The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
:
FREDERICK NAHAS, M.D., :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil No. 13-06537 (RBK/JS)
:
v. : OPINION
:
SHORE MEDICAL CENTER, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:
:
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 273)
and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 276). For the
reasons expressed herein, the Motion for Sanctions is DENIED and the Motion for Leave to File
Notice of Supplemental Authority is accordingly DENIED AS MOOT.
I. BACKGROUND
This case, which has stretched over a decade in multiple courts, arises from Defendant
Shore Medical Center’s denial of surgical admitting privileges to Dr. Nahas, the Plaintiff. A
comprehensive history of Plaintiff’s case has been previously laid out in the Court’s prior opinions,
namely the Opinion granting Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (See Doc. 249.)
As such, the Court does not restate the procedural history here. Rather, the Court sets forth only
the relevant facts for disposition of the currently pending motions.
On September 24, 2019, this Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 250.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims and then declined to exercise
supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. (Doc. 250.) After
prevailing on summary judgment, Defendants moved for sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1927, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and the Court’s inherent authority. (Doc. 273,
“Mot.”) Defendants request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs for the efforts performed from
the time of Plaintiff’s deposition through the Court’s issuance of its ruling on the motions for
summary judgment. (Mot. at 7.) Defendants allege that they have incurred $311,009.00 in
attorneys’ fees and $28,940.80 in costs since Plaintiff’s depositions. (Mot. at 7.) Plaintiff opposed
the motion (Doc. 274, “Opp.”), and Defendants replied (Doc. 275 (“Reply”). Plaintiff then filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Supplemental Authority seeking to supplement the record
with additional case law. (Doc. 276.)
II. Legal Standard
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Defendants first move for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under this statute, “[a]ny
attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” “It . . . [is] well settled in the Third Circuit that 28
U.S.C. § 1927 requires a finding of four elements for the imposition of sanctions: [the offending
attorney] ‘(1) multiplied proceedings; (2) unreasonably and vexatiously; (3) thereby increasing the
cost of the proceedings; (4) with bad faith or with intentional misconduct.’” In re Beers, 399 F.
App’x 748, 749 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing LaSalle Nat. Bank v. First Conn. Holding Group, LLC, 287
F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2002)).
“[A] finding of willful bad faith on the part of the offending lawyer is a prerequisite for
imposing attorney’s fees under this provision.” Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 242 (3d
Cir. 1991) (citing Ford v. Temple Hosp., 790 F.2d 342, 347 (3d Cir. 1986)). That is, “sanctions
may not be imposed under § 1927 absent a finding that counsel’s conduct resulted from bad faith,
rather than misunderstanding, bad judgment, or well-intentioned zeal.” LaSalle, 287 F.3d at 289.
“Bad faith should not be lightly inferred, and counsel should be given significant leeway to pursue
arguments on a client’s behalf.” Lewis v. Smith, 480 F. App’x 696, 699 (3d Cir. 2012). Sanctions
pursuant to § 1927 are intended to deter an attorney from intentionally and unnecessarily delaying
judicial proceedings, and they are limited to the costs that result from such delay. See Zuk v. E.
Penn. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. College of Pa., 103 F.3d 294 297 (3d Cir. 1996).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
Defendants next move for Rule 11 sanctions. Rule 11(b) provides that “[b]y presenting to
the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper” an attorney certifies that it is “not being
presented for any improper purpose,” “the claims are warranted,” and “the factual contentions have
evidentiary support.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11(c)(1) states that “if, after notice and a reasonable
opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may
impose an appropriate sanction on any . . . party that violated the rule or is responsible for the
violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).
Sanctions awarded under this rule “are warranted only in the exceptional circumstances
where a claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or frivolous.” Goldenberg v. Indel, Inc., No.
09–5203, 2011 WL 1134454, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2011) (citing Watson v. City of Salem, 934 F.
Supp. 643, 662 (D.N.J. 1995); see also Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857
F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988)). Indeed, the Third Circuit has recognized that Rule 11 sanctions
should only be imposed in those rare instances where the evident frivolousness of a claim or motion
amounts to an “abuse[ ] of the legal system.” Id.
A Rule 11 motion alleging that a party has violated subsection (b) of the rule must be filed
as a separate pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (“A motion for sanctions must be made
separately from any other motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates
Rule 11(b)”). Further, before addressing the merits of a party’s Rule 11 motion, the Court must
determine whether the party complied with the “safe harbor” provision of Rule 11(c)(2). Under
that provision, a party cannot file a motion for sanctions until it first presents the motion to the
offending party and allows 21 days for the other party to withdraw or correct the challenged issue.
In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for sanctions under both 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. The Court addresses each in turn.
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Sanctions
Defendants first move for § 1927 sanctions. Defendants contend that “Plaintiff’s approach
to litigation has unnecessarily multiplied the proceedings in this matter, forcing repeated
conferences and unnecessary motions.” (Mot. at 9–10.) In particular, Defendants argue that
sanctions are warranted because Defendants incurred “significant expense” in “opposing
Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment,” “moving for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims,” and responding to “motions to seal[.]” (Mot. at 10.) Defendants highlight several instances
of Plaintiff’s conduct that they perceive as warranting sanctions. For example, Defendants cite to
Plaintiff’s prior filing of a lengthy counterstatement of material facts. Defendants also assert that
the Third Circuit’s affirmance of this Court’s decision granting summary judgment shows the
frivolousness of Plaintiff’s claims.
While the Court acknowledges Defendants’ frustrations, the Court does not find that this
is an appropriate case to impose sanctions pursuant to § 1927. Defendants’ arguments essentially
rely on the proposition that because the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims via summary judgment,
Plaintiff was unreasonable and vexatious in pursuing these claims. However, as other courts in this
Circuit have held, disagreement over the resolution of a legal matter in litigation is not a ground
for sanctions. TEGG Corp. v. Beckstrom Elec. Co., No. CIV.A. 08-435, 2008 WL 5216169, at *5
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2008). The Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims does not—on its own—
establish that Plaintiff pursued these claims vexatiously, with bad faith or with ill-intention.
Defendants have not provided any evidence that Plaintiff did act in bad faith. Without such
evidence, Defendants cannot meet the high burden that § 1927 imposes. Moreover, as the Third
Circuit has noted, courts are cautioned to sparingly award sanctions in all but the most egregious
of cases, “lest the prospect thereof chill the ardor of proper and forceful advocacy on behalf of
[the] client.” Hackman, 932 F.2d at 242 (quotations omitted). A weak case, as long as it is arguable,
does not merit sanctions. Id. Because Plaintiff’s arguments were grounded in arguable
propositions, this Court DENIES Defendants’ sanctions request under § 1927.
B. Rule 11 Sanctions
Defendants next move for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
Defendants contend that Rule 11 sanctions are warranted here because Plaintiff’s claims were not
legally viable. (Mot. at 20.) Defendants assert that “[f]orcing Defendants to engage in dispositive
motion practice and to respond to repeated, procedurally improper motions to seal was wholly
improper.” (Mot. at 21.) Therefore, Defendants aver that “Rule 11 sanctions in the form of
attorneys’ fees are appropriate.” (Mot. at 21.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not violated Rule 11(b). Much like Defendants’
arguments for § 1927 sanctions, Defendants’ arguments for Rule 11 sanctions are premised on the
fact that the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. However, the Third Circuit
has made clear that Rule 11 “must not be used as an automatic penalty against an attorney or a
party advocating the losing side of a dispute.” Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d
Cir.1987). As such, sanctions under Rule 11 are not warranted merely because the Court granted
judgment in favor of Defendants on some of Plaintiff’s claims. Moreover, the filings between
Plaintiffs and Defendants do not strike the Court as evidencing anything more than the familiar
back and forth about disputed issues of material fact attendant to most adversarial proceedings.
These filings do not rise to the level of “patently unmeritorious claims” that call for Rule 11
sanctions. While it is true that the Court has, on several occasions, marked the factual and legal
deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claims, the Court does not believe that Plaintiff’s arguments rise to the
level of “unmeritorious” that would justify sanctions. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Defendants’ request for Rule 11 sanctions.1
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons contained herein, Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 273) is
DENIED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 276)
is DENIED AS MOOT.
Dated: 7/20/2021 /s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
1 Defendants also request sanctions pursuant to the “inherent authority of the Court.” (Mot. at 22.) However,
as the Court has articulated above, the Court does not believe that this is an appropriate case for sanctions.
Accordingly, this request is similarly denied.