013 WL 1163751

at * 3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013) (emphasis in original). A complaint that contains “impermissibly

vague group pleading” will be dismissed. Id. at *11, 2013 WL 1163751. Without knowing exactly

what wrongful conduct that they are alleged to have engaged in, the individual Defendants have

not been given fair notice of the allegations against them. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating

that Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests”) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

Aside from Plaintiff’s allegation regarding the “Twenty Fifth Amended Declaration of

Alfaro Ortiz,” Plaintiff merely alleges that Chief Judge Wolfson issued the standing orders and

that Governor Murphy issued unspecified “Covid-19 emergency orders.” Plaintiff does not allege

any specific acts that can be attributed to a particular Defendant, nor does Plaintiff allege how he

was personally affected by Defendants actions. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff also “does

not identify the orders or state how they caused the specific rights violations he wishes to

challenge, or specify how any decisions, policies, practices, . . . caused him harm.” Hill, 2021 WL

3879101, at *4 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff’s conclusory remark that Defendants are

responsible for the alleged wrongs is not supported by the allegations in the Complaint.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s does not allege sufficient facts to support his conspiracy claim. To

state a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege some factual basis to support an agreement between

the conspirators to violate the plaintiff’s rights and concerted action by the conspirators.

Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009); Brown v. Deparlos, 492

F. App’x 211, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (“the bare allegation of an agreement is insufficient to sustain a

conspiracy claim”); Desposito v. New Jersey, No. 14-1641, 2015 WL 2131073, at *14 (D.N.J. May

5, 2015) (showing that two parties’ actions had the same result insufficient to show conspiracy,

conspiracy requires showing of actual agreement and concerted action). Plaintiff does not allege

any facts to demonstrate that there was an actual agreement or concerted action. Accordingly,

Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim for conspiracy.

Collectively, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege which claims are being raised against each

Defendant and, thus, fails to provide fair notice of the grounds on which he intends to rest his

claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Stated differently, such claims “would not provide any meaningful

opportunity for the [remaining] Defendants to decipher or answer the vague allegations levied

against them.” Johnson v. Koehler, No. 18-807, 2019 WL 1231679, at *3 (D.N.J. March 15, 2019);

see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s

claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 5 U.S.C. § 702, for failure to state a claim.

E. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

Plaintiff also raises claims against all Defendants under the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d). (ECF No. 1, at 4.) Section 1962(c)

“makes it unlawful ‘for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or

the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or

indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.’”

In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §

1962(c)). Section 1962(d) expands liability under the statute by making it “unlawful for any person

to conspire to violate [18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)].” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). To state a civil RICO claim,

a plaintiff must plausibly allege the following elements: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)

through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

“In order to have standing to litigate a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must show that she

suffered an injury to her business or property and that the injury was proximately caused by the

defendant’s racketeering activities.” Miller v. Pocono Ranch Lands Prop. Owners Ass’n Inc., 557

F. App’x 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The injury to business or property element requires

“proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest.”

Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Steele v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 36

F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir.1994)). “[I]n construing the federal RICO law, [the Third] Circuit has rejected

the argument that personal injuries qualify as RICO injuries to ‘business or property.’” Williams

v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 323 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Maio, 221 F.3d at 492.)

Here, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead a violation of the federal RICO statute. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants “acted as a criminal enterprise that is run as a business with a pattern of

illicit conduct exceeding two predicate acts that equates to fraud, corruption, violence and activity

in furtherance of human trafficking and slavery.” (ECF No. 1, at 19). Plaintiff, however, does not

plausibly plead that Defendants formed a “criminal enterprise” or what predicate acts they took

part in. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support the conclusion that he suffered

a “concrete financial loss.” The Complaint only raises allegations of constitutional violations

related to personal injury, which are not proper RICO losses. Maio, 221 F.3d at 492. Plaintiff’s

RICO claims offer only conclusory allegations, which fail to state a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s RICO claims are dismissed without prejudice.

F. Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act

The Complaint also asserts claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. The RFRA “prohibits the Federal Government from

taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes

the least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental interest.” Burnell v. Hobby Lobby

Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 690-91 (2014). RLUIPA, among other things, “allows prisoners ‘to

seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA.” Holt v.

Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 358 (2015) (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unio

Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006)). “Congress enacted RLUIPA and its sister statute, . . . RFRA

. . . ‘in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty.’” Holt, 574 U.S. at 356 (quoting

Burwell, 573 U.S. at 693). RFRA and RLUIPA are similar with claims under RLUIPA being

limited to “only land use regulations . . . and the religious rights of institutionalized persons.”

Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 2007)

(internal citations omitted).

To state a claim under either statute, “Plaintiff must allege facts that indicate that the federal

government substantially burdened a sincerely held religious belief.” See, e.g., Martinez v. United

States, No. 21-4336, 2021 WL 2224268, at *4 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021) (citing Holt, 574 U.S. at 360–

61); Gambino v. Cassano, No. 17-0830, 2021 WL 1186794, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2021). Under

the RLUIPA,

a substantial burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced to choose

between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits

otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning

one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR

2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to

substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).

Here, Plaintiff failed to adequately plead the required elements to support a RLUIPA and

RFRA claim. Plaintiff pleads no facts regarding his own religious beliefs or tenets, and instead

merely notes that certain COVID-19 jail restrictions are interfering with certain forms of worship.

(See ECF No. 1, at 12, 15-16.) While it may be possible that Plaintiff could plead a RLUIPA claim

based on the alleged restrictions, without specific allegations as to what Plaintiff’s sincerely held

religious beliefs are, he cannot plead a viable RLUIPA claim. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA and RFRA

claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice. See McClain v. United States, No. CV 21-4997

(SDW), 2021 WL 2224270, at *4 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021).

Finally, as no federal claims remain in this case, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, including any claims under

the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109,

123 (3d Cir. 2000)

G. Request for Jail Credits

In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks four extra jail credits for every day spent in detention

during the pandemic for unspecified detainees. (ECF No. 1, at 20.) Detainees may not, however,

use a civil rights complaint to “challenge the fact or length of [their] detention.” Pittman, 2021

WL 2260518, at *2. Rather, detainees must raise any claim “which would impugn or otherwise

overturn the fact or length of . . . detention . . . via a criminal motion or a habeas petition.” Id.

(citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643–

48 (1997)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for additional jail credits is dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims

against the United States, the United States Department of Justice, the United States Marshals

Service, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the claims against Chief

Judge Wolfson for monetary relief, and the claims against Governor Murphy in his official

capacity for monetary relief. The Court will dismiss the remainder of Plaintiff’s federal claims

without prejudice and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. An

appropriate Order follows.

s/ Julien X. Neals

DATED: January 20, 2022 JULIEN XAVIER NEALS

United States District Judge