The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
______________________________
:
JACQUAR STOKES, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civ. No. 20-3881 (NLH)(AMD)
:
v. :
:
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE : OPINION
BOARD MEMBERS, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
______________________________:
APPEARANCE:
Jacquar Stokes
824841
1001 Sterigere Street
Norristown, PA 19401-5391
Plaintiff pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se with a civil rights
complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Previously, this
Court granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status. See ECF No.
2.
At this time, this Court must review the complaint,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), to determine whether it
should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
II. BACKGROUND
The allegations of the complaint are construed as true for
purposes of this screening opinion. Plaintiff names numerous
Defendants in this action; they are as follows:
1. New Jersey State Parole Board Members
2. Samuel J. Plummeri – Chairman State Parole Board
3. Sgt. Tania Larkin – District Parole Supervisor
4. Barry Volkert, Jr.
5. Masseroni
6. Whittaker
7. Niederer
8. Scott
9. Dzurkoc
10. Healy
11. Taurino
11. Unnamed Officers from the United States Marshals Service
12. Juanita Cherry – Parole Officer
13. Ronald Cathel III – Parole Hearing Officer
14. Gregory L. Embley – Chief of Parole Revocation Unit
15. Carla M. Shabazz – Assistant Supervisor Revocation Unit
16. L.A. Dewitt – Technical Assistant
17. John Powell – Administrator South Woods State Prison
At the time Plaintiff filed this action, he was
incarcerated at the New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, New
Jersey.1 Plaintiff challenges the circumstances leading to his
arrest on a parole warrant as well as his subsequent parole
revocation. Plaintiff states on June 9, 2018, he “maxed out”
1 Plaintiff’s most recent notice of address change indicates he
is no longer incarcerated at a New Jersey state correctional
facility. See ECF No. 9.
and was released from South Woods State Prison. See ECF No. 1
at 9. On November 19, 2019, Defendants Plummeri and Larkin
issued a state parole warrant, but neither Defendant signed it.
See id.
On November 27, 2019, New Jersey State Parole Officers and
United States Marshals, which included Defendants Volkert, Jr.
Masseroni, Whittaker, Niederer, Scott, Dzurkoc, Healy, Taurino
as well as unnamed members of the United States Marshals
Service, took Plaintiff into custody based on this warrant.
Plaintiff states he was extracted at gunpoint, transported
across state lines from Pennsylvania to New Jersey and then
initially housed at the Burlington County Jail. See id.
Plaintiff appeared on December 24, 2019, before Defendant
Cathel III for a preliminary hearing. Defendant Cherry
testified at that hearing and conceded the parole warrant lacked
signatures. She though could not comment on other areas such as
Plaintiff’s claim he was required to remain on release status in
the community. Defendant Cathel though recommended Plaintiff
remain in custody as Cathel did not find Plaintiff’s testimony
credible. See id.
On January 14, 2020, Defendant Dewitt gave Plaintiff a new
indictment which purportedly falsely claimed Plaintiff had a new
sentence which began on November 27, 2019, or the day Plaintiff
was taken into custody on the parole warrant. Plaintiff
explains this new indictment did not come from a grand jury or a
judge. See id.
On January 16, 2020, Plaintiff contacted Defendant Embley
about this issue. Defendant Shabazz responded to Plaintiff’s
inquiry that the matter would be forwarded to South Woods State
Prison Administrator Powell for review. See id. at 10.
Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were violated
when he was kidnapped and transported across state lines with a
fraudulent indictment. He further claims he was
administratively tagged as a parolee and incarcerated at a
“staged” quasi-judicial hearing. See id. Thus, Plaintiff is
challenging both the underlying parole revocation arrest and
subsequent hearing that placed him back in New Jersey state
prison.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. He also
seeks declaratory relief in the form of an apology from the New
Jersey State Parole Board as well as a “statement that it is
illegal to place defendants who max out . . . back in prison”
and a definition of his release status in the community. See
id. at 11.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”),
district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte
dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure
to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.
App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as explicated by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the
court's screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint
must allege ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim
is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro
se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of constitutional rights. Section
1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police
Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see
also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
IV. DISCUSSION
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States
Supreme Court limited a § 1983 plaintiff's right to recover for
certain causes of action if the plaintiff has been convicted on
charges directly related to the § 1983 claim. Heck restricts a
plaintiff's ability to recover damages for an “allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. To recover
damages in such a case, a plaintiff “must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.” Id. at 486–87. Accordingly, when a prisoner seeks
damages in a civil suit, “the district court must consider
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,
the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.” Id. at 487. Heck also applies to a § 1983 action
that would imply the invalidity of a decision to revoke parole
that has not already been invalidated, including where a
plaintiff seeks declaratory relief. See, e.g., McKinney v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 405 F. App'x 646, 647–48 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d
Cir. 2006)) (District Court properly dismissed complaint seeking
monetary and declaratory relief under Heck because success on
his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state
confinement on parole revocation which had not been invalidated
elsewhere).
Based on these principles, a judgment in Plaintiff's favor
in this case “‘would completely erode the basis for his
[revocation of parole], implying that the [revocation] was
invalid.’” Griffith v. Traendly, No. 19-15669, 2021 WL 912897,
at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2021) (quoting Robinson v. New Jersey
State Police, No. 11-06070, 2012 WL 5944298, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov.
27, 2012)); see also Connolly v. Arroyo, 293 F. App'x 175, 177–
78 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The duration of Connolly's confinement after
he was arrested on the parole violator warrant has never been
reversed on direct appeal, declared invalid by a state tribunal,
or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, and he, therefore, has not satisfied Heck's
favorable termination rule.”); Deslonde v. State of New Jersey,
No. 09-3446, 2010 WL 3167777, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2010)
(plaintiff’s claim seeking damages for unlawful detention based
on parole warrant falsified by defendant barred by Heck absent
proof underlying conviction was invalided). Therefore, Heck
bars Plaintiff’s claims.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.2 An appropriate order will be
entered.
Dated: _September 27, 2021 ___s/ Noel L. Hillman _____
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
2 Given that any amendment would be futile considering the Heck
bar to Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff shall not have leave to
file an amended complaint at this time. See McKinney, 405 F.
App’x at 648 (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).