HILL v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

_________________________________________

RONDELL HILL, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civ. No. 21-03872 (KM)

:

v. :

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., : OPINION

:

Defendants. :

_________________________________________ :

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Rondell Hill, a pretrial detainee at Essex County Correctional Facility

(ECCF), originally filed a complaint against the United States on March 8, 2021, alleging

various civil rights violations related to restrictions imposed during the Covid-19 pandemic. (DE

1.) I previously granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status and leave to file an amended

complaint. (DE 5.) Plaintiff has now filed an amended complaint adding various defendants:

federal (the Marshal’s Service, this Court, Chief Judge Wolfson, the Department of Justice), and

state (Governor Murphy, Essex County, Director Ortiz, Warden Cirillo), plus a state contractor

(CFG Medical Services). (DE 7.) Plaintiff also requests class certification, appointment of pro

bono counsel, and injunctive relief.

Having screened the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), I will

dismiss it for the following reasons.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66

to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil

actions in which a plaintiff is proceeding IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The PLRA directs

district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)

(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),

as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court's

screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege ‘sufficient factual matter’ to

show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted).

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of

constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in

any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege first, the violation of

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged

deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v.

Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is the

federal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Walker v. Zenk, 323 Fed.Appx. 144, 145 n.1 (3d

Cir. 2009) (citing Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004)). To state a claim under

Bivens, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States; and (2) that the deprivation of the right was caused by a person acting under

color of federal law. See Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing that

Bivens created a right against federal officials parallel to Section 1983’s right to assert a claim

against state officials); see also Collins v. F.B.I, No. 10-3470, 2011 WL 1627025, at *6 (D.N.J.

Apr. 28, 2011) (“The Third Circuit has recognized that Bivens actions are simply the federal

counterpart to § 1983 claims brought against state officials and thus the analysis established

under one type of claim is applicable under the other.”).

III. DISCUSSION

The amended complaint, like the initial complaint, asserts civil rights claims against the

United States. The United States, however, is not subject to suit for constitutional torts,

including these civil rights claims, and is entitled to absolute sovereign immunity in this matter.

See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476-77, 484-85 (1994) (the United States is immune

from suit for constitutional torts, and Bivens provides no cause of action against the United States

or its agencies); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687 (1949)

(sovereign immunity bars suit against the United States either for damages or for injunctive relief

requiring government action); United States v. Rural Elec. Convenience Co-op. Co., 922 F.2d

429, 434 (7th Cir. 1991) (sovereign immunity bars suits seeking damages or coercive injunctive

relief); Scott v. Manenti, No. 15-7213, 2016 WL 80640, at *1 n. 2 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2016).

Plaintiff’s civil rights claims against the United States must therefore be dismissed.

Likewise, many of the other named Defendants are also immune from suit. Federal

departments and agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the United States Marshals

Service, are immune from suit in civil rights matters. See, e.g., Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148,

158-59 (3d Cir. 1998) (federal governmental entities are not “persons” subject to suit in a federal

civil rights matter); see also Gary v. Gardner, 445 F. App’x 466-67 (3d Cir. 2011) (“the United

States Marshals Service is entitled to sovereign immunity from suit” absent an explicit waiver of

sovereign immunity). Chief Judge Wolfson is joined based on her issuance of the standing

orders Plaintiff opposes. Those orders were clearly issued in a judicial rather than administrative

capacity, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, and Judge Wolfson is therefore

absolutely immune from suit in this civil rights matter. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208

F.3d 435, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2000) (“judges . . . are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts,

even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done

maliciously or corruptly”). Th United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sued as

an entity, is likewise entitled to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States Dist. Ct.

of Rhode Island, No. 18-778, 2019 WL 1301727, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 21, 2019). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims against the United States, Judge Wolfson, this Court, the United States

Marshals Service, and the United States Department of Justice are dismissed.

Plaintiff also contends that this Court’s standing order violated his speedy trial rights and

challenges the pre-trial conditions of confinement, including “severe isolation,” lack of family

and attorney visitation, and limited medical care. (DE 7 at 14-16.) Plaintiff poorly delineates

which Defendants committed which alleged violations; he states only that Judge Wolfson issued

the standing order he believes violated his speedy trial rights, that Governor Murphy issued

“Covid-19 emergency orders that were used by defendants to deprive plaintiff of constitutional

rights,” that this Court and the United States employ some of the defendants and should be

responsible as such, that Director Ortiz issued unspecified “emergency declarations,” and that all

of the Defendants other than this Court, Governor Murphy, and the United States, “conspired” to

deprive him of his rights. (Id. at 6-7).

As discussed herein, Plaintiff does not, for the most part, specify which Defendants

committed which violation, or support his allegations of conspiracy with factual allegations.

Perhaps most problematically, Plaintiff does not specify how his own rights were violated, as

opposed to making general allegations of restrictive conditions of confinement imposed on

detainees in general. (Id. at 6-28). 1

As to the remaining named Defendants – Governor Murphy, Essex County, Director

Ortiz, Warden Cirillo, and CFG Medical Services – Plaintiff fails to plead adequate facts which

1 Numerous federal detainees have filed the same form complaint, which differs only in the

name and docket number assigned. In this case, as in others, Plaintiff seeks to have his claims

proceed on a class action basis. Still, a class representative must possess a claim on his own

account.

would indicate personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. A defendant in a federal civil rights

matter may not be held liable based solely on his role as a supervisor. To be held liable, such a

supervisor must have had “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.” Rode v. Dellarciprete,

845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (civil rights defendants

may not be held liable under respondeat superior theory of liability). Thus a plaintiff must

generally plead facts showing either the supervisory defendant’s “participation [in the alleged

wrong], or . . . actual knowledge and acquiescence [in his subordinate’s wrongdoing].” Tenon v.

Dreibelbis, 606 F. App’x 681, 688 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766

F.3d 307, 316-20 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015); Wilcox v.

Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that liability will lie under § 1983 only

“where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally” in the violation of

plaintiff's rights and affirming dismissal of claim where plaintiff did not allege personal

involvement by defendant) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)).

In the case of a municipal defendant or outside contractor, such as Defendants Essex

County and CFG Medical Services, a plaintiff must instead plead that the municipality or

contractor adopted a policy, practice, or custom which was ultimately responsible for the alleged

violation. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). A municipal

or corporate policy, practice, or custom must therefore be the “moving force” behind the alleged

constitutional violation for a plaintiff to successfully plead a plausible claim for relief as to such

a defendant. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); see also Los Angeles Cnty. v.

Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35-36 (2010).

Here, Plaintiff does not plead Defendants’ specific acts, other than to note that Governor

Murphy issued certain unspecified emergency orders (presumably those related to COVID-19),

and that Director Ortiz issued unspecified “emergency declarations.”2 (DE 5 at 7). Plaintiff

does not identify the orders he challenges, state how they caused the specific rights violations he

wishes to challenge, or specify how any decisions, policies, practices, or other actions by

Defendants caused him harm. For example, throughout the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff refers

2 In his argument in support of his complaint, Plaintiff excerpts these declarations without proper

context regarding who enacted the policies in question, including whether Ortiz himself adopted

the challenged policies, what the policies truly are, or how they have been specifically applied to

Plaintiff. (See DE 5 at 21-24). Without specificity, these snippets are insufficient to state a claim

for relief as to Defendant Ortiz.

to general conditions, like a complete lack of access to any dental visits and limited access to

other medical services, but does not establish his own need for (and deprivation of) access to

those services (DE 7 at 17.) Indeed, several allegations in the Amended Complaint refer to a

different facility entirely. (See, e.g. DE 7 at 15 (alleging that lack of family visitation caused

Monmouth County Jail detainee to die by suicide.)) Plaintiff has therefore failed to plead a

cognizable claim for relief based on civil rights violations as to any of the remaining Defendants,

and Plaintiff’s claims against them must therefore be dismissed.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s bald assertion of a “conspiracy” among the Defendants to deny him

his rights does not preserve his complaint. A plaintiff who seeks to plead a conspiracy cannot

rest on bare accusations, but must instead plead facts showing actual agreement between the

alleged conspirators and concerted action towards the object of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Startzell

v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008); Epshteyn, 608 F. App’x at 93; Brown

v. Deparlos, 492 F. App’x 211, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (“the bare allegation of an agreement is

insufficient to sustain a conspiracy claim”); Desposito v. New Jersey, No. 14-1641, 2015 WL

2131073, at *14 (D.N.J. May 5, 2015) (showing that two parties’ actions had the same result is

insufficient to show conspiracy, which requires a showing of actual agreement and concerted

action). As Plaintiff has failed to plead facts giving rise to a plausible inference of actual

agreement or concerted action, he has failed to plead a conspiracy. Any claims based on alleged

conspiracy will therefore be dismissed without prejudice against the remaining, non-immune

Defendants.

In addition to standard civil rights claims, Plaintiff alleges claims under two other federal

statutes – the federal Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statute,

18 U.S.C. § 1962, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42.

U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. To the extent Plaintiff asserts Civil RICO claims, he has failed to allege

many of the elements of such a claim – particularly, the essential elements of conduct of an

enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. See, e.g., Parness v. Christie, No. 15-3505,

2015 WL 4997430, at *6-8 (D.N.J. August 19, 2015). He has likewise failed to plead cognizable

RICO losses – civil RICO may only be used to recover “concrete financial loss” in the form of

an injury to property or business; personal injury or emotional harm are not proper bases for a

RICO claim. Id.; see also Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000); Magnum v.

Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 253 F. App’x 224, 227 (3d Cir. 2007). All of Plaintiff’s claims

allege constitutional violations related to personal injury, including prolonged pre-trial detention,

and are unrelated to the kind of losses addressed by RICO. The RICO claim is therefore

dismissed.

Likewise, the complaint fails to state a claim under RLUIPA. To state a claim under that

statute, Plaintiff must plead facts showing that Defendants burdened his personal sincerely held

religious beliefs and exercise thereof. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360-61 (2015);

Farnsworth v. Davis, No. 7:20-CV-00264, 2020 WL 4017848, at *3 (W.D. Va. July 16, 2020)

(dismissing RLUIPA claim where plaintiff claimed he was barred from church services but did

not indicate his religion or beliefs, including any allegation that attendance at services at some

regular interval is a precept of his religion).

Again, Plaintiff’s lack of specific allegations undermines the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff pleads no facts regarding his own religious beliefs or tenets, or any interference with his

form of worship. Instead he merely notes generally that certain jail restrictions have hindered

certain forms of worship. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice.3

Finally, Plaintiff asserts a speedy trial claim, and seeks jail time credit as a remedy. A

civil rights claim, however, may not be used to challenge the fact or length of a prisoner’s

detention. Any claim challenging the fact or length of a prisoner’s detention must be raised either

via a motion in the criminal case or a habeas corpus petition. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544

U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“a . . . prisoner’s [civil rights] action is barred (absent prior invalidation

[of his period of detention]) – no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter

the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal [disciplinary]

proceedings) – if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the

confinement or its duration”); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-48 (1997) (award or

restoration of additional jail credits in civil rights action would impugn validity of length of

detention); see, e.g. United States v. Smith, 460 F. Supp. 3d 981, 983 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (analyzing

Speedy Trial Act factors in Covid-19 context). Plaintiff alleges that he is a pre-trial detainee, and

courts in this Circuit generally decline to exercise pre-trial habeas jurisdiction. A speedy trial

challenge to detention or to seek additional jail credits towards a sentence are therefore most

appropriately made through a motion filed in the underlying criminal case. See, e.g., Reese v.

3 Because Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is clearly deficient, this Court need not, and does not at this

time address whether any named Defendant is a proper RLUIPA defendant.

Warden Philadelphia FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2018) (pre-trial detainee may not

resort to habeas petition and must instead seek pre-trial relief through the filing of a criminal

motion).

Finally, Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA),

N.J.S.A. 10:6-2. I will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c). Such a dismissal is appropriate where, as here, the only federal claim is no

longer viable, the case has not progressed substantially, and no particular prejudice will result.

Robert W. Mauthe, M.D., P.C. v. Optum Inc., 925 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2019); see also Bringa

v. Roque, Civ. No. 13-3296, 2015 WL 857884, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2015) (“the court may,

within its discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state-law

claims”).4

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the claims in the Amended Complaint against the United States,

this Court, United States Department of Justice, United States Marshals Service, and Judge

Wolfson are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, because the court finds that their defects

would not be remedied by further amendment. The claims against the remaining Defendants are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s applications for the appointment of

counsel, injunctive relief, and class certification are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

because no claims remain. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: August 30, 2021

/s/ Kevin McNulty

______________________________

KEVIN MCNULTY

United States District Judge

4 Moreover, because the NJCRA is interpreted analogously to Section 1983 claims, the

NJCRA claims would also be dismissed for the same reasons as the 1983 claims: there are

insufficient facts alleged detailing state Defendants’ specific actions and their impact upon

Plaintiff. Szemple v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 493 Fed. App’x. 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2012)

(“NJCRA is interpreted as analogous to § 1983.”)