The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LEWIS C. BROWN and JEROME Z. MACE,
Civil Action
Plaintiffs, No. 20-07002 (CPO)
v.
OPINION
DENNIS QUINN, et al.,
Defendants.
Appearances:
Lewis C. Brown, Savannah, GA, pro se.
Jerome Z. Mace, Egg Harbor Township, NJ, pro se.
O’HEARN, United States District Judge:
THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff, Lewis C. Brown’s Motion
for Default Judgment against Defendant, Dennis Quinn. (ECF No. 17). For the reasons set forth
herein, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion without prejudice, vacate the entry of default, and
grant an additional sixty (60) days for Plaintiff to effect proper service upon all remaining
Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e).
I. BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2020, Plaintiffs, Lewis C. Brown and Jerome Z. Mace, filed their Complaint
against Defendants, Dennis Quinn, Ryan Van Syckle and the City of Pleasantville. (ECF No. 1
“Complaint”). The Complaint alleges that Defendants arrested Brown on May 4, 2018, without
probable cause and with knowledge that he had not violated any laws. (Id. ¶ II(D)). It further
alleges that Defendants “conspired to arrest and wrongly confine” both Plaintiffs Brown and Mace
for several months. (Id.). Plaintiffs also sued the City of Pleasantville alleging it was aware of the
unconstitutional actions of its employees. (Id.). Regarding injuries, Plaintiff Brown asserts that the
months he spent in jail before the charges against him were eventually dismissed, caused him
mental anguish, stress, and loss of wages. (Id.).
Plaintiffs filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis which was granted on October
14, 2020. (ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-3, and 4). On review of the Complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) when permitting a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court sua sponte
dismissed the claims as to the City of Pleasantville and the remaining Defendants in their official
capacities; it permitted Plaintiffs to proceed with their claims for false arrest and false
imprisonment against Defendants, Quinn and Van Syckle, in their individual capacities. (ECF No.
3 “Opinion”).
A. Service of Process
The Court issued summonses as to Defendants Quinn and Van Syckle on December 2,
2020. (ECF No. 8). The docket indicates that Plaintiff Brown attempted to serve Defendant Quinn
two times.
First, the U.S. Marshals Service attempted to personally serve Defendant Quinn on
December 4, 2020. (ECF No. 10). The summons indicates that the Marshal was unable to effect
service because Defendant Quinn no longer worked at the address provided. (ECF No. 10).
Second, Plaintiff Brown attempted to use a private process server to serve Quinn on May
24, 2021. (ECF Nos. 12 and 15). The summons indicates that service was effected on “Kevin
Carnall,” and the section of the Proof of Service was completed indicating that Mr. Carnall was
designated to accept service of process of behalf of “Dennis Quinn – NJ State Police.” (ECF No.
15). The Proof of Service further states in handwriting “served at NJ State Police Headquarters,
River Road (Route 175) Trenton, NJ.” (ECF No. 15). This is the service on which Plaintiff Brown
relies upon in seeking a default judgment. (ECF No. 17).
To date, Defendant Quinn has not answered the Complaint. As a result, Plaintiff Brown
requested, and received, an entry of default by the Clerk on August 2, 2021. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff
Brown now requests that the Court issue an order directing entry of a judgement of default against
Quinn. (ECF No. 17 “Motion for Default Judgment”).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits a court to enter a default judgment against
a properly served defendant who fails to respond. “Before the Court can enter default judgment, it
must find that process was properly served on the Defendant.” Teamsters Pension Fund of Phila.
& Vicinity v. Am. Helper, Inc., 2011 WL 4729023, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2011) (citing Gold Kist,
Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985)).
“[T]he party asserting the validity of service bears the burden of proof on that issue.”
Grand Entm’t Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993). And while courts
liberally construe “the pleadings and the complaints of pro se plaintiffs . . . [they] must follow the
rules of procedure and the substantive law.” Khater v. Puzino Dairy, Inc., 2015 WL 4773125, at
*3 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2015) (quoting Thompson v. Target Stores, 501 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603 (D. Del.
2007)). There are two ways to effectuate proper service under the federal rules. First, service is
proper when it complies with “state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(e). Pursuant to New Jersey Rule 4:4–4(a)(1), service on an individual must be made:
[B]y delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally,
or by leaving a copy thereof at the individual’s dwelling place or usual place of
abode with a competent member of the household of the age of 14 or over then
residing therein, or by delivering a copy thereof to a person authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process on the individual’s behalf.
Second, service is proper when a copy of the summons and complaint are (A) delivered to
the individual personally; (B) left at the “individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with
someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there”; (C) delivered to an agent authorized by
appointment or law to receive service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
III. DISCUSSION
Upon review of the Summons and affidavit from Plaintiff Brown, the Court concludes that
Defendant Quinn was not properly served in any of the ways permitted by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(e). First, the Summons clearly indicates that Quinn was not personally served. (ECF
No. 15). Second, service of process on Carnall at what appears to be Quinn’s place of employment,
the New Jersey State Police Headquarters in Trenton, is not proper as a matter of law. Delivering
service to an employer’s office is not delivery to an individual’s dwelling place. Reddy v.
MedQuist, Inc., 2009 WL 2413673, at *4 (D.N.J. 2009) (citing Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1096, at 522 (3d ed. 2002)); Blount v. TD Bank, 2021
WL 2651760, at *6 (D.N.J. June 28, 2021) (“Courts applying New Jersey law have repeatedly
found that serving an individual not specifically authorized to accept service on behalf of a
defendant at that defendant’s place of employment is insufficient under NJ Court R. 4:4-4(a)(1).”).
Third, Plaintiff Brown has not provided any evidence and there is nothing in the record to
establish that Carnall is an eligible agent to receive process on behalf of Defendant Quinn. The
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an agency relationship existed. Dunkley v. Rutgers, 2007
WL 2033827, at *2 (D.N.J. July 11, 2007) (citing Local 617, Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, Chauffers,
Warehousmen & Helpers of Am. v. Hudson Bergen Trucking Co., 440 A.2d 18, 19–20 (N.J. App.
Div. 1981)). Two types of agents are eligible to receive process: those authorized by appointment
and those authorized by law. Local 617, 440 A.2d at 19–20 (citing James William Moore, Moore’s
Federal Practice § 4–186 to § 4–188 (2d ed. 1979)). Service upon an agent tends to be strictly
construed, requiring “an actual appointment for the specific purpose of receiving process.” Nyholm
v. Pryce, 259 F.R.D. 101, 104 (D.N.J. 2009) (quoting Dunkley, 2007 WL 2033827, at *2). “[I]n
the absence of an express agreement between the agent and principal or in the absence of
circumstances which clearly show that such an agreement was intended by the parties,
authorization to accept service of process on behalf of a corporation or an individual would not be
deemed to exist.” Local 617, 440 A.2d at 20.
For example, in James v. City of Jersey City, a plaintiff attempting to serve process on a
police officer certified that he was instructed by the Chief Officer at the police department that the
police department would accept service on behalf of the defendant officer. 187 F.R.D. 512, 514
(D.N.J. 1999). The Court found the Chief Officer’s statements to be “inapposite” and declined to
find proper service since (1) “plaintiff does not assert that a member of the [police department] is
authorized by law to accept service for any other member of the department;” and (2) “[t]here is
nothing in the record to suggest that [the defendant officer] appointed or authorized any member
of the [police department] to serve as his agent for receipt of process.” Id. at 516.
Here, service is improper for substantially the same reasons. Plaintiff Brown has provided
no argument or statutory support for the proposition that Carnall was authorized by law to receive
service of process for the New Jersey State Police or its officers such as Defendant Quinn, nor has
he provided evidence by affidavit or otherwise to suggest that there was an independent agency
relationship between Carnall and Defendant Quinn. In the absence of any facts in the record to
suggest an agency relationship for receipt of process existed, the Court cannot conclude that
Carnall was authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of Defendant Quinn.
IV. CONCLUSION
Thus, since there has not been proper service upon Defendant Quinn, Plaintiff Brown’s
Motion for Default Judgment is denied without prejudice. The Clerk will be directed to vacate the
entry of default. Finally, Plaintiff Brown will be granted leave to effectuate proper service upon
all Defendants within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order. Since it has been more than ninety
(90) days since the Complaint was filed and Plaintiff Brown has failed to properly serve Defendant
Quinn, or any other Defendant, failure to effect service will result in the dismissal of Plaintiff
Brown’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). An appropriate Order will
follow.
Date: December 7, 2021 s/ Christine P. O’Hearn
CHRISTINE P. O’HEARN, U.S.D.J.